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 Abstract 
 
 
Ghana’s economic and political past and present show that foreign aid has 
provided support for infrastructural development, budget financing, macro-
economic policy reforms, institutional restructuring and political reforms. 
Existing literature and pronouncements by leading aid advocates and devel-
opment practitioners also indicate that aid is a potential catalyst to devel-
opment. Using the case of Ghana’s trajectory of economic and political 
transformation from 1957 to 2013 (categorised into three phases), the thesis 
postulates that aid can be a catalyst to development in so far as endogenous 
drivers in the recipient country are predisposed to react positively to it; oth-
erwise there are little returns to development.  
The study metaphorically applies five attributes of a catalyst from indus-
trial chemistry, and three analytical approaches, including process-tracing, to 
construct a chain of causal mechanisms and effects between foreign aid and 
Ghana’s endogenous resources, institutions, structures and actors. Inferring 
from the outcomes of Ghana’s transformation, the thesis shows that foreign 
aid was least catalytic to economic and political transformation in phase I 
(1957–82); most catalytic in phase II (1983–92) and largely ineffectual in 
phase III (1993–2013) especially the later part of that period.  
Reflecting on the findings of the case study to draw larger theoretical and 
policy implications, the thesis suggests that aid can be a catalyst to develop-
ment when (i) a substantial part of it is invested in the recipient’s economi-
cally productive sectors with the objective of promoting structural trans-
formation; (ii) the recipient country’s political settlement is led by a 
dominant political party with visionary and disciplinary leadership; (iii) the 
recipient country has exportable value-added products; and (iv) a profes-
sional and technocratic bureaucracy. The findings imply that long-term eco-
nomic transformation and a best-fit political system should become an im-
portant goal to be facilitated through aid in developing countries. 
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Hulp als katalysator voor ontwikkeling? Ghana’s politieke en 
economische transformatie (1957-2013) als casestudy 
 Samenvatting 
 
 
In Ghana’s economische en politieke heden en verleden heeft buitenlandse 
hulp steeds bijgedragen aan infrastructurele ontwikkeling, financiering van 
de begroting, macro-economische beleidshervormingen, institutionele her-
structurering en politieke hervormingen. De bestaande literatuur en uit-
spraken van ontwikkelingswerkers en vooraanstaande pleitbezorgers van 
ontwikkelingshulp geven ook aan dat hulp een potentiële katalysator voor 
ontwikkeling is. Op basis van onderzoek naar de economische en politieke 
transformatie in Ghana van 1957 tot 2013 (onderverdeeld in drie fases), 
wordt in dit proefschrift betoogd dat hulp kan fungeren als katalysator voor 
ontwikkeling mits endogene krachten in het ontvangende land er positief 
tegenover staan; anders levert de hulp weinig op voor de ontwikkeling.  
Vijf eigenschappen van een katalysator uit de chemische technologie 
worden in het onderzoek als metafoor gebruikt, en er worden drie analy-
tische benaderingen waaronder process-tracing toegepast om een keten van 
causale verbanden te leggen tussen buitenlandse hulp en Ghana’s endogene 
hulpbronnen, instellingen, structuren en actoren. Op basis van de resultaten 
van de transformatie in Ghana laat het proefschrift zien dat buitenlandse 
hulp het minst van invloed was op de economische en politieke transfor-
matie in fase I (1957-82); het meest in fase II (1983-92) en nauwelijks in fase 
III (1993-2013), vooral niet in het laatste deel van die periode.  
De resultaten van de casestudy hebben bredere implicaties voor theorie 
en beleid, die in dit proefschrift worden geschetst. De resultaten wijzen erop 
dat hulp kan fungeren als katalysator voor ontwikkeling wanneer (i) een sub-
stantieel deel wordt geïnvesteerd in economisch productieve sectoren van 
de ontvanger met als doel het bevorderen van structurele transformatie; (ii) 
het ontvangende land wordt geleid door een dominante politieke partij met 
visionair en strak leiderschap; (iii) het ontvangende land beschikt over ex-
portproducten met toegevoegde waarde en (iv) een professionele en techno-
cratische bureaucratie. De resultaten impliceren dat economische transfor-
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matie op de lange termijn in combinatie met een politiek stelsel dat het 
meest passend is een belangrijk doel moet worden dat te faciliteren is door 
hulp aan ontwikkelingslanden. 
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1 
Research Setting: Misunderstanding 
and Misinterpreting the Role of 
Foreign Aid in Development 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis investigates the catalytic effect of foreign aid on three phases 
of Ghana’s economic and political transformation and development 
from 1957 to 2013. The starting point of the study is the existing litera-
ture, which suggests that foreign aid can be a catalyst to development in 
developing countries (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1961; McKinnon, 1964; 
Chenery and Strout, 1966; Pronk, 2001, 2003). In addition to the litera-
ture, there have been a number of pronouncements by leading aid advo-
cates on the relationship between aid and development. In 1949, Paul 
Hoffman, head of the Economic Cooperation Administration, told the 
US Congress that the Marshall Plan1 had provided the ‘critical margin’ on 
which other investments needed for European recovery depended 
(quoted in Hogan, 1987:189). In recent times, the longest serving Dutch 
Minister of Development Co-operation, Jan Pronk, has pronounced aid 
as a catalyst to transformation of the policies and institutions necessary 
for development in developing countries (see Pronk, 2001 series in Devel-
opment and Change). Andrews supported the pronouncement and indicated 
that ''since the time of the Marshall Plan to present, and due to its suc-
cess, aid has been seen by many as a catalyst to economic growth, and 
has thus been applied in many countries all over the world'' (Andrews, 
2010:95). 
Beyond foreign aid as capital flows to developing countries, the word 
“catalyst” is also used in some of the literature to describe the roles 
played by aid actors such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the World Bank in the economies of developing countries (Bird and 
Rowland, 2004; Bird et al., 2000). This is because the decisions these or-
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ganisations make regarding the financial health of a country influence 
other private capital flows into a recipient country. A former Minister of 
Finance in Ghana reminded the author of this study “the IMF in particu-
lar serves as a ‘senior prefect’ to ministries of finance and central banks 
in aid recipient countries that have signed policy and programme agree-
ments with them to improve fiscal and monetary discipline. With IMF 
and the World Bank’s seal of approval, bilateral donors have confidence 
in your economy” (Interview, July, 2013). This makes the Bretton 
Woods institutions a different form of catalyst in the aid discussions. 
Their presence and monetary/fiscal policy engagement with a recipient 
country can provide assurance to market investors and bilateral donors 
for new/additional aid to the country.  
Foreign aid2 was introduced into the system of international relations 
as a short–term measure to save lives during emergencies and to con-
tribute to economic growth and development as a long-term objective 
(Cassen, 1994; Edgren, 2002; Emmerij, 2002). In the development dis-
course, the giving of aid was premised on the assumption that, since the 
Marshall Plan helped Europe to rebuild its infrastructure, political and 
social institutions after the Second World War, attention could be shifted 
to the developing world to achieve the same objectives.  
Moreover, right from the 1960s there was a theoretical economic ar-
gument that supported the giving of foreign aid.3 Neo-classical growth 
theory predicts that there is a minimum threshold of capital that is need-
ed before self-enforcing growth can be realised in a country. The impli-
cation is that in poor countries a massive injection of exogenous capital 
in the form of foreign aid is needed to enable these countries take off in 
development (McKinnon, 1964). This was the justification for the big 
push for aid in the 1960s. According to McKinnon, a low-income coun-
try requires substantial investment, which cannot be financed through 
low savings. Foreign aid, therefore, provides the additional financing that 
countries with low savings and investment need to propel economic 
growth. By supplementing domestic resources, foreign aid facilitates the 
growth of gross national product (GNP) and ultimately development—
that is, improvement in the standard of living of the citizens in the recip-
ient country. In the long run, the need for foreign aid disappears as re-
cipient countries transform the economic and socio-political institutions 
that are necessary to sustain growth and development. In the end, as 
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domestic savings, exports and tax revenue rise with GNP per capita, 
there is no more need for foreign aid.4  
Consequently, the last five decades have witnessed a steady and global 
expansion of aid flows from rich countries to the developing world. Dur-
ing the 1950s and 60s, aid amounted to 10% of gross domestic product 
(GDP) or more in about 30 countries with populations of over one mil-
lion people (Brautigam, 2000). It is now estimated that total global aid 
flows transferred from the developed world to developing countries have 
reached US$ 2 trillion over the past 50 years, out of which transfers to 
Africa amounted to over US$1 trillion (Moyo, 2009:35). Africa contains 
more countries that depend on foreign aid for a significant share of cen-
tral government income than any continent. Although ODA to Africa as 
a share of Gross National Income (GNI) declined from 6.2% to 4.9% 
between 1990 and 2009, it still remains four times higher than the next 
most aid-dependent region -the Middle East.  
Figure 1.1 shows annual disbursed aid flows from all donors (OECD-
DAC and multilateral institutions) to Africa since 1960 in US 2014 con-
stant prices, rising from an average of US$ 11.8bn a year in the 1960s to 
US$19.3bn a year in the 1970s. By 1990 ODA to Africa had reached a 
peak at US$ 41.6bn a year as successful developing states in Latin Amer-
ica and Asia ‘graduated’, freeing more resources for Africa. Japanese and 
European aid also increased, surpassing US contributions. 
Figure 1.1  
Annual ODA to Africa in constant 2014 US$ prices, 1960-2014 (billions) 
Source: Calculated from OECD-QWIDS database (2016) https://stats.oecd.org/qwids/.  
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However, it fell to its lowest (US$ 26.6bn) by the end of the decade, 
following the end of the Cold War, with the collapse of the Soviet Union 
in 1991. At the beginning of the millennium (2000) ODA began to rise 
again, attaining an average of about US$ 44.2bn a year between 2001 and 
2013. By 2013, ODA to Africa had risen to US$ 55.9bn a year (OECD-
QWIDS, 2015).  
As the quantum of aid increases, so does polarisation of arguments 
for and against its effectiveness as a catalyst to transformation and de-
velopment in poor countries. Those who support it increasingly show 
that “aid matters” and that most of the aid succeeds in its developmental 
objectives, such as a drop in child mortality, improved access to clean 
water, control over diseases like smallpox and polio, expansion of uni-
versal primary and girls’ education, and so on (Cassen, 1994; Sachs, 
2005).  
Foreign aid has provided support for large infrastructure projects 
(roads, energy and airports) that domestic revenue could not have fi-
nanced. Apart from hard infrastructure projects, supporters of aid have 
also argued that it has helped to develop and advance institutions such as 
pluralistic form of politics. For example foreign aid has been used to 
support the transition from political conflict and instability to the organi-
sation of credible elections. For many protagonist of aid, the economic 
turnaround of many Asian countries since 1960s is a testimony that “de-
velopment aid works”. According to Rahman (2008:150) and Lieshout et 
al. (2010:20) Botswana and the Republic of Korea achieved success 
through aid in the 1960s, Indonesia and Taiwan in the 1970s, Bolivia and 
Ghana in the 1980s, and Uganda and Vietnam in the 1990s. Botswana 
transitioned with foreign aid in the 1960s and 1970s and was no longer 
reliant on external finance by the 1980s. This group of countries have 
gone through crisis to rapid development as a result of aid, although it 
must be said that some of them have slid back after initial success.  
At the other end of the spectrum are economists who believe that aid 
has not been effective in helping poor countries to transform their econ-
omies, but has instead led to dependency of the recipients on donors 
(Knack, 2000; Brautigam, 2000; Brautigam and Knack, 2004; Killick, 
2005; Easterly, 2006; Moyo, 2009). They argue that, as the proportion of 
aid increases in the budget of governments in the developing world, so 
does corruption among the ruling elites. According to Moyo (2009), even 
with more than US$1 trillion of foreign aid to Africa, the money has 
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failed to deliver sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction. 
Moyo and others with the same point of view often cite the case of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire) where decades of large-
scale foreign assistance have left no trace of progress in that country. 
They contend that foreign aid has instead retarded Africa’s development 
by substituting for, instead of supplementing, domestic savings, taxable 
income and investment, and further worsening the balance of payments 
deficit (Moore, 1998; Moyo, 2009). These arguments have gained much 
ground, and in combination with other factors like global economic re-
cession and growing opposition to aid in donor countries, led to its re-
duction from the mid 1990s to early 2000. In most of their conclusions, 
critics like Easterly (2006) and Moyo (2009) suggest that development 
can only be achieved if it is home-grown.  
The critiques about how effective aid is have been fuelled by analyses 
that appear to overemphasise the impact of external aid on a recipient 
country’s development. The aid industry has perhaps made too many 
unsubstantiated claims about the effects of external finance, thereby 
leaving it open to criticism; aid can only serve as a catalyst when it is in 
addition to a developing country’s own efforts to transform its society, 
improve government and policies, establish meaningful democracy, 
strengthen economic institutions, and so on (Pronk, 2001, 2003). Pronk 
contends that if aid were not considered to be “a direct cause of devel-
opment, or its origin, its source or its prime mover, but were only per-
ceived as a catalyst, many studies on its impact could have been left un-
done or replaced by less abstract analyses. Also, expectations concerning 
the results of aid could have been toned down and made more realistic'' 
(Pronk, 2001:620). The ultimate aim of foreign aid is therefore to facili-
tate the role that endogenous drivers play to promote transformation of 
local structures, institutions and systems in the recipient country until 
there is no longer the need for a catalyst. Such a transformation process 
takes time and does not follow a single path. It involves different trajec-
tories and different paces of change, driven by different kinds of agents 
that deploy different institutional arrangements (Polanyi, 1944:57).  
Ghana has received foreign aid in its various forms since 1960 to 
supplement endogenous resources. External capital has financed major 
infrastructure projects and influenced macro-economic policies and insti-
tutional reforms. Generally, aid is said to have contributed to Ghana’s 
current state of political and economic transformation and development. 
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On the other hand, it has also provided perverse incentives for endoge-
nous agencies, institutions and actors to react in ways that work against 
the catalytic objectives of aid. This research examines the extent to which 
aid has had a catalytic effect on the Ghanaian political and economic 
transformation.  
1.2 Background to Ghana’s Development Trajectory  
(1957-2013) 
1.2.1 Economic and political trajectory 
Ghana’s current economic and political path cannot be separated from 
its colonial past, policies and attempts to achieve self-development. 
Ghana was colonised for over a century by the British, a period during 
which mining, timber and cocoa were developed as the country’s major 
drivers of economic growth. At independence in 1957, the country en-
joyed a high economic and political head start unrivalled elsewhere in 
sub-Saharan Africa, with relatively high per capita income of US$ 390,5 
the same as South Korea and higher than Malaysia (US$ 270) and foreign 
exchange reserves of US$ 484m (Leith, 1996, 2003; Uphoff, 1972:222). 
With per capita income of US$ 490, Ghana was considered a middle-
income country in the mid-1960s. In addition to its income, Ghana’s 
parliamentary system of government was also considered complementary 
to the country’s quest to achieve higher development. However, by 1966 
Ghana had a negative balance of -US$ 391m in its foreign reserves, and 
by 1970 the country had slipped to low-income status (Berry, 1994). 
By 1983, the economy of Ghana was at its lowest level, with Ghana-
ians suffering the lowest standard of living in the nation’s history. Under 
the military leadership of Flt Lt Jerry John Rawlings, the country negoti-
ated a structural adjustment and economic reform programme6 with the 
World Bank and IMF (Berry, 1994; Aryeetey et al., 2000). Ghana's struc-
tural adjustment programme succeeded in reversing the downward spiral 
in production and exports. The economy recovered from large fluctua-
tions in annual growth rates (and decline in GDP) to a hefty positive rate 
of 8% in 1984 (see Figure 1.2).  
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Figure 1.2 
Ghana’s annual GDP growth, 1961-2015  
Source: Extracted from World Bank Database, 2016. 
 
With annual GDP growth reaching 7.7% in 2010 and 13.6% in 2011 
(propelled by oil revenue), GDP per capita in constant 2010 USD prices 
more than doubled between 1984 and 2013 (see Figure 1.3).  
Figure 1.3 
Ghana’s GDP per capita in constant 2010 US$ prices, 1960-2014 
Source: Computed from World Bank Database, 2015. 
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Again, with increasing GDP, the per capita purchasing power of 
Ghanaians started to rise. It more than doubled, from US$ 1,225 to US$ 
2,755 between 1990 and 2008, and the World Bank estimated it to be 
US$ 3,974 in 2013 (World Bank, 2014). Ghana’s level of development is 
further visible through the lens of its achievement of the millennium de-
velopment goals (MDGs). Ghana was the first country in sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) to achieve the halving of the proportion of population in 
extreme poverty ahead of the UN target year of 2015. The overall pov-
erty rate7 declined substantially, from 51.7% in 1991/92 to 28.5% in 
2005/2006 and 24.2% in 2013 (Ghana Statistical Service, 2007; Ghana 
Report, 2010, 2014) due to significant improvements in economic growth, 
accompanied by social and economic policies on poverty reduction.  
Figure 1.4 
Contribution of agriculture, industry and services to GDP in Ghana,  
1965-2015 (%) 
Sources: Data from various sources and World Bank Database, 2016. 
 
However, despite the consistently high economic growth, the config-
uration of the economy has not been transformed. Primary commodities 
(cocoa beans and gold) and, recently, crude oil, continue to be the domi-
nant exports. There has been no improvement in the productivity of the 
agricultural sector, its contribution to GDP falling below 30% after 2009, 
and services is now the leading sector (see Figure 1.4), growing very fast 
in response to the needs of a growing middle class while industry lags 
behind. Government policies that support transformation of the agricul-
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ture sector and also support agro-industries have been inconsistent 
(Amoako, 2011; ECA and AU, 2011; Lin, 2012; Noman and Stiglitz, 
2012). As a result, there are serious doubts about the sustainability of the 
current economic growth; to borrow Tony Killick’s phrase, Ghana’s 
economy is “fragile still” (Killick, 2000).  
Ghana’s current level of economic transformation cannot be separat-
ed from its past political development (Berry, 1994; Osei, 1995; Aryeetey, 
et al., 2001; Dzorgbo, 2001; Leith, 1996 and 2003; Meng, 2004; Agye-
man-Duah, 2008; Ackah and Kutsoati, 2008; Fosu, 2009). The nature of 
Ghana’s politics provides an explanation for the economic decline by 
1966 and a worsened standard of living by 1983. Ghana inherited multi-
party democracy at independence, but by 1964 it had changed into a sin-
gle-party state. The slide from political pluralism to dictatorial regimes 
continued until 1992, although there were experiments with multi-party 
politics in 1969-71 and 1981-2 (see Figure 1.5). 
Since 1993 Ghana has witnessed a very stable democratic regime, with 
six successful presidential and parliamentary elections in 1992, 1996, 
2000, 2004, 2008 and 2012. This successful political transformation is 
rare among new African democracies. In 2010 Ghana was rated fifth in 
Africa, with a score of 6.02 out of 10, by the Economic Intelligence 
Unit’s Democracy Index. The Freedom House Index, 2010, also classi-
fied Ghana as “free”, along with only five other countries in Africa 
(South Africa, Botswana, Mali, Namibia and Benin). In the Democracy 
Index sub-section on electoral process and pluralism, Ghana scored 8.33 
out of 10, which was the highest in Africa and better than the USA 
(8.18), Spain and the UK (8.16), Italy (7.83), France (7.77) and Japan 
(8.08). The 2013 Mo Ibrahim Index of African Government (IIAG) 
ranked Ghana as seventh in Africa, with a score of 66.8%, which was 
above the continental average of 51.6%. Mauritius, Botswana, Cape 
Verde, Seychelles, South Africa and Namibia ranked higher than Ghana 
in good governance (see tables 1.1 and 1.2).  
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Civilian Regime 
Figure 1.5 
Political trajectory of Ghana, 1957-2013 
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Source: Author’s construct
 
Notes:  
CPP=Convention People’s Party  
NLC= National Liberation Council  
PP= Progress Party  
NRC National Redemption Council 
SMC= Supreme Military Council  
AFRC= Armed Forces Revolutionary Council 
PNP= People’s National Party  
PNDC=Provisional National Defence Council 
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Table 1.1 
Good governance scores and rankings in selected African countries, 2006-12 
Good Governance 
Annual Score (Out of 100) Rank 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2012 
Ghana 64 64 64 66 66 66 67 7th 
Mauritius 79 79 83 83 83 82 83 1st 
Botswana 76 76 76 76 76 76 78 2nd 
South Africa 71 71 70 70 71 71 71 5th 
Kenya 54 54 53 51 53 54 54 21st 
Mali 54 53 54 54 54 56 51 27th 
Cote D’Ivoire 36 36 35 37 36 39 41 44th 
Somalia 9 10 7 8 8 7 8 52nd 
African Average 50.0 50.4 50.2 50.3 51.2 50.2 51.6  
Source: Extracted from Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance 2013 Report.  
Table 1.2 
Ghana’s average good governance score compared with Africa average 
Good Governance  
Indicators 
Score (%) Rank out of  
52 countries Ghana Africa Average 
Safety 70.8 52.7 6th 
Rule of Law 81.0 47.6 6th 
Accountability 60.3 41.5 8th 
Personal Safety 52.5 43.1 16th 
National Security 89.5 78.4 16th 
Overall Governance 66.8 51.6 7th 
Source: Mo Ibrahim Governance Index 2013 Report. 
 
 
In 2014, the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI), 
which examines and evaluates the quality of democracy, market economy 
and political management in 129 developing and transition countries, 
ranked Ghana 23rd out of 129 countries in the world. Table 1.3 shows 
Ghana’s scores and rankings in three BTI assessments.  
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Table 1.3 
Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI), 2010-14 
Year 
Overall  Political Transformation Economic Transformation 
Score/10 Rank/129 Score/10 Rank/129 Score/10 Rank/129 
2014 7.36 23 8.30 17 6.43 39th 
2012 7.40 22 8.30 19 6.50 22nd 
2010 7.33 26 8.15 22 6.50 40th 
Source: BTI biannual assessment reports.  
 
For a country that was classified as authoritarian three decades ago, 
with rampant military coups and some occurrences of human rights 
abuses, this has been a major political transformation. Of the approxi-
mately 30 countries in Africa that attempted democratic transitions in the 
early 1990s, Carothers cites “Ghana as the only African country that has 
made significant democratic progress and remains positively engaged in 
democratization” (Carothers, 2002:9). Ghana now has relatively high lev-
els of political freedom. There is high citizen participation in political 
processes while governments have become more tolerant of civil society 
organisations (CSOs) to the extent of facilitating their engagement in the 
public policymaking process (Crawford, 2004; Darkwa et al., 2006; 
Kpessa, 2011). The efforts of Ghanaian civil society are bolstered by 
support from international donors (Gyimah-Boadi, 2009). The country 
has a competitive political party system, a vibrant opposition political 
party, and free media. These are strong credentials denoting a country 
that has consolidated its multi-party democracy.  
Today, donors, academics and investors frequently cite Ghana as an 
example of political and economic transformation worthy of emulation 
(Aryeetey et al., 2001; Gyimah-Boadi, 2008; Breisinger et al., 2011; BTI 
2003; Fosu, 2009; Whitfield, 2009; Gyimah-Boadi, 2009a; Abdulai and 
Crawford, 2010). In 2008 Ghana attained lower middle-income status.8 
Table 1.4 shows progress that the country has made in other aspects of 
human development since 1970. 
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Table 1.4 
Selected national development indicators (standard of living) for Ghana 
HDI 1970-74 
1975
-79 
1980-
84 
1985
-89 
1990
-94 
1995-
99 
2000
-04 
2005-
09 
2010-
13 
2015 
Access to clean 
water (%) 
NA NA 42.9  56.5 60.0 70 78.8 86 89 
Under 5 MR 
(/1000 births  
201.1 185.5 167.70 155.3 128.2 114.0 101.3 88.3 83.2 NA 
Literacy rate (%) NA NA NA NA NA 64.5 58 NA 71.5 76.6 
Life expectancy 49.33 50.81 53.1 54.11 57 58 58.4 61 63.8 65.7 
Poverty level (%) NA NA NA NA 51.7 43.0 39.5 28.3 24.2 NA 
Sources: UNICEF Database, 2014; GLSS (VI), 2016.  
Note: NA = Not available. 
Table 1.5 
Ghana’s scores and global rankings in the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), 
2000-2014 
Year CPI/10 Rank 
2000 3.5 52 90 
2001 3.4 59 91 
2002 3.9 50 102 
2003 3.3 70 133 
2004 3.6 64 145 
2005 3.5 65 158 
2006 3.3 70 163 
2007 3.7 69 179 
2008 3.9 67 180 
2009 3.9 69 180 
2010 4.1 62 178 
2011 3.9 69 182 
2012 4.5 64 174 
2013 4.6 63 177 
2014 4.8 61 175 
2015 4.7 56 167 
Source: Compiled from Transparency International Database, 2014. 
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Despite the above economic and governance progress, political pat-
ronage remains endemic and perceived public corruption remains high. 
Table 1.5 shows increasing trends of public perception about corruption 
in the country. (The closer the CPI scores are to zero, the higher is the 
degree of corruption as perceived by the citizens.)  
In addition to corruption, there are other challenges that hinder the 
country’s progress. These include inefficient public sector administration, 
inadequate domestic revenue mobilisation, and over-reliance on revenue 
from the export of primary commodities (cocoa beans, gold and oil).  
Figure 1.6 
ODA received by Ghana, 1960-2012,  
in current and constant 2013 US$ prices (millions) 
Source: Extracted from OECD QWIDS Data Base, 2016. 
 
1.2.2 Foreign aid to Ghana  
In the early years of Ghana’s independence, the quantum of foreign aid 
received was very small. Significant foreign reserves and the importance 
of cocoa revenue gave the Ghanaian government a sense of economic 
security, which also meant that the regime was not very eager to receive 
aid. However, by the mid 1960s, Ghana’s foreign reserves had dried up 
and the country needed external financial support. ODA was very low 
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(US$ 2.94m, US$ 18m and US$ 62.19m in 1960, 1963 and 1966 respec-
tively, all in current prices; see Figure 1.6). From 1960 to 1970, ODA 
averaged about US$ 36m a year and from 1971 to 1982 it was US$ 101m. 
However, in 2013 constant US prices instead of current prices9 (see Fig-
ure 1.6) ODA received went up to about US$200m by 1980.  
Figure 1.7 
Net ODA to Ghana as % of GDP, 1965-2011 
 
Source: World Bank Database, 2014. 
 
When Ghana embarked on Economic Recovery and Structural Ad-
justment Programmes (ERP and SAP) in 1983, the magnitude of aid, its 
composition and origin all began to show greater improvement. In the 
initial stages of the reform programme (1983–1986), total aid inflows 
averaged about US$ 518m a year in 2013 constant prices. The level of 
inflows then rose rapidly to reach about US$ 623m per year in 2013 con-
stant prices during the 1987–1991 period. The bulk of the inflows were 
programme aid/balance of payments support provided by multilateral 
institutions led by the IMF and the World Bank. In 2002, Ghana opted 
for inclusion in the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, 
leading to about 50% of the country’s foreign debt being written off by 
the donor community (IMF, 2004). From 2005 to 2008, foreign aid 
maintained an appreciable level, averaging about US$ 1.3bn annually. In 
2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013, ODA was US$ 1.76bn, US$ 1.78bn, 
US$1.80bn and US$1.33bn respectively, all in 2013 US constant prices. 
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In terms of the Net ODA contribution to Ghana’s GDP, while from the 
1960s to 1983 it amounted to a few percentage points, by 1989 it had 
increased to 13.62% and maintained an average of about 10% in the 
1990s. By 2000, Ghana’s dependence on ODA had gone up to 12% of 
GDP, 20% of imports, 50% of gross capital formation and 64% of gov-
ernment expenditure. Net ODA contribution to GDP reached an all-
time high of 16% in 2004 and then started falling, reaching its lowest 
level in two decades in 2012 (see Figure 1.7).  
In a five-year average (2005-2010) the leading bilateral donors were 
the United Kingdom (US$ 150m), the USA (US$ 120m), the Nether-
lands (US$ 100m) and Denmark (US$ 80m). Others were Canada (US$ 
80m), France (US$ 80m), Germany (US$ 60m) and Japan (US$ 
60m)(OECD/DAC, 2010). One of the reasons for the increasing pro-
portion of bilateral aid was the desire of donor countries to be part of 
Ghana’s economic success (Geddes et al., 2009; Meng 2004; Andrews 
2010:98). In 2000, the Government of Ghana (GoG) and donors devel-
oped a multi-donor budget support mechanism. The donors were aware 
of the risks associated with direct transfers of resources to support 
budget implementation,10 but given Ghana’s improvement in democratic 
governance, they were ready to work with the government (ODI, 2007). 
In 2013, multi-donor budget support included 10 donor partners and 
represented around 30% of the overall aid inflow to Ghana. The total 
amount of the budget support was US$ 404m in 2010 and US$ 484m in 
2011 (GoG, 2012 budget). 
Figure 1.8 
Ghana’s ODA per capita in US$, 1981-2012 
Source: World Bank Database, 2014. 
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According to 2013 OECD/DAC statistics, Ghana ranks as the 
eighth-largest ODA recipient in Africa. The ODA per capita of US$9 in 
1983 increased substantially to US$ 50 before the end of that decade, 
and by 2012 it had reached US$ 71 (see Figure 1.8 in current US$).  
1.2.3 Three phases of Ghana’s economic and political trajectory  
On the basis of the historical experiences of politics, aid and economic 
policies, this study divides Ghana’s transformation and development tra-
jectory into three phases: 1957-82, 1983-92 and 1993-2013. Phase I is 
from Ghana’s independence from British rule until it descended into a 
period of political instability. During those 25years, the military and civil-
ians took turns to rule the country; thus, politically, the phase was one of 
the unstable periods in Ghana’s history. Using a broad brush, it was 
characterised by socialist economic policies, with the country embarking 
on state-led development in production and distribution of goods and 
services. In addition to controlling production and distribution, the state 
was also involved in fixing commodity prices and the exchange rate of 
the local currency, restricting imports, creating employment, and so on. 
With the exception of intermittent attempts to change course, both mili-
tary and civilian governments pursued similar socialist policies. While the 
standard of living was very high at the beginning of Phase I, the econo-
my deteriorated and the last part of that phase was the worst period in 
the nation’s history (Berry, 1994; Dzorgbo, 2001). The economic chal-
lenges became excuses for frequent military takeovers. As noted earlier, 
foreign aid in terms of quantitative flow was relatively minimal, apparent-
ly being influenced by the ideological rivalry of the Cold War.  
Phase II (1983-92) began the transition to major structural political 
and economic transformation as Ghana started shedding many of its 
post-independence economic policies and political disorder, with foreign 
aid being a major factor in the drive towards that change. Multilateral 
donors provided substantial financial and technical support to influence 
the country’s transition from socialist economic policies. During that 
period, the World Bank and the IMF portrayed Ghana as an African 
success story. Politically, the country was stable — though undemocratic 
-under the military regime. The end of the period marked Ghana’s transi-
tion to a democratically elected government. During Phase III (1993-
2013), Ghana became “one of the most stable countries” in Africa. It 
witnessed successful democratic change from one elected government to 
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another. The country pursued mixed economic policies with substantial 
elements of neo-liberalism and donor-supported social development 
programmes. The period also saw substantial donor inflows, although 
the contribution of aid to the country’s GDP began to fall.  
1.3 Problem Statement 
The background information on Ghana’s economic and political past 
and present shows that foreign aid has provided support for budget fi-
nancing, macro-economic policy reforms, institutional restructuring and 
political reforms. For more than three decades since 1983, Ghana has 
seen steady and significant macro-economic growth and democratic po-
litical stability, all of which foreign aid is claimed to have impacted 
(Ackah and Kutsoati, 2008). However, has a similar amount (or even 
more) not been given to countries like Mozambique, Tanzania, Mali, or 
Nigeria without achieving the necessary political and economic trans-
formation? And have many countries (Malaysia, South Korea, and Bot-
swana among them) not performed better than Ghana although given 
similar support? And have many countries not slipped back after initial 
success (for example, Bolivia and Côte d’Ivoire)? These questions point 
to the fact that foreign aid on its own could not have achieved the trans-
formation in these countries without some endogenous factors or drivers 
that worked with aid. Yet, critics and many studies have tended to make 
foreign aid the prime mover of a country’s quest for development in-
stead of viewing it as a catalyst to local processes of transformation. For 
instance, the MDGs and advocacy projects like “make poverty history” 
have put forward foreign aid as the key input to solving developmental 
problems in poor countries.  
For instance, in the year 2000, UNCTAD called for a doubling of aid 
to African countries in order to kick-start their economies. The “High-
level Panel” on Financing for Development, the Monterrey Consensus, 
the Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals (the 
“Sachs Report”), the Commission on Africa, and the World Summit all 
echoed the need for developed countries to increase aid in order to facili-
tate development in Africa. The Commission on Africa, which the for-
mer British Prime Minister Tony Blair established, sought to raise $50 
billion a year from the international capital markets to help stimulate 
economic growth in Africa (Booth, 2005). The governments of Brazil, 
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Chile, France, Norway and the United Kingdom proposed an interna-
tional tax on financial transactions or items such as plane tickets to fi-
nance development (UNDP, 2012:10). The UN called on rich countries 
to increase their foreign aid to 0.7% of GNI by 2015 (UNDP, 2012:23). 
Governments and activists from the economically developed world still 
gather now and then to agitate for more aid to pull Africa out of its eco-
nomic doldrums.  
By calling for doubling of aid in order to make poverty history, pro-
tagonists such as the UN (2006) and Sachs (2005) have put foreign aid in 
the front seat of a country’s development process. Similarly, critics like 
Moyo (2009) and Easterly (2006) have over-emphasised the role of for-
eign aid. Both protagonists and critics have forgotten that aid is sup-
posed to be a catalyst that works with endogenous drivers11 to transform 
economic and political structures that are necessary for growth and de-
velopment but is not itself the transformer. In other words, foreign aid 
works to quicken the efforts of endogenous drivers only when these fac-
tors are predisposed to react with aid. This suggests that even if aid to 
Africa were to be doubled, there is no guarantee that the needed trans-
formation and development would be achieved if existing endogenous 
factors did not react positively to it. This raises a vital question to begin 
with: in Ghana’s case, what endogenous drivers were present during the 
three phases of the drive to economic and political transformation, and 
to what extent were they predisposed to react with each other and with 
foreign aid? In other words, did foreign aid have anything to accelerate?  
Second, to understand how a catalyst works, one needs to know what 
happens in a chemical reaction without the presence of a catalyst. This 
means that if aid is to play a catalytic role, there must be indications that 
endogenous drivers are already responding to relevant challenges and 
need a catalyst to accelerate the process. In Ghana’s case, what were the 
relevant economic and political challenges that prevailed in different time 
periods, how did endogenous drivers respond to the challenges, and why 
was aid needed to speed up the process? As indicated earlier, Ghana was 
at par with South Korea during the early years of its transformation, but 
today South Korea is far more advanced than Ghana, thanks partly to 
the role that aid and endogenous drivers played (Kim, 2013). It may be 
that a Korean route to economic development was never exactly what 
Ghana could have followed because of its particular challenges and the 
extent to which endogenous drivers were available at that time to re-
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spond; but then what could have been both desirable and feasible for 
Ghana? What endogenous drivers (actors, institutions and ideas) could 
have responded to Ghana’s challenges and why did they fail to do so? 
Third, if aid is a catalyst that hastens the reaction of endogenous sub-
stances on the path to transformation, how does one characterise or rec-
ognise a developmental trajectory? After all, not all transformation is 
positive. How does one attribute developmental transformation to the 
catalytic role of aid? What is the nature of Ghana’s structural and institu-
tional transformation that can be classified as developmental? How did 
aid influence any of the structures and institutions during Ghana’s post-
independence history of economic and political transformation? Trans-
formation processes, whether fast or slow, usually involve political set-
tlements and fundamental changes in existing institutions, policies, ideas 
and structures that control power and resource distribution. Only by 
linking the influencing role of aid to endogenous drivers, including his-
torical setting, can one clearly get the picture of how aid influences trans-
formation and development in a country. Thus, in a structural context in 
which transformation has occurred in a country, the vital ‘triggers’ that 
have initiated the processes, the agents that have contributed to shaping 
the paths, the resources (natural and human factors) and the institutions 
(rules of the game) that have supported (or inhibited) the transformation 
require deeper analysis of their interrelationships. 
Fourth, contrary to expectations in chemistry that an ideal catalyst 
would not change while undergoing chemical processes with an object, 
the literature provides a plethora of information showing that aid has 
undergone several changes (forms, motives and character) in its interac-
tion with recipient countries’ endogenous drivers. For instance, during 
the Cold War era, aid was given on the basis of loyalty though its inten-
tion was development (UN, 2006:9; Lancaster, 1999; 2008). There was 
no strict accountability as long as recipients remained politically loyal to 
the donor government. This is no longer so. In Ghana and elsewhere, 
aid has moved from predominantly funding projects to financing pro-
grammes, providing support to policies and institutional development, 
and most recently to a focus on poverty alleviation, governance, MDGs 
and anti-terrorism actions. A corollary question is, how did the motive 
for ODA change in Ghana? What role did endogenous substances play 
to influence the change? And, when aid loses its catalytic effect, how 
does it regenerate itself in a country?  
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In summary, current research on the effectiveness of aid has over-
emphasised the leading role of foreign aid, and by so doing misunder-
stood and misinterpreted aid in terms of what it is and what it is not. 
Current studies have also understated the importance of endogenous 
drivers and how they relate to, or interact with, foreign aid to determine 
a development outcome. This study hypothesises that “foreign aid”, or 
ODA as financial and technical assistance, can be a catalyst to develop-
ment in so far as endogenous drivers in the country are predisposed to 
react positively with aid. If aid is a catalyst to development, as claimed by 
Pronk and others, what catalytic role did it play during its five-and-a half 
decades association with Ghana? What sorts of catalysis took place dur-
ing that period? What endogenous drivers were present during that peri-
od, and to what extent were they predisposed to react with foreign aid? 
What is the nature of Ghana’s structural and institutional transformation 
and how can we attribute the degree of transformation to any role that 
foreign aid may have played? 
1.4 Research Objectives 
The general objective of the study is to expand the frontiers of the con-
cept of a ‘catalyst’ as it is borrowed from chemistry and applied in the 
social sciences, and, using Ghana as a case study, to further explore the 
conditions under which foreign aid plays a catalytic role in transforming 
and developing a country. Specifically, the study aims to:  
i. Analyse the extent to which foreign aid has been a catalyst to polit-
ical and economic transformation in Ghana since independence in 
1957;  
ii. Analyse how endogenous substances (structures, institutions and 
actors) that existed in Ghana’s three periods (1957-1982, 1983-
1992 and 1993-2013) were predisposed to working with aid;  
iii. Use the evidence arising from the Ghanaian case to build a model 
on “aid as a catalyst” and to indicate at what point a catalyst may 
no longer be needed in a country.  
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1.5 Research Questions 
i. What relevant challenges characterised Ghana’s three periods of 
economic and political transformation and to what extent have 
these challenges been addressed? 
ii. How did endogenous drivers (political and economic structures, 
institutions, agents, and ideas) respond to the country’s economic 
and political challenges?  
iii. How did foreign aid interact with endogenous drivers and to what 
extent did it possibly play a catalytic role in the country’s economic 
and political transformation?  
iv. Based on Ghana’s experiences with aid, generally under what con-
ditions can aid be a catalyst?  
1.6. Scope and Limitations of the Study 
In its broadest context, “foreign aid consists of all resources—physical 
goods, skills and technical know-how, financial grants (gifts), and loans 
(at concessional rates)—transferred by donors to recipients” (Riddell, 
2007:17). This broad definition would include resources to address hu-
manitarian, developmental and poverty needs in a country. This research 
focuses only on development aid, defined as aid given by a government and 
multilateral agencies to support the economic, social and political devel-
opment of a developing country (OECD, 2008). Like the OECD defini-
tion, this analysis excludes grants or loans for military purposes and 
transfer payments to private individuals. In other words, foreign aid is 
used in this thesis to refer to official development assistance (ODA) to 
low-income countries to promote economic development and the wel-
fare of the people. Usually such a financial assistance has a grant element 
of not less than of 25% of the total amount (OECD definition of ODA).  
Transformation in this study is conceived in terms of economic and 
political institutional and structural changes. Socio-cultural change is ad-
dressed in the analysis in so far as it provides explanations for political 
and economic transformation in the country. In other words, the study 
does not delve into wholesale analysis of socio-cultural changes that are 
taking place. There are two reasons for not including an all out, in-depth 
socio-cultural analysis: (i): to keep the research manageable within the 
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time frame, and (ii) the transformation of socio-cultural traits takes a 
considerable amount of time.  
This study has several limitations. First, it focuses more on macro is-
sues and less on microanalysis of particular sectors. Because of this fo-
cus, there are no details or in-depth analysis of the impact or contribu-
tion of a particular aid project to a sector; for example, aid for improving 
water supply and sanitation in a community. Second, “catalyst” is not 
just a concept; it is also a real product that is used in industrial sciences. 
As this study tries to apply an industrial science concept to the social sci-
ences, there is a high probability that it will be criticised as lacking con-
ceptual depth. Third, the author is not an economist, but the issues being 
analysed have economic relevance. In what can be seen as political econ-
omy analysis, the author set out to examine the dynamics and interrela-
tion of institutions, power, interests, and so on, as they relate to econom-
ics (Hudson and Leftwich, 2014). 
Fourth, the study relies on extensive literature and expert interviews. 
The interviewees reflected on the past and made sense of the current 
reality. Some tried to rewrite history or were biased because of what they 
know today, and sometimes because of past associations with a particular 
regime. Although interviewees’ responses were examined carefully and 
triangulated with each other, and checked against archival materials (es-
pecially publications from the early 1980s) and statistical data to avoid 
blatant biases, it is possible that a few biases slipped through. 
Fifth, the study considered, attempted but dropped the use of coun-
terfactuals as one of the instruments in the analysis. Counterfactual anal-
ysis is often raised when analysts are dissatisfied with the historical out-
come and argue that a country could have achieved a better outcome if 
any of the causal factors had been different. Counterfactual analysis 
could have enabled the research to reconstruct a plausible account of 
what could have happened if aid or Ghana’s endogenous drivers had 
been different. For instance, what would have happened to Ghana’s de-
velopment trajectory by now had the government not accepted 
IMF/WB structural adjustment policies? A robust counterfactual analysis 
would have been to compare Ghana’s transformation with some selected 
countries like Malaysia, Mexico and South Korea that were at similar lev-
els of political and economic development as Ghana at independence 
but took a different approach that resulted in results that are dissimilar to 
Ghana’s. The author discontinued the counterfactual analysis because of 
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inadequate data to make comparative analysis and the need to trim the 
scope of the study to make it manageable. Nevertheless, where counter-
factual information was available the study makes reference to it. 
1.7 Organisation of the Thesis 
The thesis is divided into seven chapters. After this introductory one, 
which set the context of the study, Chapter 2 reviews the concepts of 
‘catalyst’ and ‘transformation’. It defines and explains the two concepts, 
their attributes and how they are used as analytical lenses for examining 
Ghana’s case study. Chapter 3 presents the methodological approaches 
that were used for the analysis. It sets the research hypothesis and de-
scribes the dependent and independent variables in it, the four key ana-
lytical approaches, the sort of data collected, and the sources. Chapters 4 
to 6 examine the interactions or catalyses between foreign aid and en-
dogenous drivers of transformation and development that took place in 
the three phases. Specifically, Chapter 4 examines Phase I (1957-82); 
Chapter 5, Phase II (1983-92) and Chapter 6 Phase III (1993-2013). 
Chapter 7 summarises the study findings and draws conclusions. It also 
reflects on the concept of catalysis as applied to aid in the image of Gha-
na’s experience, develops a model for aid as a catalyst and draws some 
policy implications for Africa.  
Notes 
 
1 The Marshall Plan expended about U.S. $12.5 billion by 1951 on rebuilding 
physical and social infrastructure in Europe (Andrews, 2010: 94). 
2 Defined by OECD as official development assistance (ODA) capital flows 
provided by Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and multilateral insti-
tutions to developing countries, aimed at promoting economic development 
and the welfare of the people, often concessional in nature and containing a 
grant element, usually 25% minimum.  
3 See, for instance, Harrod-Domar Model (1939); Solow-Swan Model (1956) 
and Post-Keynesian Model. 
4 According to Azam et al. (1999) Botswana and the Republic of Korea are typ-
ical examples of countries where this argument has a resonance. Both countries 
transitioned from aid dependency to rapid growth and development, to the ex-
tent where they no longer needed aid.. 
 
512566-L-sub01-bw-Awortwi
Processed on: 10-8-2017 PDF page: 51
 Research Setting: The Role of Foreign Aid in Development 25 
 
5 With per capita income being regarded as a reliable indicator of development, 
Ghana was regarded as a middle-income country. Using measuring worth indi-
cator (time traveller’s investment calculator), Ghana’s 1957 per capita income 
of US$390 in current terms (October 2011) will be US$3020 (CPI), US$2444 
(GDP deflator), US$6790 (nominal GDP) and US$12,300 (relative share of 
GDP). 
6 SAP had many features: devaluation of the currency to abolish price control 
and import quotas, diversification, reduced role of the state, and private-sector-
led development, among others.  
7 That is, the population that earns less than a dollar a day by 2015. The meas-
ure of poverty in 2013 counted individuals living on less than GHC 3.60 
(US$2.34 or EUR 2.21) a day whilst the UN figure is less than US$1.25 a day. 
8 Lower-middle-income countries are those with per capita Gross National In-
come of between $1,006 and $3,975 per year. 
9 The difference between current and constant prices is inflation. However, 
ODA was actually low from 1960 to 1982 when compared with 1983 to 1992 
and subsequent years.  
10 The risks include the commitment of the government to budget implementa-
tion, how broad-based the budget is, the technical capacity to implement the 
budget, the soundness of public finance management, the transparency of gov-
ernment systems and the feasibility of harmonisation among donors them-
selves, and the fungibility of the funds made available to the government.  
11 Endogenous “drivers”, “elements”, “substances”, “chemical factors” and 
“reactants” are used interchangeably in this thesis.  
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2 
Aid as a Catalyst to Economic  
and Political Transformation  
and Development: A Conceptual 
Framework 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
A substantial body of literature on aid has evolved over the seven dec-
ades during which foreign aid has been delivered as a concerted ap-
proach to the socio-economic and political challenges of the developing 
world. While some of the literature portrays aid as an ‘impediment in the 
development trajectory of low-income countries (Easterly, 2002, 2006; 
Calderisi, 2006; Moyo, 2009; Hubbard and Duggan, 2009), other sections 
of it view aid as a catalyst that has enormous potential to influence eco-
nomic and political transformation, and development in recipient coun-
tries (Pronk, 2001; Sachs, 2005; Collier, 2007; Banerjee, 2007). This con-
ceptual framework tries to unpack both views to understand the 
conditions under which aid catalyses transformation and eventually na-
tional development.  
The chapter is divided into seven sections. Section 2 briefly defines 
development as the ultimate outcome of positive transformation. Section 
3 reviews the literature on the concept of transformation. The section 
argues that economic and political transformation is needed in a country 
for it to achieve development. Section 4, borrowing ideas from industrial 
chemistry, introduces the concept of a ‘catalyst’ and explains the process 
through which catalysis works. Section 5 applies the concept metaphori-
cally to foreign aid; it explains how a catalyst works to promote trans-
formation, and points to the weaknesses in applying of the concept in 
the social sciences. Section 6 summarises the literature and uses that to 
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develop an analytical framework for the study. Section 7 presents con-
cluding remarks. 
2.2 Development as a National and/or International 
Agenda to Pursue  
The term ‘development’ when defined in any standard measurement is 
subject to criticism because it is viewed as connoting a “Western Script” 
or modernisation ideology of the West where some countries are de-
scribed as ‘developed’ or ‘rich’ and others ‘undeveloped’, ‘developing’ or 
‘poor’. It is not the intention of this study to enter into that debate about 
what is ‘development’ and what is not. In international development 
studies, development usually connotes improvement in the living condi-
tions of people. The living conditions may include better health care, 
high adult literacy, access to shelter and nutritious food, high per capita 
income, high life expectancy, decent employment, peace and stability, 
and other normative indicators of standard of living (see earlier work on 
development by Frank, 1967; Seers, 1979; Myrdal, 1989; Sen, 1999).  
Analysis of factors that promote development shows that some coun-
tries have achieved high growth through foreign assistance. Some have 
become victims of others’ development processes. Some are neither vic-
tims nor beneficiaries of external support; instead, the citizens design 
and implement their own processes. Whatever the historical antecedents, 
there are many theories and perspectives that explain factors of devel-
opment and underdevelopment (Frank, 1967; Passe Smit and Seligson, 
2008); divergence in paths to development (Barendsen et al., 2013); geo-
graphical location as the cause of development or underdevelopment 
(Diamond, 1997, 2012; Sachs and Warner, 1997; Krugman, 1998; Gallup 
et al., 1999 Collier, 2007); legacy of colonisation as a key variable in un-
derdevelopment (Fieldhouse, 1981; Cypher and Dietz, 2008); cultural 
differences and values that promote development (Fukuyama, 1996); and 
aid as a catalyst to development (Pronk, 2003).  
The pursuit of economic and political transformation and national 
development has never been unidirectional and peaceful throughout his-
tory. Some transformation has been violent, involving the struggle be-
tween the proletariat and bourgeoisie. The revolution from above, as 
discussed by Trimberger (1978) was conditioned by the presence of a 
small and weak ‘bourgeois’ class and large coalitions of bureaucrats, 
512566-L-sub01-bw-Awortwi
Processed on: 10-8-2017 PDF page: 54
28 CHAPTER 2 
 
modernising militaries and intellectual reformers. That process of devel-
opment came from above. The classic model is that of Japan, Taiwan 
and South Korea (Woo-Cumings, 1999). As argued by Leftwich (2006) 
external threat or the thought of it happening and the determination to 
catch up with the rest of the developed world were key factors that mo-
tivated the development of the Asia model. On the other hand, Moore 
(1966) argues that the developmental approach of Russia and China were 
based on “revolution from below”. This came about because peasants 
led the reforms under the aegis of vanguardist parties. The elites mainly 
the military and bureaucrats were reluctant to spearhead the path to-
wards modernisation.  
Where do some of the successful contemporary performers fit in? 
What explains their paths? Leftwich suggests that the agency of politically 
and nationalistically driven elites who built and commanded developmental 
or quasi-developmental states of varying strength, capacity and endur-
ance, are critical factors explaining the success of contemporary per-
formers. He cites the example of Turkey in 1923 and Thailand in 1932, 
and, later, Singapore, Malaysia and even Botswana and Mauritius as ex-
amples of countries where Moore’s (1966) agencies were not in evidence. 
But even in those cases -with politically and nationalistically driven elites- 
some serious external or internal threat or anticipated threat had always 
been a major factor triggering and galvanising transformation. Recent 
studies point to some states that have become economically successful 
through regimes that developed specific economic policies and pro-
grammes (for example industrial policies) that were more in tune with 
their context (Chang, 2003; Whitfield, 2012; Noman and Stiglitz, 2012). 
For instance, one of the major conclusions of the studies that compared 
the development performance of Southeast Asia and Africa indicated 
that “timing and sequencing of the adoption of three policy features: 
macro-economic stability; pro-poor, pro-rural public spending; and eco-
nomic freedom for peasants and small entrepreneurs” explain much of 
the divergence in their development progress (Booth, 2013:491). See also 
Barendsen et al. (2013), Vlasblom (2013) and van Donge et al. (2012). 
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2.3 Economic and Political Transformation as a Prelude to 
Development 
The term ‘transformation’ means an ongoing process of change in politi-
cal and economic structures and institutions of a country that represents 
a sharp break with the past. This break is a major difference between 
transformation and simple reform. Garfield argues, “While reform is an 
attempt to go down the same path more efficiently, transformation in-
volves the development or discovery of entirely new paths” (Garfield, 
1991:50). The critical issue here is that development is a transformational 
process involving economic and political changes. As indicated earlier, 
these metamorphoses have often been turbulent throughout history, in-
volving radical changes in the structure of economy and politics. 
2.3.1 Stylised facts about economic structural transformation 
One stylised fact in the development literature is that economies that 
have successfully transitioned from low-income to high-income status 
experienced significant structural transformation (Chenery, 1986; 
Breisinger and Diao, 2008; Losch et al., 2012; Dorosh and Mellor, 2013). 
Economic transformation involves “changes in the structure of the 
economy (that is, sectoral composition of output and employment), its 
organisation, technology, management and institutions, to achieve high, 
inclusive and sustainable growth and development” (Ackah and Kutsoa-
ti, 2008:22). The stylised textbook analysis shows at least three features 
of economic transformation: (i) when there is economic transformation, 
the share of manufacturing sector to GDP increases while the share of 
agriculture declines; (ii) the share of agriculture in employment falls while 
the share of manufacturing and other sectors of the economy increases; 
and (iii) economic activities shift from rural areas to urban, leading to 
urbanisation. Therefore, economic transformation signifies sectoral 
changes not only in production and technological innovation, but also in 
society and institutions. This stylised transformation process is not linear 
as there are iterations and retreat as countries experience boom and bust 
cycles over a period of time and the three sectors that constitute the 
economy of a country (agriculture, industry and services) undergo major 
changes.  
Historically, in the traditional structure of most economies, agricul-
ture has been the primary sector providing employment and has serves 
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as a major source of foreign exchange. Production has been basically car-
ried out with local technology, hence it has been subsistence-oriented. 
When economic transformation takes place, there is a shift in labour 
from agriculture to industry as a result of application of technology in 
agriculture, which displaces labour. Later, a similar transformation pro-
cess occurs in industry, with labour moving into services. This process of 
change is referred to as economic transformation.  
This stylised definition and processes of structural transformation is 
widely acknowledged in economic literature. The 2013 African Trans-
formation Report (ATR) defines economic transformation as Growth + 
DEPTH1 (ACET, 2013). The outcomes of such transformation include 
diversification from agriculture to manufacturing; export competitive-
ness of a country’s products; productivity increase through efficient use 
of labour and high yielding crops; and application of technology.  
Since economic organisations are the centre of transformation, 
growth and changes in the structure of production could happen 
through expansion in technological capabilities of the people and institu-
tions. Concomitant government policies also play important roles in this 
transformation. 
A transforming economy—more than just a growing economy—can 
weather the ups and downs of global product and service markets, the al-
ternating liquidity and illiquidity of local and global financial markets, and 
the vicissitudes of commodity and construction booms. Thus, it is that a 
Ghana can become a South Korea, a Senegal a Thailand, and a Kenya a 
Malaysia (ACET, 2013:1).  
It is widely recognised that poverty reduction cannot be sustained for 
a long period in a country without economic transformation and sectoral 
productivity change. Experiences of developing countries that have suc-
cessfully gone through economic transformation show that there was 
remarkable diversification of agricultural exports (Breisinger and Diao, 
2008). This was the experience of South Korea in the 1950s and early 
1960s, and China in the late 1970s. Along the trajectory of economic 
transformation, labour becomes more productive in the agriculture sec-
tor. Southeast Asia’s experience shows that the state facilitated the trans-
formation process by encouraging rural-urban migration to nascent 
manufacturing industries. Smallholder farmers were supported in adopt-
ing new technologies (Henley, 2010).  
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 Historically, economic growth in low-income countries has been ag-
riculture-led (Johnston and Mellor, 1961; Mellor, 1995). Current research 
also finds agricultural transformation relevant as prelude to industrial 
growth and development in low-income countries (Breisinger and Diao, 
2008; Losch et al., 2012; Dorosh and Mellor, 2013). Per capita income 
growth at early stages of development is associated with rapid increase in 
the share of the manufacturing sector (Dinh et al., 2013). Page (2013) 
argues that Africa’s share of global manufacturing in GDP is less than 
one half of the average for all developing countries, explaining why Afri-
ca needs to put much more effort into industrialisation if it is to catch up 
with the rest of the developing world. Industrialisation has been the an-
chor of structural transformation since it is a high-value sector. 
The past two decades have seen substantial economic growth in Afri-
ca but little economic structural transformation (ACET, 2013; 2014). For 
many years, the challenge that confronted African development was 
economic stagnation, but since the late 1990s Africa’s economy has seen 
consistent growth of about 5% annually. Out of the 10 fastest-growing 
world economies in the 2000s, six were in Africa. This includes Angola 
that experienced an annual growth of 11.1%; Niger (8.9%), Ethiopia 
(8.4%), Chad (7.9%), Mozambique (7.9%) and Rwanda (7.6%) (ACET, 
2014:2). This turnaround from previous decades prompted three major 
publications in 2010 (McKinseny Institute, 2010; Economist, 2010; and 
Radelet’s, 2010) but many analysts argued that Africa needed to work to-
wards achieving economic transformation (ECA and AU, 2011; 
Amoako, 2011; Lin, 2011; 2012; Noman and Stiglitz, 2012) as a prelude 
to sustained growth and improvement in the welfare of the citizens. 
Booth (2012) argues that a shift in emphasis away from mere growth to 
transformation is needed. He identifies four transformation perspectives 
that are generally missing in the current economic growth in sub-Saharan 
Africa:  
changes in the structure of the economy (a diversification of production 
and exports) resulting from widely spread improvements in productivity; 
productivity breakthroughs in smallholder agriculture in particular; acceler-
ated formation and expansion of capitalist firms, with the acquisition of 
new skills and technological capabilities; and public and private strategies 
to anticipate countries’ future comparative advantages in international 
trade (Booth, 2012:19).  
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According to the 2013 African Transformation Report, with the exception 
of South Africa and Mauritius in all of Africa, agriculture and extractives 
are still the leading sectors (ACET, 2013). There is no country with a 
strong manufacturing sector that can compete internationally. Agricul-
ture can be the source of economic transformation if there are produc-
tivity gains from expansion of non-traditional agricultural products, but 
in Africa agricultural production is characterised by low productivity with 
little upgrade in the application of science and technology. Exports are 
also dominated by primary commodities, incorporating little application 
of science and technology, while the bulk of manufacturing and 
knowledge-based services are imported.  
Economic transformation through diversification of production 
structure and systems reduces economic volatility. It provides greater 
scope for a country to respond to economic challenges and global mar-
ket opportunities. Through exposure to greater international competi-
tiveness, the quality of a country’s export commodities improves, which 
has a positive effect on employment and incomes, enabling the spreading 
of growth to many people. A diverse export base also has multiplying 
effect on reduction of a country’s foreign exchange volatility, which is 
important for importing intermediate inputs and technology. Economic 
transformation cannot take place when a country continues to export the 
same primary commodities for years without adding any value to the 
products (ACET, 2013).  
Growth accompanied by these structural changes is referred to as 
“economic transformation” (ACET, 2013:4). Comparing the structure of 
the economy of today’s developed countries with the structure at the be-
ginning of the eighteenth century, we find that all those countries were 
poor and underdeveloped. Their economies were dependent on agricul-
ture. According to Lin (2012:1) growth of GDP per capita hovered 
around 0.05% a year for millennia. It was only after the Industrial Revo-
lution that per capita income grew, accelerating to around 1% a year in 
the nineteenth century and 2% in the twentieth century (Maddison 
1995).2  
At the end of World War II, a few countries in the developing world 
experienced consistent growth that enabled them to narrow the gap be-
tween themselves and the developed world. Japan was one of these 
countries. In 1950, Japan’s per capita income was 20% of that of USA. 
However with consistent high economic growth of 9.6% from 1950 to 
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the 1960s, Japan reached 63% of U.S. income by 1970. According to Lin, 
that prolong growth-facilitated Japan’s rise to occupy the second posi-
tion in the ranking of world largest economies that year (Lin, 2012:2). 
Japan achieved economic transformation through continuous upgrading 
of key manufacturing sectors. Not only Japan, but also the Asian Ti-
gers—Hong Kong, China, the Republic of Korea; Singapore and Tai-
wan—all showed that it was possible for a developing country to close 
the gap with developed countries through economic transformation 
(Whitfield, 2012; Noman and Stiglitz, 2012; van Donge et al., 2012; Bar-
endsen et al., 2013; Vlasblom, 2013). Most recently, Brazil and India 
have seen a steady march in the direction of developed countries by 
transforming their economies (World Bank, 2011). These transformed 
economies have substantially reduced poverty. Recent empirical work 
confirms that the key difference between Asia and Africa is the structural 
change that has taken place in the former and is absent in the latter 
(McMillan and Rodrik, 2011).  
What brings about successful structural transformation in a country? 
Is it endogenously generated or exogenously introduced where aid may 
play a role? Or is it a combination of endogenous and exogenous fac-
tors? While historical antecedents show that economic transformation is 
a prelude to development, the extent to which foreign aid has supported 
or hindered a poor country’s path to economic structural transformation 
is the subject of this conceptual review. Dirk Willem te Velde (2013:1) 
argues that “only productivity change and structural transformation and 
innovation can secure development in the long-run”. Low-income coun-
tries may well fail to make the transformation to middle-income status if 
there is no productivity change. He contends that one of the critical con-
straints to development in Africa is inadequate investment financing in 
agriculture and manufacturing, which keeps productivity low in these 
sectors. If aid is a catalyst to development, it should facilitate the process 
of economic transformation, and this requires investment of aid money 
to improve productivity, enhance technological growth in agriculture, 
and ultimately focus on an industrialisation drive.  
As will be argued later in this thesis, economic structural change does 
not occur automatically. It is organised through politics, political organi-
sation and elite consensus or political settlement. Booth observes that 
low-income and aid-recipient countries need forms of politics that ena-
ble design of development policies that are in sync with their societies 
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and not necessarily following a particular political doctrine. A number of 
studies gravitate towards this argument and show that policies for eco-
nomic transformation require active role of the state (Stiglitz, 2002; 
Booth, 2012; Rodrik, 2015).  
In terms of economic policy, the concern with Africa’s transformation 
represents a belated recognition of a point that has long been established 
in theory. Since markets in the real world are very far from being ‘perfect’, 
even in highly developed economies—and more so in very poor ones—
there is no robust general case for a neoliberal stance of minimising the 
role of the state in the economy (Booth, 2012:19).  
Booth’s argument seems to contradict what has now come to be 
known as neo-liberal policies or Washington Consensus about the role 
of the state in development (Williamson, 1994, 2000). “Neo-liberal poli-
cies” and “neo-liberalism”, as used often in this thesis, refer to an eco-
nomic ideology that is based on the promotion of “free market” princi-
ples or private sector supremacy as the best mechanism for allocation of 
resources when compared with the state or the public sector. With spe-
cific reference to the role of multilateral donors like the IMF and the 
World Bank, neo-liberal policies and strategies are conditionalities that 
these donors often attach to the aid money they provide to developing 
countries. Neo-liberal policies include privatisation of government ser-
vices and the productive sector, fiscal austerity and reduction in govern-
ment spending, removal of democratic controls over central banks and 
monetary policy, and facilitation of private sector development.  
2.3.2 Political transformation 
Any group of people, whether at family, society, state or federation level, 
uses politics as a means of making binding and collective decisions in or-
der to survive and achieve progress (Leftwich, 2006:9). Politics is the 
process through which individuals, people, and societies negotiate their 
collective goals and the means to those goals. According to Leftwich, 
politics is best understood or conceptualised as ‘‘consisting of all the ac-
tivities of cooperation, conflict, and negotiation involved in decisions 
about the use, production and distribution of resources’’ (2006:10). Poli-
tics is regarded as a distinctive “form of rule whereby people act together 
through institutionalised procedures to resolve differences, to conciliate 
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diverse interests and values and to make public policies in the pursuit of 
common purposes” (Crick, 2004:67).  
At the beginning of the path to development, politics does not pre-
suppose consensus about the type of political system that is suitable for 
governing a society. Where development progress has occurred, reaching 
consensus on the organisation of politics has not been smooth 
(Brautigam, 1997). From the Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries, countries have achieved high levels of 
development through a variety of political systems and governments.3 
Political systems are based on an understanding of who holds power in 
relations between the government and the people and how the govern-
ment uses power. In this regard, political systems could be authoritarian, 
monarchical, democratic or oligarchic. Political systems evolve, grow, 
break down or adapt under the influence of a number of factors—wars, 
colonisation, industrialisation, population growth, emergence of new po-
litical issues, extension of the scope of government activities, and many 
social, economic and technical factors. Those who believe in the Aristo-
telian position on the causes of stability and instability argue that the 
breakdown of political systems arises from an unequal match between 
distribution of wealth and power, while Marxist theorists consider 
changes in the mode of production to be the determinants of stability 
and instability (Miliband, 1977; Callinicos, 1987). Many other factors, 
such as disintegration of authority, quality of political leadership, eco-
nomic scarcity and deprivation, a sense of insecurity about the future, 
have also been identified as leading to political instability and radical 
change in political systems.  
Political transformation is defined as a radical change in the political 
systems, structure, institutions and processes of governing a country. It 
involves change in political structures; pattern of resource flows, distri-
bution of power between members and groups in a country and peaceful 
resolution of conflicts. Politics is an important factor in the transfor-
mation process of a country. According to Leftwich (2006), both con-
ceptually and practically, the influence of politics can be understood in 
two ways. The first concerns the “rules of the game” through which 
politics is organised. Both formal and informal rules complement each 
other. While formal institutions specify the rules, for instance the way 
elections may be organised and how power may be shared, these rules 
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can be made operational through the support of informal institutions. 
Leftwich explains this:  
For example, a cardinal informal rule is that where power is determined 
through elections, winners do not use their power to undermine or threaten 
the interests of the losers so much that either the losers do not abide by 
the result or withdraw from the underlying electoral contract. Equally, the 
losers must accept the outcome, knowing they can try again later. Without 
consensus about such rules, formal and informal, politics is prone to in-
stability, conflict and violence and, as a result, developmental processes are 
compromised, to say the least (Leftwich, 2006:4).  
The second level of politics relates to the “games within the rules”, 
that is, how political parties organise their internal structures and pro-
grammes within the established rules of the game to compete for power. 
In the early years of development, sets of agreed and legitimate institu-
tional rules may be in short supply and many competing and inconsistent 
sets of rules may exist instead. Some of these may be formal and infor-
mal and work to influence any attempt to change and transform political 
systems.  
There is no consensus on the types of political systems and regimes 
that promote development. It is all about what fits, based on a country’s 
context and social and economic culture. After independence, the politi-
cal regime that takes over the reins inherits a form of political system 
that is aligned to the former colonial master and sometimes is discon-
nected with their society (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2015). An important part 
of a political system is how it establishes channels of political action and 
agreed procedures for resolving conflicts peacefully. Throughout history, 
political transformation has been achieved either through violent revolu-
tion or peaceful elite bargain, or a combination of both. According to the 
OECD, any society that is not experiencing widespread conflict has ar-
rived at a form of political settlement: “Generally speaking, every politi-
cal regime that is not in the midst of an all-out civil war over its basic 
parameters is based on some kind of settlement” (OECD, 2011:9).  
A particular political system is not inherently efficient for all societies. 
For instance, while liberal democracies and decentralised economic 
structures and institutions were conducive to growth in North America 
and England in the nineteenth century (North, 1990), late developers like 
South Korea and Taiwan achieved their own development through de-
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velopmental centralised authoritarian regimes that coordinated invest-
ment (Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990). This suggests that endogenising poli-
tics in a way that would promote national development is necessary and 
may not conform to a particular type of politics. The various kinds of 
political settlement, whether democratic capitalist societies of the West 
(Hall and Soskice, 2001) or developmental state models of Southeast 
Asia (Haggard, 2004a, 2004b) may have positive or negative effects on 
development.  
Political transformation involves changes quite akin to those of eco-
nomic transformation. Just as the process of economic transformation 
involves corresponding changes from small-scale to large-scale agricul-
ture, so does political transformation involve changes from small-scale 
local politics to large-scale politics (Uphoff, 1972:233). In a developing 
polity, there are numerous small-scale local centres of politics where a 
greater part of the resources are exchanged between political authorities 
and clients. Persons outside the community hardly receive part of the 
resource exchange. When there is transformation, the scope of the polit-
ical market is expanded to enable equitable distribution of the power and 
resources that come with it. New political and administrative infrastruc-
ture is created. This includes political parties, elections, constitutions, 
legal structures, and communications media. In other words, when polit-
ical transformation takes place, the capacity of the political and adminis-
trative infrastructure is improved. 
Another important element of political transformation concerns fac-
tor endowments. In an underdeveloped polity, there is unequal factor 
endowment among participants in the political process. Fewer partici-
pants possess greater status, income, and authority and exercise more 
power than the majority. The few rich and powerful people accumulate a 
substantial amount of the factors of political production. According to 
Uphoff (1972:233), raising the “aggregate productivity of the political 
process” entails increasing factor endowments to the majority of the 
population. This can be done through improvement of the economic, 
social and educational status of the majority of the people and giving 
them equal citizenship rights. For example, supporting organisation of 
free and fair elections can disperse authority. If such improvements are 
not made, then one other political resource that the majority in number, 
but minority in power and resources, can resort to is social and political 
action, including violence. As Uphoff puts it, “violence is the only politi-
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cal resource left to any group, which is poor, ignoble, illiterate and disen-
franchised” (1972:234). Whilst the raison d’être of the UN and many civ-
il society organisations is to promote peace and avert violence in society, 
the majority of people that have been denied resources and power to 
improve their wellbeing, and whose peaceful attempts to change their 
situation have been ignored or crushed, view “violence” as the only op-
tion left to them for demanding a fair share of national resources. They 
see little justification for being denied the use of that option. This propo-
sition leads us to an important analytical concept that is relevant to this 
study—political settlement.  
Political settlement analysis provides deeper insights into how differ-
ent forms of politics and power relations underpin national develop-
ment. Di John and Putzel define political settlements as “the balance or 
distribution of power between contending social groups and social clas-
ses, on which any state is based” (2009:4). As noted earlier, policies are 
critical in shaping the transformation and development trajectory of a 
country; thus, it is important to know the characteristics of the govern-
ment that shapes national policies. Political settlement indicates the na-
ture of the ruling government that presides over economic and political 
resources of the country and its institutional capacity to effectively use 
the resources well for general development of the country. Political set-
tlement is a tacit agreement arrived at through struggle and negotiation 
between elite groups in society about the conditions under which peace-
ful competition for power is preferable to violent seizure of power. This 
tacit agreement is needed because in most cases in Africa, politics is 
fragmented along ethnic, regional and other fault lines. When there is 
political settlement, the relative power of the ruling government over 
other excluded groups is critical. The ruling government must have pow-
er over other political groups that are not part of the ruling coalition and 
at the same time have influence over lower-level factions that support 
the ruling government. The power of the ruling government over other 
groups vertically and horizontally determines its capacity to plan long-
term development. In addition, given that aid-recipient countries have an 
inadequate capitalist sector and the state has a narrow tax base, political 
settlements invariably involve tacit agreements regarding generation and 
distribution of economic rents (Booth, 2015:2).  
Distribution of state resources and economic rents among elites vis-à-
vis the general population is a key component in understanding varieties 
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of political settlements and their influence on development. In Africa, 
patronage and patron-client relations have long been key features of poli-
tics between rulers and the ruled (Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Leonard and 
Straus, 2003). The politics is characterised by reciprocal relationships be-
tween “patrons”, usually politicians that distribute state resources to fa-
voured recipients, and “clients” (individuals, business organisations, eth-
nic groups, and so on) who provide continuous support as a quid pro 
quo (Kelsall, 2011; 2013; Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, 2012). The politi-
cal system allows the patron to allocate and use state resources to build 
and hold together political coalitions. The African Power and Politics 
Programme (APPP) research identified variations of neo-patrimonial re-
gimes in terms of how economic rents are centralised and managed in 
support of national development. One such regime is developmental 
neo-patrimonialism (Booth and Golooba, 2012), which is of particular 
interest to this study. We will return to the discussion on the nature of 
political settlements that promote effective use of aid later in this chap-
ter. 
The character of developmental neo-patrimonialism involves the rul-
ing elite having the desire and capacity to promote national development 
through effective use of resources for public good instead of private in-
terests. The elites do so by forgoing their own personal interests or by 
expanding the national cake instead of their own accumulation. Under 
this regime type, the state bureaucracy operates in a well-disciplined 
manner. The leadership of such a regime has a vision that inspires the 
creation of rents and it disciplines rent seeking in order to expand in-
come through productive investment over the long term. The APPP 
analysis shows that such a regime always involves some combination of 
the following: a strong, visionary leader (often an independence or war-
time hero); a single or dominant party system; a competent and confi-
dent economic technocracy; a strategy to include, at least partially, the 
most important political groups in some of the benefits of growth, and a 
sound policy framework, meaning a broadly pro-capitalist, pro-rural bias 
(Booth, 2012:26).  
By centralising economic rent and limiting rent seeking, the leaders of 
such regimes have been able to steer rent creation into high productive 
economic areas involving increases in value-added, or transformations in 
productive capacities over time, instead of the simple quick wins that 
could be gained from embezzling money. Booth found that, over time, 
512566-L-sub01-bw-Awortwi
Processed on: 10-8-2017 PDF page: 66
40 CHAPTER 2 
 
there are noticeable development results not only in terms of growth 
rates above average, but also visible signs of important economic diversi-
fication, with both improvements in rural incomes and expansion of 
non-agricultural activities for domestic and export markets (Booth 
2012:26).  
In much of Africa, those in control of formal power and authority 
have used their positions to amass and expand their wealth and that of 
their cronies through a patron-client relationship. If aid is to become an 
effective catalyst to development, donors may have to be selective in tar-
geting structure and institutions or at least making them developmental 
in a dynamic way. In adapting the framework developed by Leftwich 
(2006:17-21) to this study, we see that aid must be able to facilitate trans-
formation of political and economic structures and institutions that 
promote development. 
According to Leftwich political and economic institutions and activi-
ties overlap and interlock in two ways:  
When people change the way they use, produce and distribute resources, 
they also change their (social and political) relations of power with each 
other.  
When people change their political and social (power) relations with each 
other, they usually change the way they use, produce and distribute re-
sources (2006:13).  
Since the 1980s, when the World Bank and Western donors em-
barked on neo-liberal policy prescriptions for Africa, an important policy 
concern for donors has been the need for governments to tackle the 
causes of corruption and inefficiencies associated with state intervention. 
Neo-liberal economic policies have restricted the role of the state in eco-
nomic transformation, emphasising provision of an enabling environ-
ment—infrastructure provision, rule of law and security, and social pro-
tection. The notion that good governance is needed before economic 
transformation can be achieved is not supported by historical evidence 
associated with Western countries or the Southeast Asian experience. On 
the basis of studies that have compared Africa and Asia, it is safe to con-
clude that some aspects of political transformation are needed to pro-
mote economic transformation, but they may not necessarily be defined 
by the Western notion of good governance or politics. While neo-
patrimonial regimes have presided over rapid economic growth and pov-
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erty reduction in Malaysia, Indonesia and South Korea, in the case of 
Africa, donors and many researchers have argued against the practice 
and have sought to make combating neo-patrimonialism a condition for 
receiving foreign aid.  
Many donor preferences on political transformation have focused on 
multi-party democracy without clear evidence that it promotes higher 
economic growth and better development than democracy in all socie-
ties. Looking for guidance as to whether a particular governance system 
promotes better development than others, Kelsall found: 
You turn to the academic literature. Frustratingly, there is little convincing 
evidence in the large-n, cross-national statistical literature for the develop-
mental superiority of either authoritarianism or democracy. Although 
some authors purport to find a positive relationship between democracy 
and development, the effects are small, while others find the reverse 
(Kelsall, 2014:3).  
Western liberal democratic practices seem to be the preference of 
many OECD countries, irrespective of the socio-cultural context in the 
recipient country. From their perspective, political transformation also 
means a transition from a single or military regime to a multi-party re-
gime, as well as sustaining and consolidating the long-run viability of that 
process (Resnick, 2013). In this case, ODA to promote political trans-
formation involves technical and financial assistance for the electoral 
process, support for anti-corruption activities, decentralisation, demo-
cratic participation, legislation and political parties, media, and building 
of civil society organisations. The 2011 Fourth High-Level Forum of Aid 
Effectiveness (UN, 2011) pinpointed “promoting human rights, democ-
racy, and good governance” as integral objectives of the international 
community. As political transformation takes place in a country with 
ODA playing a positive role, there is expected to be a shift to increasing-
ly consensual politics. There is a symbiotic change in the institutions that 
characterise relations between politics and economics. New institutions 
are developed that modify how power and resources are distributed be-
tween people and interest groups (Leftwich, 2006). Where there are disa-
greements on how these rules are organised, open conflict arises. This 
can take place between ethnic groups and between religious groups. 
Where there are sharp and deep cleavages of ethnicity, culture or reli-
gion, conflict may escalate and become violent. It is not unusual for new 
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interest groups to emerge, whose collective loyalties are narrower than 
national interest. When political transformation occurs among the popu-
lation, the citizens do not put their ethnic or religious identity above the 
national interest.  
Liberal democracy enables interaction of groups and group interests to 
be represented in formal political institutions.4 In democratic politics 
groups are able to mobilise and represent their interests through formal 
institutions (Smith, 1995; Held, 1996). This view of politics is associated 
with policy communities or networks. Here, interest groups, both public 
and private, including research organisations, form communities of prac-
tice in which policy issues are discussed beyond and outside the formally 
constituted bodies like Parliament or political parties. When based on 
liberal democratic assumptions, political transformation makes the return 
of military or single-party rule unlikely because of the existence of demo-
cratic and accountable institutions and competitive party systems. It is 
not just about conducting successive rounds of multi-party elections, but 
of sustaining that process and deepening its structures to the extent 
where a return to military rule or dictatorial rule is unimaginable. For in-
stance, in 1990s many African countries transitioned to multi-party de-
mocracy but by 2010 Burundi, the Central African Republic, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and Gambia had experienced the 
breakdown of democracy. 
In Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam, different types of political re-
gimes have delivered policies that actually promote economic transfor-
mation. According to Henley and van Donge (2012) none of the regimes 
in these countries conformed to the notion of good governance as de-
fined by the World Bank or the West. Moore and Schmitz (2008) and 
Steer and Sen (2010) argue that personal, informal relationships between 
investors and public officials may be more important than rules-based 
governance during the early stages of development. In fact, if one exam-
ines developed countries during their period of rapid development, it is 
difficult to find the kind of politics, rule of law and arm’s length relations 
between business and the state that are characterised as today’s good 
governance.  
The discussion so far on political transformation shows that there is 
no particular form of politics that is best for delivering development in 
all countries. Context matters and political transformation requires con-
tinuous change to the organisation of politics in a way that complements 
512566-L-sub01-bw-Awortwi
Processed on: 10-8-2017 PDF page: 69
 Aid as a Catalyst to Economic & Political Transformation and Development 43 
the economic and social development of a country. Relating this propo-
sition to the “aid as a catalyst to development” thesis, one can argue that 
foreign aid is more effective when it supports a recipient country in de-
veloping its political institutions, instead of prescribing or imposing a 
particular form of politics on that country.  
2.4 Catalyst Defined and Explained  
In chemistry and applied sciences, a catalyst is a substance or an agent (it 
can be liquid, solid or gas) that accelerates the chemical reaction in other 
substances or reactants but itself remains chemically unchanged at the 
end of the reaction process. In the catalysis process, a relatively small 
amount of the catalyst is added to the mix of pre-existing substances to 
augment the speed of reaction. It does this by reducing the barriers that 
would normally prevent a reaction. Some catalysts enable reaction in 
substances more efficiently and often with less waste than others, mean-
ing that catalysts can operate selectively depending on the mass composi-
tion of the reactants. The presence of inhibitors or poisons in the reac-
tants can reduce catalytic activity, while promoters (their opposites) 
speed up the reaction process (Hagen, 2006; Suarez, 2007). The brief 
explanation above highlights five key attributes of catalysis:  
1. A catalyst is a facilitator that speeds up the reaction of endogenous 
substances. The initiation of a reaction requires a minimum energy 
called ‘activation energy’. Higher activation energy is a barrier to reac-
tion, so a catalyst decreases the activation energy among participating 
substances and thus accelerates the reaction process. For example, 
hydrogen (H2) and Oxygen (O2) can be stored together to produce 
water (H2O). However, the moment platinum (which is a catalyst) is 
added, water generation occurs with explosive speed. 
2. A catalyst works with other substances by providing a convenient sur-
face for these substances to react. The reacting substances or particles 
gather around the catalyst surface and collide more frequently with 
one another. The more the reactants or particles collide with each 
other, the faster they break. A catalyst does not replace existing sub-
stances; it works with them, meaning that the quality and quantity of 
endogenous substances are important to produce the needed out-
come. If aid is assumed to be a catalyst, , then the substances it works 
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with to produce development are a country’s own resources, institu-
tions and agencies. 
3. The mass composition of the participating substances (reactants) 
must be predisposed to react with a catalyst. A catalyst attracts the 
molecule of the primary particles to its surface so that they are closer 
together and can react more easily. This means that the primary sub-
stances must be predisposed to chemical reaction when they come in-
to contact with a catalyst, or otherwise nothing happens. When the 
mass composition of the participating substances contains more in-
hibitors, catalytic processes are reduced (negative activation energy is 
released) but when the particles contain promoters, catalytic processes 
speed up (positive activation energy is released). This means that the 
composition of the participating substances affects the rate or speed 
of reaction. An illustration of catalytic leadership is provided by 
Liedtka, Rosen and Wiltbank (2009:7): 
Try putting a lit match to a pile of sugar. Nothing happens because ig-
niting sugar requires more heat than a single match or even a lighter 
can provide. So it stays just sugar. Nothing changes. But put just a little 
ash on top of the sugar pile and see what happens when you strike that 
match. 
4. In addition to accelerating reactions, another important property of a 
catalyst is its ability to direct reaction of a desirable product from a 
completely different starting material. This means that, to be able to 
direct a reaction to yield a preferred a new product, the catalyst has to 
be suited to a particular reactor. In other words, one cannot select a 
wrong catalyst and expect to yield the preferred new product. 
5. In theory, a catalyst does not change or would not be consumed at 
the end of the reaction process. This means that there is just as much 
catalyst at the end of a reaction as there was at the beginning. Never-
theless, some catalysts may be deactivated because of negative or poi-
sonous substances in the participating substances, which lowers the 
effectiveness of those catalysts. Thus, they need to be regenerated or 
replaced in the long run. In other words, as a catalyst is involved in 
chemical bonding with the reactants during a catalytic process, its ca-
pacity to accelerate reaction wears down over time, making replace-
ment or regeneration necessary.  
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These five characteristics will be the subject of conceptual analysis as 
we apply them to foreign aid. The concept is being applied metaphorical-
ly and therefore the reader is reminded not to take the meaning literally 
in its relation to aid.  
2.5 Application of Catalytic Attributes to Foreign Aid 
The claim that foreign aid can be a catalyst is based on existing literature 
and pronouncements by leading aid advocates after the Second World 
War. Since the success of the Marshall Plan, many development analysts 
have considered aid to be a catalyst to economic growth and have 
pushed for its application in developing countries to achieve the same 
success (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1961). In recent times Jan Pronk, the long-
est-serving Dutch Minister of Development Co-operation, has been a 
major advocate of the concept (see Pronk, 2001 series in Development and 
Change).  
When applied metaphorically to international development, aid as a 
catalyst represents external inputs (the catalysts) added to a country’s in-
ternal resources and institutions (economic, political, social and cultural) 
to speed up development. Aid as a catalyst accelerates the process in 
which a country’s economic resources are combined effectively with po-
litical and social institutions and ideas to respond to development chal-
lenges—economic growth, employment creation, poverty reduction, so-
cial justice, improved health care, and so on. That is to say, aid as a 
catalyst overcomes constraints to economic growth, transformation and 
development. The catalyst cracks the growth code by recognising that 
internal resources of a country are inadequate to bring faster transfor-
mation.  
We shall now systematically explore the conceptual ideas underlying 
the five attributes of a catalyst described above, with the aim of develop-
ing a model with which we can empirically analyse the case of aid as a 
catalyst to a country’s development. 
2.5.1 Aid as a facilitator of endogenous resource mobilisation and 
investment drive 
In 2001, Jan Pronk made a strong argument in Development and Change 
that aid must be seen as a catalyst instead of being regarded a prime 
mover of development (Pronk, 2001). His argument followed a similar 
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one developed by Rosenstein-Rodan in the late 1960s that “aid should be 
allocated where it will have the maximum catalytic effect in mobilising 
additional resources and effort” (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1969:1). Rosenstein-
Rodan’s arguments were partly based on the “two-gap” model developed 
by Chenery and Strout (1966) and the Harrod–Domar growth model.5  
The two-gap model was based on the premise that the engine of eco-
nomic growth is revenue mobilisation and investment. At the beginning 
of a country’s path to development, the rates of local savings tend to be 
too low to meet the needed levels of revenue mobilisation and invest-
ment (the savings–investment gap). Export earnings are also not suffi-
cient to provide the capital required to import the needed materials. This 
leads to a foreign exchange gap. Foreign exchange shortages can con-
strain the investment drive needed for economic growth, as low-income 
countries are unable to import the needed equipment and intermediate 
materials for production. Given that the accessibility of low-income 
countries to international private capital is limited, foreign aid provides 
the foreign exchange that these countries need for capital investment.  
A country needs to save at least 15-20% of its GDP to invest and grow. If 
you fail to do so, you have two options: FDI or aid. African countries find 
it difficult to attract sufficient FDI. A country may not be generating suffi-
cient revenue to undertake all the infrastructure projects it needs in order 
to promote specific sectors of the economy. Foreign aid is therefore need-
ed to supplement that. For instance, you can build 100 kilometres of roads 
with endogenous revenue but you need 300 kilometres. When you restrict 
road construction to 100 kilometres, you may not need aid, but if you look 
at where you want to go, then you need financial support to provide 300 
kilometres of roads. This is where a catalyst in the form of aid is needed to 
provide that extra push (Interview with former Finance Minister of Gha-
na, 15 August 2015). 
So the role of external aid is to fill foreign exchange and resource 
mobilisation gaps as a short-term measure to stimulate higher levels of 
investment. The basic rationale is that capital formation and investment 
will take a longer time to materialise in low-income economies if the only 
sources of finance are own savings and foreign exchange earning capaci-
ty. Foreign aid therefore augments the rate of capital investment in a re-
cipient economy just as a catalyst stimulates faster reaction in substances. 
As capital is formed through provision of aid, a cycle of investment cul-
ture is developed in the recipient country, providing opportunities for 
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higher savings, capital formation and further investment. The catalysis 
that is stimulated by foreign aid leads to economic transformation as the 
initial investment gridlock of foreign exchange or “missing money” is 
alleviated. In fact, development researchers and aid activists had believed 
in the “missing money” argument. Given that governments in develop-
ing countries have few sources of revenue, aid is expected to bridge the 
gap between the government’s revenue potential and what is needed to 
promote investment—the missing money. But how safe is this proposi-
tion in reality?  
A number of studies on the aid-investment-economic growth nexus 
have come to the conclusion that there is little or no positive correlation 
among the three variables in the developing world (Boone, 1994; Gwin 
and Nelson, 1997; Tsikata, 1998). Using empirical data from about 100 
countries, Boone showed that a recipient country is unlikely to invest any 
of the aid money if the total amount to GDP is less than 15%.. Boone’s 
findings were corroborated by Burnside and Dollar (1997), who found 
little correlation between foreign aid and economic growth from 1973 to 
1993. One important reason for this lack of catalysis is that a substantial 
part of bilateral aid to Africa is not allocated to or invested in productive 
sectors to generate capital-savings and investment drive. For instance, in 
1995–96 about 30% of bilateral aid was allocated to economic infrastruc-
ture, industry and production. A further 30% was for social and adminis-
trative infrastructure; 10% was for commodity aid, programme assistance 
and emergency aid (Development Assistance Committee, 1999:A43–4). 
In 2008, about 47% of ODA flows to African countries were allocated 
to the social sector and only 18% went to economic activity (Gyimah-
Brempong, Shaw and Samonis, 2012:2). Morrissey (2001:38) calculates 
that, on average, only about one-third of all bilateral aid is specifically 
intended for investment purposes  
Second, aid may have simply become a substitute for domestic sav-
ings, leading to increased consumption with negative effect on invest-
ment and subsequent growth (Griffin, 1970; Hansen and Tarp, 2000). A 
third reason for the lack of correlation is the fact that recipient govern-
ments tend to divert own resources to other ‘unproductive expenditure’ 
when aid money is used to finance investments. Lensink’s (1993) study 
in a number of sub- Saharan Africa economies in the 1980s drew a simi-
lar conclusion. Lensink showed that governments’ behaviour impeded 
the potential positive contribution of aid to economic growth. This was 
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because governments either failed to increase their effort on domestic 
savings or rather expanded their unproductive consumption expenditure. 
Fourth, even if a substantial part of aid is invested in productive sectors, 
the outcome of that investment depends on the quality of the overall 
policy environment of the recipient country and not on how much of the 
aid is invested. 
The above findings on the correlation between aid, investment and 
growth in a recipient country appear to run through the contemporary 
literature, overly emphasising the driving force of aid but with little con-
sideration to other key attributes of catalysis; that is, the participating 
substances or drivers that foreign aid is supposed to accelerate. Studies 
on the relationship between aid inflow and a recipient country’s devel-
opment sometimes fail to acknowledge the contribution of different en-
dogenous inputs/drivers. Using the concept of ‘mass composition', en-
dogenous drivers may include economic policies, institutions, structures, 
key actors and ideology. The features coalesce to influence the marginal 
propensity to invest aid money in productive ventures. As indicated ear-
lier, if aid money just becomes a substitute for, instead of stimulating, 
domestic savings in the recipient’s context, there can hardly be sufficient 
capital formation and investment necessary for economic growth. What 
if there were no adequate supporting investment opportunities in the 
recipient country? What if agricultural land, water resources, entrepre-
neurship, rainfall pattern, and so on, and not foreign exchange, were the 
critical investment or the “missing object”? This possibility makes it nec-
essary to analyse the mass composition of the recipient country’s endog-
enous resources or drivers of growth and transformation.  
2.5.2 Mass composition of the recipient country’s drivers of 
growth and transformation  
As a catalyst gathers all participating substances to itself to ensure faster 
reaction, so is aid supposed to provide a convenient platform for a coun-
try’s prevailing political and economic institutions to gather so they can 
interact or work together to provide faster development. What factors 
constitute a country’s growth engines that aid can work with to promote 
transformation and development? The Commission for Growth and 
Development (CGD) 2008 Report lists 13 high-growth economies 
whose development was highly facilitated by foreign aid at the beginning 
of their transformation process. The economies include China, Indone-
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sia, Singapore, Malaysia, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Botswana, and 
Mauritius. The report shows that while there is remarkable diversity in 
the list—in size, governing structures, endowments, location, and eco-
nomic challenges—these economies had many things in common in 
their development process. They (i) adopted good policies; (ii) exploited 
and managed endogenous natural resources very well; (iii) possessed 
strong institutions; and (iv) had committed, credible, and capable state 
leadership (Ackah and Kutsoati, 2008; CGD, 2008). These can be con-
sidered to be growth and transformation engines on which aid can have 
a positive effect. Let us now discuss the composition of the growth en-
gines.  
i. Existing economic policies that aid works with to stimulate 
development 
A country’s economic policies are important determinants of the overall 
orientation of the government towards economic transformation and 
subsequent development. Government economic policies affect systems 
for setting money supply, ownership of national resources, taxation, 
trade policy, redistribution of income, and the role of the state vis-à-vis 
the private sector. The literature on aid and growth seems to support the 
argument that aid can be an effective catalyst if appropriate economic 
policies are in place (Burnside and Dollar, 1997). Economic policies are 
broadly divided into two schools of thought—focusing, respectively, on 
market-led or state-led development. Economic liberalisation policies 
support the giving of greater economic freedom to the market instead of 
relying on government interventions. Socialism and communism, in con-
trast, are characterised by collective ownership of the means of produc-
tion and substantial involvement of the state in production. In between 
the two poles are variants of the two approaches.  
Aid becomes a catalyst to development when it facilitates better mac-
ro-economic policymaking in the recipient country. As Pronk asserts, 
foreign aid must augment a recipient country’s efforts to seek, find, 
choose and follow the right development policies. Burnside and Dollar 
(1997) warned that if donors want to experience economic improvement 
in aid-recipient countries, they have to place emphasis on good macroe-
conomic policies by these countries. Pronk supports this view and sug-
gests “more emphasis on better policies in order to achieve higher im-
pact” (Pronk, 2001:626). Foreign aid may catalyse a country’s policy-
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making by providing technical advice and ensuring that aid is provided 
on the condition that changes are made to prevailing policies to make 
them better. In other words, donors offer financial or technical assis-
tance as an inducement to recipients to adopt policies that they think are 
needed for development.  
Aid proponents believe in conditionality, that when aid money is in-
vested in a bad policy environment, its catalytic role will be constrained. 
Aid conditionality is not new; the Marshall Plan recipients also had to 
adhere to a strict set of conditions imposed by the USA. In the 1980s 
and 1990s, conditionality was an important instrument for compelling 
aid recipient countries to undertake policy reform. However, many do-
nors from the OECD countries prescribed economic policies based on 
ideologies that resembled theirs instead of the recipients’. The assump-
tion was that the recipient country was poor because its economic poli-
cies were weak. From the late 1980s onwards, the OECD’s economic 
policy prescription was market liberalisation (financial liberalisation, ex-
change rate flexibility, fiscal discipline, tax reforms, privatisation, and so 
forth, generally referred to as the Washington Consensus) (Williamson, 
1994:26-8). While bilateral aid agencies might pick and choose from any 
of the above market-based instruments as one of the conditions for 
providing aid, the IMF in particular has been keen on fiscal discipline 
while the World Bank has insisted on trade liberalisation, privatisation 
and public sector reforms (Koeberle et al., 2005; World Bank, 2007).  
It is assumed that, without conditionality, an important growth engine 
like macroeconomic policy would not be a priority for the recipient 
country. However, critics of conditionality have argued that selectivity 
principles should be used instead. Just as a catalyst is selective about the 
particles it attracts, so should aid donors. The selectivity principle in-
volves aid being channelled to countries that have already demonstrated 
their commitment to policies that are needed for it to work (Collier, 
1997; Kaufmann et al., 1999; Hout, 2002;). Aid selectivity assumes that if 
a country already has policies that support development in place  for 
example, investment in education and health, exchange rates that provide 
incentives for exports, trade policies that encourage competition, prices 
and interest rates that encourage investment, fiscal and monetary policies 
that check inflation, and so on  then aid will be effective in promoting 
economic growth and development (Amprou, et al., 2007).  
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Lancaster observes that, on the basis of the selectivity principle, 
Scandinavian countries, for example, favoured African countries like 
Tanzania that had a social-democratic orientation similar to their own. 
The USA and Germany, at least on the level of rhetoric, favoured coun-
tries with policies that supported expansion of the private sector (Lan-
caster, 2008:52).  
A country’s own policies drive development. Collier (1997) criticises 
the use of conditionality because it undermines the choices that an aid-
recipient country would have made had aid not come in between. The 
presence of aid has the potential to compromise reform ownership be-
cause aid simply buys the decision and efforts to reform bad policies in 
recipient countries. He argues that aid allocated on the “basis of selectivi-
ty” is better than “conditionality” because the aid-recipient country 
would have already made the choice to reform the policy environment, 
hence ownership would not have been undermined by the presence of 
aid. The World Bank’s study (Collier, 1997) found aid to be more effec-
tive in countries with already supportive economic policies. The study’s 
findings gave the principle of selectivity a boost in aid discussions and 
development policy analysis (World Bank, 2007). The principle of selec-
tivity was expanded beyond economic policies to include the quality of 
governance—for example, political openness and degree of corruption. 
For instance, the US government used the selectivity principle to design 
its new aid agency—the Millennium Challenge Corporation, which was 
to disburse aid to countries only on the basis of 16 criteria such as good 
governance, free markets and investment in human capital.6  
The selectivity principle is consistent with how catalysts work in in-
dustrial chemistry. As indicated earlier, catalysts operate selectively de-
pending on first, the mass composition of the prevailing reactants, and 
second, the choice of the catalyst added. If the existing reactants do not 
contain the chemicals that are predisposed to react with a catalyst, noth-
ing happens. The catalyst becomes ineffective. So, for aid to be an effec-
tive catalyst, the mass composition of the prevailing policies must be 
compatible with aid principles; otherwise, aid becomes an expensive in-
put with no returns. The potency of a catalyst is reduced if it has to ex-
pend on building new substances instead of accelerating existing ones. In 
fact, the work of a catalyst is not to rebuild or replace the mass composi-
tion of existing substances. Aid does not have to develop new policies 
but, if it would act as a catalyst, it transforms existing policies to make 
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them potent to development. And, as history shows, this depends nei-
ther on market or state, but on a combination of state and market in a 
way that is appropriate to a country’s context. Boyce and others have 
criticised the selectivity principle and caution that if donors decide simp-
ly to wait until ‘bad performers’ change their behaviour before providing 
aid, they may wait for a very long time for many ‘failing states’ to shape 
up (Pronk, 2001; Boyce, 2002).  
Countries that need aid the most are the ones with institutional and 
political challenges that aid must help to meet. Pronk (2001) reflected on 
selectivity policy prescriptions of foreign aid and came to the conclusion 
that aid should help turn around structures that are not conducive to de-
velopment. It means a change in prevailing political settlement that is not 
conducive to development. Aid should help recipients to stabilise and 
reform their economies in order to achieve growth and development, 
instead of donors expecting low-income countries to achieve all the bet-
ter policies alone. Aid should be used as a catalyst to get policies re-
formed or improved. Pronk (2001) and Boyce (2002) point out that 
many of the countries that Burnside and Dollar identify as ones in which 
aid is working because of a good policy environment are among those 
that need less foreign assistance. In contrast, countries that do not have 
good policies in place may need help to bring them on track. Though the 
selectivity and conditionality arguments differ in their perspective on 
what comes first (reform before aid or aid for reforms)   analogous to 
the chicken-and-egg problem—both acknowledge that good internal pol-
icies are needed if aid is to catalyse development.  
ii. Recipient countries’ participating institutions in the catalysis 
In addition to focusing on macroeconomic policies, several authors have 
also emphasised the importance of prevailing institutions in the recipient 
countries (North, 1990, 1994; World Bank, 1998; Ostrom et al., 2002). 
Their position is that in analysing how and whether aid effectively cataly-
ses development, one needs to understand the nature of the prevailing 
institutions that distribute resources and power in the recipient country. 
One particular institutional element is the nature of the ruling political 
regime that creates institutions, its sources of power and its capacity to 
act effectively in formulating and implementing programmes that are 
supported by aid. When the nation-state is unbundled as a unit, one is 
able to identify different economic, political and social interest groups 
512566-L-sub01-bw-Awortwi
Processed on: 10-8-2017 PDF page: 79
 Aid as a Catalyst to Economic & Political Transformation and Development 53 
that work individually or collectively either to catalyse or to work against 
aid effectiveness. 
After decades of trying to understand the challenges of replicating the 
Marshall Plan in developing countries, it is now widely accepted that one 
of the key constraints to development in poor countries is ‘missing insti-
tutions’ or ‘perverse institutions’ (North, 1990, 1994; World Bank, 1998; 
Ostrom et al., 2002). Rather than pointing a finger at “missing money”, 
which foreign aid tries to provide, analysts now pick out the ways in 
which prevailing institutions in aid-recipient countries create constraints 
to aid effectiveness (Bates, 1998; Killick, Gunatilaka and Mar, 1998; Cat-
terson and Lindahl, 1999).  
Institutions are defined as “formal and informal rules of the game 
that coordinate human interaction, and structure incentives in human 
exchange, whether political, social, or economic” (North, 1990:3). Insti-
tutions are formal if they are enforced by the state, and informal if they 
are self-enforced or enforced partly or entirely by non-state actors or 
agencies (Khan, 2012). A catalytic aid process involves many agents, in-
cluding donor governments, donor agencies, the recipient government 
and bureaucratic agencies, contractors, interest groups in the donor and 
recipient country polities, and the citizens of the recipient countries that 
interact in a continuous complex tangle of relations. Each of these actors 
functions within systems of institutions and structures that promote or 
inhibit the objectives of aid and individual actors’ interest. Perverse in-
centives may arise from unfavourable institutional circumstances in the 
recipient country, but they may also arise from the manner in which aid 
is delivered (Ostrom et al., 2002).  
The adoption and adaptation of policies that result in structural trans-
formation in society involve bargains among interest groups. A review of 
existing literature that puts institutions at the core of development analy-
sis yields three types of institutions that are relevant to this study: politi-
cal, economic and bureaucratic (Khan, 1999, 2000; DFID, 2003; Kelsall, 
2013; Booth, 2014; Hickey et al., 2015). These institutions provide the 
lens for analysing elite consensus or political settlements in a country. 
This thesis argues in subsequent sections that the nature of political set-
tlements in an aid recipient country may promote or inhibit that coun-
try’s transformation and development. 
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Political institutions 
Political institutions define the rules of the game regarding politics, polit-
ical systems, the distribution of power, political regimes, and policy space 
and contestation. Once a regime type is established, it begins to set, 
maintain and enforce political systems, institutions and standard proce-
dures for conducting politics. In addition, political institutions also set 
socio-economic goals, standards, and actions, which facilitate growth and 
development. The relative power of a ruling government, compared with 
the opposition or those outside power corridors, can affect the nature 
and growth of political institutions in a country. When a country gains 
independence from a colonial ruler or discovers natural resources, the 
nature of the ruling coalition is also critical in ensuring successful transi-
tion to a new development path. This is because prevailing political insti-
tutions dictate the direction of development and use of resources in what 
can be described as path dependency. This is why tracing the nature of 
the political settlement at the time of independence is necessary for un-
derstanding how it will set in motion the subsequent development paths 
available to a new nation. We will revisit this line of argument in later 
discussions on developmental regimes.  
Bureaucratic institutions 
The institutional structure of the state is anchored in bureaucratic sys-
tems. This administrative structure of the state provides policy advice as 
well as financial and organisational capabilities to implement pro-
grammes of the state, including those related to foreign aid. The ability 
of a recipient country to negotiate aid conditions and to utilise aid money 
effectively depends on the capacity of the state bureaucracy. Promoting 
the effective use of aid money demands targeted investments, policies 
and programmes. The capacity of the state bureaucracy to coordinate the 
implementation and monitoring of aid-supported programmes is neces-
sary to ensure efficiency. The state institutions responsible for coordina-
tion have to play an active role in facilitating structural change 
(Breisinger and Diao, 2008; Barendsen et al., 2013; Dorosh and Mellor, 
2013). Bureaucratic organisations bargain for power and resources to 
deliver and enforce state policies and programmes. Therefore, the degree 
to which power is distributed horizontally and vertically within the bu-
reaucracy has implications on how aid programmes can be coordinated 
between central and local bureaucracies. Vertically, central bureaucracy 
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may share power with local bureaucracy; and horizontally, a central or 
sectoral agency may be created to coordinate decisions and programmes 
of other sectors. For example, a Ministry of Economic Planning is creat-
ed to coordinate implementation and monitoring of aid projects across 
sectoral ministries. If there are multiple and powerful ministries in the 
country, central coordination of aid projects will be difficult.  
As central and local bureaucratic organisations interact continuously, 
if the local organisations act in concert with the central bureaucratic or-
ganisation, the latter will likely use its authority to centralise bureaucratic 
power in order to effectively implement rent-creation and rent-
management strategies that best serve its interest. However, if local bu-
reaucratic organisations are strong enough to resist central domination, 
because decentralisation policies have given them power and resources 
or because donors are implementing direct decentralised cooperation 
projects, then they will implement programmes suitable for local devel-
opment. A country where bureaucracy is weak at the central agency level 
is also likely to have weaker capability at the lower level. A weak state 
bureaucracy in terms of technical capacity and power is likely to have 
constraints in its bargaining with political organisations. The mode of aid 
delivery itself can also negatively affect the capacity of the state bureau-
cracy to learn, if aid externalises policymaking and implementation to 
consultants instead of government departments and agencies. For exam-
ple, in the 1990s, donor policies and aid conditionalities shrank state bu-
reaucracy and replaced it with private sector managerialism and quasi-
market structures. As a result, the ability of government bureaucrats to 
plan and independently develop state policies and programmes was 
weakened (Lancaster, 1999).  
Economic institutions  
Economic institutions comprise all collective productive actors, ranging 
from informal peasant farms or craft-based manufacturing to formally 
organise large firms (Khan, 2013:20). Economic organisations are influ-
enced by activities of formal and informal political and bureaucratic insti-
tutions. The bargaining power of economic institutions is a critical de-
terminant of the likely use of state resources, including foreign aid, in 
supporting capital accumulation, competitiveness and acquisition of 
technology. Where traditional small economic organisations with low 
productive capabilities dominate, there is a significant constraint to eco-
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nomic transformation. Where economic organisations face severe bar-
gaining power challenges or are incapable of becoming competitive, they 
may work towards capturing rents. Based on the extent to which the 
most important economic organisations have productive capabilities and 
bargaining power relative to political and bureaucratic institutions, differ-
ent forms of political settlements may result that have effects on how 
state resources are allocated, used for national development or appropri-
ated by elites. 
 If the majority of economic organisations in an aid recipient country 
have high capability and political power/support, there is great potential 
for these organisations to become competitive by taking advantage of 
short-term capital that aid injects into the economy. They are also able to 
influence the direction of the use of aid money to expand their competi-
tiveness in the international market, thereby expanding production, 
productivity and employment creation. Such economic organisations be-
come positive endogenous drivers that are able to work with aid provid-
ed it is selectively focused on improving the global economic competi-
tiveness of these firms. Mauritius is a classic case where foreign aid 
provided by the USA through the African Growth and Opportunity Act 
(AGOA) facilitated the business competitiveness of local manufacturing 
companies to export abroad (Teal, F. 1999; Chernoff and Warner, 2002; 
ACET, 2013).  
According to Khan (2013:21), in a country where economic organisa-
tions have ‘moderate to low capability but powerful bargaining power’ 
there will be weak incentives to focus on achieving competitiveness un-
less the political and bureaucratic environment creates the conditions for 
them. Because firms are already powerful, they may be able to appropri-
ate aid money from the ruling party and waste it since they have low ca-
pacity. Given their strong connection with the ruling regime, they will be 
unwilling to accept strong disciplining and monitoring. In the end, these 
organisations will use their superior political power to capture rents and 
resources, including aid money, from the state, but are unable to deliver 
(Khan, 1999, 2000).  
The nature of political settlements that promote effective use of aid 
Given that aid works within the prevailing political settlement, it is ex-
pected that a configuration of economic, political and bureaucratic insti-
tutions that provides a coalition for aid to work effectively will be the 
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ideal type for development. Hickey et al. (2015: 4) find that “this form of 
analysis is helpful for generating insights into the ways in which configu-
ration of power shapes the national-level incentives to which political 
elites respond when it comes to governing resources.” The type of polit-
ical settlement could explain why ambitious development strategies of 
the East Asians may not have been successful in Africa. As Khan indi-
cates, the East Asian political settlement had weak political organisations, 
which was a result of the strategies adopted by Japan during colonial 
rule, while typical British and French colonial strategies involved local 
people in colonial administration and divide-and-rule practices. Hence, 
political organisations that evolved out of Africa were stronger than 
those in Asia (Khan, 1999, 2000). Khan (2010, 2012), Kelsall (2013), 
North (1990) and Whitfield and Therkildsen (2011) inform the analysis 
in this thesis of how different configurations of institutions (political, 
economic and bureaucratic) influence aid effectiveness in a country. 
The bargaining between political, economic and bureaucratic institu-
tions and agents results in a social order or political settlement that ena-
bles distribution of resources and power in society (Khan, 2010; 2012).7 
Political settlement is anchored in the proposition that institutions are a 
key influence on other, non-institutional, means that lead to social order 
in a country (North et al., 2009). Political organisations mobilise their 
members and constituencies to win power. Economic organisations en-
gage in organising production. Typically, both seek to change institutions 
and resource distribution in ways that favour their interests. If enforce-
ment of institutions works against the interest of organisations, they will 
use their relative power to contest or obstruct this enforcement. Many 
analysts of political settlements, like Whitfield (2011a), Khan (2013) and 
Booth (2014), argue that elite bargaining in political, economic and bu-
reaucratic institutions shapes a country’s developmental path by influenc-
ing developmental possibilities.  
Since much of ODA is anchored in the state, it is important to under-
stand the actors that form the political settlement in a country and how 
that settlement facilitates or inhibits effective use of aid money. As Di 
John and Putzel (2009:18) state, “Not only does the political settlement 
set the constraints for what can and cannot be accomplished with for-
eign assistance, but foreign assistance itself can have an impact on the 
type of political settlement.” The quadrant in Table 2.1 that depicts ac-
tors/institutions that form political settlements and further influence 
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transformation or lack of it in a country. This study contends that for aid 
to facilitate transformation and development in a country, the powers 
and incentives that these actors have in any political settlement is critical.  
Table 2.1 
Actors/institutions that determine the nature of political settlement  
in a country 
 High Power  
Strong Incentives 
Political elites  
State bureaucrats 
 Military 
 Police 
Business associations 
Managers of public corporations  
Employers’ association 
Donors 
Traditional council 
Faith-based organisations 
Leaders of labour unions 
Transnational corporations Weak Incentives 
Small enterprises 
Commercial banks 
Local politicians 
Party foot-soldiers 
Commercial farmers 
Civil society organisations 
 Think tanks 
Women’s groups 
Youth associations 
Peasant farmers  
Informal sector workers 
The poor 
 Low Power  
Source: Adapted from Oduro et al. (2014:12). 
 
The top left cell of the quadrant shows actors with significant power 
and incentives to either keep or change the status quo political settle-
ment. They are the key actors that drive development or block it since 
they possess high power and strong incentives to either effectively direct 
the use of aid or misappropriate it. They are the key drivers of develop-
ment in a country.  
Actors in the bottom left cell have little power but strong incentives 
to change or keep the status quo. Given their strong incentives, if such 
actors are able to form a coalition or are supported with foreign aid, they 
become a countervailing force to those in the top left cell.  
The actors in the top right cell have strong power but weak incentive 
to change prevailing political settlement. These groups could be part of 
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the elites or former ruling elites. When they have access to aid money, 
they are likely to use it for their own interest instead of for the provision 
of collective goods.  
Those in the bottom right cell have little power and weak incentives 
to change the present political settlement. These actors are likely to be 
the working class, the bottom of the pyramid, and peasants. The ability 
of a ruling government to survive politically depends on how much it is 
able to finance a coalition among the actors. Given that most countries 
in the developing world are unable to adequately finance political order 
through formal budgets on the basis of tax payments, rents from natural 
resources, import tax, VAT and so on, foreign aid, rent creation and rent 
seeking are alternative sources that ruling elites use to pay for the cost of 
forming and maintaining a large coalition.  
The literature identifies different types of political settlements that 
may be arrived at during the struggle and negotiation between the actors 
to build a coalition to rule a country (Lewis, 2007; Khan, 2010; Kelsall, 
2013; Levy; 2014; Booth, 2015). Khan 2012 identifies four types of polit-
ical settlement that are applicable to the Ghanaian context. They are: po-
tential developmental coalition, authoritarian coalition, dominant party, 
and competitive clientelism. It is postulated that some types of political 
settlements are amenable to aid effectiveness whilst others are not. Polit-
ical settlements analysis helps to understand why some regimes are able 
to pursue a successful long-term developmental path while others are 
not. 
Developmental coalition regime 
In this type of political settlement, the ruling coalition has substantial 
power over excluded groups. In addition, within the ruling coalition, 
lower-level members of the regime have less power. This prevailing 
power condition is likely to give ruling governments long-term security 
to implement plans. Given that lower-level supporters have less power 
to challenge national politicians, the ruling government has high capacity 
to enforce programme implementation. If the aid recipient country has 
many economic organisations with ‘high capability’ but weak bargaining 
power in relations with politicians and bureaucrats, there may be strong 
incentives for political organisations to extract rents from these highly 
competitive economic organisations.8 If the ruling political organisation 
and state bureaucracy have long-term vision, strong leadership, and ca-
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pacity to plan and manage rents, there may be strong incentives and op-
portunities for such states to pursue a developmental agenda. When for-
eign aid is provided to such regimes, it has the potential to catalyse de-
velopment. Singapore, under Lee Kuan Yew, and Malaysia, under 
Mahathir Mohamad, are examples of such a setup. The literature also 
mentions South Korea and Taiwan from the 1960s to 1980s, and Bot-
swana in the 1970s (Khan, 2012; Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, 2012). 
Rwanda, under Paul Kagame, and Ethiopia during Meles Zenawi’s rule, 
are two of the developmental states that are gradually developing in Afri-
ca.  
Authoritarian regime 
In this political settlement, the power of excluded groups is strong, but 
the ruling government uses force and restrictions (formal and informal) 
to control them. Because of the vulnerability of such a government to be 
overthrown violently by excluded groups, long-term planning and use of 
aid are restricted to the short term unless the ruling regime has strong 
support from the military. Ghana in the 1980s, under Jerry Rawlings, 
could be described as such. Khan points out that it is easier for an au-
thoritarian regime to be sustained longer when there are supportive fac-
tors, such as natural resources, rents and military, that bolster the capa-
bility of the ruling coalition to exclude other members of society. He 
cites the military government in Pakistan in the 1960s and Bangladesh in 
the 1980s and 1990s as examples of authoritarian coalition government 
(Khan, 2010:65). Like the developmental state, authoritarian regimes 
with capacity and strong military support can use aid to undertake radical 
structural reforms that are needed for development. Chapter 5 uses the 
Ghana case study to show that Rawling’s regime was of this type, using 
aid money to undertake better policy reforms unlike many democratic 
regimes. Elsewhere in Africa, authoritarian regimes, too, have used re-
sources for their own survival instead of development (Ayittey, 1998; 
Clark, 2002).  
Dominant political party regimes 
Under this type of regime, the ruling government has substantial power 
because excluded political groups are few and weak. It can also mean 
that almost all or the majority of the powerful groups may be involved in 
the dominant party. A dominant regime could also emerge because ex-
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cluded factions are too fragmented to pose any effective threat to the 
dominant party. Unlike an authoritarian government, the dominant party 
is able to win contested elections without the use of the military to ex-
clude others. . Khan cites Thailand, under Thaksin, in 2001; and Tanza-
nia, under the ruling party Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) in 1992. A sin-
gle dominant party (Botswana Democratic Party) has ruled Botswana 
since independence in 1966. Where the ruling government faces little 
opposition or threat from excluded political organisations, the ruling 
coalition has strong incentives to implement its policies and intervention 
programmes without fear of losing power. If economic and bureaucratic 
organisations are strong, they can be used to transform the country be-
cause aid is able to catalyse what is already fit for transformation and will 
be operating in a good institutional environment. The ruling coalition is 
able to use aid money and the conditionality involved to pursue tough 
developmental policies without fear of losing power. The ruling govern-
ment therefore has a long-term horizon to its plans. However, if both 
economic and bureaucratic institutions have low capacity, and because 
there is little possibility of political competition, much of the develop-
mental trajectories will depend on the dominant party. With no threat of 
losing power, a dominant party with good visionary leadership is likely to 
promote long-term developmental ambitions. However, if the leadership 
of the ruling dominant party has little capacity to extract rent and man-
age properly, such a dominant party could be less developmental. 
Democratic competitive clientelism 
Under a democratic competitive regime, excluded political groups are as 
strong as the ruling government. On the basis of this, there is a high ten-
dency for excluded groups, too, to win power and take over from a rul-
ing government. Ruling coalitions often try to retain power by ensuring 
that they are able to win support from outside the coalition or retain ex-
isting members of the coalition through extension of state patronage and 
clientelist relations. Given the vulnerability of ruling governments, short-
term planning to win votes and stay in power is preferred to long-term 
planning. According to Whitfield (2011) this type of political settlement 
has the potential to prevent a country from turning growth into structur-
al transformation. A competitive clientelist political settlement has the 
potential to undermine the functioning of bureaucratic institutions, 
which will lead to inefficiency in institutions that provide public goods. 
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According to Levy (2014) a competitive clientelist political system is like-
ly to be characterised by electoral competition that distributes resources 
to citizens with an expectation of votes rather than focusing on policies 
and intervention programmes.  
Such political settlements provide opportunities for the ruling coali-
tion not to implement tough economic policies. To sustain its rule, the 
ruling coalition would have to spend more state resources to buy the 
support of opposition groups or to keep its slim majority in power. Sub-
stantial state resources, including aid money, if not ring-fenced, could be 
wasted in such a political settlement. In addition, the government would 
not be able to implement fiscal discipline measures like increasing na-
tional taxation or cutting unneeded subsidies. All these could lead to do-
nors having to include tough conditionality and credible threat of with-
drawal of aid.  
The above premises show that a political settlement or social order in 
a country is driven by a complex relationship between political, econom-
ic and bureaucratic organisations and institutions that may have signifi-
cant consequences for the effective use of a country’s resources and for-
eign aid. There are strengths and weaknesses in each of the political 
settlements, but the bottom line is how they enable consensus on expan-
sion of the national cake for the public in general instead of sharing it 
among the few. While the four typologies on political settlements may 
not be mutually exclusive, as sometimes a developmental state could also 
be dictatorial and could be led by a dominant political party (for instance, 
Singapore, under Lee Kuan Yew, was seen as dictator supported by a 
dominant party —the People’s Action Party—and so is Rwanda under 
Paul Kagame). The key factor of political settlement is elite consensus on 
how power and resources are distributed among actors and institutions 
outside or inside the ruling coalition. 
Booth (2015) argues that developmental and structural transformative 
outcomes come about from governments that adopt an iterative and 
adaptive policymaking process supported by a stable political settlement 
that is insulated from short-term clientelist imperatives of ruling elites to 
stay in power. In recent times, the Ethiopian government under the 
leadership of Melese Zenawe has vocally pursued an activist develop-
mental coalition approach to economic transformation and develop-
ment. According to Meles (2012), the neo-liberal paradigm is a “dead-
end” incapable of bringing about structural transformation that is highly 
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needed to extricate poor countries from the shackles of underdevelop-
ment. He points out that the history of Africa is replete with negative 
outcomes brought about by the workings of predatory regimes. Looking 
for a third way, Meles suggests that poor countries in Africa have to 
draw historical lessons from East Asia that adequately address develop-
ment through an activist state approach (Meles, n.d). He labels such a 
developmental state as an actor that strives to eliminate market failures 
and uses a carrot and stick approach in dealing with the private sector so 
as to promote growth-enhancing behaviour instead of rent-seeking dis-
positions and practices (Meles, 2012).  
In most of the East Asian countries, a relatively stable political set-
tlement, facilitated by a dominant party regime, was conducive to efforts 
aimed at realising long-term developmental goals. An activist develop-
mentalist policy has been successful in Rwanda and Ethiopia to unlock 
prospects for sustained growth in a manner unprecedented in the history 
of the two countries. Behind this developmental success lies a relatively 
stable political settlement centred on the programmatic drives of the rul-
ing party. Successful state intervention, rent management and centralisa-
tion required strong political leadership committed to achieving the set 
objectives and spearheaded by a ruling party with ideological coherence 
in steering ongoing developmental efforts. 
iii. Availability of endogenous resource endowments 
The availability of natural resources can help to stimulate development 
or lay the foundation that aid can build on to promote productive 
growth. The literature is replete with analyses of the paradox of ‘natural 
resources curse’ where countries that are generously endowed with natu-
ral resources (such as minerals and oil) tend to promote bad institutions, 
and suffer from corruption, civil wars, Dutch disease, and neglect of ed-
ucation and economic diversification (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; Want-
chekon, 1999; Ross, 2000; Clark, 2002). For example, the diamond boom 
in Sierra Leone contributed to that nation’s impoverishment because of 
weak institutions and poor leadership (Davies, 2000, 2006). Poverty in 
Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo is also a perverse conse-
quence of their wealth in oil and minerals, respectively. In all three coun-
tries, the political settlement provided poor leadership and selfish elites 
who mismanaged the proceeds from natural resources for their own 
benefit instead of the good of the nation. The natural resource curse lit-
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erature shows that abundant natural resources inhibit transformation of 
the type experienced by China and Malaysia (Sachs and Warner, 1995, 
2001). 
Nevertheless, natural resources, if available, can provide the fulcrum 
around which aid can catalyse development. Botswana avoided the natu-
ral resource curse by investing the proceeds from diamond exploitation 
in productive economic development and education (Acemoglu et al., 
2003). As a result, it is now among the most successful countries in Afri-
ca. The existence of natural resources provides potential for a country to 
use aid to harness them and, over time, wean itself from aid. Limited re-
sources pose a constraint to economic development as a country may 
become aid-dependent forever.  
As Zimmermann observes, “Resources are not, they become” 
(1951:814–5). The resource endowments of a country are changeable 
over time. A country’s ability to shift from the production of primary 
commodities to industrial production is partly determined by its resource 
endowments. Economic diversification involves a switch from exploita-
tion of resource endowment that uses high labour inputs to the one that 
uses capital and technology to achieve higher returns (Lin, 2012). Lin 
argues that “the best way to upgrade a country’s endowment structure is 
to develop its industries at any specific time according to the compara-
tive advantages determined by its given endowment structure at that 
time” (2012:5). Introduction of new technologies through technical assis-
tance can help turn a comparative resource endowment to an economic 
advantage. This also means that foreign aid can facilitate the transfor-
mation of a country by providing technical and financial support to ef-
fectively exploit the natural resources of an aid recipient country. Such 
efforts enhance the growth of a country that would not have been possi-
ble if no natural resources were available.  
iv. Importance of geography  
Endogenous resources must be reactive to catalytic aid, but to what ex-
tent can foreign aid facilitate development in a country whose geograph-
ical location makes it so handicapped, for instance, that it cannot be 
competitive in international trade or transformative development? Deliv-
ering a speech at the United Nations Conference on Women and Devel-
opment on 13 June 2000, Haussmann (2009:3) quoted U.S. Treasury 
Secretary Lawrence Summers as decrying “the tyranny of geography”. 
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Summers was quoted as warning against the conclusion that “the eco-
nomic failures of isolated, tropical nations with poor soil, an erratic cli-
mate and vulnerability to infectious disease can be traced simply to the 
failure of governments to put in place the right enabling environment.” 
Using geographical location as an explanation for development failure 
may be perceived in some quarters as being offensive, but the reality is 
that tropical countries face many geographical constraints to develop-
ment. With about 75% of Africa lying between the tropics, these con-
straints handicap many small and large countries in the continent. Two 
major factors contribute to the high incidence of poverty in tropical 
countries in comparison with temperate countries: diseases and low agri-
cultural productivity (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012).  
Tropical diseases are notoriously difficult to eradicate. For years now, 
the only success achieved has been yellow fever vaccine . Despite billions 
in aid money having been invested in combating malaria, there is as yet 
no vaccine against it. Malaria poses a threat to productivity, and hence to 
transformation, since unhealthy farmers may produce mostly for own 
consumption and sell just a little to buy fish. Gallup et al. (1999) estimate 
that reducing severe malaria in a country increases its per capita econom-
ic growth by 1%, compared with a country where the disease is preva-
lent. Reducing the incidence of malaria by 10% will increase economic 
growth by 0.3%.  
Another important geographical factor is accessibility; that is, whether 
a country has a seacoast or is land-locked. Without a coast, a country will 
struggle to transport bulky materials to and from other countries. Hence, 
industries that require bulky machinery and raw materials are unlikely to 
be established in these countries. Access to navigable rivers or the sea, 
on the other hand, will lower the transport costs of exports and facilitate 
access to markets; hence, industries that are unviable where the transport 
costs are high can become viable. Access to the sea is a major explana-
tion for the success of economies like those of Hong Kong, Taiwan and 
Singapore, while many inland areas in Africa, China, and India find it 
difficult to develop economically because of their distance from markets 
and maritime trade. 
In ‘Prisoners of geography: landlocked countries and economics’, 
Hausmann (2001) argues that a good mix of excellent policies will not be 
enough to get poor countries onto a developmental path and transform 
them. He highlights the influence of geographical location, acting inde-
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pendently of institutions, as a major debilitating factor in a country’s de-
velopment. If a country is poor because its geography, then there are se-
rious limitations to how much foreign aid can foster growth there. This 
implies that there is always the possibility that aid will fail to achieve its 
full potential in a negative geographical environment, especially if it is 
conceived as a short-term intervention.  
2.5.3 Disposition of a Recipient Country’s Actors and Leadership 
to React to Aid 
The availability of endogenous factors such as natural resources, institu-
tions, policies and geography alone may not be enough to trigger trans-
formation and development when a catalyst is added. The recipient 
country’s leadership must react in a way that would be in consonance 
with the objectives of aid. The way leaders choose to respond to incen-
tives provided by foreign aid and its delivery processes influence how 
effectual aid is in stimulating political and economic transformation.  
The aid industry provides perverse incentives for state leadership to 
engage in actions that do not promote the goals of national develop-
ment. A recent study by Booth and Golooba-Mutebi (2014) draws atten-
tion to the many international incentives that encourage elite behaviour 
that is harmful to national development processes. Contemporary studies 
on governance in Africa have focused on institutions and structure and 
less on the agency of the actors that animate these institutions; yet the 
economic history of Southeast Asia shows how leadership makes a dif-
ference irrespective of institutions. A comparative study of African and 
Southeast Asian developmental strategies demonstrates that “leaders and 
technocrats in Southeast Asia were interested in improving the economic 
and social lot of the mass of the population as quickly and effectively as 
possible, and they were pragmatic in choosing how they did that” (Booth 
and Golooba-Mutebi, 2014:4). Three factors guided the leaders’ resolve 
to improve the economic and social lot of the masses: “principles of ur-
gency”, “outreach” and “expediency”. According to Booth and Goloo-
ba-Mutebi, these three principles were absent in the governance of the 
African countries (Van Donge et al., 2012; Henley, 2015).  
Aid recipient countries need leaders who understand effective use of 
aid. If such leaders react positively to aid, moral hazard is less likely to 
arise. For instance, aid money will be used as a supplement to local tax 
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efforts instead of as a substitution  a kind of fungibility associated with 
development aid provided through budget support. The importance of 
suitable leadership is brought out statistically by Brautigam and Knack 
(2004:263) “while middle-income countries have increased tax revenue as 
a percentage of GDP from an average 16.5% (1972–76) to an average 
21.1% (1995–99)”, low-income countries (which receive more aid on 
average) have seen their tax revenue fall from an average 17% to an av-
erage 14.3% over the same period. Moreover, 71% of countries in Africa 
that received more than “10% of GDP in aid in 1995 were also in the 
group of countries judged in an IMF study to have lower than expected 
tax effort” (Brautigam and Knack, 2004:263). Another area in aid provi-
sion that requires positive attitudes from endogenous actors, for example 
the leadership, is accountability in the use of aid money. In this area, 
again, Brautigam and Knack (2004) show that in these countries, there is 
a systematic pattern of behaviour where government leadership leaves 
much of the initiative for accountability in the use of aid money to the 
donor. The leadership make no plans to gradually replace aid with do-
mestic financing. In fact, government officials are glad to see more aid 
money being pumped into the economy even if it does not generate the 
right returns. Hanlon’s analysis of aid effectiveness in Mozambique illus-
trates this perverse aid enterprise. Government officials, consultants, lo-
cal aid agency staff and workers in NGOs have become well off through 
the administration of aid in that country (Harlon, 2004a, 2004b).  
Foreign aid may have little success in catalysing transformation in 
low-income countries unless the political regime leaders that interact 
with donors find it in their self-interest to act positively.9 But under what 
circumstances will the ruling elites react positively or alter their self-
interested behaviour so that the potentially catalytic effect of aid is not 
deactivated? Perhaps this can be done if aid donors selectively identify 
endogenous drivers of change and work with them to develop new insti-
tutions and policies in the recipient country (DFID, 2003). Protagonists 
of new institutionalism argue that prevailing institutions determine indi-
vidual pursuit of self-interest. By changing institutions or aligning the 
interests of actors to coincide with the prevailing institutional structure, a 
society can arrive at political equilibrium (North, 1990; Bates et al., 
2014).  
Donors of catalytic aid would aim at influencing the perverse incen-
tive system that works against its effectiveness. This means that aid can-
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not continue to be apolitical. It also explains why a catalyst may change. 
We will discuss this attribute in the next two sections. Changing the 
‘rules of the game’ can be essential for making productive use of aid, but 
it requires the active will and ideas of the ruling elite to do so; strong civil 
society organisations that react against the selfish pursuit of their interest 
by ruling elites instead of ‘being in bed’ with them; and credible or exis-
tential threat of losing power.  
Changing the rules that affect the existing distribution of benefits of 
national resources requires state leadership that is able to take decisions 
and enforce them despite the potential consequences to the ruling coali-
tion. It is here that the leadership of the ruling elite matters. Lee Kuan 
Yew in Singapore Deng Xiaoping in China and Seretse Kharma in Bot-
swana were leaders fully committed to changing resource allocation to 
promote economic transformation and inclusive growth. They were in-
terested in spreading the wealth or economic rent of their nations across 
society. The reason why these leaders were committed to developmental 
ideals was that they had long-term vision and were committed to bring-
ing the majority of citizens out of poverty. In addition, the visionary 
leaders had a strong dominant political party supported by the military, 
so they did not face an existential threat to their regimes. With such a 
long-term horizon guaranteed, there was no incentive for the leaders to 
extract short-term rents for their personal gain and they could focus on 
transformation and long-term development (Kelsall, 2014; Booth et al., 
2015). 
In almost all the 13 high-growth economies that the Commission for 
Growth and Development (CGD) report of 2008 listed, the leaders were 
less corrupt. They were committed to ruling within the law and exuded 
public confidence in their leadership. They considered expansion of pub-
lic goods more than their own resource accumulation. Take for instance, 
Botswana’s first President,Seretse Kharma of Botswana who transferred 
ownership of the country’s diamond mining rights from his own tribe to 
the state. That single act enabled every citizen of the country to benefit 
from the diamond revenues (Acemoglu et al., 2003; Ackah and Kutsoati, 
2008; CGD, 2008; Henley, 2010).  
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2.5.4 Selecting an Appropriate Catalyst to Yield Preferential 
Transformation  
The selection of a catalyst is important for delivering the right new 
product. Just as a natural science catalyst has different attributes, so does 
foreign aid come in different forms (that is, project aid, commodity aid, 
Balance of Payment support, technical assistance, grants, loans, and so 
on). Each of these has specific qualities and targets. Much of the litera-
ture indicates that “aid works” but with caveats of “ifs”; for example, “if 
the quality of aid is good” and “if the interests of the provider and recip-
ients coincide”, and so on.  
Whenever there is a bilateral agreement between two parties, there is 
an interest. The recipient country has to negotiate in such a way that its 
development interest is not compromised. For instance, IMF condition-
alities include macroeconomic stability (sustainable debt level, lower in-
terest rate and associated inflation control). In such a case, recipient 
countries need to negotiate a deal with the donor to ensure that such an 
imposition is development oriented rather than impeding the country’s 
progress. So the ability of the recipient to select or negotiate for the type 
of aid that is appropriate to its peculiar circumstances matters for the 
effectiveness of aid. States with weak institutions and policies do not 
readily use aid to change their polities and economy, hence they require a 
different type of foreign aid that strengthens their institutions and state 
building (Hopkins, 2000; Hansen and Tarp, 2001).  
As discussed earlier, having the right properties is one of the attrib-
utes needed in a catalyst to bring about rapid reaction. The choice of a 
catalyst must be suitable to the mass composition of the endogenous 
substances; otherwise a non-preferable new product will result. This 
means that, in an aid recipient country, the effectiveness of a catalyst de-
pends not only on the mass composition of the endogenous substances, 
but also on the choice of the particular catalyst, including the type of aid, 
the prescription it provides, and the objectives it seeks. For instance, 
since the adoption of MDGs, the aid objectives pursued by the interna-
tional community have changed from growth orientation to poverty re-
duction.  
Donors who provide the catalyst also want a bundle of outcomes in 
the recipient’s country in return for their money. Donor aid is therefore 
not benign, it is also provided to advance donor interest, either in diplo-
512566-L-sub01-bw-Awortwi
Processed on: 10-8-2017 PDF page: 96
70 CHAPTER 2 
 
macy, commercial or cultural outcomes or a combination of these. So 
there is no neutrality in a catalyst. This means that recipient countries 
have to balance a number of choices and decide what is to their benefit 
as compared with what they give away. If the recipient country has a 
choice, it will select aid that responds to its needs and priorities (for in-
stance, with a high proportion of grants and less in loans with condition-
ality) instead of the donor’s interest. In other words, a recipient will se-
lect aid without conditionality. So, aid negotiation is a matter of strategic 
choices.  
According to the literature, a major weakness of aid is donors’ failure 
to reconcile the needs, priorities and preferences of the receiving country 
instead of their own needs (Emmerij, 2002; UN, 2006; de Haan, 2009). If 
the recipient country needs aid to improve its productive sectors, but 
donors insist on spending on social sectors, to what extent can that help 
the needs of the recipient? In that case, a wrong catalyst is applied to a 
recipient country’s substances. As a consequence, there will be no reac-
tion or there could be even a negative reaction. Since 2000, the catalytic 
potential of foreign aid has diminished because much of it has been allo-
cated to social expenditure instead of its original tenet of economic de-
velopment and infrastructure. This is an issue that African finance minis-
ters have raised on several occasions (UN, 2006:3), expressing concern 
over whether such expenditure could catalyse investment and economic 
growth.  
To perform a catalytic role, aid would need to be selective, to balance 
both growth-enhancing and social-development-oriented goals. Fur-
thermore, inside donor countries, there are firms, individuals and sectors 
that benefit from aid money meant for poor countries. Such groups may 
have interests that may not necessarily be incompatible with aid but 
whose interaction with the recipient endogenous factors could work 
against achieving the intended objectives of aid. Such groups may have 
direct contact with the foreign policy wing of bilateral aid agencies. Mul-
tilateral agencies such as the World Bank and UN agencies that pursue 
aid promotion also have their interests. Their employees are among the 
highest paid public servants in the world working with the poor. With 
these groups, managing aid is a business and it is their interest to keep 
aid flowing even if it does not achieve the set objectives.  
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2.5.5  Ideal catalyst would not change 
One of the key attributes of a catalyst is that it does not change its chem-
ical composition, both in quality and quantity, after catalysis has oc-
curred. How relevant is this attribute to aid? Established shortly after the 
Second World War, foreign aid has changed in several ways. In the early 
1950s, it was to be delivered by the International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development (now World Bank) in the form of debt relief and 
economic development packages. The main purpose was to enable coun-
tries in Western Europe to reconstruct their infrastructure and econo-
mies and to become prosperous again. In the 1960s, the success of in-
dustrialisation objectives of aid in Western Europe triggered the desire to 
replicate the prescription, with similar objectives in developing countries. 
Towards the later part of the 1970s, aid shifted towards stopping the 
spread of poverty. The use of aid as a tool for stabilisation and structural 
adjustment took place during the 1980s, while aid was used as a buttress 
of democracy and governance during the 1990s. At the turn of the mil-
lennium, aid was used to help meet the MDGs (Cassen, 1994; Emmerij, 
2002). The chronological change of motives, aims and character of inter-
national development appears to be inconsistent with the attributes of a 
catalyst in a science laboratory. As economic and political conditions 
change in the world, so does aid in terms of its size, structure, motives 
and outcomes. As argued by Hopkins (2000:4) “there has never been a 
pure economic development assistance regime. Rather, foreign policy has 
created and sustained various aid regimes among donors” (see also Grant 
and Nijman, 1998). 
Contrary to what has been indicated earlier, that an ideal chemical 
catalyst would not change as it is being applied, discussions on foreign 
aid so far show that it has undergone several changes in its interaction 
with recipient countries’ drivers of development. Aid changes within the 
context of international geopolitics, security issues, and ideological or-
thodoxies. For instance, during the Cold War era and the ideological 
scramble for Africa, aid was given on the basis of loyalty though it was 
intended for development purposes (UN, 2006:9-12). The March 2005 
Report of the Commission for Africa observed that much of the evidence on 
aid reflected not necessarily the need for growth but rather geopolitical 
considerations (Commission for Africa, 2005). Even in the minds of 
many politicians and much of the public opinion in donor countries, aid 
was perceived as a humanitarian gesture to less-fortunate people. There 
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was no need for accountability as long as recipients remained faithful. 
However, it is different today. The Paris Declaration on effectiveness of 
aid, which was adopted in March 2005 by the DAC of the OECD, aims, 
among other things, to achieve mutual accountability, which implies that 
donors and recipients must account more transparently to each other for 
their use of aid funds, and to their citizens and parliaments for the im-
pact of their aid (Moon and Mills, 2010). In addition, geopolitical and 
ideological factors influence the IMF/World Bank conditionalities and 
bilateral donor preferences (Lancaster, 1999, 2008).  
The changing nature of aid and the need to promote stricter account-
ability means that donors demand more than a single objective or condi-
tionality from an aid recipient country. For instance, during the Cold 
War, support for international positions was enough for an African 
country to receive aid, but that is no longer the case (Lancaster, 1999; 
Moon and Mills, 2010). Donors can now insist on multiple objectives 
that include policy reforms, ending corruption, and even regime change 
in return for aid. With aid being tied to donor preferences and agendas, 
the challenge for recipient countries is to develop and express their vi-
sion, policy preferences and direction, and to ensure that aid catalyses 
those choices instead of removing them from their national development 
agenda. As Whitfield and Frazer put it, “donors typically find it hard to 
challenge a recipient’s priorities that are constructed within a coherent 
framework, particularly one that draws strength from links to a wider 
international discourse that might contradict donor preferences” 
(2010:348). In the social life environments where foreign aid operates, a 
catalyst like foreign aid will change as a result of years of experience be-
tween donors and recipients (a kind of a repeated game theory) with 
each actor studying and understanding the behaviour and strategic 
moves of the other, looking for an opportunity to neutralise the other’s 
strategies and “unneeded” influence.  
In this respect, social sciences are different from the natural sciences. 
Whilst in the natural sciences a catalyst is not expected to change during 
the catalytic process, the changes that have occurred in foreign aid have 
been a switch from one model of a catalyst to another. That is, a change 
from one delivery modality to another in search of an appropriate mo-
dality for each country. For instance, in many aid recipient countries, do-
nors have switched from project support to sector-wide and budget sup-
port and a combination of modalities depending on the prevailing 
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national and international context. Hence, this analysis will focus on dif-
ferent aid models that have been used in Ghana, and not on the natural 
sciences metaphor of changes within the aid modality. 
Table 2.2 
Summary of literature review and study arguments 
Description Key definition of 
issues/variables 
Line of argument Critique 
Development Improvement in the 
standard of living of 
the citizens. 
The ultimate aim of aid is to promote 
development in the recipient country. 
Development refers to transformation of 
the economy and politics as they affect 
the well-being of the citizens. Indicators of 
development are experienced in the form 
of increased economic growth, income per 
capita, life expectancy, access to educa-
tion, healthcare, clean water, political 
participation, etc. 
One of the key cri-
tiques of development 
is its measurement. 
For example, there is 
no consensus on 
indicators that must be 
included or excluded in 
the calculation of a 
country’s GDP.  
 
Transformation Economic: change 
in structure, em-
ployment diversifica-
tion and productivity 
growth. 
Stylised facts about sequential economic 
structural change (agric-industry-service) 
is prerequisite for sustained growth.  
The pursuit of political 
and economic trans-
formation may not be 
unidirectional and 
always peaceful. For 
instance, economic 
transformation in a 
country may not follow 
familiar pattern of 
agricultural transfor-
mation to industrial 
revolution and, later, 
services.  
Political: change in 
systems and organ-
isation of politics, 
government, distri-
bution of power and 
resources. 
Organisation of politics is key to economic 
growth. There is no consensus on the type 
of political system and regimes that pro-
mote economic growth and development. 
It is all about what is fit for a country 
based on context.  
Factors that 
promote trans-
formation and 
development in 
developing 
countries. 
1. Foreign aid:  
quantity and quality 
of ODA provided to 
a country to facili-
tate economic and 
political transfor-
mation.  
 Literature and statements of aid activ-
ists portray ODA as a catalyst. 
 This study questions whether ODA 
fulfils the features of a catalyst.  
 Five features of a catalyst reviewed: 
Catalyst in natural 
sciences is used 
metaphorically in this 
study. 
 
2. Endogenous 
drivers of economic 
and political trans-
formation. 
 
i. Existing economic policies that for-
eign aid works with to stimulate de-
velopment. 
ii. Existing political, economic and bu-
reaucratic institutions that define the 
nature of political settlement in the 
country. 
iii. Availability of resource endowment. 
iv. Geographical location of the aid re-
cipient country. 
v. Disposition of the leadership and ac-
tors to react positively to aid. 
The resource curse 
thesis; limitations of 
economic planning, 
engrained systems of 
patronage on which 
leadership positions 
are built (so that not all 
leaders could adopt 
developmental pro-
grammes), etc.  
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On the basis of the discussions so far, the main arguments of this 
chapter are summarised in Table 2.2. 
2.6 Catalysis of Foreign Aid and Endogenous Drivers of 
Political and Economic Transformation 
On the basis of the literature review and discussion so far, catalysis for 
development will be defined as the continuous interaction between the 
quality and quantity of foreign aid and endogenous drivers (policies; eco-
nomic, political and bureaucratic institutions that coalesce to form politi-
cal settlements; resource endowment; geography of the country; and 
leadership). The interaction between aid and these endogenous derivers 
produces different opportunities for and constraints on the effectiveness 
of a catalyst, hence affecting progress on national development. While 
this study works on the assumption that the outcomes of these interac-
tions are political and economic transformation and subsequent devel-
opment in the recipient country, the donors may view the outcome as 
multi-faceted because aid may be given for different reasons, of which 
transformation and development could only be a tangential outcome.  
It is important to reiterate that the outcomes of economic and politi-
cal transformation may be positive or negative and that they will ulti-
mately affect the nature of national development. Historically, transfor-
mation has not followed a single path. Different countries and their 
political regimes have deployed different processes and strategies to 
promote or undermine development. The kind of interactions that take 
place between endogenous factors and ODA propels the transformation 
and development. So, for example, one does not expect the interactions 
that took place in South Korea or Europe (with the Marshall Plan) to be 
the same as Ghana’s transformative process, because of the differences 
in both endogenous and exogenous drivers and the political settlement 
that ensued in these countries. This is also why the choice of a catalyst 
and its application cannot be “one size fits all” (Acemoglu, et al., 2003; 
Ackah and Kutsoati, 2008).  
2.7 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, we have discussed two concepts that form the analytical 
framework of the thesis. We have defined and elaborated the concept 
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“catalyst” and applied its attributes from natural sciences to development 
assistance discourse and shown how it is supposed to work. In applying 
the concept to development aid, we have systematically reviewed five 
attributes of a catalyst and explained how they are supposed to function. 
We have argued that if the essence of foreign aid were to help countries 
to facilitate national development then one would need to witness trans-
formation in the country’s economy and polity. We have seen that the 
process of achieving economic and political transformation requires 
more than just pouring more aid into a country. Conceptually, this re-
quires endogenous drivers that interact with aid in a positive way. Those 
domestic substances must be predisposed to working with aid, otherwise 
nothing happens and catalytic outcomes become a pale shadow of the 
developmental intentions. The conceptual review clearly postulates that 
there are conditions under which foreign aid becomes either a positive or 
negative catalyst to a country’s economic and political transformation. 
These conditions include resource endowment; the geography of the 
country; the political settlement or elite consensus arising from political, 
economic and bureaucratic institutions and agents that make use of for-
eign aid; the prevailing policies and ideology of the ruling regimes; and 
the leadership. As a catalyst, foreign aid can be effective in the transfor-
mation process insofar as endogenous substances are available and able 
to react to the intentions of aid. 
Notes 
 
1 DEPTH: diversification, export competitiveness, productivity, technology and 
human well-being. 
2 Growth accelerated mainly in the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand and the United States, countries where industrial revolution started 
(Maddison, 1982).  
3 The government is the means by which state policy is enforced, as well as the 
mechanism for determining state policy. 
4 Liberal democracy is a form of government in which elected representatives 
exercise decision-making power over the people, but these decisions are subject 
to the rule of law, usually moderated by a Constitution that emphasises protec-
tion of the rights and freedoms of individuals (Wikipedia.org., <https:// 
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberal_democracy>). 
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5 The Harrod-Domar growth model (Harrod, 1939; Domar, 1946) is a post-
Keynesian one that calculates the rate of economic growth from the amount of 
savings and the productivity of capital. It is the pioneer of exogenous growth 
models.  
6 The US government launched the US$5 billion Millennium Challenge Corpo-
ration in 2004. Democracy was targeted because it was thought that only in 
such an environment could economic growth be jump-started (Chhotray and 
Hulme, 2009). The Dutch government also used selectivity to choose six coun-
tries in Africa (Benin, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique, Rwanda and Uganda) for 
development aid. 
7 Agents may be public or private actors that pursue individual or group inter-
est. This includes politicians, bureaucrats, the military, faith groups, trade un-
ions, civil society groups; the media; the private sector and academics. 
8 This seems to be similar to what is referred to as ‘booty capitalism’. See, for 
instance The Politics of Banking in the in Philippines (Hutchcroft, 1998), which uses 
this classification. 
9 While Gordon Tullock believes that “the average human being is about 95% 
selfish in the narrow sense of the term,” it must be stated that individuals often 
need social and cultural norms to set aside self-interest in the name of some 
societal good. 
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3 
Analysing Ghana’s Case of Aid: 
Methodological Approach and Data 
Needs 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
An increasing number of studies now utilise econometric data to back 
arguments on the impact of aid on developing countries (Mosley, 1980; 
Boone, 1994; Burnside and Dollar, 1997; Bowen, 1998; Hansen and 
Tarp, 1999). Such analyses, though influential in policy prescriptions, fall 
short when it comes to providing insights into specific country phenom-
ena. The developing world is so diverse that large N cross-country case 
analyses inadvertently leave out insightful details that single case studies 
could have revealed. Secondly, doing a case study gives a researcher the 
opportunity to zoom into causal processes in ways that larger N studies 
cannot. It is on this basis that this study chose a single case for analysing 
aid and development.  
Ghana was chosen as a case study because, as shown in section 1.2, 
there is anecdotal evidence that the country has passed through three 
phases of political and economic transformation, a period during which 
the country was also associated with foreign aid. Ghana’s case could 
provide powerful and compelling evidence to draw wider conclusions for 
other African countries because of the country’s historical pacesetter role 
in political and economic transformation. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
there are theoretical arguments for expecting that under certain political 
settlements or conditions aid can be a catalyst to a country’s transfor-
mation and development. 
This chapter discusses the approach chosen to systematically analyse 
Ghana’s “foreign aid”, political and economic transformation, and de-
velopment. The chapter is divided into six sections. After this introduc-
tion, section two explains the meaning of and approach to the case 
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study, and the justification for its adoption. Section three develops the 
rationale for choosing Ghana and explains the composition of the Gha-
na case. It sets out the economic and political arguments for selecting the 
country. Section four discusses the study model and variables, while sec-
tion five explains the three analytical approaches adopted in the study. 
Section six describes the type of data needed and collected for the study, 
the methods applied in data collection, the ontology of the evidence col-
lected, and sources of the data. 
3.2 Case Study: Meaning, Conceptual Approach and 
Justification for Adoption  
A case study is a piece of research work in which one gathers data to 
provide a depth of analysis for understanding specific circumstances in 
detail, richness and completeness, rather than circumstances in general 
and with limited regard for comparison with other cases (Gerring, 2007). 
It strives to explain specific features of events that led to an outcome, 
why they occurred, when they did and how they occurred. In other 
words, a case study enables a focus on tracing the process dynamics that 
led to a specific outcome. Gerring (2007) lists a number of characteristics 
of a case study, while admitting that these features could also cause con-
fusion. It is important to list some of the features that are applicable to 
the approach of this study. A case study: 
 has affinity to qualitative technique and focuses on small number 
of units (small N);  
 comprehensively examines a phenomenon in detail;  
 utilises a kind of evidence that is akin to ethnographic, non-
experimental, historical, contextual, field research, participant 
observational and process-tracing;  
 employs triangulation or multiple sources of evidence (Gerring, 
2007:17).  
Conceptually, a case study is used to shed light on a larger class of 
cases, but the case that is studied may not necessarily be a perfect repre-
sentation of the larger population. The process of selecting a case in-
cludes consideration of the cross-case characteristics of the larger popu-
lation or potential cases (for example, extreme, deviant, and so on). 
Therefore, to conduct a case study the researcher would have to under-
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stand the characteristics of the phenomenon in the broader population. 
The researcher needs to explain, “what is this a case of” as Gerring puts 
it (2007:13). 
3.2.1 Justifying the choice of a case study approach 
A case study approach is appropriate for this research because it can help 
to build or generate hypotheses concerning the potential effect of for-
eign aid on a country’s development by tracing the process dynamics in-
volved in the relationship between the two variables without measuring 
in any quantitative estimate the causal effect or making any strong attrib-
ution. As argued by George and Bennett (2005) and Gerring (2007), 
causal arguments depend not only on the measuring of causal effect, but 
also on the identification of causal mechanisms. A causal mechanism is 
that a variable X must be connected with a variable Y in a plausible fash-
ion. In this study, it is argued that foreign aid may have a catalytic effect 
on a country’s development provided there are sufficient endogenous 
conditions to make it work. In qualitative social science, the causal effect 
of X (foreign aid) on Y (development) may not be direct as events may 
be inter-related. However, adequate causal explanation requires that an 
empirical analysis be conducted to substantiate the assertions about both, 
the causal mechanisms and causal effects. A case study approach there-
fore gives the researcher the possibility of peeping into the box of cau-
sality to locate the intermediate factors that lie between X and Y.  
The covariation model in which one can make causal inferences to 
explain a pattern of behaviour (Kelley, 1973) is adapted to also explain 
our expectation of the model (A, B, C) =Y; meaning the combined effect 
of A, B, C, may potentially cause Y. Covariation refers to an observation 
of how two or more variables change in relation to each other. With co-
variation analysis, the researcher collects information or evidence from 
multiple experiences (at different places and times) and determines 
which variables have changed or remained the same, as well as the total 
effect on the dependent variable. The researcher is able to observe the 
pattern of behaviour of ‘A’, ‘B’, and ‘C’ over different time periods. That 
is, there are causal effects or connecting threads between ‘A’, ‘B’, and ‘C’, 
on the one hand, and ‘Y’, on the other. In this case, causes of an out-
come ‘Y’ can be attributed to the combined effect of critical historical 
challenges (circumstances), endogenous factors (internal) and catalytic 
aid (external). However, it must also be stated that the researcher is una-
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ble to explicitly quantify with any numerical accuracy the precise effect 
of the independent variables on ‘Y’. A case study approach using causal 
mechanisms or process tracing can only show that the cause occurred 
before the effect but cannot explicitly establish with certainty the full 
causal-effect on Y. Here, Bunge’s argument that productivity effect can-
not be fully established is valid. It only provides a social scientist with the 
possibility of formulating outcomes or productivity effects in causality 
without explicitly stating their full effect (Bunge, 1979). 
In summary, the four objectives in choosing the case study approach 
are: (i) the complex and dynamic nature of analysing aid interaction with 
endogenous drivers in a country without quantitatively measuring the 
necessary and sufficient conditions or making any strong attribution; (ii) 
the orientation of the study towards generating hypotheses instead of 
testing them; (iii) to enable tracing of the process dynamics of aid, trans-
formation and development using historical and current information so 
as to provide insightful information that is usually hidden behind aggre-
gate data in large N cross country analyses; and (iv) to use evidence 
drawn from Ghana to illuminate the role of aid in Africa’s development. 
These objectives, according to Gerring (2007) and George and Bennett 
(2005), justify adopting a case study approach. 
In recent times, academic disciplines like economics and political 
economy, which were not receptive to case study designs, have begun to 
use the approach. For instance, recent studies of the economic growth of 
countries such as Botswana, Korea and Mauritius have turned to the case 
study approach (Chernoff and Warner, 2002; Acemoglu et al., 2003). 
Gerring (2007) observes that there is a gradual shift in social science re-
search away from a variable-centred approach towards a case-based ap-
proach. Key factors influencing this shift are heightened scepticism to-
wards cross-case econometrics (Winters et al., 2004:78; Achen, 2002; 
2005) and the development of qualitative comparative analysis (Drass 
and Ragin, 1992; Hicks et al., 1995) and counterfactual thought experi-
ments in the analysis of individual case histories (Fearon, 1991; Lebow, 
2000). 
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3.3 Selection of Ghana as a Case Study of Catalytic Aid 
Analysis 
A single case study can have powerful and compelling evidence that may 
be relevant to other countries. This presents the researcher with a formi-
dable challenge of case selection that will represent the larger population. 
In large N sample research, case selection is usually handled by some 
version of randomisation. However, Ghana’s case was not selected ran-
domly but purposively based on deductive approach and pragmatic con-
sideration. In terms of deductive approach, Ghana was selected on the 
basis of its typicality as well as variation from other developing countries 
on whose development trajectories foreign aid has had differential ef-
fects.  
With a per capita income of US$ 490 in the early years of independ-
ence, Ghana was considered a middle-income country comparable with 
South Korea, Mexico and Malaysia. Endowed with natural resources and 
well-trained state bureaucrats, Ghana had a distinctive potential to accel-
erate development with little international assistance (Uphoff, 1972:221). 
The country was a pacesetter in political transition from colonisation to 
independence and led the fight for liberation of other African countries. 
Considering the country’s current level of development, Ghana is a typi-
cal developing country in Africa that has not achieved a significant de-
gree of transformation and development relative to its peers like South 
Korea and Malaysia, and thus it continues to receive ODA. Three dec-
ades (1957-84) of involvement with ODA did not lead to the transition 
that its founding fathers envisioned. Compared to some of Ghana’s peer 
countries in the developing world like South Korea, Malaysia and Mexico 
during that period, Ghana’s case is a deviant one. It represents the de-
velopment paths of the many countries in the developing world where 
aid did not help to transform the economy and politics after years of in-
teraction.  
In fact, Ghana moved from a middle-income to low-income country 
during that period. However, the second period (1983-92) showed Gha-
na beginning to lay a strong foundation for economic and political trans-
formation with aid. It was the period when foreign aid was said to be 
effective in the developing world when the fundamentals were right. 
Ghana’s case during that period represents countries in the developing 
world where aid was said to have worked because the endogenous condi-
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tions were good. As it will be shown in Chapter 5, it is during that period 
that Ghana radically changed the economic institutions and policies that 
had bedevilled the country’s development during the previous three dec-
ades. The 1983-92 period is when Ghana became an example of a devel-
oping country making a successful transformation with the support of 
foreign aid and serving as a model for replication by other countries. 
This is the variation that Ghana’s case presents from the typicality de-
scribed earlier. According to Kolavalli et al. (2012:1), in several ways 
“Ghana can be considered a benchmark for other African countries that 
are seeking transformation”. 
The third phase of Ghana’s development trajectory (1993-2013) was 
marked by consistent positive rates of GDP growth of more than 5%, 
though it was less than in the early years (1960-80) of transition countries 
such as Botswana (12%), Thailand (8.4%) and South Korea (7.8%) 
(Fosu, 2009; Weisbrot and Ray, 2011, Kim, 2013;). In 2011, Ghana tran-
sitioned from low-income to lower middle-income status, but the stand-
ards of living of its population were far lower than those in the compa-
rable countries that also received aid during the early years of their 
transition. 
In political terms, the case of Ghana represents much of what hap-
pened in many African countries during the early post-independence 
years. Historically, this period is significant to the developing world, and 
especially Africa, in two areas. First it was the period during which the 
Cold War dominated the provision of foreign aid. Ghana and many de-
veloping countries were affected either negatively or positively, depend-
ing on the perception of the major power blocks—the USA and United 
Kingdom represented the West, whilst the Soviet Union represented the 
East. Second, the early years of independence saw the growing populari-
ty of a number of African leaders voicing Pan African ideology, and 
Ghana provided leadership for that movement. These two historical 
events culminated in internal political rancour, to the extent that by the 
time the Cold War ended, political structures and democratic systems 
had collapsed and been replaced by military and dictatorial rule. This was 
the political story of many African countries in the first two decades after 
independence. 
In the early 1990s, aid came in the form of assistance for good gov-
ernance and political transformation involving multi-party democracy. 
Ghana was an example of countries that transitioned successfully into a 
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democratic regime and has since made remarkable progress. Ghana’s 
case is rare because most in African countries underwent a long period 
of political fragility after support was given to the development of politi-
cal pluralism. It is the rarity of democratic transformation in the region 
that makes Ghana a valuable case for studying the role that foreign aid 
may have played in its development.  
The pragmatic consideration for selecting Ghana is the researcher’s 
familiarity with the country, having lived through two of the phases and 
witnessed at first hand the challenges and successes of Ghana’s trans-
formation trajectories.  
3.4 Building a Model of the Relationship Between 
Development and Foreign Aid and Economic and 
Political Transformation 
This study explores the causal relations between foreign aid and Ghana’s 
political and economic transformation since 1957 to date, using a simple 
exploratory model: 
Y= f(A, B, C) 
Where: 
Y = Ghana’s three phases (1957-82; 1983-92; and 1993-2013) of 
economic and political transformation and development  
A =  Historical events or critical economic and political challenges in 
the three epochs 1  
B =   Aid, defined as the quantity and quality of technical and finan-
cial assistance, and mode of delivery (ODA flows) 
C=  Endogenous factors (policies, economic, political and bureau-
cratic institutions, natural resources, leadership, etc.)  
f: The function of A, B, C 
The model has three independent variables2 (A, B, C) that can be ob-
served and compared over three different time periods (1957-82, 1983-
92, and 1993-2013). These independent variables were chosen on the 
basis of the literature review in Chapter 2. They relate to one another to 
some extent and so may be considered to be covariates (Kelley, 1973).  
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The principle of covariation states that, "an effect is attributed to one 
of its possible causes with which, over time, it covaries" (Kelley, 
1973:108). That is, certain outcomes are attributed to potential causes 
that appear at the same time. The causes can be attributed to the internal 
traits of the individual variable being examined, the stimulus (external), 
the circumstance, or some combination of these factors (Hewstone and 
Jasper, 1973). According to Kelley, in the covariation principle, attribu-
tions are made on the basis of three criteria: consensus, distinctiveness 
and consistency (Kelley, 1973). Consensus is the opinion on the specific 
variable shared by different people. For example, if many researchers 
share the opinion that the atom bomb ended the Second World War, 
then the consensus is high. Distinctiveness refers to how unique the be-
haviour of the variable is to the particular situation. There is a low dis-
tinctiveness if the variable behaves similarly in all situations or contexts, 
and there exists a high distinctiveness when the variable only shows ef-
fect in a specific context. If the distinctiveness is high, the researcher can 
attribute the specific outcome more to the context than to the variable 
(Gilovich et al., 2005). Consistency is when the variable shows the same 
effect across time and context.  
Covariation variables A, B and C continuously interact with each oth-
er. The interaction may cause and affect the other. It is hard, however, to 
determine or establish a causal relationship between each of the variables 
and Y. Covariation establishes that there is a cause and effect relation-
ship between the variables A, B and C on one hand, and with Y on the 
other. Covariation establishes that A, B and C had some measurable ef-
fect on Y, whatever that may be.  
3.5 Analytical Approaches 
The thesis employs three analytical approaches. The first is historical 
analysis, which involves: (i) identifying the relevant political and econom-
ic challenges and opportunities that defined the three phases; (ii) identi-
fying attempts made to meet these challenges, in which foreign aid 
played a catalytic role (iii) identifying endogenous factors that constituted 
the country’s political settlement with which aid worked; and (iv) exam-
ining whether the covariates were predisposed to work with each other. 
The study did not assume that the three variables were passive during 
catalysis, but rather tried to establish how the existing structures, institu-
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tions and actors reacted after interaction with aid (in the form of activa-
tion or deactivation). In this approach, the study extensively reviewed the 
available literature and solicited experts’ views. The experts’ views were 
triangulated with secondary literature and historical archival materials.  
The second approach involved analysing pre- and post- A, B, C inter-
vention effects on Y. Here, data/information was collected for each of 
the covariates before and after interactions took place, which was com-
pared with any changes in the dependent variable Y in different time pe-
riods. Aid agencies and international financial institutions (IFIs) influ-
ence local policymaking by providing financial resources, technical 
assistance and sometimes platforms for policy debate through organisa-
tion of conferences and seminars. They also try to impose policies 
through aid conditionality. A methodology for analysing the effect of aid 
on domestic issues is to find out if policies that were introduced through 
aid were better or worse in terms of facilitating quantitative and qualita-
tive improvement in macroeconomic and political indicators and stand-
ard of living of the population. This approach is supported by Bourgui-
gnon and Sundberg (2007), who propose that the links along this chain 
(A, B, C) be traced and monitored to help clarify the contribution of aid 
to transformation outcomes (Y). This includes: evaluating the quantity 
and quality of aid, governance characteristics of the country before and 
after aid interventions, the quality of domestic policies before and after 
provision of foreign aid, and tracking development outcomes. In this 
case, the ‘control’ variable is the pre- and post-intervention state of Y. 
The term “intervention” is used in the broadest sense to indicate any sort 
of change in trend in the key covariables A, B and C. Given that three 
different phases were analysed in this study, the pre- and post-analyses 
employed longitudinal time series comparison.  
 In qualitative case study research, evidence pertains that the effects 
of covariates (A, B, C) on Y are often opaque for two main reasons: 
there are too many confounding causal factors and the latter cannot usu-
ally be eliminated through quantitative techniques. Therefore, a third 
analytical tool that has come to be known as process tracing was em-
ployed.3 This method helps the researcher to infer and construct a causal 
chain account of how various conditions and variables interact with or 
are connected to each other, and produce historical outcomes over time. 
“Process tracing is a methodology well suited to building or testing theo-
ries in a world marked by multiple interaction effects, where it is difficult 
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to explain outcomes in terms of two or three “independent” variables or 
covariates” (George and Bennett; 2005:172-85). The method relies heavi-
ly on contextual evidence and deductive logic to establish causality be-
tween covariables and their combined effect on the dependent variable 
Y. The procedure involves identifying the sequence of events to depict 
how each of the independent variables sets into motion a complex causal 
chain. It involves multiple types of evidence that are employed for the 
verification of a single inference. The method is akin to detective work—
bits or pieces of evidence that are relevant to building of a model. The 
combined behaviour of A, B and C in each of the three phases is narrat-
ed diagrammatically to demonstrate the flow of sequences, effects and 
outcomes (see Figure 3.1, an example of process tracing using Skocpol’s 
explanation of the breakdown of the French state in 1789). According to 
Gerring (2007), although the procedure seems messy, we are often con-
vinced by its conclusions.  
Process tracing helps to identify a sequence of events that foreclose 
certain transformational paths. During the three periods under review, 
Ghana experienced different patterns of political and economic trans-
formation and development. On the basis of the literature review in 
Chapter 2 and taking a cue from Skocpol’s application of process tracing 
to explain the breakdown of the French state, our model: Y= f(A, B, C) 
can be represented in a framework shown in Figure 3.2. Note that the 
variable ‘C’ comprises of two components (C1 - C2). 
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Figure 3.1 
Skocpol’s explanation of the breakdown of the French state in 1789 
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Figure 3.2 
Interaction between foreign aid and endogenous drivers  
(catalysis of development cooperation) 
 
 
The figure summarises the interactions that take place in the three co-
variates: A (historical/development challenges), B (foreign aid) and C 
(endogenous factors) and their outcomes captured in Y (political and 
economic transformation). We have to accept that the transformation 
and development trajectory of a country is difficult to predict in real 
time; hence, in this study, the analysis covers three crucial phases in the 
past to establish the changes that have taken place in the structure and 
institutions of the country’s economy and polity during those periods. 
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For example, it asks: Are the later structures better for delivering high 
economic growth, lower inflation or reduction in the incidence of cor-
ruption than what existed before then? One of the ways in which the 
political transformation can be measured is in terms of showing that in 
the first two phases of Ghana’s development trajectory, there were fre-
quent military coups, political violence, uncertainties in leadership, and 
so on, while during phase III Ghana achieved a stable democratic politi-
cal system with clear and acceptable institutions for choosing and chang-
ing leadership, with high rankings in good governance. That is a trans-
formation, a sharp break from the past. What might have influenced the 
changes? The research hypothesis is that the three independent variables 
A, B and C contributed to this transformation. The covariates are all nec-
essary conditions for transformation, but none of them by itself could 
have been sufficient to cause Y. To a large extent, the INUS conditions 
apply here (Sosa and Tooley, 1993).4 It is also important to note that in 
this thesis transformation does not only connote a positive outcome of 
the interaction between aid and endogenous drivers; the outcome of 
transformation can also be negative.  
3.6 Data Needs, Sources and Collection Methods 
This section describes the type of data needed, collected and their 
sources for the study, the methods applied and the ontology of the evi-
dence collected. 
3.6.1 Data Needs 
To analyse the catalytic causes and effect of aid on economic and politi-
cal transformation, the study needed two types of data: the first type of 
data was to enable the study to analyse the degree of political and eco-
nomic transformation, and development that had taken place over the 
three periods as described in section 2.3. The second type of data was on 
the three covariates (A, B, C). In both cases, primary and secondary data 
were needed. Based on the literature review and the analytical framework 
presented in fig. 3.2 the study derived a number of factors in the cause-
and-effect model Y=f(a, b, C). For instance the literature review shows 
that one needs to collect data on the structure of the economy over the 
study period, the changes to the key sectors of the economy, GDP 
growth and inflation trends, employment growth and patterns, etc. to 
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determine the nature of economic transformation that has taken place. 
In terms of political transformation, the review also suggested data on 
the following: mode of government, the nature of political institutions, 
citizens’ participation in governance and other good governance indica-
tors. Collecting data on these factors were needed in order to assess the 
dependent variable ‘Y’ which is economic and political transformation 
and development. The same procedure (literature review) was used to 
derive the factors in the independent variables ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’. For in-
stance the independent variable ‘B’ needed information on quantity and 
quality of ODA received over the study period, the conditions based on 
which ODA was provided, sectors that ODA was disbursed, etc. Table 
3.1 shows the study variables, data needed and collected, and their 
sources.  
Table 3.1 
Study variables, data needs and sources 
Variables Data Needs (1960-2013) Sources of Data 
Dependent  
Economic 
transfor-
mation and 
development 
Structure of the economy; 
trends in macro-economic 
growth; human develop-
ment indicators 
World Bank Data base; Bank of Ghana 
bulletins; Government of Ghana budget 
statement; Factfish World statistics and 
data research; Human Development 
Report; Expert interviews 
Political 
transfor-
mation 
Mode of government; Politi-
cal institutions; Citizens 
perception; Corruption 
index; Good governance 
indicators 
Polity IV; Mo Ibrahim Index of African 
Governance; Transparency Internation-
al; Afro barometer; The Bertelsmann 
Stiftung's Transformation Index (BTI); 
Expert interviews 
‘Independent Covariates  
A= 
Historical  
Path breaking events that 
occurred (critical junctures) 
secondary literature, grey literature 
and expert interviews 
B= 
Foreign aid 
Quantitative and qualitative 
ODA disbursed; aid condi-
tionality; key donor coun-
tries, etc. 
World Bank database; 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/ 
home.aspx; World statistics and data 
research http://www.factfish.com 
OECD International Development Statis-
tics https://stats.oecd.org/qwids/ 
Semi structured interviews with repre-
sentatives of donor agencies 
C= 
Endogenous 
factors 
Development policies & pro-
grammes; economic, politi-
cal, and bureaucratic insti-
tutions; government reven-
ue and expenditure, etc. 
Semi structured interviews with experts 
and review of existing literature (pub-
lished and unpublished materials).  
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Based on information derived from the literature review the study de-
veloped semi-structured questionnaire that links the dependent and in-
dependent variables together and sought the expert opinions of the in-
terviewees regarding those factors, their causal relationships and 
outcomes (see annex 1). Some of the responses from the interviewees 
also provided additional factors in the dependent and independent varia-
bles that the literature review did not pick. The use of process tracing 
was very help in this regard, helping to construct a pattern of relation-
ships (cause-effect) between all the factors in the dependent and inde-
pendent variables.  
3.6.2 Primary Data and Collection Methods  
The research undertook in-depth interviews with identified individuals 
and institutions that have information on the study variables. A system-
atic stratified sampling method was adopted to select the interviewees 
with the objectives of: (i) obtaining historical information about the co-
variables; (ii) triangulating information obtained from other interviewees 
and the literature; and (iii) connecting one event/information with others 
in the form of process tracing. Selection of interviewees was based on 
prior knowledge of their work on the subject and/or introduction by 
their peers as having deeper or alternative views (a kind of snowball ap-
proach to rope in others for interviews). The list of interviewees includes 
five senior government officials, in the Ministry of Finance, Office of the 
Head of the Civil Service, and the National Development Planning 
Commission; officials from nine donor agencies; seven think-tanks and 
civil society organisations, two former Finance Ministers, one former 
President of the Republic of Ghana and two private sector entrepre-
neurs. The field interviews were divided into two stages. The first was 
conducted in the summer of 2013, and the second in the summer of 
2015. The second field interview was necessitated by inadequate data, 
especially from the donors, during the first interview. Table 3.2 shows 
the breakdown of the categories of institutions while Annex 2 shows 
their positions.  
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Table 3.2 
List of Institutions/key actors covered in primary data collection 
Institutions/Key actors Number of interviewees 
Central government 5 
Donors 9 
Think-tanks and advocacy organisations 7 
Social commentators 2 
Former finance ministers 2 
Former President  1 
Academic and research organisations 4 
Private sector 2 
Total 32 
 
Many of the interviewees were directly involved in different phases of 
Ghana’s political and economic transformation and ODA engagement. 
The author administered the semi-structured questionnaire interviews 
personally, face-to-face, by telephone and through email exchanges. A 
deliberate decision was made to get respondents who were very active 
during each phase to obtain their thoughts on the incentives and con-
straints placed on political actors by the structural and institutional con-
text of their era, how they executed their policies, their approach to aid 
and strategies for negotiating with donors, and what they consider to be 
the key drivers of Ghana’s transformation and development.  
The responses from the interviewees were carefully examined; trian-
gulated and connected to each other, then supported by literature (ar-
chives of development policies, statistical data, published and grey mate-
rials) in order to distinguish perceptions from evidence of facts.  
On the donor side, field data collection targeted multilateral and bilat-
eral donor agencies in Ghana. The multilateral agencies included IMF 
and the World Bank while bilateral donors included DFID, USAID, Eu-
ropean Union; and Development Cooperation agencies at the Embassies 
of Netherlands, Denmark and Norway. The research sought the views of 
these donors on the three phases of Ghana’s political and economic 
transformation: what in their view were the key drivers of each of these 
phases, their perceptions about different regimes and their predisposal to 
working with aid. It must be stated that it was a challenge for most of the 
interviewees from the donor side to recount events in Phase I as they did 
not have much information. 
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3.6.3 Secondary Data Collection 
A lot has been written on Ghana’s economic and political past especially 
during the second phase where ERP and SAP were implemented, leading 
to harsh economic realities of transition. It is during this period that for-
eign aid and endogenous factors punctuated the established structure 
and institution to create a new path towards economic and political 
transformation. In recent times a few researchers have begun to write on 
Ghana’s drive to transformation. The research systematically followed 
the literature on the three phases. Data on both independent and de-
pendent variables were collected from published and unpublished 
sources including journal articles and books, working papers and other 
online materials. Ivor Agyeman-Duah’s (2008) edited book An Economic 
History of Ghana: Reflections on a half-century of challenges and progress provides 
the opinions of 20 distinguished Ghanaians and non-Ghanaians on 
Ghana’s economic trajectory, the causes and effects of institutions and 
public policies. This book proved to be a good source of secondary in-
formation.  
Notes 
 
1 Critical decisions that established a particular development path for Ghana, 
upon which subsequent policies, institutions and structures were built, resulting 
in increasing returns and locked-in outcomes. 
2 The independent variable refers to the explanatory (causal) factors on which 
the outcome is supposedly dependent. The dependent variable refers to the 
outcome of an investigation. 
3 Process tracing is also referred to as causal-process, genetic explanation, inter-
pretive method, narrative explanation, and sequential explanation (see Brady 
and Collier, 2004; George and Bennett, 2005; Goldstone, 1991) 
4 INUS is an acronym for ‘Insufficient, Necessary, Unnecessary and Sufficient 
conditions. INUS states that effects have typically a plurality of causes; that is; a 
certain condition can be brought about by a number of factors working togeth-
er. While each of the variables may be needed to cause an effect, a singular vari-
able is insufficient but necessary part of a condition, which is itself unnecessary 
but sufficient for the effects (Mackie, 1965). 
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4 
Ghana’s Early Years of Economic and 
Political Transformation (1957-82): 
The Period of Endogenous Drive with 
Little Foreign Aid 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the effects of foreign aid in the early years of 
Ghana’s quest for economic and political transformation and develop-
ment. As conceptualised in Chapter Two the interaction between histori-
cal events, endogenous resources, political settlements arising from polit-
ical, economic and bureaucratic institutions and actors, prevailing 
policies and ideologies, and foreign aid may result in positive or negative 
transformation and development. This chapter traces such interactions 
immediately after independence in 1957 where there was so much hope 
for the newly independent country, through the difficult years of the late 
1970s, and mid 1980s, where all hopes for an economic breakthrough 
and political stability disappeared and in place hopelessness became the 
aura of the country. Using historical facts as they were and an application 
of process tracing, this chapter connects the three covariables and shows 
how they collectively contributed (cause and effect) towards the coun-
try’s economic and political transformation and development during that 
period.  
The chapter is divided into six sections after this introduction. Section 
two summarises the political and economic conditions at the beginning 
and at the end of the period. It identifies all the elements or attributes of 
the three covariables that caused and affected economic and political 
transformation. The subsequent sections then provide the narratives on 
how specific attributes of the covariables (history, aid and endogenous 
drivers) interacted. Section three begins the narrative with analyses of 
five historical events (critical junctures) that set into motion and subse-
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quently influenced the catalysis between endogenous drivers and foreign 
aid. Section four analyses the interaction between foreign aid and endog-
enous factors while section five then links the interaction back to the 
degree of economic and political transformation and development. Sec-
tion six concludes by revisiting the five attributes of a catalyst and an-
swers the basic question of whether aid was a catalyst in Ghana, based 
on the evidence deducted from the analyses.  
4.2 Ghana’s Political and Economic Transformation 
Before, During and After Interaction between Foreign 
Aid and Endogenous Drivers 
Ghana’s economy in the early years of independence was solid on the 
production and export of primary commodities. The country was the 
world's leading producer of cocoa beans, minerals, particularly gold, and 
timber. Through the exploitation of mineral deposits and export of co-
coa beans and timber, Ghana became a middle-income country whose 
per capita income of US$ 490 in the mid 1960s matched that of Mexico, 
South Korea and Malaysia. The country’s economy was doing better 
than those of all the sub-Saharan countries by a significant amount (Up-
hoff, 1972; Herbst, 1993). Ghana could produce enough food to feed its 
population, which was about 6.5 million in 1957. Agriculture absorbed 
about 80% of the labour and constituted about 50% of the GDP. Manu-
facturing industries were non-existen,t so Ghana was importing almost 
all its processed commodities (Kolavalli et al., 2012).  
Politically, Ghana was founded on the basis of multi-party democracy, 
but that changed within seven years and the country experienced political 
instability from 1966 to 1982 (Austin, 1964; Apter, 1972). Democracy, 
defined as “government of the people by the people and for the people,” 
seldom became a feature of national governance for 16 years and military 
coups became an acceptable part of the polity. The people in general 
blamed the political regimes for their economic hardships and applauded 
the coups (Boafo-Arthur, 1999; Gyimah-Boadi, 2008). Having taken 
power in pursuit of their narrow interests, various military regimes pur-
sued short-term economic policies that did not lead to major economic 
transformation.  
The economy continued its protracted decline for three decades. The 
annual GDP growth rate of 2.2% between 1960 and 1970 was small. 
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Growth even dropped further by 0.5% annually in the subsequent years 
(Aryeetey et al., 2000; Aryeetey, 2008). The initial push for industrialisa-
tion started to weaken by early 1970. That also happened to the manu-
facturing sector. During the mid 1970s (1975-79) the sector declined an-
nually by 2.5%, reaching a growth rate of 12.3% between 1980 and 1982. 
At that point, population growth and the worsening economy combined 
to make Ghana lose its medium-income status. By 1982, living standards 
had deteriorated so badly that Ghanaians would do anything to survive. 
At that time, by today’s standards, Ghana would have been classified as a 
failed state given the chaotic situation in the country. The Ghanaian head 
of state, Flight Lt. Rawlings, described hospitals as “graveyards” (Boafo-
Arthur, 1999; Aryeetey and Tarp, 2000; Adedeji, 2001).  
On the basis of interviews and secondary data, this study identified 
the 17 causal factors that explain Ghana’s poor economic and political 
structural transformation from 1957 to 1982. Through application of the 
process tracing method, which connects the 17 factors in the covariates 
A, B and C together, we can provide plausible answers to the key re-
search questions in this thesis. Figure 4.1 summarises the process tracing 
causal-effect linkages of Phase I. The reader’s attention is drawn to the 
labelling of the factors as they correspond to the respective dependent 
and independent variables. 
A:  Critical Historical Junctures 
A1:  Cold war ideology dominated foreign policy of  both donors and 
aid recipient countries.  
A2:  Ghana’s substantial foreign exchange reserves and high economic 
rent from gold and cocoa beans led to leaders’ disinterest in 
foreign aid. 
A3:  The decolonisation period and Ghana’s role in the Pan African 
movement.  
A4:  Absence of  large endogenous businesses/entrepreneurs in 
industrial or modern sector of  the economy. 
A5:  Unequal terms of  trade and desire to industrialise.  
 
B: Aid 
B1:  Little/insignificant foreign aid received. 
B2:  Poor quality of  ODA with high percentage of  loans and fewer 
grants. 
B3:  Low disbursement of  ODA. 
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B4:  ODA unfocused on productive sectors (importation of  goods 
and services). 
 
C: Endogenous Drivers 
C1:  Abundance of  natural resources 
C2:  Reliance on the production and export of  two primary 
commodities (cocoa beans and gold). 
C3:  Politics of  intimidation, divisiveness and exclusion. 
C4:  Socialistic economic policies that antagonised the West, 
discouraged large private sector, encouraged large public sector 
and promoted state inefficiency. 
C5:  Import substitution industries. 
C6:  Inadequate investment in raising productivity of  cocoa and gold. 
C7:  State inefficiency in planning and management.  
C8:  Role of  the state in direct production of  goods and services. 
 
Y: Economic and Political Transformation 
Y1:  Constant price fluctuation of  Ghana’s major exports (cocoa 
beans and gold). 
Y2:  Inadequate foreign exchange and unstable currency. 
Y3:  Foreign debt burden. 
Y4:  Widespread corruption. 
Y5:  Frequent military coups, political instability and violation of  
human rights.  
Y6:  Failure of  industrialisation programme. 
Y7:  Unchanged economic structure or little transformation. 
 
Z: Deterioration in Standard of  Living 
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Figure 4.1 
Tracing Ghana’s developmental trajectory from 1957 to 1982 (Phase I) 
 
 
4.3. Historical Antecedents that Shaped the Interaction 
Between Foreign Aid and Endogenous Factors  
From the historical accounts provided by experts and the literature (Up-
hoff, 1972; Leith and Soldering, 2000; Agyeman-Duah, 2008; Rooney, 
2015) we can identify five historical events that played important roles in 
shaping the interaction between aid and endogenous drivers, causing 
cascading effects on the structure and transformation of Ghana’s econ-
omy, politics and development. The five historical events were:  
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a. Cold War ideology that dominated the international foreign 
policy of both, major donors and Ghana’s political regimes; 
b. Ghana’s substantial foreign exchange reserves at the time of in-
dependence, which shaped the leadership’s disinterest in foreign 
aid; 
c. The decolonisation period and Ghana’s leading role in the lib-
eration of other Africa countries (Pan Africanism); 
d. The absence of significant numbers of domestic business peo-
ple in the modern sector and the disinterest of the state in pro-
moting private capitalism; 
e. Unequal terms of trade and the founding fathers’ desire to in-
dustrialise. 
4.3.1 Domination of Cold War ideology in foreign policy of donors 
and aid recipients (A1) 
At the time of Ghana’s independence, there were political and military 
tensions as well as ideological differences between the Western bloc, led 
by the USA and Britain and its allies, and the Eastern bloc, led by the 
Soviet Union and its allies. During the early years of the Cold War, the 
USA and Britain, and to some extent the Soviet Union, were the major 
providers of aid to the developing world. The apex of the Cold War in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s coincided with the period when move-
ments sprang up to liberate African countries from colonialism by West-
ern countries. As France and Britain began losing their colonies, Wash-
ington, Moscow and to a large extent Beijing, were eager to replace 
them.  
It was President John Kennedy’s plan to use foreign aid and propa-
ganda to keep as many African countries as possible out of the Sovi-
et/Communist camp. The implication of the Cold War was that the 
dominant interests in the provision of foreign aid were either those of 
the West or those of the East. There was little discussion about the eco-
nomic and political interests of aid recipients as distinct from those of 
the donor. To quote Hopkins (2000:4), “development was a secondary 
concern; rentier elites were not obliged to account to donors for aid ef-
fectiveness in terms of economic or political improvements.” It must be 
stated, however, that non-aligned states such as Finland and Switzerland 
did not provide aid for Cold War purposes. 
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4.3.2 Ghana’s substantial foreign reserves at the time of 
independence (A2) 
At the time of independence, Ghana had foreign exchange reserves of 
US$ 500m and no debt (Uphoff, 1972:222; Leith and Soldering, 
2000:25;). Significant foreign exchange reserves and the importance of 
revenue from cocoa beans gave Nkrumah and the CPP government a 
sense of economic security, which also meant that the regime was not 
eager to receive foreign aid. It was Nkrumah’s intention to use rents 
from cocoa beans and the accumulated foreign exchange reserves to 
transform and build a prosperous Ghana. Aid was seen as an extension 
of imperialism and Nkrumah vehemently opposed its domineering influ-
ence on foreign policies. He argued that Africans were capable of han-
dling their own affairs.  
4.3.3 The decolonisation period and Ghana’s leading role in the 
Pan African movement (A3) 
After Ghana became the first black colony in Africa to gain independ-
ence, Nkrumah extended the liberation movement to other African 
countries. That also meant supporting those countries with Ghana’s for-
eign exchange reserves and other resources. Nkrumah wanted to lead the 
future “United States of Africa”. Hence, he financed many Africa libera-
tion struggles and opposed apartheid, which was supported by the UK. 
During the celebration of Ghana’s independence, Nkrumah declared: 
We are going to see that we create our own African personality and identi-
ty…. We again rededicate ourselves in the struggle to emancipate other 
countries in Africa; for our independence is meaningless unless it is linked 
up with the total liberation of the African continent (BBC, 11-4-1997).  
Ghana’s leading role in the Pan African movement and the Cold War 
ideological divisions pulled the country apart in two different directions 
and on a collision course with some of the Western powers, which want-
ed Ghana to align with capitalism. They were concerned that Ghana’s 
socialistic approach to development might make it lean towards China 
and Soviet Union, and then, given Ghana’s pan-African agenda, sway 
other African countries to the East. The Cold War also divided Africa, 
and Nkrumah’s ambition of African unity against the imperialism of the 
West was not achieved. The US used other African leaders, like Presi-
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dent William Tubman of Liberia, who did not like Nkrumah’s claim of 
leading Africa’s liberation movement in the 1950s when Liberia had been 
independent since 1847, and Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, who 
had emerged from the Second World War as an African hero for leading 
the allied forces in defeating the Italian military in Africa. During the first 
international meeting of non-aligned countries, which declared neutrality 
in the Cold War, Nkrumah was elected deputy to President Josip Tito of 
Yugoslavia and he persuaded some of the African leaders to join the 
non-allied movement. This angered the West, especially the USA, which 
at that time was the dominant provider of international aid to developing 
countries. In addition, it created a basis for animosity between the USA 
and Ghana, which further shaped their foreign policies.  
4.3.4 Absence of large-scale endogenous businesses (A4) 
While it was Nkrumah’s intention to pursue an industrialisation pro-
gramme in the early years of Ghana’s independence, there were few local 
business people in the manufacturing sector. This was in contrast to ag-
riculture, where many Ghanaians had been successful in cultivating co-
coa. There were also many and small-scale traders. The size of cocoa 
farms had become the measure of wealth in Ghana and private individu-
als were interested in its cultivation, but Kwame Nkrumah was uncom-
fortable with private capitalism. Moreover, cocoa was grown in southern 
Ghana, especially in the Ashanti region, where his strongest opposition 
had come from, so he was reluctant to facilitate its development. Nkru-
mah was afraid that supporting the private sector could give his political 
rivals state resources to turn against his long-term political ambition and 
ideology of socialism.  
Inadequate local enterprises with experience in large-scale manufac-
turing enabled Nkrumah to argue that there was no bourgeois class 
among Ghanaians to undertake large-scale investments, so the state 
would have to step in. He established numerous state enterprises and 
economic institutions that supported the development of state capitalism 
as opposed to independent private sector development (Leith and Soder-
ling, 2000; Aryeetey and Tarp, 2000; Rooney, 2015). However, a Ghana-
ian industrialist, a banker and a retired politician disputed Nkrumah’s 
contention that there were few Ghanaian private sector entrepreneurs to 
lead industrialisation. 
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Look, Tetteh Quarshie, who introduced cocoa to Ghana, was a private 
man. The government didn’t do any plantation. From the eastern region to 
western and to Ashanti, private individuals grew cocoa. By the time we re-
alised it, Ghana had become the number one cocoa producer in the world, 
but the government didn’t have a single tree. Nkrumah was wrong to say 
there was no private capitalist to lead (Interview with a retired industrialist 
in Accra, 5 August 2015).  
4.3.5 Unequal terms of trade and Ghana’s desire to industrialise 
(A5) 
One of the rationales for Britain’s colonisation of Ghana was to facilitate 
exploitation of the country’s rich natural resources for UK’s industrialisa-
tion. As part of the colonial relationship, Ghana was to produce primary 
commodities like cocoa beans, gold, timber and bauxite and export them 
to Britain and other industrialised countries, while importing industrial-
ised commodities with the foreign exchange obtained from exporting 
primary commodities. So, at independence, the terms of trade favoured 
industrialised countries, as they do today. Two interviewees (a former 
Economic Minister and an activist in Kwame Nkrumah’s political party) 
provided several examples of the regime’s explanations for wanting to 
change Ghana’s economic structure to obtain better terms of trade. One 
of them is reproduced below. 
In 1962/63 a ton of cocoa beans was sold in the international market 
for £208, but the price dropped to £191 per ton in 1963/64 and £90 in 
1964/65 (Gill and Duffus, 1967) while the price of a Volkswagen Beetle 
car in 1963 was £1200. Thus, to purchase one Volkswagen Beetle in 
1963 required more than 13 tons of cocoa beans. While it took less than 
a few labour hours to produce that one car, it took Ghana several years 
of labour to produce 13 tons of cocoa beans with. Whilst critics may ar-
gue that the analogy does not take into consideration the role of capital, 
to Nkrumah and the regime, the prevailing terms of trade where primary 
commodities were viewed as being less valuable than industrial commod-
ities needed to change. And the only way to change the terms of trade 
was for Ghana to shift towards production of industrial goods.  
512566-L-sub01-bw-Awortwi
Processed on: 10-8-2017 PDF page: 129
 Ghana’s Early Years of Economic and Political Transformation (1957-82) 103 
4.4 Interaction Between Foreign Aid and Endogenous 
Factors 
The Ghana case confirms that prevailing conditions in the international 
arena determine who gets aid, how much of it, its predictive influence, 
and resulting development in the recipient country (Austin, 1964; Amin, 
1972; Apter, 1972; Asad, 2002; BBC, 1997; Agyeman-Duah, 2008; 
Rooney, 2015). In Ghana, the conditions trigger the behaviour and strat-
egies adopted by donors and different political regimes in aid negotia-
tions, the amounts committed and disbursed, accountability or absence 
of it, the sources of leverage that both exerted during negotiations, and 
the environment on the basis of which economic policies and political 
systems were designed and implemented. The sub-sections below we 
trace and link how these factors played out in Ghana.  
4.4.1 Founding political regime and state-led economic 
development (C3+C4+C5+C7) 
After gaining independence in 1957, the political regime led by Dr. 
Kwame Nkrumah attempted to change the economy, which was pre-
dominantly based on agriculture, to to give a greater role to the manufac-
turing industry. The aim was to rapidly stimulate social and economic 
transformation and development (Agyeman-Duah, 2008; Rooney, 2015). 
Nkrumah conceived a policy of self-financing public infrastructure, with 
the hope that it would motivate investment by the international private 
sector in Ghana’s enormous natural resources and thus promote indus-
trialisation and economic transformation. As noted earlier, Nkrumah felt 
there were no endogenous large-scale private enterprises with the capital 
and technology necessary to lead the kind of industrialisation he envi-
sioned. However, by 1960 there was no foreign direct investment involv-
ing international private capital and Nkrumah felt frustrated.  
He then decided on a state-led industrialisation programme. It was 
the desire to hasten industrialisation and the availability of substantial 
foreign exchange reserves to facilitate change that resulted in a develop-
ment policy based on a substantial state role in economic activities. The 
regime embarked on a number of policies that ‘closed’ the economy. 
These included import-substitution industries and tight regulation of for-
eign exchange and interest rates (Meng, 2004; Ackah and Kutsoati, 
2008;). Among the state-led industries that were established were an al-
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uminium smelter, timber-processing plants, cocoa-processing plants, 
breweries; cement manufacturing, oil refining, tomato paste, textile man-
ufacturing, and vehicle assembly plants. In agriculture, he established oil 
palm plantations not only to diversify revenue earnings but also to rival 
cocoa, which was grown by private individuals. Nkrumah wanted to in-
dustrialise in order to counter the unequal terms of trade. He believed 
that accepting foreign aid to invest in primary commodities would per-
petuate Ghana’s dependence on the industrialised countries and further 
worsen the terms of trade (Meng, 2004; Ackah and Kutsoati, 2008; 
Rooney, 2015).  
To facilitate his industrialisation programme, Nkrumah needed cheap 
energy. A study to construct a dam and hydroelectric power station on 
the Volta River had been conducted by the British colonial government 
but had not been financed because Nkrumah had started negotiations 
for political independence from Britain. The project was estimated to 
cost £130 million, which could not be met from internal resources, so 
Nkrumah looked for foreign aid. The Cold War played a significant role 
in the subsequent negotiations. A US private investor, Edgar Keizer, was 
persuaded to invest in Nkrumah’s plan to convert a large bauxite deposit 
in Ghana into aluminium. The viability of the aluminium plant depended 
on cheap power, so Nkrumah requested financial support from the USA 
to undertake the hydroelectricity project that Britain had abandoned. 
However, given Nkrumah’s position in the non-aligned movement, the 
US Congress voted against financing the project. Nkrumah then threat-
ened to approach the Soviet Union or look elsewhere for the money, and 
President Kennedy’s security advisors recommended financing the pow-
er project (Rooney, 2015). The UK and US governments provided 25% 
of the cost of the project and persuaded the World Bank to provide 
34%. The government of Ghana provided the remaining 41%. The 
World Bank’s contribution was to be disbursed to the government in 
instalments. Nkrumah was noted for undertaking discretionary actions in 
the use of national budget, so the Bank was to monitor the use of the 
project money. Furthermore, it was to provide a business case for the 
project (Killick, 1978:249; Leith and Soldering, 2000:20), which enabled 
the two donor countries to justify their involvement on economic, not 
political, grounds. The expectation was that, with American government 
aid supporting the construction of the dam, and the Volta Aluminium 
Company (VALCO) having American private sector investment, private 
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capital would flow into the country from the USA as had happened in 
South Korea with American private investors running the factories.  
When Keizer invested in VALCO, if other American private investors had 
followed up to establish aluminium chain industries, exploiting our bauxite 
and producing the aluminium in Ghana, that would have been the essence 
of American capital and catalytic aid. We needed private capital, technolo-
gy and market and those were associated with the West, not the East—
Russia and China. Give me an example of a country that benefited from 
Chinese and Russian assistance, and managed to turn around. From no-
where into the limelight, South Korea turned around with America aid and 
private investment (Interview with a former Finance Minister of Ghana, 
15 August 2015). 
With no more private sector investors, the financing needs of indus-
tries were addressed by the state through establishment of national de-
velopment banks, the National Investment Bank (1963), and the Agricul-
tural Development Bank (1965). The state provided credit support to its 
preferred sectors and directly intervened in the financial market (Ar-
yeetey, et al., 2001).1 The government also began numerous infrastruc-
ture projects (roads, railway systems, hospitals, and so on.).  
Consequently, the manufacturing sector expanded, with a rise in GDP 
growth from 2% to 9% between 1957 and 1969. The sector also im-
proved its contribution to exports with a 14% share, whilst employment 
grew at 8% per annum (Osei, 1995). From 1957 to the end of 1966, pub-
lic corporations that were in manufacturing propelled employment crea-
tion from 11,052 to 115,826 (Adda, n.d.:2). Economic growth was re-
spectable, averaging 4% during the 1960s (World Bank, 1994). The push 
for industrialisation as a strategy for structural transformation reduced 
the focus on agricultural production and productivity. Import substitu-
tion industries (ISIs) made the economy heavily dependent on foreign 
exchange, and simultaneously the neglect of the cocoa sector resulted in 
a shortage of foreign currency to import intermediate inputs for the in-
dustries (Steel, 1972; Dinye and Nyaba, 2001; Ackah and Kutsoati, 2008).  
In addition to the industrialisation programme, Nkrumah spent for-
eign exchange reserves on showpiece projects, public buildings and other 
costly endeavours, particularly in large towns; by 1966 Ghana’s foreign 
exchange reserves had dried up (Apter, 1975). In 1965 Nkrumah criti-
cised the West for meddling in Ghana’s and Africa’s affairs. He used the 
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word ‘neo-colonialism’ to represent the conditions where African states 
were theoretically independent but in reality were controlled by the colo-
nial powers because their economies and politics were linked to the 
West. Nkrumah’s foreign policy was heavily influenced by Cold War ide-
ology, socialism and decolonisation. His constant speeches against the 
West were not received well by the USA in particular. After publication 
of his book Neo-colonialism: the Last Stage of Imperialism, the US govern-
ment voiced displeasure over Nkrumah’s ideology and immediately can-
celled US$ 35m in aid to Ghana (Asad, 2002).  
With cocoa prices falling in the international market and accumulated 
foreign reserves completely used up, in 1965 Nkrumah asked the IMF 
and World Bank to provide substantial foreign aid, but it did not materi-
alise because he refused to accept their conditions of non-inflationary 
borrowing, reduced government spending and structural adjustment 
(Government of Ghana, 1965, quoted in Boafo-Arthur, 1999:77; BBC, 
1997). With no foreign exchange reserves left, the government resorted 
to supplier credits to finance many projects and importation of essential 
commodities. Taking advantage of the Cold War, the regime received a 
small amount of aid from China and the Soviet Union. By 1966, Ghana’s 
economy had experienced serious deterioration. This was reflected in the 
balance of payments deficit and poor credit rating. Although in general 
the amount of foreign aid was remarkably small in any of the economic 
sectors or in terms of its contribution to the country’s GDP, by 1966 the 
government had accumulated US$790m in foreign debts of (Uphoff, 
1972:222; Leith, 1974:29;). According to Uphoff, “nearly three-quarters 
of this debt was in the form of medium-term supplier credits with inter-
est of 6%. Technical assistance amounted to about US$ 50m, grants US$ 
25m, training US$ 8m, and long-term projects like the Akosombo Dam 
US$ 108m” (ibid.). 
4.4.2 Cold War effect on politics of divisiveness, intimidation and 
exclusion (A1+C3) 
The Cold War had effects on Ghana’s domestic politics. Ghana adopted 
the British parliamentary system of government, with a vibrant multi-
party political system and a strong opposition. Nkrumah’s Convention 
People’s Party (CPP drew populist support from rural and working-class 
Ghanaians while the opposition United Party (UP) drew more elitist, ur-
banised professionals and small businessmen and women. The CPP rul-
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ing coalition comprised labour unions, rural workers and the working 
class, but it excluded institutions like traditional authorities, religious and 
professional bodies, and academic institutions that opposed his socialist 
ideology. Institutions that could promote anti-government pluralistic 
politics were crushed in order to promote one large political coalition.  
The legal system was particularly weakened through enactment of 
controversial laws such as the Preventive Detention Act. Civil disobedi-
ence in the form of protests and workers’ demonstrations was curtailed 
(Rathbone, 1978). Nkrumah legalised imprisonment without trial for 
people that he considered to be security risks and in 1964 declared him-
self President of Ghana for life. He organised a referendum, which he 
won by 99.9%, and declared Ghana a single party state with the CPP as 
the only party (BBC, 1997; Yergin and Stanislaw, 1998; Leith and Solder-
ing, 2000:5).  
The social and political tension between Nkrumah’s ruling coalition 
and excluded institutions led to the demise of democratic structures. The 
CPP changed its constitution and rebranded Ghana a socialist state. 
Nkrumah replaced political pluralism with a single-party system, with 
him as the linchpin making all major decisions and providing inspiration 
and direction for the country. That system also ensured gradual devel-
opment of patronage. With the challenge of transforming the nation be-
coming daunting, and wanting to retain power any means, Nkrumah 
took out his frustration on the opposition parties and groups that did not 
share his single-minded views. He oppressed political parties and weak-
ened the civil service through intimidation. Organised labour was co-
erced to become a subsidiary of Nkrumah’s ruling party (Janda, 1980). 
The politics of divisiveness, intimidation and exclusion together with 
unfavourable donor response to Nkrumah’s socio-economic approach to 
development kindled much rancour in Ghana. For the first time in the 
history of the country, people had to queue for essential commodities. 
The US government further weakened Nkrumah’s economic pro-
grammes by refusing requests for financial assistance and clandestinely 
supporting his overthrow.  
Kwame Nkrumah was very much involved in the activities of the East, to 
the annoyance of the West, and given Ghana’s colonial relationship with 
UK, it was obvious the West conspired to get rid of him (Interview in Ac-
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cra on 7-8-15 with a senior citizen who witnessed the overthrow of 
Nkrumah).  
A CIA memo quoted on the website of HistoryCommons seems to 
corroborate the suspicions that many Ghanaian experts have about how 
Nkrumah was overthrown:  
In Washington, D.C., US Ambassador to Ghana William P. Mahoney met 
with CIA Director John A. McCone and the Deputy Chief of the CIA’s 
Africa division to discuss a “Coup d’etat Plot” in Ghana. According to a 
CIA document summarising the meeting, Mahoney said that he is uncer-
tain whether the coup, being planned by Acting Police Commissioner will 
ever come to pass. Notwithstanding, he adds that he is confident that 
President Kwame Nkrumah will not make it another year, given his wan-
ing popularity and Ghana’s deteriorating economy. “In the interests of fur-
ther weakening Nkrumah,” Mahoney recommends that the US deny 
Nkrumah’s forthcoming request for financial assistance. He adds that by 
refusing the request it would make a “desirable impression on other coun-
tries in Africa. In the event of a coup, Mahoney says a military junta would 
likely come to power (CIA memo of 3-11-1965, quoted on Histo-
ryCommons.org).  
On 27 March 1965, Robert W. Komer, a national security staffer stat-
ed in a memo to President Lyndon Johnson’s Special Assistant for Na-
tional Security Affairs: 
 … plans to overthrow the Ghanaian government are looking good. We 
may have a pro-western coup in Ghana soon. Certain key military and po-
lice figures here have been planning one for some time and Ghana’s dete-
riorating economic conditions may provide the spark. The plotters are 
keeping us briefed, and State thinks we’re more on the inside than the 
British. While we’re not directly involved (I’m told), we and other Western 
countries (including France) have been helping to set up the situation by 
ignoring Nkrumah’s pleas for economic aid. The new OCAM (Franco-
phone) group’s refusal to attend any OAU meeting in Accra (because of 
Nkrumah’s plotting) will further isolate him. All in all, looks good (Na-
tional Security Council memo of 27/3/65, quoted on Histo-
ryCommons.org; Lee, 2002).  
The political tension was the pretext on which a small group of senior 
army and police officers led by Colonel E.K. Kotoka, who was then 
commander of the Second Army Brigade in Kumasi, the capital of 
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Ashanti Region, overthrew Nkrumah’s regime. The military regime justi-
fied its action by citing Nkrumah’s abuse of power, political repression, 
economic decline and corruption, among other things. From the above 
memo it became known that the CIA had instigated the overthrow of 
Nkrumah because of his socialist ideology. The military regime—the Na-
tional Liberation Council (N.L.C.) led by General J.A. Ankrah, was 
formed in February 1966. In a letter to President Lyndon Johnson of the 
USA, the leader of the military regime justified their actions and pledged 
to improve relations with the West: 
… The Army and the Police Services were compelled to intervene to stem 
the tide of a growing communist menace in Ghana and the catastrophic 
deterioration of our economy…. We became convinced that the ex-
President and his communist friends … were determined to use Ghana as 
a bridgehead for the dissemination of communism and subversion in Afri-
ca… Nkrumah leaned heavily towards the East and brought into the 
country hundreds of so-called Chinese, Russian and East German techni-
cians and experts. We knew, however, that some Chinese experts were in 
fact training saboteurs in special camps to subvert other independent Afri-
can States. The Russians were also using East German nationals to train 
the ex-President’s guard and security men. What is more, by their reckless 
political adventures and spurious economic theories, the deposed Presi-
dent and his Party drove Ghana to the brink of economic disaster and al-
ienated the sympathy and support of our traditional friends in the West 
with whom we had enjoyed years of friendship and economic co-
operation. We are determined to remove all traces of alien ideological in-
fluence from our country and improve relations with our traditional West-
ern friends, among whom we count the people of the United States. Gha-
na’s balance of payments is in serious deficit … we appealed to your great 
country, Mr. President, for aid and food, and I do earnestly hope that your 
response will be swift and substantial. (J.A. Ankrah, Accra, March 24, 1966 
culled from the Office of the Historian).2  
So while Nkrumah wanted an inward looking approach to develop-
ment—a path that he considered suitable for Ghana—the new regime 
wanted a strong relationship with the West and to orientate or integrate 
Ghana into the world of the colonial metropolis. That was the essence of 
the regime’s letter to President Johnson. It was also to confirm that 
Nkrumah had been working against the interests of the West. 
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Reporting on 12 March 1966 on the successful military takeover in 
Ghana, in which the West was complicit, Robert W. Komer informed 
President Johnson in a memo that the overthrow of the Nkrumah gov-
ernment was “another example of a fortuitous windfall”, that “Nkrumah 
was doing more to undermine our interests than any other black Afri-
can” and that the “new military regime is almost pathetically pro-
Western.” He advised that the US should “follow through skilfully and 
consolidate such successes.” He recommended, “A few thousand tons of 
surplus wheat or rice, given now when the new regimes are quite uncer-
tain as to their future relations with us, could have a psychological signif-
icance out of all proportion to the cost of the gesture. I am not arguing 
for lavish gifts to these regimes—indeed, giving them a little only whets 
their appetites, and enables us to use the prospect of more as leverage” 
(National Security Council, 1966; Lee, 2002).  
 Again, on the basis of the above quotes, the USA’s interest in giving 
aid was basically to ensure that it got countries such as Ghana on its side, 
as part of its Cold War strategy. Some of the experts interviewed even 
suggested that the USA and other major Western countries manipulated 
cocoa bean prices downwards to strangle Ghana’s economy and make 
Nkrumah unpopular. They suggested that it was not coincidence that the 
prices of cocoa beans dropped substantially during Nkrumah’s time but 
remarkably rose by 38% after his overthrow and a further 15%, 19% and 
22% in each of the subsequent years that the military government was in 
power (Leith and Soldering, 2000:25). With the overthrow of Nkrumah, 
all Russian and Chinese technicians that were supporting Nkrumah’s in-
dustrial and infrastructure projects were expelled from the country by the 
new regime. 
4.4.3 Quantity and quality of ODA provided (B1+B2) 
The IMF, World Bank and Western donors returned to Ghana after 
Nkrumah was overthrown, and foreign aid to Ghana began to increase. 
The Bretton Woods Institutions provided Ghana with standby credit 
while Western donors agreed to postpone the country’s debt require-
ments until the IMF-sponsored meeting at the end of the year. During 
the meeting, the Paris Club agreed to postpone Ghana’s debt repayment 
from 1966-68 for another 10years. From 1968-69, aid accounted for 19% 
of Ghana’s imports, 20% of the government’s revenue and 27% of gross 
investment (Killick, 2010:120). As can be seen in Figure 4.2, the amount 
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of aid was small from 1960 to 1965 though it rose in absolute terms in 
2013 constant prices.  
Figure 4.2 
ODA to Ghana, 1960-82 in constant and current US$ prices (millions) 
Source: Extracted from OECD QWIDS Database, 2015. 
 
Whilst aid flows increased during the period, Western donors and 
multilateral institutions also had a strong influence on the economic pol-
icy direction of the military government. Under Western influence, the 
NLC government reversed Nkrumah’s socialist policy by denationalising 
some of the state-owned enterprises, devalued the Ghanaian currency 
from Nkrumah’s fixed exchange rate of 0.71 to one US$, to 1.02 to 
one US$ (Leith and Soderling, 2000; Aryeetey and Tarp, 2000). The NLC 
also reduced total government expenditure. Monetary discipline was in-
troduced, cutting the government deficit from 4% of GDP to 3.3% in 
1969. By 1970, the total debt of US$ 1bn was about 25% of Ghana’s 
GDP. With implementation of liberal economic policies, the NLC in-
curred the displeasure of some of the military elites, resulting in several 
attempts to overthrow the government. From 1966, when Nkrumah was 
overthrown, to 1969, there were three military coup attempts and nu-
merous rumours of counter insurgency (Sangaparee, 2010, GoG, 2014).  
Foreign aid coming on the back of all this had the effects of reversing 
Nkrumah’s policies. It also prepared the ground for an election that 
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brought in Ghana’s second democratic government. In October 1969, 
the NLC handed over power to Dr K.A. Busia, leader of the Progress 
Party (PP) that had been carved out of the UP—the party that had op-
posed Kwame Nkrumah’s CPP. After experiencing the military regime 
and comparing it with Nkrumah’s regime, the Ghanaian preference 
switched towards a leader who would not be too interested in leading 
Africa but who would be interested in solving Ghana’s internal prob-
lems. They found that in Dr Busia, who was then a sociology professor 
with an interest in social cohesion within the country and liberal democ-
racy. Donors had confidence in the PP government because of its free 
market economic. The PP government built a strong relationship with 
the Bretton Woods institutions and introduced IMF-sponsored mone-
tary reforms. In December 1971, the government devalued the currency 
from 1.02 to 1.82 to the US dollar and liberalised the external sector 
(Frimpong-Ansah 1991; Leith and Soderling, 2000:30). Busia also fo-
cused on support to private sector capitalism.  
While the regime’s anti-public sector business was apparent, the PP 
government could not reduce public expenditures substantially and the 
state mismanagement of enterprises was still a drain on the national 
economy. Interviews with a number of informants who witnessed eco-
nomic policies during that time confirmed Busia’s difficulties: 
The irony is that if you look at that period carefully, you will find that 
when Busia’s government took over, they didn’t abolish price controls and 
all state control policies immediately. They continued some aspects of stat-
ism that were prevalent in Nkrumah’s time even though they preached lib-
eralisation. I guess it was a pragmatic approach because they could not eas-
ily switch to free market mechanisms. Foreign aid from the West and 
World Bank had some influence, much bigger influence, in pushing the 
country in the direction of the market (Interview with a former govern-
ment official, 18 August 2013).  
The pursuance of a free market economy led to Busia’s downfall. The 
stabilisation approach, particularly the devaluation of the Cedi was 
deemed to be harsh. It provided one of the excuses by a section of the 
military to end Ghana’s attempt to steer clear of socialist economic poli-
cies. The military overthrew the democratic regime on 13 January 1972; 
27 months after Busia had taken power. Colonel I.K. Acheampong be-
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came the head of state and formed the National Redemption Council 
(NRC). The head of state also doubled as the Minister of Finance.  
Under Acheampong, the NRC government unilaterally rescheduled 
some debt repayments and abrogated others. That got Ghana blacklisted 
in the donor community and international financial circles. It affected 
Ghana’s ability to obtain financial support from multilateral as well as 
bilateral agencies. Foreign aid in the 1970s was a little over 2% of GDP. 
Acheampong appointed Dr Kwame Donkor Fourdjuor as a special assis-
tant to the ministry of finance. Dr. Fourjour had been employed by the 
previous regime and had worked at the International Finance Corpora-
tion (IFC), part of the World Bank Group. He advised the regime to ne-
gotiate for debt relief and Ghana negotiated to get its debt repayments 
rescheduled.  
Coincidentally and paradoxically, the NRC regime witnessed a sub-
stantial increase in commodity prices. With a bumper harvest of cocoa 
beans and rise in gold production, Ghana’s economy improved slightly. 
The regime resumed Nkrumah’s socialist policies. The gradual devalua-
tion of the currency, which the two previous regimes had introduced, 
was reversed. The cedi was revalued to 1.28 to the US dollar and im-
port controls were tightened (Leith and Soderling, 2000). The NRC gov-
ernment revived some of the old state-owned enterprises and acquired 
additional ones by taking a 55% equity share in foreign-owned mining 
and timber companies, nationalised Ashanti Goldfields and Volta Alu-
minium Company, and took a majority share-holding in commercial 
banks through an indigenisation decree in 1976 (Chazan, 1983). In effect, 
the government moved away from the right-of-centre economic policies 
that Busia had started. This was because Acheampong was Nkrumah’s 
protégé and seized the opportunity to reverse the capitalist interventions 
that opponents of Nkrumah had introduced. He was able to get away 
with it because commodity prices were high and so the government did 
not need foreign aid. There was significant growth in foreign exchange 
reserves on the back of fairly buoyant commodity prices over that peri-
od. It is also noteworthy that the regime unilaterally abrogated all foreign 
debts; thus, there was no possibility of receiving foreign aid. The quota-
tions below by two economists suggest that with good leadership and 
prudent public investment, a country like Ghana does not need foreign 
aid: 
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Foreign aid wasn’t that significant, so donors didn’t have that kind of lev-
erage on Acheampong’s regime. The wholesale conditionality that said, 
“adjust the exchange rate, remove price controls and abolish state enter-
prises” didn’t happen at all because there was little aid from donors. 
Acheampong maintained course, he kept the state enterprises, he didn’t 
listen to anybody at all and he didn’t need their money and there wasn’t 
that much aid. He didn’t want to service debts to the disadvantage of pub-
lic investment. (Interview with a Ghanaian economist and former gov-
ernment advisor, 30 July 2013) 
If Acheampong had maintained course and used the resources sensibly, 
the country would have been much better off actually, but a significant 
amount of corruption set in during that period. The gains from high 
commodity prices were largely lost just through profligacy, ineptitude in 
fiscal policy, corruption and public investment programmes that were not 
entirely informed by value for money considerations. Again, donors did 
not play any role in this economic policy direction. (Interview with a Gha-
naian economist, 30 July, 2013)  
Acheampong’s regime continued with its left-wing economic policies 
for almost eight years; a period marked by growth retardation and cor-
ruption. The harmful economic policies and blatant rent-seeking behav-
iour of the military regime and its cronies had effects on all facets of 
Ghana’s economy and population (Berry, 1994; Leith and Soldering, 
2000; Dzorgbo, 2001). Many Ghanaians with marketable skills voted 
with their feet and left the country to seek greener pastures abroad. The 
widespread corruption of the NRC military led to development of vari-
ous pressure groups (Association of Professional Bodies, People’s 
Movement for Freedom and Justice, Front for the Prevention of Dicta-
torship) to call for a change of government. Acheampong attempted un-
successfully to form a union government (UNIGOV) made up of a coa-
lition of civilians, the military and police. With increasing pressure from 
junior army officers as well as civil society, Acheampong’s fellow officers 
forced him to resign in yet another palace coup on 5 July 1978. General 
F.W.K Akuffo led the new regime and formed the Supreme Military 
Council (SMC). General Akuffo sought to reinstate the market led econ-
omy policies that Busia had started. The Ghanaian currency was deval-
ued from 1.28 to 2.75 to one US$, resulting in major strikes in the 
urban areas and political unrest. On 1 January 1979 Akuffo lifted the ban 
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on political parties following widespread public demonstrations in almost 
every sector of the economy.  
Remnants of Nkrumah and Busia’s political regimes regrouped and 
formed political parties. The supporters of Nkrumah and his ideology 
(Nkrumahism) formed the People’s National Party (PNP) while the fol-
lowers of Busia formed the Popular Front Party (PFP). Other splinter 
groups also entered the political fray. Elections were set for 18 June and 
Ghana seemed set once again to resume the path to democratic rule. 
However, the lower ranks of the armed forces were apparently unhappy 
with members of the previous regime not being prosecuted even after 
there was evidence of corruption. On 15 May 1979, Flight Lt. Jerry 
Rawlings and a small group of soldiers attempted unsuccessfully to over-
throw the military government. They were arrested and tried publicly. 
During the trial they won more support among the rank and file of the 
army. On 4 June, a group of soldiers released Rawlings, overthrew the 
government and formed the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council 
(AFRC). The AFRC proceeded to conduct the elections that had been 
planned for 18 June and the PNP, led by Dr. Hilla Limann, won them. 
Before handing over power, the AFRC undertook what it called a 
“house cleaning exercise” during which three former heads of state (Col 
I.K. Acheampong, Lt. General A.A. Africa and General F.W.K. Akufo) 
and other senior officers were publicly executed without trial.  
ODA increased slightly in 1980, following the return of the country 
to democracy after seven years of military rule. However, after 31 De-
cember 1981, when Rawlings staged another coup, citing mismanage-
ment by the government, ODA fell again. By 1982, political instability in 
Ghana reduced donor interest in the country. Aid per capita was US$ 14, 
or 3.4% of GNP. The country went into a serious liquidity crisis, with 
foreign exchange reserves, trade credit and medium-term financing all 
drying up.  
The PNP government, during its short stint in power, was reluctant 
to go to the IMF and World Bank for loans because of the conditionality 
involved. At the heart of Ghana’s challenges were poor economic poli-
cies at a time of excess demand over supply. Inflation had reached over 
100% in 1981; government revenue, amounting to 10% of GDP in 1976, 
had dropped to 5% by 1981. Limits on government expenditure were 
often ignored and revenue-raising measures were announced but never 
followed through. With little ODA available, the government resorted to 
512566-L-sub01-bw-Awortwi
Processed on: 10-8-2017 PDF page: 142
116 CHAPTER 4 
 
printing money to finance its budget, which created high inflation. De-
spite the inflation, interest and foreign exchange rates were normally 
fixed at levels far below the prevailing ones. Roads deteriorated, schools 
and clinics were left without personnel because their staff had not been 
paid for months. It was not surprising that the population welcomed 
Rawlings’ second coup. 
4.4.4 Low disbursement of committed ODA (B3) 
In the 1970s, while bilateral donors pledged to provide aid to various 
Ghana governments, disbursement remained smaller than the commit-
ments because of mistrust between donors and various regimes. Com-
mitments averaged US$ 60-70m annually during the early years of the 
1970s and increased to about $120m during the later years of the decade. 
However, actual disbursements fell below these levels (see Figure 4.3).  
Figure 4.3 
Reliability of foreign aid: the gap between commitment and disbursement, 
1966-82 (US$ millions) 
Source: Extracted from OECD-DAC-QWIDS Database, 2014. 
 
During this phase of Ghana’s history, foreign aid was characterised by 
a high percentage of concessional loans with interest and few grants. 
From 1963 to 1970, the grant equivalent of net ODA averaged about 
35% while loans with interest constituted 65% (see Figure 4.4).3  
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Figure 4.4 
Composition of ODA (loans and grants), 1962-82 (US$ million) 
Source: OECD QWIDS Database, 2014. 
 
From 1970 to 1982 there were six different political regimes, but the 
composition of aid did not change significantly irrespective of the re-
gime. About 60% of the ODA was provided as loans to be repaid with 
interest. It was no wonder that Ghana accumulated substantial foreign 
debts by the end of the period, in addition to the ones that the previous 
regime had accumulated. In fact, two-thirds of the total debt had been 
accumulated during Nkrumah’s regime in the form of supplier credit 
used to finance infrastructure projects and recurrent purchases after do-
nors had denied Ghana grants (Leith and Soldering, 2000:20). Hardy 
(1982) attributed much of the huge debt to credit pushing by export-
promoting agencies of the creditor countries and poor use of the foreign 
capital. In 1974, instead of cancelling Ghana’s debts, the Paris Club only 
provided a substantial grant element of the debt and compelled Ghana 
to repay its total debt over a 28-year period. Continuous implementation 
of state-led economic development programmes without an eye on man-
agement efficiency increased the debt. By the end of 1979, Ghana’s debt 
had doubled it to US$ 1.3bn, about 47.5% of the country’s GDP (Leith 
and Soldering, 2000:5).  
On the basis of the differences between grant elements of total ODA, 
Tsikata (1999:43) calculated effective development assistance and 
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showed that, from 1970-82, on average only about 57% of ODA was 
effective.4 Even where there were grants, they were invested in less eco-
nomically productive sectors. Bilateral and multilateral aid was delivered 
in the form of projects and commodity aid. From 1970 to 1982, much of 
ODA was spent on importing goods and services from donor countries 
(tied aid), social sectors and technical assistance. From 1970 to 1972, no 
ODA was spent on manufacturing, and from 1972 to 1982, on average 
only 11.7% of total aid went to productive sectors (see Table 4.1).  
Table 4.1 
Sectoral distribution of grant equivalent of bilateral and multilateral aid, 
1970-82 (US$ millions) 
Expenditure 
items of ODA 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
BoP support 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.46 3.01 6.88 0.63 0.28 2.20 0.00 0.00 
Social 
services 
0.40 5.47 4.40 4.90 1.19 1.55 1.84 0.21 2.17 3.78 2.80 5.75 2.17 
Current 
imports 
1.30 6.12 8.27 7.65 0.90 1.18 2.79 2.95 1.24 17.51 26.26 20.36 1.85 
Electricity, 
gas and 
water 
0.00 1.11 4.69 1.61 0.86 4.69 1.09 9.44 19.35 15.68 24.62 12.33 24.64 
Manufactur-
ing 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 4.10 2.36 2.29 2.96 3.09 6.04 13.27 4.58 2.80 
Transport 
and commu-
nication 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 7.12 7.65 9.25 4.03 0.03 10.04 7.61 
Others 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.07 0.04 1.12 3.94 
Grant Equiva-
lent of ODA 
loan 
1.70 12.70 17.60 14.70 7.90 19.80 20.40 34.10 30.50 51.80 75.30 55.40 46.20 
Source: Tsikata, 1999:44. 
 
Technical assistance, which was basically foreign experts and technol-
ogy, constituted on average more than 50% from 1970 to 1975 and 40% 
from 1976 to 1982.  
4.4.5 Inefficient state bureaucracy (C7) 
The Ghanaian civil service, while relatively educated, was not modern by 
Weberian standards, and not equipped to implement the kind of eco-
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nomic transformation that Nkrumah envisaged (Kelsell, 2013:75). For 
example, Japan implemented a series of modernisation projects aimed at 
building a little Tokyo in Seoul, but aid projects in Ghana immediately 
after independence did not have those modernisation intentions (Kim, 
2013). While a modern state with an effective bureaucracy was intro-
duced by Japan to Korea, Ghana’s bureaucracy was not modernised in 
the Weberian sense by the British, so civil servants looked up to the po-
litical figurehead of Nkrumah for direction and favour. For instance, 
Kelsell observes that because of inadequate technical competence, the 
seven-year development plan was technically flawed and had inadequate 
data to ensure realistic implementation (Kelsell, 2013:75). Import substi-
tution Industrialisation encountered numerous challenges. According to 
Killick, it included “unselective and arbitrary protection, unwise prefer-
ence for capital-intensive instead of labour-intensive production process-
es, poor agricultural backward and forward linkages with other sectors of 
the economy, a deteriorating quality of investment decisions and sub-
standard performance by state enterprises” (Killick, 1978:204-5). 
Throughout the period, not much support was provided to modernise 
the civil service, either through foreign assistance or internal resources. 
The Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration and oth-
er government training institutions were established to enhance the ca-
pability of civil servants, but the training did not do much to changing 
the culture in the civil service.  
4.4.6 Ghana’s political settlement and aid influence  
(C1-C8 + B1-B4) 
During the political trajectory of Phase I (1957-82), a period of 25 years 
saw only three democratic regimes that lasted a total of 12.5 years and six 
military regimes that also lasted 12.5 years. There was no consensus on 
the type of politics that would suit Ghana as the military and politicians 
jostled with each other and took turns to rule the country. The political 
settlement of that period was characterised by zero-sum games of power 
relations between ruling coalitions and those outside the coalitions. State 
resources and power were distributed among actors/institutions that 
were members of the ruling coalitions. Table 4.2 shows institu-
tions/agents that comprised Ghana’s political settlement during the pe-
riod.  
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Table 4.2 
Institutions and actors that constituted Ghana’s political settlement, 1957-
82 
 High Power  
Strong Incentives 
Political parties 
Military and police 
State enterprises  
Media (radio, television, newspa-
pers) 
Senior bureaucrats 
Donors 
Traditional authorities 
Ghana Bar Association 
W
eak Incentives 
Cocoa farmers 
Local political elites and foot sol-
diers of political parties 
Labour unions 
Employees of state enterprises  
University students 
Crop and peasant farm-ers 
Ordinary citizens 
 Low Power  
Source: Adapted from Oduro et al., 2014:12 
Note: During the period, the actors moved from one quadrant to the other hence their 
positions were not been fixed. The current table is used to reflect the general trend. 
 
The top left of the quadrant shows the ruling elites during the larger 
part of Phase I. From the beginning of independence, the ruling coali-
tion of Ghana constantly consisted of leaders of political parties, the mil-
itary, senior civil servants and managers of state enterprises. Traditional 
authorities like the Ashanti kings, chiefs, queen mothers, village elders, 
and so forth that commanded power at the local level cycled in and out 
of the ruling coalition. Both the civilian and military regimes co-opted 
and sidelined traditional authorities at different time periods, depending 
on what served their interest.  
Nkrumah’s political coalition had to rebuild itself so it could continue 
to dominate all aspects of Ghana’s social, economic and political institu-
tions. According to Apter (1975), in doing that Nkrumah drove away any 
independent-minded individuals from his inner circle and coalition. Hav-
ing succeeded in doing that, Nkrumah set the stage for state-led econom-
ic policies and production. . By the mid 1960s, state-owned enterprises 
were involved in production and distribution of a wide range of prod-
ucts. These activities included production of basic goods and services, 
among them liquor and biscuits. The state was also involved in construc-
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tion, mining, management of hotels and retail trade. The path that 
Nkrumah created reinforced itself in all aspects of national institutions. 
Members of the ruling coalition that benefited from Nkrumah’s state-led 
approach and largesse ensured continuity of his policies. Patronage, not 
efficiency, became the mode of management of state corporations (Apt-
er, 1975; Killick, 1978; Aryeetey, 2008). A former government official 
witnessed mismanagement of state enterprises during that era: 
In the management of state laundries, family members and friends of 
managers took their clothes there and would not pay for the cost of ser-
vices. The state enterprises were making losses, but the private sector 
laundries were making a profit. There was no need to create state enter-
prises; instead, he could have promoted Ghanaian entrepreneurs to go in-
to the laundry business as was done in the late 1980s. Whereas Nkrumah 
wanted the state to own everything, including farms, it didn’t go down well 
with Ghanaian natural philosophy because farmers had owned their farms 
years before he became President. The country had become the number 
one producer of cocoa without the government owning a single tree, so 
why state farms? Kwame Nkrumah established state enterprises because 
he wanted to create opportunities for employment for people who, after 
completion of school, wanted to receive a monthly salary (Interview with a 
former government official, 13 August 2015). 
The Ghanaian version of socialism developed into a culture of pat-
ronage and state institutions became instruments for catalysing its im-
plementation. Ghana’s political economy developed in such a way that 
politicians were viewed as providers of everything, which is similar to the 
role of a “chief” who must cater to his “subjects”. This expectation was 
increasingly reflected in the role of the state—provision of jobs and so-
cial services—while in the family, those that had money were also ex-
pected to help the have-nots with part of their resources. In all these pa-
tron-client relationships, the same was expected of politicians in order to 
guarantee votes from the citizens. This meant handing out import licenc-
es, coupons for collecting rations from state supermarkets and even cars 
to those in administrative positions and positions of privilege. Those in-
cluded executives of state-owned enterprises and senior civil servants. 
Given their positions, managers of state enterprises, for instance, were 
expected to share the largesse they received from politicians with their 
employees, who after receiving free goods would sell them in private 
shops. The institutionalisation of official import licences and controls 
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over foreign exchange provided enormous windfall profits to agents and 
institutions that could gain access to the licences and foreign exchange 
and sell them in parallel markets. As on the years passed, provision of 
and demand for kickbacks became the norm. All ruling coalitions, 
whether military or civilian found it difficult to change those institutions 
or found the system beneficial to their members and therefore main-
tained the status quo (Apter, 1972; Killick, 1978; Chazan, 1983; Mikell, 
1989; Leith and Lofchie, 1993). The inefficiency and waste associated 
with the management of state enterprises explains the low productivity 
of the Ghanaian economy. 
During that period, donors had some power and strong incentives to 
influence the country’s economic policy direction, but their power was 
limited because of the Cold War and Nkrumah’s socialistic ideology. 
That changed after Nkrumah was overthrown, and over the long period 
of military regimes, donors had less incentive to influence the country’s 
policy direction as long as Ghana was not receiving aid from the Soviet 
Union (Fitch and Oppenheimer, 1966; Leith, 1974; Aryeetey and Cox, 
1997; Aryeetey, 2008). 
From Nkrumah’s period onwards, civilian governments distributed 
state resources and enterprises to political cronies and the prevailing po-
litical and social norm was “the winner takes all government”. In that 
environment, political winners were also economic winners and political 
losers were also economic losers. The short-term horizon of civilian re-
gimes meant that they needed to expand patronage in order to have a 
large coalition. Rent seeking became a lucrative business. Military coup 
leaders accused previous regimes of corruption and ineffectual economic 
policies, but they failed to fundamentally change course and retained the 
institutions that had given rise to mismanagement. Southeast Asia also 
had neo-patrimonialism, but governments did ensure state efficiency in 
the management of enterprises; in the Ghanaian case, however, 
achievement of productivity and efficiency did not feature in the organi-
sation of state enterprises (Fosu and O’Connell, 2006; van Donge et al., 
2012; Barendsen et al., 2013). 
All the regimes suppressed political freedom and human rights abuses 
were common phenomena. As shown earlier, in the 15 years from 1967 
to 1982, Ghana had five military and two civilian regimes. The civilian 
government that succeeded Nkrumah was the Progress Party (PP), with 
the majority of its followers belonging to the Akan-speaking ethnic 
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group. The PP proceeded to dismiss 568 public officials suspected of 
being members of the CPP, but none of them was an Akan speaker. The 
party also used the legal process to prevent the opposition leader from 
taking his seat in parliament (Austin, 1964, 1976). The instigation of sev-
eral military coups as a result of the Cold War set a precedent that state 
power could be usurped by a disgruntled few who possessed arms. Dur-
ing the military and civilian regimes, the attitude of prominent donors, 
mainly the UK and USA, depended on how the government reacted to 
debt repayment and conditionality regarding economic policies. Though 
there was little foreign aid, it was still used covertly to influence domestic 
politics.  
Out of dominant socialistic economic policies and brief neoliberal 
economic policies emerged widespread corruption and moral decadence. 
Corruption was mainly attributed to economic policies involving a sys-
tem of import licences and high taxes on imported goods (Jebuni and 
Oduro, 1998). Ghanaians described this widespread culture of state pat-
ronage and corruption as kalabule, meaning “keep it quiet” or “hide it” 
(Frimpong-Ansah, 1992). The corruption weakened state institutions to 
the extent that civil servants hardly delivered any substantial service to 
the population. Moonlighting became pervasive in the civil service while 
many educated Ghanaians sought jobs abroad. 
In the 24 years from 1957 to 1981, Ghana saw eight political leader-
ships and governments, but almost all of them (the exceptions were the 
NLC and PP governments, which were short-lived) pursued similar 
state-led and state-controlled economic policies. Every regime started 
opening discussions with the IMF to negotiate reforms of the economy 
and policies, but they all failed to agree on a comprehensive way forward 
(Tsikata, 1999).  
By 1981, Ghana’s sources of external finance had whittled down to a 
handful of donors (Harrigan and Younger, 2000: 193). Bilateral donors 
had left the country and those who stayed had only desk officers. The 
PNDC policies at the beginning were also designed to be state-
interventionist as it was hostile towards the prescriptions of the IMF and 
World Bank. During Rawlings' first year, the economy came to a virtual 
halt. Industry ran at 10% capacity due to the chronic shortage of foreign 
exchange for importing raw and intermediate materials, and spare parts 
(Tsikata, 1999; Aryeetey et al., 2000; Aryeetey, 2008). The regime man-
aged to bring together a coalition of young radical ideologues that ab-
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horred corruption, inequality and private sector wealth creation. They 
believed in the Marxist vision of a classless society and, through a series 
of populist programmes like arresting and flogging traders for selling 
above the control prices, pursued economic purity. The PNDC regime 
believed from the beginning that the poor economic conditions were a 
result of corruption and that the situation would improve if it could find 
an antidote to corruption by punishing people for wrongdoing. Aid 
would flow in from sympathetic governments. However, there was a 
rude awakening; donors stayed away and even sympathetic foreign lead-
ers such as Fidel Castro of Cuba, Muammar Gaddafi of Libya and Shagu 
Shagari of Nigeria were unable to bail out their colleague military head of 
state and ideological brother.  
4.5 State of Ghana’s Political and Economic 
Transformation at the End of Phase I (Y1-Y7) 
With the interplay of aid and endogenous political settlements amidst a 
deteriorating economy, Ghana’s two decades attempt to change the 
structure of the economy by emphasising industrialisation was a com-
plete failure. Manufacturing output could not expand to stimulate growth 
of GNP and bring in the needed foreign exchange, and with a gradual 
fall in cocoa bean exports Ghana began to experience financial difficul-
ties (Asanti, 2000). By 1983, government revenues had fallen to less than 
5% of GDP from 21% in 1970 (Tabatabai, 1986). With this decline, the 
government relied on the banking system to finance its expenditures. 
Loss of monetary control accelerated inflation. By 1982, the promise of 
“paradise on earth” by Nkrumah had become a fantasy and Ghana was a 
pale shadow of its post-independence middle-income status. Countries 
that were at par with Ghana in the mid 1960s multiplied their per capita 
income ten-fold by 1982, while Ghana retrogressed.  
The AFRC and PNDC governments, which inherited deleterious 
economic policies in 1981/82, pursued policies that criminalised some 
economic activities that were perceived as rent seeking; goods and prop-
erties alleged to have been obtained through rent seeking were confiscat-
ed and offenders beaten and shot. Former heads of state were killed and 
market structures regarded as the causes of high prices of goods were 
burnt. A parallel judicial system in the form of public tribunals was es-
tablished to prosecute “wrongdoing”, bank deposits of more than 50, 
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000 (exchange rate  2.75 to one US$) that could not be justified were 
confiscated. Producers and market women were forced to sell their 
goods at state-controlled prices. Supreme Court judges were abducted 
and killed. State bureaucrats deserted their work in public offices.  
By 1982, structural transformation of the economy had not occurred. 
The share of the agricultural sector in GDP increased because manufac-
turing output had declined substantially. Industry's share of GDP fell by 
an annual average rate of about 2%. Import substitution industries that 
had been established in the 1960s were either producing at 10% capacity 
level or had collapsed. By 1982, industry was contributing only 12% to 
GDP, a fall from 24% in 1975; the service sector’s contribution had 
gone up, from 23% in 1975 to 33% in 1982 (see Figure 4.5).  
Figure 4.5 
Contribution of agriculture, industry and services to GDP, 1965-82 (%) 
Source: Extracted from various sources, including World Bank Database, 2014. 
 
Ghana’s economic structure did not change. Agriculture continued to 
be the leading sector in employment, foreign exchange, domestic income 
and GDP growth. In fact, its contribution expanded in these areas, in-
stead of decreasing, as one would expect in a stylised structural trans-
formation model. No new agricultural export product was added to co-
coa and productivity was at its lowest for 17 years. Cocoa production fell 
from over 557,000 tonnes in 1965 to about 158,000 tonnes by 1983. No 
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new technology was used to increase agricultural production and produc-
tivity remained at the 1957 level. Crop production was basically at sub-
sistence level, using the traditional slash-and-burn method. The farms 
were mostly small land holdings. By 1982, more than 60% of the popula-
tion were working in agriculture and the share of the sector in GDP had 
returned to 55%; yet the nation was not producing enough to feed itself 
and needed food aid (Aryeetey and Tarp, 2000; Aryeetey, 2008; Ackah 
and Kutsoati, 2008). 
There was no structural transformation towards the end of phase I, so 
Ghana’s economic growth reversed in several macro-indicators. Annual 
GDP recorded negative growths in much of the 1970s (1972, 1975, 
1976, 1979) and early 1980s (see Fig. 4.6).  
Figure 4.6 
Changes in GDP, 1967-82 (%)  
Source: Drawn from World Bank Database, 2014. 
 
Total GDP was US$ 4.4bn in 1980, but it dropped to US$ 4bn in 
1983. Per capita GDP growth stagnated and in the early 1980s started 
falling from US$ 412 in 1980 to US$ 341 by 1983 (see Figure 4.7).  
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Figure 4.7 
Per capita GDP, 1960-83 (US$ millions) 
Source: Extracted from World Bank Database, 2016. 
 
Inflation also started to rise gradually, hitting triple digits in 1977 
(116.5%) and 116.5% in 1981 (see Figure 4.8). 
Figure 4.8 
Inflation, 1965-82 (%) 
Source: Extracted from World Bank Database; World Factfish database. 
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By 1982, for most Ghanaians, the state had lost its relevance as an 
important institution in their daily lives. Its welfare role in terms of eco-
nomic benefits or opportunities for meaningful political participation 
was unobservable (Berry, 1994; Dzorgbo, 2001).  
Summary of the major political and economic challenges during 
the period 
The major challenge of Ghana’s economy during phase I was the overex-
tended state. Politics had been a major determinant in Ghana’s economic 
policies. After independence, the lack of large-scale indigenous enterpris-
es and the regime’s reluctance to encourage private capital led the state 
to lead in economic production. A second challenge was the deleterious 
economic policies that led to excess demand. From Nkrumah’s regime to 
1982, fiscal and monetary policies failed to control excess demand. The 
government budget was the key source of excess demand because of 
over-supply of money. Prior to independence, government expenditure 
was steady at 10% of GDP. After independence, the government’s ex-
penditure control was weak and revenue generation was inefficient. Ac-
cording to Leith and Soldering, “National economic management was 
reduced to government spending on non-profitable state enterprises and 
little attention was paid to expanding national revenue mobilisation, at-
tracting investments, mobilising savings, macro-economic stability, and 
so forth” (Leith and Soldering, 2000:100). Over-valuation of the local 
currency affected both, the volume of international trade and govern-
ment revenue.  
A third economic challenge was how to diversify or expand the ex-
port sector beyond cocoa beans and gold. In 1920, the colonial gover-
nor, Sir Guggisberg, had cautioned, “We should not keep all our eggs in 
one basket,” referring to the total dependence of Ghana on gold and co-
coa bean exports. However, his words had not been heeded, and by 1982 
the same structural challenge faced the independent country. Ghana’s 
economy was so vulnerable to international price volatility that revenue 
forecasting and economic planning was impossible. Over-reliance on 
cocoa and gold meant that there was little focus on non-traditional ex-
ports. Given the volatility of cocoa bean prices, there was insufficient 
foreign exchange to finance the Nkrumah government’s industrialisation 
programme or import processed goods for the urban population.  
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A fourth challenge to Ghana’s economy was deterioration of infra-
structure in rural areas that made agriculture production and transporta-
tion inefficient. In addition to that, the government’s pricing policies 
were a disincentive to cocoa farmers; the producer price of cocoa was 
below the world market price and the fixed exchange rates against for-
eign currencies meant that cocoa farmers were overtaxed. This led to a 
downward trend in cocoa production. Cocoa and gold production de-
clined heavily in 1976-79 when the world prices were still favourable. 
Furthermore, rural roads had deteriorated so badly that cocoa beans 
could not be transported easily to the ports for export (Tsikata, 1998; 
1999).  
Corruption became pervasive in Ghana as people tried to make a liv-
ing in the face of failing economic policies (Fitch and Oppenheimer, 
1966; Gyimah-Boadi and Jeffries, 2000). During the 1967-82 period, 
high-level corruption provided an excuse for the military to stage coups.5 
However, even under military rule, lack of accountability to the public 
made it easy for bureaucrats and politicians to misuse their access to 
state resources for corrupt practices. The banks were used as instruments 
for channelling funds to corrupt members of the military regimes. Dur-
ing Acheampong’s regime, the state had substantial shareholdings in 
commercial banks; many of the bank loans were given to state enterpris-
es, a large number of which were bankrupt. According to Sheng and 
Tannor (1996), quoted in Leith and Solderling, “In 1982, 92% of the 
outstanding bank credit was owed by the public sector” (Leith and Sol-
derling, 2000:52). By extension, the loans had been granted on political, 
rather than commercial, grounds. 
Did foreign aid donors attempt to solve some of the challenges Gha-
na was facing? If this phase is divided into two periods (1957-69) and 
(1970-83), we find two different interactions between foreign aid and 
Ghana’s domestic factors. From 1957 to 1969, when aid was viewed 
through the prism of the Cold War, the catalytic role of aid was negative. 
Nkrumah’s regime was not given much aid because of his initial antago-
nism to it, his penchant for criticising the West, the Cold War, and his 
Pan African movement ideology and state-led economic policies, all of 
which that were not in the interest of the major aid providers. The little 
project aid, technical assistance and credit facilities that Nkrumah con-
tracted accumulated to become a substantial foreign debt for the coun-
try. By the end of 1960, foreign debt was US$ 1.3bn. Repayment of the 
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debt created economic problems and state instability for subsequent 
Ghanaian governments. From 1970 to 1983, there was no major policy 
change or developmental agenda that could affect the role of aid in the 
economy. Much of the challenge during that period was not so much the 
quantity or quality of aid, but endogenous factors—the quality of state 
machinery and governance. The state was ineffective in managing both 
aid and rule of law. The various military regimes failed to act in the col-
lective long-term interest of the country, but pursued economic policies 
that were deleterious to economic stability and growth. The foreign aid 
that was provided failed to change those deleterious policies because the 
regimes were not ready to pursue reforms. The policies served their in-
terests and those of their cronies. In addition, previous attempts to 
switch policies had resulted in military takeovers. Why did donors not 
put more pressure on the military leaders to reform the mode of eco-
nomic and political governance? A few of the interviewees indicated that 
interactions during that period had Cold War undertones and pressure 
could have been seen as intrusion or recolonisation. The US Assistant 
Secretary for African Affairs, Herman Cohen, is quoted as saying:  
The Africans claimed they had their own form of African democracy. It 
was only toward the end of the 1970's we saw the one-party states were 
fraudulent. But we didn't want to tell the Africans the truth: democracy 
and human rights were not on anyone's agenda (Perlez, 1992). 
4.6 Conclusion: Foreign Aid Was Not a Catalyst to 
Economic and Political Transformation During the 
Period 
This chapter has discussed the interaction between foreign aid and Gha-
na’s endogenous elements of political, economic and bureaucratic insti-
tutions; and the quantity and quality of aid provided. It has further ana-
lysed the economic policies pursued by various governments. Using 
process tracing based on historical events and interactions of aid and en-
dogenous actors and institutions, it has shown how each of the three co-
variates connected to each other, resulting in a chain reaction in terms of 
economic and political transformation and development. This final sec-
tion summarises the conclusions by reflecting on the attributes of cataly-
sis and answers the basic question: was foreign aid a catalyst to Ghana’s 
economic and political transformation and development during Phase I?  
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The first phase (1957-83) was one in which the state sought to replace 
the economic structure dominated by primary commodities to one based 
on manufacturing. The analysis shows that although the contribution of 
manufacturing to GDP increased a little in the beginning, the growth 
was short-lived. The manufacturing industry was not able to replace agri-
culture as the biggest employer or become a major contributor to GDP. 
The structure of Ghana’s economy did not experience a major change 
during the period. 
To play the role of a catalyst, aid should have enhanced the industrial-
isation agenda that the country had laid down. Foreign aid played an im-
portant role in Nkrumah’s development plan (for instance the building 
of the Akosombo Dam), but none of the subsequent plans had substan-
tial aid input. The little foreign aid that came in was invested in discreet 
projects that involved importing goods, services and technical assistance 
from the donor country (tied aid) by Ghana. To a large extent, foreign 
aid provided less benefit to Ghana.  
A catalyst requires the right amount and chemical composition to be 
effective in speeding up reaction in endogenous objects. The analysis of 
both the quality and quantity of aid received during phase I clearly shows 
that the aid was too insignificant to catalyse any improvement in public 
finances and investment in the country. In other words, aid did not ena-
ble Ghana to meet its foreign exchange needs and so could not be 
claimed to have catalystic enough to stimulate growth. This confirms the 
finding of Boon’s 1994 empirical analysis covering 100 countries, includ-
ing Ghana. Aid flows were determined very much by the political regime 
that donors wanted to support and less by a specific course of develop-
ment. Bilateral aid, for instance, was given for strategic political reasons 
and was less concerned with efficiency and effectiveness, let alone eco-
nomic structural transformation. On sectoral composition of aid, the 
analysis shows that during the period, foreign aid was less in the form of 
grants and more as loans to be repaid with interest. Given that the de-
velopmental objectives of the loans were dubious, the result was that 
Ghana was saddled with long-term debt.  
Another important feature of a chemical catalyst is that it works with 
endogenous substances by providing a convenient surface for these sub-
stances to react. A catalyst attracts the molecule of the primary particles 
(reactants) to its surface so that they are closer together and can react 
more easily. In other words, the reacting particles gather around the cata-
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lyst’s surface and collide more frequently with one another. Did aid pro-
vide a convenient platform for endogenous institutions and resources to 
converge around it to promote transformation and development? Did 
donors help to convene meaningful discussions on changing economic 
policies that were failing in Ghana?  
In terms of stimulating right economic policies, aid did influence two 
short-lived political regimes (NLC in 1967-69 and PP in 1969-72) but in 
general was not influential enough to transform them. While it is argua-
ble whether socialistic or market-oriented policies were the right ones for 
that time, aid could not help Ghana to determine the appropriate eco-
nomic policies suitable for its conditions. The socialist policies that 
Nkrumah introduced obviously had many structural problems. It result-
ed in state patronage, which became endemic in Ghanaian society. 
Whilst counterfactual evidence from early peer countries like Malaysia 
and South Korea shows that initial state-led policies gave way to private 
sector-led growth, in the Ghanaian case those policies continued for two 
and half decades after independence. In other words, while there was 
path departure in the peer countries, Ghana continued along the same 
path that was failing its development agenda.  
There is no doubt that Ghana would have been better off had it man-
aged to switch economic policies. Attempts by the IMF and World Bank 
to influence such a change in economic policies in 1967 after the over-
throw of Nkrumah and during the period of Progress Party rule in 1971, 
were not sustained as many of the political regimes at that time were 
afraid of the domestic political consequences of undertaking austerity 
measures. Denationalisation of state enterprises and devaluation of the 
local currency led to several military coups in Africa, heightening such 
fears. In conclusion, Ghanaian regimes were not predisposed to change. 
After years of implementing socialistic policies, many were not con-
vinced that market-oriented policies would be a better alternative. The 
Bretton Woods institutions backed off from Ghana after several luke-
warm attempts to switch policies, while bilateral donors maintained an 
ambivalent approach to those deleterious economic policies. So, the little 
aid that was given was delivered amidst an unsound economic policy en-
vironment.  
Chapter 2 made the point that for catalysis to occur, participating 
substances must be predisposed to reaction. This means that the compo-
sition of the participating substances matters to the rate or speed of reac-
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tion when a catalyst is added. When participating substances contain 
more inhibitors, the catalytic process slows down, but when endogenous 
particles contain promoters, the catalytic process speeds up (positive ac-
tivation energy is released). How did endogenous institutions react to 
aid? A combination of perverse incentives arising from aid money and 
perpetuation of socialistic ideology instead of economic efficiency prin-
ciples contributed to ineffective use of national resources and aid. Eco-
nomic policies such as the decision to have a state farm in every parlia-
mentary constituency, or to situate different components of a footwear 
industry in different corners of the country, were purely for political rea-
sons devoid of economics (Killick, 2010). So even if there had been sub-
stantial aid, it could not have contributed to economic efficiency since 
those endogenous decisions were purely political. This was an important 
difference between statism or patronage policies in Southeast Asian 
countries like Singapore, Malaysia, and South Korea and those in Ghana, 
because in Ghana the state patronage in economic policies was not 
backed by efforts to achieve economic efficiency.  
A catalyst reduces the activation energy of prevailing endogenous 
substances and thus helps to stimulate reaction. This was the expectation 
in Ghana, that foreign aid would reduce the perverse incentives or nega-
tive influence of endogenous actors, institutions and structures. Howev-
er, that did not happen. From 1967 to 1982, the political settlement in 
the country did not have a developmental focus. The elite consensus of 
winner takes all focused mainly on sharing rent between members of the 
ruling coalitions more than expanding rent and spreading it over the 
larger population outside the coalition. 
Notes 
 
1 State intervention in the financial market began before independence. Under 
“self-rule” in 1953, the state established Ghana Commercial Bank for both po-
litical and economic objectives. 
2 Foreign Relations of the United States (1964-1968). https://history.state.gov/ 
3 Disaggregated data on specific interest rates for each bilateral and multilateral 
loan was not available; hence, the study used OECD data that categorises ODA 
into grants and loans.  
4 Effective development assistance was defined as an aggregate measure of aid 
flows combining total grants and the grant equivalent of all official loans. 
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5 During this period, there was no worldwide corruption index. The first Cor-
ruption Perception Index (CPI) started in 1995, to be followed by Worldwide 
Governance Indicators in 1996, so it is difficult to measure people’s perception 
of the degree of corruption at that time. 
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5 Foreign Aid As Catalyst for Economic and Political Reforms (1983-92) 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses the interaction that took place between foreign aid 
and endogenous factors during Phase II (1983-92). This is the phase 
when Ghana began to shed many of its post-independence economic 
and political problems, with foreign aid being a major factor in the drive 
towards that change. The chapter is divided into seven sections. After 
this introduction, section two provides a snapshot of the endogenous 
and exogenous factors that catalysed to rescue the Ghanaian economy. 
The section further lists all the covariables and shows the outcome of the 
process tracing that links the causes and effects of Ghana’s transfor-
mation. Section three analyses the antecedents or events that led to the 
challenges at the beginning of the period, based on which a rescue plan 
was inevitable. Section four summarises discussions on ways to rescue 
the economy, the negotiations that took place between members of the 
ruling coalition and the final decision to seek financial and policy assis-
tance from the World Bank and IMF. Section five traces the various in-
teractions that took place between foreign aid and endogenous factors, 
while sections six and seven trace how the interaction contributed to 
economic and political reforms and answer the question of whether aid 
was a catalyst to economic and political transformation during the peri-
od. The last section draws conclusions.  
5.2 Tracing How Foreign Aid Rescued a Failing State 
At the beginning of 1983, the economy was on its knees and in political 
chaos. GDP was 4.6% below zero and inflation was 122.8%. The pro-
duction of the country’s two major commodities that earned foreign ex-
change (gold and cocoa beans) had declined steeply to their lowest levels 
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in decades. The literature review and accounts of many of the expert in-
terviewees show that three endogenous factors and four exogenous 
shocks were the main causes of Ghana’s economic paralysis (Tsikata, 
1998; Leith and Soldering, 2000; Aryeetey and Cox, 2002). The process 
tracing analysis also shows that the IMF and the World Bank injected 
substantial foreign aid into the Ghanaian economy. That, coupled with 
endogenous factors that were predisposed to making aid work, enabled 
the economy to recover from its downward trend and start to grow.  
On the basis of process tracing analysis, which links history, policies, 
aid, and endogenous factors, this study identified the 22 factors below 
that interacted to change Ghana’s economic and political situation. The 
factors are listed below in three covariables and Figure 5.1 connects the 
cause and effect in the form of process tracing. 
A : Historical Factors 
A1:  Deportation of  1m Ghanaians from Nigeria. 
A2:  Severe drought and bushfires, which caused temporary famine 
compelling Ghana to seek food aid. 
A3:  Departure of  bilateral and multilateral donors and refusal by 
friendly nations to provide temporary relief  (bailout). 
A4:  Poor economic policies over three decades. 
A5:  Endemic corruption as part of  the Ghanaian fabric. 
A6:  Existential threat of  military coups if  there was no solution to 
economic hardships. 
A7:  Desperate economic situation with no credible endogenous and 
preferred external solution. 
B:  Aid 
B1:  Substantial amount of  aid made available by IMF and World 
Bank to fill financing gap. 
B2:  Improved quality of  aid (more grants and fewer loans, while 
substantial part was directed towards production, and high 
disbursement rate. 
B3:  Aid conditionality.  
B4:  Return of  bilateral donors.  
C:  Endogenous factors 
C1:  Strong and committed political leadership that was ready to 
accept aid. conditionality and implement economic reforms. 
C2:  Change of  economic policies (from socialism to neoliberalism). 
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C3:  Corruption/rent seeking become high risk activities (Economic 
and moral reforms pursued jointly). 
C4:  Authoritarianism as political settlement needed for the pursuance 
of  radical economic reforms.  
C5:  High sense of  collective responsibility among the citizens. 
C6:  Centralisation of  economic management. 
C7:  Decrease in the role of  interest groups. 
C8:  Cocoa and gold provide fulcrum of  economic recovery. 
C9:  Skilful economic management and negotiation team. 
C10:  Deterioration in civil service.  
C11:  Rehabilitation of  existing industrial plants and equipment. 
Y: Economic and Political Transformation 
Y1:  Availability of  foreign exchange.  
Y2:  Increase in production of  traditional exports (cocoa beans and 
gold).  
Y3:  Economic stability and recovery. 
Y4:  Availability of  essential goods and services.  
Y5:  Increase in export of  non-traditional products.  
Y6:  Development of  pro-democracy forces. 
Y7:  Political stability and transition to liberal democracy. 
Y8:  Increasing debt burden. 
Y9:  Moderate economic structural transformation. 
Z: Outcome: relatively improved standard of  living 
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Figure 5.1 
Tracing Ghana’s developmental trajectory, 1983-92 (Phase II)  
 
5.3 Antecedents of Ghana’s Economic Atrophy and 
Political Disorder  
As shown in Figure 5.1, at the beginning of 1983 Ghana was confronted 
with three endogenous challenges and four exogenous shocks. These 
critical junctures that worked together to cause economic atrophy and 
political chaos at the beginning of the period are discussed below.  
5.3.1 Poor macro-economic policies over three decades (A4) 
The first endogenous factor that led to economic paralysis at the begin-
ning of 1983 was Ghana’s brand of socialistic economic policies imple-
mented over three decades since independence. The policy provided 
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many disincentives to production and incentives for rent seeking. The 
policies included inflexible exchange rate controls, currency over-
valuation, state control of market prices of commodities, over-taxation 
of agricultural exports to subsidise goods and services for urban con-
sumption, and non-performance of over 300 state-owned enterprises. 
The government held majority shares in 200 of the 317 state-owned en-
terprises; minority shares in 29, and equity shares through state-owned 
banks in 88. The government acquired its equity interest in 62 of the en-
terprises through confiscation of private properties. The state enterprises 
operated as a bureaucracy without an eye to profit or even to break even 
(Tsikata, 1999; Aryeetey et al.; 2000; Aryeetey, 2008).  
By 1982, cocoa production had become so unprofitable that farmers 
preferred to leave the crop to rot in the bushes. The fixed exchange rate 
policy made the price that farmers obtained for their cocoa beans far 
lower than their actual value in the parallel market. As a result, produc-
tion of cocoa beans and gold dropped to less than 50% of the levels that 
pertained in the 1970s; cocoa bean production fell from about half a mil-
lion tons to 150,000 tons, and gold production from almost 800, 000 
ounces to less than half of that quantity. The value of exports amounted 
to only 5% of GDP (Leith and Soldering, 2000:45). The reduced produc-
tion of the two commodities coincided with worsening terms of trade 
due to a drop in cocoa prices in the international market and a rise in oil 
prices (Leechor, 1994; Fosu, 2009:6). Many Ghanaians resorted to smug-
gling goods across the borders and trading in the black market. Because 
of the exchange rate differences, it was profitable to smuggle. As a result 
government revenue fell to less than 5% from about 20% in 1970s, mak-
ing it impossible for the state to offer any meaningful public services. 
This parallel market also deprived the state of foreign exchange to im-
port essential goods. The macro-economic situation was therefore beg-
ging for some remedy at the beginning of 1983. 
5.3.2 Endemic corruption as part of the Ghanaian fabric (A5) 
The second endogenous factor that had become part of the Ghanaian 
fabric by 1983 was corruption, which was perceived as an outcome of 
failed economic policies. Rent seeking had made productive ventures 
unprofitable, and hence people resorted to short-term means of getting 
money. Access to state resources, including goods and services provided 
by state enterprises guaranteed easy profits for public officers and their 
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families. In the harsh economic conditions, government workers pre-
tended to work but moonlighted in the informal sector. Various political 
regimes, both democratic and military, saw corruption destroying the 
economy but attempts to reduce it through radical and extra-judicial 
measures, including summary killing of three former Presidents, failed to 
eradicate it.  
5.3.3 Existential threat of military coups because of poor 
economic policies and deteriorating living conditions (A6) 
As economic conditions deteriorated, Ghanaians became impatient and 
those who had access to guns threatened to overthrow the government. 
There were several attempted military coups between 1982 and 1983, 
involving the regime’s own ranks, supported by powerful international 
forces, including the CIA. Two former members of the PNDC, Chris 
Atim and Alolga Akatapore, staged an abortive coup in 1982 and it was 
alleged that the American embassies in Ghana and Togo had funded the 
uprising. According to Martinson (2000:144), a female African-American 
CIA agent who served in Accra until 1985 divulged CIA intelligence to 
her boyfriend, who happened to be Rawlings’ cousin. She was later con-
victed in the United States of having divulged CIA secrets. The constant 
threats of military takeovers increased the political pressure on the 
PNDC to hasten efforts to find solutions to the country’s economic 
problems (Ninsin, 1991).  
The above endogenous factors that caused deteriorating living condi-
tions in Ghana were worsened by three exogenous events: prolonged 
bushfires, deportation of Ghanaians living abroad, and departure of bi-
lateral and multilateral donors from Ghana. 
5.3.4 Prolonged drought and bushfires (A2)  
While Ghana’s economy was paralysed by 1982, a prolonged drought 
accompanied by strong harmattan winds resulted in widespread, uncon-
trollable bushfires that destroyed approximately 154,000 tonnes of cere-
als, about 35% of the crop, (USAID, 1985:31; Arthur and Arthur, 2010). 
Large areas of cultivated tubers (yams, cocoyams, and cassava) used to 
compensate shortfalls of cereals were also destroyed. Cash crops such as 
cocoa and timber also suffered, resulting in extensive loss of foreign ex-
change to the Ghanaian economy. The effect was substantial and food 
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shortages compelled Ghana to request temporary food aid (USAID, 
1983).  
5.3.5 Deportation of an estimated 1m Ghanaians (A1) 
Ghana’s food shortages in 1983 were worsened by an influx of about 1m 
Ghanaians expelled from Nigeria. Over a two-week period, Ghana’s 
population swelled by 10%, significantly increasing the demand for food. 
In response to the government’s request for food aid, the USA provided 
emergency assistance totalling US$ 21m, and Australia, Canada, Germa-
ny, the UK, Japan, the Netherlands and Spain also provided food reliefs 
(USAID, 1983). 
5.3.6 Departure of bilateral and multilateral donors from Ghana 
(A3) 
By 1983, many bilateral donors had left the country and the few that re-
mained had only desk officers. The multilateral donors, especially the 
IMF and World Bank, did not have any offices in the country. Rawlings 
sent a delegation to the Soviet Union, Cuba and Libya for aid, but they 
returned empty handed.  
The above endogenous and exogenous factors (A1+A2+A3+A4+ 
A5+A6) coalesced to make living conditions unbearable for many Gha-
naians -(A7). There appeared to be no viable endogenous solution. The 
following quotation from the Minister of Finance during that period 
summarise the conditions in which Ghanaians found themselves: 
Frankly, the country was on the brink of social and economic disintegra-
tion. There was almost a state of breakdown. Our debt stock had gone up 
significantly; nobody would lend us any money. There were shortages of 
everything; people would queue for uncooked kenkey (corn dough); people 
would travel to Ouagadougou [in Burkina Faso] and Lome [in Togo] to 
buy common soap. It was a period of great hardship. The country was flat 
on its back, and at the same time the government was ideologically Left 
oriented. I was the Minister of Finance in the government and a Marxist 
intellectual; we were not World Bank and IMF lovers initially, but we 
looked at the situation the country was facing at that time. On the one 
hand we had price control, significant state enterprises that were all un-
profitable. Our national reserves had sunk to less than a month’s imports, 
our debt stock was high, we owed about US$ 600m to Nigeria just for the 
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supply of oil alone. As a result of our arrears, Nigeria had cut us off supply 
of oil. Bushfires raged throughout the country and at the same time the 
country suffered a sudden 10% increase in population—because during 
that period of hardship two million people had fled to Nigeria and Côte 
D’Ivoire, and just when we were on our knees, Nigeria sent back a million 
people. Those were the circumstances in which we had to decide how we 
were going to revive the economy. (Interview with the Finance Minister 
who initiated Ghana’s structural adjustment programme, 13 July 2013).  
According to the Finance Minister, the PNDC developed a National 
Reconstruction and Development Plan, which sought to combine social-
istic and market-oriented policies. A Ghanaian World Bank official who 
witnessed the economic crisis at that time said: 
The economy was completely collapsed…. maybe you were one of those 
who ran away and left us here [referring to the author]. We queued for every-
thing…. walked long distances to get to school because there was no fuel 
for vehicles to run. When you saw people gathered in one place you joined 
them, hoping that they would be selling something you could buy (Inter-
view with a World Bank official, 20 August 2015). 
5.4 Desperate Economic Conditions with Unviable 
Endogenous Solutions (A7) 
The living conditions at that time meant that Ghana needed not only 
economic remedies but also the right political institutions for state stabil-
ity. The PNDC government knew where it wanted to go with the Gha-
naian economy, but the endogenous financial resources were inadequate 
to carry them out their plans. In December 1982, the Finance Minister 
announced a ‘home-grown’ Reconstruction and Development Plan, 
which was aimed at achieving stabilisation and transformation of the 
economy. The plan was based on what the PNDC identified as the chal-
lenges of the Ghanaian economy. A former member of the PNDC, who 
and currently heads a major policy think-tank, summarised the intentions 
of the plan:  
If you have a classical colonial economy, which is dependent on a few 
baskets of exports, and yet you import everything, your economy suffers 
every day because there will not be adequate foreign exchange to import 
what your people demand. So, what we were looking at was how to get 
money to feed our people today, knowing we wanted to get out of de-
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pendency tomorrow. This was what we wanted to do with our Stabilisa-
tion and Reconstruction Plan. The tension was between stabilisation ver-
sus transformative requirements, because we wanted to get out of our de-
pendency on a few commodities and transform the economy (Interview 
with a former member of the PNDC, 9 July 2013). 
The Reconstruction and Development Plan contained ideas on what 
the nation ought to be doing to plug the structural deficiency that had 
bedevilled the economy, but there was no costing and timeline on many 
of the items in it. The plan envisioned structural change of the economy 
over the long term, but in the short term the key challenge was obtaining 
foreign exchange to import intermediary materials so that the manufac-
turing industries could run at full capacity. As noted earlier, by 1982, 
most of the state industries were running at 10% of their capacity. In ad-
dition, there was a need to rehabilitate the transport infrastructure to en-
able cocoa beans that were rotting in the rural areas to be conveyed to 
the country’s ports for export.  
To the regime and many analysts, there was no endogenous remedy 
to Ghana’s economic malady. Corruption had become endemic in Gha-
naian society and Rawlings had failed to eradicate it through brutal 
measures. Government expenditure had been reduced to only 11% of 
GDP and the government was unable to carry out its basic responsibili-
ties, such as payment of salaries to public sector employees, and inflation 
was above 100%. The PNDC sought a catalyst and the only options 
were the IMF and World Bank. Various studies on the political economy 
of Ghana (Rothchild, 1991; Leith and Lofehie, 1993; Gyimah-Boadi and 
Jeffries, 2001) suggest that by the time the PNDC made the decision to 
go to the IMF and the World Bank, Ghana’s economy was such in bad 
shape that there was no argument left against reform.  
Nevertheless, the decision to finally go to the IMF and the World 
Bank was not made without acrimony. There were disagreements among 
the members of the regime on how to proceed with economic reforms. 
Adoption of Economic Recovery Programmes (ERP) and Structural Ad-
justment Programmes (SAP) had to be negotiated at both, domestic and 
international levels. The domestic negotiation was within the regime, 
with the inclusion of civil servants, while external negotiation was be-
tween a small team of the regime and the IMF and World Bank. The civ-
il servants were being blamed of contributing to the collapse of the 
economy, so they did not have the same influence as PNDC members. 
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Moreover, the reform was fundamentally meant to change the structure 
and incentives of the public sector, so although civil servants had a lot at 
stake in the negotiation, they could not oppose the ideas of the PNDC 
members. Fear of Rawlings, the founder and leader of the PNDC gov-
ernment, also prevented them from opposing the reforms openly. 
The PNDC itself was a coalition of people with different ideological 
persuasions, mostly Left-wing radicals, pragmatics and academics (Cha-
zan, 1983; Ninsin, 1991). Together they constituted the June 4th Move-
ment—a revolutionist group that had forcibly taken power in 1979 and 
1981. Thus, the members of the PNDC clearly understood the root 
causes of Ghana’s economic challenges but were divided on the ideolog-
ical approach to solving the problems. The Left-wing members of the 
inner core of the regime, who were critics of the IMF and the World 
Bank, included Zaya Yeebo, Chris Bukari Atim, Sgt. Alolga Akatapore, 
Brig. Mensah-Nunoo, Yao Graham and Taata Ofosu. Zaya Yeebo and 
Tata Ofosu were journalists and former student leaders; Akatapore and 
Mensah-Nunoo were retired military officers, while Yao Graham was a 
young Ph.D. student in England.1 The six Left-wing members believed 
in workers’ rights and social justice and made that clear in their argu-
ments to Ghanaians.  
In summary, the Left wing members were young Marxists who be-
lieved that imbalance of power between the marginalised and elite in all 
societies needed to be changed fundamentally. They were involved in the 
ERP discussions because they were Secretaries of various ministries, 
members and advisors of the PNDC. Throughout the discussions, they 
argued against adopting IMF and World Bank policies, as they would be 
a contradiction of the ideals of the 1981 revolution. They argued for 
economic policies that would improve the lot of rural farmers, who had 
been ignored by previous regimes (Boafo-Arthur, 1999; Hutchful, 2002). 
These neo-Marxists believed that the IMF was only interested in a short-
term structural fix and not long-term diversification of the economy, 
which was what Ghana needed.  
The other, pragmatic group of the PNDC was made up of Dr Kwesi 
Botchwey, Dr Joe Abbey, Amissah-Arthur and Flight Lt. Jerry John 
Rawlings. With the exception of Rawlings, the group consisted of highly 
experienced economists who had served in various professional posi-
tions such as Ministry of Finance economists, senior officials of the Cen-
tral Bank, and university professors. These individuals, though originally 
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also Marxists, reconsidered their positions and reconciled the pressures 
of pragmatism and revolutionary idealism. They discredited their col-
league Leftist ideologists in a series of public broadcasts accusing them 
of stalling any rescue plan for the economy. They argued that any delay 
in rescuing the economy was tantamount to the party’s political suicide 
(Ahiakpor, 1991; Shillington, 1992; Tsikata, 1999). 
In the run-up to the August 1982 meeting with the IMF to take the 
final decision to shift to market reforms, a committee made up of Leftist 
ideologists was established under the leadership of Chris Atim and Yao 
Graham to reconcile their differences and to provide an alternative to 
ERP and SAP. The committee provided an economic policy trajectory, 
Alternative Economic Programme, which many analysts characterised as 
forwarding policies that were more Leftist than Nkrumah’s. From the 
perspective of the Leftists, Ghana’s problems at that time required a 
complete change of direction without the encumbrances of the Western 
countries, which were described as imperialists. They considered it illogi-
cal for Ghana to go to the West for rescue, when it was Western coun-
tries, which had manipulated the country’s drive to development to fit 
their own interests. They argued that Ghana was better-off pursuing 
programmes that had support from socialist countries, or finding its own 
resources than running to the West. They seemed to have forgotten that 
Ghana’s socialist allies such as Libya, Cuba, Eastern Europe and the So-
viet Union had already shown themselves to be unwilling to bail out 
Ghana.  
The Left-wing ideologists managed to fly in fellow Leftist intellectual 
such as Samir Amin of the Dakar-based Institute for Economic Devel-
opment and Planning (IDEP) to support their stand. According to 
Deverajan et al., (2001) Samir Amin arrived at the same conclusion, that 
Ghana has no choice but to negotiate with the international financial in-
stitutions for a bailout (Deverajan et al., 2001:65). By January 1983, Dr. 
Botchwey, a staunch critic of the IMF, had had a change of mind and 
accepted neoliberal ideas. He announced that implementing structural 
adjustment was necessary to promote social justice, which was central to 
the PNDC’s goals (Bawumia, 1998). For a Marxist to accept liberal poli-
cies shows how dire the state of the economy was at that time. To some 
extent it also gave them a degree of legitimacy because they understood 
the current predicament and were not tied to a single ideology, moreover 
one that had been found to be wanting (Ninsin, 1991). However, the 
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discussion within the PNDC over adopting ERP and SAP was so acri-
monious that the Leftist members of the party attempted a series of un-
successful military coups in late 1982 and early 1983. Atim, Graham and 
Yeebo resigned. Atim and Yeebo went into exile. Eventually, the prag-
matists led by Rawlings and Dr. Botchwey triumphed and the neoliberal 
economic prescriptions of the IMF and World Bank were adopted. How 
did the PNDC negotiate with donors to ensure that aid actually met the 
country’s policy and development needs while at the same time maintain-
ing the political coalition or warding off any political backlash? The next 
section discusses the negotiation strategies adopted by the Ghanaian au-
thorities and donors.  
5.5 Interaction of Aid with Endogenous Institutions and 
Actors 
5.5.1 Negotiating with IMF and World Bank on economic policy 
change (B1+B3+C9) 
Ghana went to the IMF and World Bank fairly well prepared. The Fi-
nance Minister led the negotiation with a few staff from his ministry and 
Bank of Ghana. Highly influential Ghanaians working in the internation-
al community also provided advice. For instance, Tsikata cites key Gha-
naians working at the World Bank and IDEP in Dakar as influential in 
helping Ghana to formulate ideas and negotiation strategies. She notes, 
“Ghanaian academics did not influence the reform process very much 
because they seemed to have had a healthy dose of skepticism about how 
long the regime would last” (Tsikata, 1999:39). The Reconstruction and 
Development Programme was the starting document that the team used 
to negotiate with the Bank. 
We knew what we wanted to achieve and we also knew something had to 
give. You can’t go to the Fund and the Bank or any lender and say I want 
US$ 200m, give it to me and I won’t abide by any conditions. It doesn’t 
happen, but we sought to ensure that the conditions attached to the aid 
made some sense, something we could live with. We didn’t really succeed 
in avoiding all conditions that we found unpalatable. In negotiations you 
don’t win everything so there were certain areas in which we agreed to the 
conditionality that made the most sense, others slowed us down. For in-
stance, the pace at which we were forced to de-nationalise certain enter-
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prises was troublesome (Interview with the former Finance Minister who 
led the team to negotiate with IMF/WB, 11 July 2013).  
So, there were conditionalities for getting financial and technical sup-
port from the World Bank. The Ghanaian negotiators found some of the 
conditionalities unfavourable and wanted them removed. This included 
the speed of the privatisation programme that the World Bank wanted 
Ghana to pursue urgently and devaluation of the currency, but overall 
the Ghanaian team felt they had negotiated a fair deal. The political divi-
sions within the country and within the regime itself seem to have won 
sympathy for Ghana. The internal disagreements or the resistance from 
the Leftist members of the PNDC also led the IMF and WB to re-
examine some of their stringent SAP economic prescriptions. For in-
stance, the IMF restricted trade liberalisation only to tariffs and import 
licensing, while the controversial privatisation of state enterprises was 
carefully prescribed to cover only non-performing state enterprises and 
non-strategic sectors. The IMF and the World Bank accepted multiple 
stage-wise or piecemeal rate as a transition to full devaluation of the 
Ghanaian currency. According to Tsikata, a straightforward devaluation 
was perceived to be politically damaging, so the IMF and the World 
Bank accepted the Ghanaian team’s proposal involving “bonuses” and 
“surcharges”.2 The compromise was seen as de facto devaluation but 
avoided use of the dreaded “D” word (Tsikata, 1999:26). In this way, the 
doomsday predictions about a potential revolt by the military if Ghana 
failed to get a fair deal from the Bretton Woods institutions did not ma-
terialise (Martin, 1991; Tsikata, 2001).  
The decision to adopt IMF and World Bank policies was therefore 
not a straitjacket as critics argue. It was an outcome of negotiations, be-
tween the endogenous actors and interest groups within the country on 
one front and between the PNDC and the Bretton Woods institutions 
on another front. 
Some of the conditionalities, we thought, made no sense, but overall, I 
cannot say that everything was imposed on us and we had no say in the 
policymaking. Frankly, we knew that the exchange rate should be devalued 
because it was killing the economy; it was not providing any incentive for 
anybody to export anything. It had killed the gold mining sector and it had 
virtually distorted the cocoa sector. If you use 10 cedis to produce a dollar 
of cocoa exports and bring the dollar back to the bank and get 2.75 cedis 
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for your dollar, how is the farmer supposed to survive in business? So we 
knew that the exchange rate needed to be devalued. There was no econo-
mist in the world that could have looked at Ghana’s economy and said 
there was no need for devaluation. So we had to devalue and we did that 
gradually. Of course, we didn’t succeed with the gradualism approach, as 
there was some prodding from the Bank and the Fund to speed up the 
process. A lot of haggling went on between the IMF and my team. Frank-
ly, in the area of fiscal policy we would have liked a slightly more expan-
sionary policy, a larger deficit financing with the flows from the Bank and 
the Fund but that was not acceptable to them (Interview with the former 
Minister of Finance and head of the negotiation team, 11 July 2013). 
The Finance Minister said that some of the IMF and World Bank 
conditions were consistent with the PNDC Reconstruction and Devel-
opment programme. In April 1983, the exchange rate of 2.75 to one 
US$ was changed to 25, a devaluation of the Ghanaian currency. By 
December of the same year, the rate changed to 30 per dollar. Periodic 
devaluation led to a dollar exchanging for 50 in 1985 and 90 in 1986. 
The flexible exchange rate system reduced the black market that had ex-
isted since Nkrumah’s regime. In keeping with the agreement with the 
IMF, the black market was legalised, allowing private forex bureaus to 
sell and buy foreign exchange in parallel with the central bank (Leith and 
Soldering, 2000:49). The abolition of price and exchange rate controls 
increased the price of imported commodities.  
We were doing exchange and price controls claiming that by doing so we 
were helping the poor, but everybody knew that the goods whose prices 
were controlled ended up mostly with the rich. The poor ended up buying 
commodities at very high market prices. So the price control didn’t benefit 
the poor, nobody could demonstrate that at all. So, if anybody says you 
were forced by the Bank and the Fund to abolish or remove price controls 
I will say, yes, it made a lot of sense because they were not helping the 
poor in any way. In no time at all, the Forex Bureaus were accounting for 
a significant portion of our import needs. Today, people have forgotten all 
those things. The Forex bureaus are everywhere, even in the smallest 
town; people no longer queue at the central bank to get foreign currencies 
(Interview with the former Minister of Finance, 13 July 2013). 
Over nine years (1983-91), with support from the IMF and the World 
Bank, Ghana’s policies of a state-led and state-controlled economy were 
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dismantled and the foundations were laid for a liberal economy. It was 
the period that saw the most significant surge of foreign aid flows into 
Ghana.  
The bulk of the prescriptions were policies that we knew we had to im-
plement. When your foreign exchange rate is over-valued nobody needs to 
tell you that you need to adjust. We needed money, so we went to the Par-
is Club, had donors’ meeting and we got the money. Did they dictate what 
we did? No. I won’t say yes. We acceded to the pace of reforms that we 
would have preferred not to. We acceded to a certain measure of fiscal 
constraint, for instance, lowering the deficit financing. If someone had 
given us more money, a little more liberally, we would have preferred not 
to, but in principle the idea of fiscal discipline was something that we wel-
comed (Interview with the former Minister of Finance, 11 July 2013). 
Aryeetey and Cox interviewed government officials involved in im-
plementing the reforms and found:  
The government took full responsibility for the preparation of the ERP 
and only received the endorsement of the World Bank and IMF when a 
finished document was already in place, in spite of the usual consultations 
along the process. A member of the Government's Economic Manage-
ment Team is reported to have stated, “to those who claim that adjust-
ment was imposed on us, we can show them the home-grown document 
that we took to the World Bank”. There was no reason why Ghanaians 
should not be capable of producing the necessary documentation for ne-
gotiations since “the chief Ghanaian negotiators were trained in the same 
universities as their colleagues from the Bretton Woods institutions. The 
government negotiators found nothing mysterious about a local “capacity 
to develop rational economic responses” to changes in the economic sit-
uation (Aryeetey and Cox, 1995:71).  
During field interviews for this current study, similar statements were 
made. For example:  
Yes, there were conditionalities, but the idea that everything was rammed 
down our throats is completely nonsense. I was a lead player and I can as-
sure you that both the IMF and the World Bank had some respect for our 
negotiating capacity. We won some battles, we lost others; we didn’t have 
all the money, nobody gives you money with you dictating all the terms. 
Overall, it was a fair deal. The aid we got went largely into rehabilitation of 
our infrastructure, no white elephants were built and gradually, we worked 
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our way into exercising more and more national ownership long even be-
fore it became fashionable (Interview with the Former Minister of Fi-
nance, 11 July 2013).  
Given the strict implementation of the agreed programmes, many 
critics suggest that the government could not have owned the pro-
grammes.  
Remember, this was a Marxist-inclined government; how could they have 
owned neoliberal policies? These were IMF and WB programmes pushed 
through our throats. The government was compelled to swallow the bitter 
pills, otherwise they were not going to get the much-needed foreign aid 
(Interview with a social commentator and head of a policy think-tank, 16 
August 2013).  
According to Aryeetey et al. (2001) a World Bank official countered 
any suggestions that it owned Ghana’s reform process with the point 
that “there had been much intellectual laziness, both within the govern-
ment and outside, as evidenced in the frequent use of the expression 
IMF intervention”. Conceding criticisms, the Bank official argued that 
the critics had no constructive alternative remedy to offer. The Bank 
maintained that the government of Ghana was very much in the front 
seat of the reform process. Officials at the Finance Ministry who were 
interviewed for this study also confirmed that in many instances it was 
the government that brought ideas and was able to convince the IMF 
and the Bank. The Bank bought their ideas because they knew that Gha-
naian officials were committed to self-discipline. When asked during the 
fieldwork for this study to respond to the World Bank official’s com-
ment regarding the critics’ failure to provide a constructive alternative, a 
former PNDC member said that the assertion was not be true because 
the Left-wing ideologists of the PNDC had proposed an economic pro-
gramme, but the Bank had refused to finance it because it was more of 
the same socialist policies.  
While, arguably, the legitimacy of Ghana’s ownership of the reforms 
persisted, one thing was clear: the Ghana government was not “pushed 
around” by donors;. on the contrary, the Ghanaian officials gained 
recognition internationally by being able to negotiate some of the diffi-
cult issues that other African governments had previously acquiesced to 
or rejected. For instance, the Ghana team was able to negotiate a two-tier 
exchange rate instead of the three-tier one that the IMF had put forward 
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(Martin, 1991; Tsikata, 1999, 2001). An archival document, Ghana Country 
Assistance Review Report, provides evidence that the Ghanaian negotiators 
were tough: 
The government had a high degree of ownership of its program…. were 
responsible and accountable for the "bitter medicine" that had to be swal-
lowed, and that the World Bank and IMF were our supporters, not scape-
goats…. the Ghanaian officials knew their own minds and were tough ne-
gotiators, able to define the limits of which issues they were or were not 
prepared to take on, and to determine how far they could go. And when 
the government delivered on most of what it had agreed to do, this per-
formance built confidence in the Bank and donor community that led to 
the gradual build-up of assistance pipelines (World Bank, 1995; Arm-
strong, 1996:54). 
5.5.2 Authoritarianism as political settlement needed for 
Pursuing Radical economic reforms (C1+C3+C4+C6+B3) 
It is important to understand the prevailing political settlement in the 
country during the period of the radical economic reforms. During the 
early years of the PNDC, the Trade Union Congress (TUC) and the Na-
tional Union of Ghana Students (NUGS) were important allies because 
of the regime’s socialistic approach that these associations subscribed to. 
However, with the switch to neoliberal ideas, the regime broke ranks 
with these organised interest groups. The TUC, which also represented 
the business community and had 17 affiliated unions, among them, the 
Ghana Private Road Transport Union (GPRTU), Ghana Mine Workers’ 
Union and the Railway Workers’ Union, was embroiled in a multifaceted 
association with the regime. The TUC was divided within itself, with 
some affiliated unions supporting the regime and some opposing it (Tsi-
kata, 1999). For instance, the GPRTU strongly supported the PNDC.  
The regime also broke ranks with urban dwellers and sided with the 
rural population. This was in contrast to previous regimes, which had 
maintained a cosy relationship with urban dwellers through consultation 
and subsidisation of urban services and consumption. Rural dwellers 
benefited from the regime’s radical economic policies, such as devalua-
tion and abolition of marketing boards, which had imposed artificially 
low prices on rural products. Rawlings established People’s Defence 
Committees (PDCs) and Workers’ Defence Committees (WDCs) in eve-
ry Ghanaian community to be the PNDC’s revolutionary foot soldiers.  
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The Ghana Bar Association, the Catholic Bishops’ Conference and 
the Christian Council of Ghana refrained from joining the coalition be-
cause of the regime’s human rights record. The regime banned political 
parties and broke ranks with Ghanaian business elites who had dominat-
ed the political economy scene since independence. Given that the au-
thoritarian regime had made economic reforms a moral issue by perse-
cuting private businesses either for not paying taxes or as rent seekers, 
branding them economic saboteurs and “anti-revolutionary elements”, 
the business community wanted nothing to do with the regime. The rela-
tionship between the regime and the Ghanaian business community was 
a cat-and-mouse one (Shillington, 1992). The traditional authorities had 
always remained powerful institutions in Ghana, but because of the au-
thoritarian nature of the regime, and because the regime had not inter-
fered with the powers of the chiefs, there was no interest on their part to 
lock horns with the government.  
Table 5.1 
Status of actors/institutions that formed the political settlement 
during the economic reforms in Ghana 
 High Power  
Strong Incentives 
PNDC  
Revolutionary organisations of the 
PNDC (PDC and CDR)  
Ghana Private Roads Transport 
Union (GPRTU of TUC) 
Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Management Team 
Donors 
Religious and traditional  
authorities 
W
eak Incentives 
Ghana Bar Association and  
academia 
National Union of Ghana Students 
Business enterprises 
Political groups 
Urban dwellers 
Small-scale farmers and rural 
dwellers 
Civil society organisations 
Local business elites 
Civil servants 
 Low Power  
Adapted from Oduro et al., 2014:12. 
 
If we depict the positions of the actors and institutions in a quadrant, 
the authoritarian regime and its members of the coalition and donors 
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occupy the top two cells, while at the lower end of the power hierarchy 
are civil society organisations, civil servants, small farmers’ labour unions 
and professional associations (see Table 5.1).  
Over the period of economic reform, foreign aid became a powerful 
political institution in itself, playing critical and influential roles in the 
decision-making process in Ghana (Konadu-Agyemang, 2001; Akonor 
2006). The donors were key to policy development and resource alloca-
tion.  
At the time of the ERP/SAP, the quality of the civil service had dete-
riorated because many of the senior staff had moved abroad. There was 
also a rumour that many of the remaining staff were going to lose their 
jobs as part of civil service retrenchment, so there was low motivation 
among the civil servants and not much support for the PNDC. When 
the PNDC began the economic reforms, there were few bilateral donors, 
so the centralised Economic Management Team could manage with the 
few multilateral aid projects. The PNDC did not allow key policy deci-
sions to pass through the official state bureaucracy. The state officials 
that negotiated with the World Bank and IMF were undefined and nebu-
lous. They comprised carefully selected economists who supposedly op-
erated from the Ministry of Finance but actually drew their powers from 
outside the hierarchy of that institution. It involved a relatively small 
group of people from the Ministry of Finance, Bank of Ghana and the 
National Development Planning Commission. Because of inadequate 
state capacity, the IMF and the World Bank did not discourage the by-
passing of central government institutions. The PNDC and the World 
Bank wanted to show results quickly, so there was no nudge from either 
to broaden the consultations to institutions like the academia and the 
private sector, which was sceptical about the regime.  
The PNDC and donors were aware that the difficult economic poli-
cies it had embarked on had the potential to weaken support for the re-
gime as many military takeovers in the country, including that of Rawl-
ings, had attributed their actions to difficult economic policies. So, 
implementing SAP needed an authoritarian regime that could use fear to 
avoid any labour or interest group confrontation. As long as the leader-
ship knew where it wanted to go and had the support of a few techno-
crats and the World Bank, there was no point in considering dissenting 
views. A political system based on democratic principles was to be 
avoided and was to be replaced by populist support from those that had 
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always been excluded by previous regimes. This included “ordinary men 
and women”, the poor, and less-educated people. A new model, which 
could be described as “non-elite consensus”, became the backbone of 
the regime. Consequently, Rawlings began a new political system based 
on what Adedeji describes as a model of “revolutionary socialism”, 
which would ensure active participation of the “people” in the decision-
making process as long as they subscribed to the tenets of the revolution 
(Adedeji, 2001). In a series of speeches, Rawlings entrenched his leader-
ship role as a “watchdog” for ordinary people, purporting to address the 
problems of injustice and corruption.  
I ask for nothing less than a REVOLUTION—something that will trans-
form the social and economic order of this country….  
To many of us, democracy does not just mean paper guarantees of ab-
stract liberties. It involves, above all, food, clothing, and shelter in the ab-
sence of which life is not worth living…. 
Fellow Ghanaians, the time has come for us to restructure this society 
in a real and meaningful democratic manner so as to ensure the involve-
ment and active participation of the people in the decision-making pro-
cess…, the people, the farmers, the police, the soldiers, the workers, 
you—the guardians—rich or poor, should be part of the decision-making 
process of this country. (Ministry of Information, 1990:2-49) 
As part of the process to court support, the PNDC established grass-
roots political institutions and organisations called People’s Defence 
Committees (PDCs) later changed to Committee for Defence of the 
Revolution (CDR) in every community and workplace.  
We are setting up PDCs in the workplaces and every district and village, so 
that the decision-making in Ghana would not continue to be the preserve 
of politicians, who had previously ruled Ghana under the most corrupt re-
gime. (Ministry of information, 1990:9) 
Changes in economic policy and improvement of the economy were 
Rawlings’ priority and he was less interested in political reforms. Rawl-
ings loathed Western democracy and was not shy about making that 
known to the world, and to donors in particular. He contended that, 
since multi-party democracy had failed Ghana in the past, there was no 
need for anybody, including donors, to consider its reintroduction in the 
country, although he was inclined to grassroots participatory politics that 
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was devoid of partisanship. During the ERP and SAP period, foreign aid 
provided by the Bretton Woods institutions helped to preserve the au-
thoritarian nature of the ruling government. The IMF and World Bank 
did not involve broader Ghanaian society in the discussion of the eco-
nomic package and frequently relied on the authoritarianism of the gov-
ernment to suppress dissenting views. Economic management was cen-
tralised to a few decision-makers outside the state bureaucracy and 
outside any political structure of the people. In fact, there was no ac-
countability structure and the PNDC was not accountable to anyone ex-
cept the donors. The reliance on foreign aid for implementing economic 
policies and programmes further strengthened the political apparatus and 
confidence of the regime against any legitimate demand of the people for 
democratic governance. 
Throughout the implementation of the economic reforms, the Gha-
naian civil society and its leadership were harassed into submission, while 
a few of the political leadership went into exile (Gyimah-Boadi, 1994). 
The regime developed repressive strategies to limit the voices of the me-
dia and civil society organizations. The national newspapers (The Daily 
Graphic and Ghanaian Times) reported only the official line, as press free-
dom was curtailed through legislative measures such as licensing re-
quirements. A typical example of the coercion of the press occurred 
when human excreta was dumped in the offices of an independent 
newspaper, Free Press, for criticising the PNDC. Since parliament had 
been dissolved and the judiciary was dormant on political issues, Rawl-
ings effectively had no political competition. The donors allowed consid-
erable leeway to the PNDC regime and gave Rawlings some breathing 
space. Though democracy was important to Western government, they 
did not make political reform a requirement for financial support. Thus, 
authoritarianism, or the delay in transition to democracy, was a pragmatic 
response that the international donor community tacitly endorsed. As far 
as the World Bank was concerned, its stated policy on politics is to main-
tain neutrality, as it does not want to interfere in the politics of the states 
to which it gives financial support. 
Five years after establishing PDCs all over the country and ensuring 
that his ideology of grassroots political institutions had been entrenched, 
Rawlings began the long and winding process of returning to democracy. 
By that time, the country had become stable and radical economic re-
forms had begun to bear fruit. The authoritarian regime had succeeded 
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in turning Ghana away from socialistic economic policies to capitalism 
without being overthrown.  
5.5.3 Substantial amount of foreign aid made available to fill 
domestic financing gap (B1+B2+C11) 
When Ghana embarked on ERP in 1983, the magnitude of aid, its com-
position and origin, all began to change. The World Bank and IMF were 
instrumental in providing financial, technical and policy support to Gha-
na. According to the former Minister of Finance during that period:  
The catalytic role of foreign aid in the economic and political transfor-
mation of any country’s development is not a matter of conjecture, but it 
must be a judgement you make on the basis of facts based on flows of aid, 
the magnitude and the uses to which it was put. (Interview, 11 July 2013) 
Figure 5.2 
ODA flow to Ghana, 1983-92 (current US$ millions) 
Source: OECD QWIDS Database, 2014. 
 
During the initial stages of the reform (1983-84) total aid inflows av-
eraged about US$ 160m a year, representing about 4% of GDP. During 
the implementation of the reforms, Ghana became one of the aid com-
munity’s favourite countries in the region because the leadership was 
predisposed to pursuing macro-economic adjustment policies that were 
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the key conditionality to receiving aid. Starting in 1985, there was a clear 
and sustained increase in foreign aid flows. The level of inflows then 
rose rapidly to reach about US$ 876.6m (9% of GDP) in 1991 (see Fig-
ure 5.2).  
From 1983 to 1992, ODA in the form of soft loans provided by the 
IMF and World Bank to Ghana amounted to US$ 2.4bn. However, in 
1992 total aid fell by 30.25% as donors appeared to be concerned about 
possible diversion of aid money to politics or a tendency to create fungi-
bility during multi-party elections.  
During the reform period, multilateral aid as a share of effective de-
velopment assistance rose dramatically. This was in contrast to previous 
decades when the IMF and World Bank had denied support Ghana. Be-
tween 1983 and 1984, multilateral aid as a share of total foreign aid dou-
bled to 79.1%. There was little bilateral assistance, but as the reforms 
began to bear positive results other donors came on board. Japan be-
came the biggest bilateral donor in the mid 1980s, displacing the USA to 
number two for about a decade (Osei, 2003:4; Geddes et al., 2009). The 
rationale underlying the rise in Japanese aid was Ghana’s importance in 
the region and good economic record. Germany, the United Kingdom, 
Denmark, Spain, France, Canada and the Netherlands all joined in and 
became important donors in terms of volume of aid provided. Several 
bilateral donors provided co-financing for Ghana’s policy adjustment 
programmes by tying their support to either the World Bank or IMF 
conditions, in addition to negotiating their own conditionalities with the 
government of Ghana.  
The reason for the USA’s low-level aid programme during phase II 
was that Ghana was regarded as an undemocratic state. In addition, there 
was also political tension between the two countries after the Ghana 
government accused the USA of trying to overthrow it. According to 
Tsikata (1999) subsequent events lent some truth to the accusation. In 
1985, eight Ghanaians spying for the CIA were arrested and exchanged 
for a Ghanaian intelligence agent who had been arrested in the USA. In 
March 1986, American mercenaries aboard a ship heading towards Gha-
na in what was alleged to be a subversive operation were also arrested off 
the coast of Brazil (Tsikata, 1999:7).  
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As noted above, by 1986, when the ERP started to show good results, 
many bilateral donors joined in and began to offer financial support 
(Tsikata, 1999). As many donors jumped on board to add to Ghana’s 
‘success’, the ability of the centralised management team to administer 
aid flows and different donor requirements was impeded. In many in-
stances, the sheer number of donors needing attention overwhelmed the 
team leaving them little time to strategise. Furthermore, by ignoring the 
civil service, the aid system created many anti-reform forces within the 
bureaucracy who, though could not complain because of fear of victimi-
sation, increasingly disowned aid-funded programmes. Donors subse-
quently bypassed the government bureaucracy by developing parallel 
project offices to implement discrete projects. In summary, weak institu-
tional structures for managing aid led to selection problems, as donors 
could not work with civil servants to identify the most critical needs of 
the country. While the capacity of the civil service to manage aid over-
flows was weak, the government also failed to clearly earmark its priori-
ties in a situation where there was limited state capacity to plan, provide 
oversight, evaluate and learn lessons. Implementing many donor pro-
grammes also meant that normal tasks of the state bureaucracy had to be 
set aside.  
5.5.4 Improved quality of aid flows (B2) 
This study analysed the quality of aid flows to Ghana during the period 
on the basis of the ratio of grant and loan composition to the total aid 
received and the sectors receiving that aid. At the beginning of 1983, the 
grants component of total aid was 57.5%, as the World Bank and IMF 
felt that was necessary, but it dropped substantially to 31.6% in 1987 as 
the country’s reforms started to bear fruit and there was conviction 
among the Bretton Woods institutions that Ghana could comply with 
the conditionalities. With foreign aid gradually shifting from grants to 
loans carrying interest rate of 2-5%, Ghana’s debt burden became a ma-
jor concern. Ghana’s foreign debt increased very sharply, rising from 
US$ 2bn in 1983 to US$ 3.5bn at the end of 1990 (Osei, 1995). It was 
only at the beginning of the 1990s, as Ghana began moving towards 
multi-party democracy that the grant component of aid started to rise 
again, to 50.6% in 1991 (see Figure. 5.3). However, generally, with a sub-
stantial part of aid money being given as loans, the quality of the aid was 
not good for Ghana’s accumulating foreign debt.  
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Figure 5.3 
Composition of ODA (grants and loans), 1983-92 (US$ millions)  
Source: OECD QWIDS Database, 2014. 
 
If the quality of aid is assessed in terms of the sectors to which money 
was allocated, during the first two years of the ERP (1998-84) Ghana 
needed immediate supply of basic goods and services, so aid was used to 
finance imports of goods and services from abroad (Tsikata, 1999:43). In 
subsequent years, much aid was used to support balance of payment and 
the transport sector. “Between 1986 and 1989, balance of payments sup-
port averaged just over 50% of total aid” (Tsikata, 1999:43). Throughout 
the period, there was no donor support for the manufacturing industry. 
Ghana’s sector development policy was designed to emphasise improv-
ing business competitiveness, with the hope that private business would 
automatically be drawn into investing in manufacturing. But that did not 
happen.  
With foreign aid flows amounting to about US$ 1.3bn in 1991, the 
PNDC government was able to increase spending on social development 
in rural areas and Northern Ghanaian the form of entitlements; these 
areas had been ignored by previous regimes. The government also fo-
cused on rural electricity and roads, an investment that increased Rawl-
ings’ popularity in these areas and later enabled him to win the 1992 elec-
tions. While electricity and roads are usually an investment to promote 
the productive sector, in Ghana’s case they were more a social invest-
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ment as the electricity extension to Northern Ghana had little linkage 
with industries or any export commodity (Whitfield, 2011a).  
5.5.5 Reliability of aid flows (B2) 
During implementation of the economic reforms, more aid was pledged 
or committed and delivered. On average, donors were generous in dis-
bursing the funds that they had committed themselves to provide. The 
initial low disbursement of only 37% in 1983 rose to almost 100% in 
1986, and by the end of the transition was 76% (see Table 5.2).  
Table 5.2 
ODA commitment and disbursement, 1983-92 (US$ millions)  
Year Actual ODA Commitments % Disbursed 
1983 108.39 291.73 37.1 
1984 213.12 287.21 72.2 
1985 194.33 419.55 43.1 
1986 358.88 361.59 99.2 
1987 409.02 726.50 56.3 
1988 575.59 702.19 82.0 
1989 715.53 781.66 91.5 
1990 559.72 790.01 70.8 
1991 878.63 1103.50 79.6 
1992 612.78 805.51 76.0 
Source: OECD QWIDS Database, 2014. 
 
5.5.6 Aid conditionalities and change of economic policy  
(B3+C2) 
With financial support from the IMF and the World Bank, Ghana’s so-
cialist economic policies began to change. The Bretton Woods institu-
tions and the government of Ghana negotiated an ERP that had a dose 
of prescribed policies to stabilise the economy and further stimulate 
growth and exports, stabilise prices, maintain favourable balance of pay-
ments, and enhance private initiative and investment (Berry, 1994; Ar-
yeetey et al., 2008). A follow-up structural adjustment programme re-
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quired the state to reduce its involvement in certain activities considered 
to be the role of the private sector. This led to implementation of privat-
isation, trade and financial liberalisation programmes. The major donors 
at that time, USA, and the UK - were championing neoliberal economic 
policies that involved reduction of state spending on citizens’ entitle-
ments, promoting market forces as the most efficient economic arbiter, 
and insisting on the supremacy of the private sector—Reaganomics and 
Thatchernomics. Downsizing the government through public expendi-
ture cuts was the mantra and raison d’état of economic reform. Policy-
based loans by the World Bank and IMF from 1983 to 1994 amounted 
to US$ 2.4bn, of which US$ 1bn, or about 40%, was meant for policy 
adjustment (Armstrong, 1996; Tsikata, 1999:5). If sectoral adjustment 
lending is included, the share of adjustment lending increased to 42%. 
During the ERP, the IMF and World Bank supported monetary policy 
kept growth of credit to the private sector and state corporations in 
check.  
5.5.7 Other catalytic role of aid (B2+B4) 
The IMF/WB catalytic role did not end after providing financial assis-
tance; they also organised Donor Consultative Group meetings annually 
to help raise additional external assistance for Ghana. UNICEF, one of 
the consulting group members, was particularly concerned about the ad-
justment programme having no human face (UNICEF, 1987). 
UNICEF’s annual report, which focused on adjustment with a human 
face, might have influenced the Bank to reconsider its policies. The 
World Bank organised a social sector donors’ meeting in Vienna and a 
subsequent one in Geneva in 1988, leading to other social catalytic roles 
by the multilateral institutions.  
An ambitious Programme of Actions to Mitigate the Social Costs of 
Adjustment (PAMSCAD) was introduced to provide support to people 
whose living conditions had seriously deteriorated as a result of the ad-
justment policies. It became the first programme in Ghana that was ex-
plicitly designed to protect the poor from the adverse consequences of 
the ERP/SAP. A total of US$ 85m, excluding contributions from local 
cost recovery, was to be spent over a two-year period 1988-89 (Graham, 
1994:282; Sowa, 1996). PAMSCAD amounted to about 6-8% of the es-
timated annual cost of donor support for Ghana’s SAP. The programme 
covered about 23 projects in five main areas: (i) community initiatives, 
512566-L-sub01-bw-Awortwi
Processed on: 10-8-2017 PDF page: 188
162 CHAPTER 5 
 
(ii) employment generation, (iii) actions to help the redeployed, (iv) basic 
needs of vulnerable groups, and (v) education (Sowa, 1996). In terms of 
job creation, PAMSCAD was supposed to create 40,000 jobs through 
projects that included public works, credit schemes for small enterprises, 
farmers and small-scale miners, and labour-intensive projects to rehabili-
tate school infrastructure.  
Most of the social adjustment programmes were in rural areas, where 
the government had support but little administrative capacity; there was 
a semblance of capacity in the urban areas, but the government was not 
on good terms with urban dwellers. According to Graham, PAMSCAD 
may have temporary relieved opposition to the adjustment programme 
among civil servants, but in general it was less successful (1994:284). The 
biannual Special Programme of Assistance for Africa (SPA) meetings 
that the World Bank and IMF held were used to mobilise aid and coor-
dinate donor activities. The Bank also took the lead in fostering commu-
nication and coordination among donors to Ghana until the early 1990s 
when that role was taken over by the Ghana government (Tsikata, 
1999:7). These were additional catalytic roles that the Bank provided to 
the Ghana government, roles that were not always within the tradition of 
the Bank. 
5.5.8 Cocoa and gold as endogenous resources to complement 
foreign aid (C8) 
The initial effort by the World Bank and IMF to resurrect Ghana’s 
economy was targeted at increasing production of existing exportable 
goods so as to obtain much-needed foreign exchange and to turn the 
balance of payments deficit into a surplus. That meant a focus on cocoa 
beans and gold, which became the centre around which ERP revolved. 
The Bank and the PNDC government invested much of the aid money 
to rehabilitate the cocoa industry and to pre-finance and pay cocoa farm-
ers (Laven, 2005; Williams, 2009). Cocoa trees were replanted and a 
high-yielding variety was introduced. The Cocoa Research Institute of 
Ghana was supported to undertake crop research (Kolavalli and Vigneri 
2011). Adequate rainfall in 1984 played a major part in restoring agricul-
tural production. There was a bumper harvest of food crops, turning the 
severe food shortages of the pre-ERP era into surpluses. As a result of 
all the investments with aid money, cocoa production recovered and ru-
ral roads and bridges were rehabilitated to enable transportation of cocoa 
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beans to the ports for export. As a result, the contribution of cocoa to 
Ghana’s export revenue shot up to about 50-60% by 1990, which was of 
nearly 20% of government revenue and 7% of GNP (Jacobeit, 
1991:222). From 1983 to 1991, foreign aid was also used to rehabilitate 
the mining sector. The PNDC government facilitated and guaranteed 
loans from the World Bank for Ashanti Goldfields.  
The argument that aid needs endogenous resources to be effective is 
amplified here. If cocoa had not been available, aid could not have easily 
provided the kind of immediate economic growth needed to convince 
the donors, including the World Bank and IMF, that recovery was possi-
ble. The donors knew that if they could get cocoa beans from the villag-
es to the ports and increase gold production, more foreign exchange 
would flow into the economy. With increases in cocoa bean and gold 
production, aid money, including the soft loans, would be repaid. The 
Bank also knew that if Ghana defaulted in on repayments, they could 
compel the government to privatise the state gold mining company 
(Ashanti Goldfields). Discussions with Dr. Kwesi Botchwey provided an 
illustration on how useful the presence of Ghana’s two major resources 
was: 
Foreign aid alone could not have achieved early recovery of the Ghanaian 
economy. Our domestic resources responded very well to the stimulus 
provided by aid. You know what, foreign aid and external forces influ-
enced some of the policy changes, but it was the internal resources that de-
termined most of the initial success of the programme. I am fond of giving 
this example; when you put an egg and a stone in the same temperature, 
just like when the hen broods over the eggs, after a while a little chick will 
break out of the egg but never out of the stone even though they are sub-
jected to the same external temperature and conditions. This is because the 
internal conditions of the egg are different from the internal conditions of 
the stone. So, although they are both subjected to the same external condi-
tions, what comes out is different. So, in Ghana, what determined the 
changes and successes that took place were the internal conditions, our 
own resolve, our own appreciation of our problems and the support that 
people had. If there had been an implosion in the country and people had 
kicked against all these, and there had been civil war, no amount of aid 
could have solved the problem. Aid of course helped to supplement our 
import capacity and also sped the process of rehabilitation of our infra-
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structure, but I won’t say it was the silver bullet (Interview with the former 
Minister of Finance that presided over Ghana’s SAP, 11 July 2013). 
With aid money having improved the infrastructure of the country, 
the industrial sector began to recover. The sector’s contribution to GDP 
increased from 7% in 1983 to 17% by 1985.and similar levels in much of 
the early 1990s. One can partly attribute the growth to rehabilitation of 
plants and equipment, and availability of imported raw materials made 
possible by substantial external capital inflows that had supported the 
programme, easing foreign exchange constraints. The rehabilitation of 
existing manufacturing plants resulted in short-term growth as many of 
the firms eventually closed down because they could not compete with 
imported foreign goods brought into the country by economic liberalisa-
tion policies (Aryeetey and Tarp, 2000). The economic policies, especially 
devaluation of the currency, benefitted firms that could produce for ex-
port and those in trading, but negatively affected domestic manufactur-
ing firms. In spite of the fact that ERP helped to improve some of the 
macro-economic indicators such as inflation, domestic savings remained 
low. Gross domestic savings to GDP averaged about 6% between 1983 
and 1990. This was about 30% of the 1970 level. With such a poor level 
of domestic investment, not only households but also the state itself 
could not replace depreciated capital (Osei, 1995:20).  
5.5.9 Strong and self-disciplined political leadership able to 
negotiate with interest groups (C1+C7) 
An important endogenous resource that was instrumental in ensuring the 
catalytic role of aid was the national leadership. While there was no 
doubt that the economic conditions in 1982 made it imperative for the 
IMF and World Bank to influence Ghana’s economic policies, the deci-
sion to embrace liberal economic reforms was taken at that time because 
the leadership of the PNDC came to appreciate the reality. Rawlings was 
a big factor. He was pragmatic and convinced that the Left-wing mem-
bers of his government had no credible remedy for the economic woes. 
Rawlings invested his political capital in the reform process. He agreed 
to implement SAP simply because it was in his best interest to do so, and 
because at that time there was no endogenous remedy and he wanted to 
turn around the economy in the shortest possible time in order to sustain 
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his political career. He was engrossed with showing results, and disinter-
ested in being tied to an ideological argument.  
Rawlings became impatient to fix the economic malaise after he real-
ised that the Leftists were not yielding to pragmatic reasoning (Bawumia, 
1998). He argued that higher productivity was the only way for workers 
to get pay rises, a posture that was anathema to his previous stance, and 
it resonated with the IMF/WB ideology. While this posture surprised 
some of his supporters, Rawlings was not worried about being branded a 
betrayer of the people’s trust. He was very receptive to pragmatism and 
less to ideology, hence he reposed considerable confidence in his Fi-
nance Minister.  
Rawlings knew that, by joining the pragmatists he was side-lining the 
neo-Marxists, which could have serious political consequences, but he 
was ready to face up to his fears (Shillington, 1992). It therefore came as 
no surprise to him when elements of the neo-Marxists attempted to 
overthrow him in a series of unsuccessful coups in October and No-
vember 1982, and June 1983. The coups forced Rawlings to “cleanse” 
the institutional governing structures, making them weaker against his 
authority. The regime played the World Bank and IMF against the Gha-
naian population when it needed to insulate itself from difficult policies. 
For instance, the regime used conditionality as a tool for gaining leverage 
in negotiations with local groups, including workers. It was easy to blame 
the World Bank for positions that the regime wished to take, since it 
knew that the Bank would not deny them publicly (Tsikata, 1999, 2001).  
Being the leader of the PNDC, Rawlings was first among equals (pri-
mus inter pares). He reorganised the PNDC in a manner that gave him to-
tal control and influence over the negotiation and policy-making process. 
There is no doubt that he was the kingpin in the whole process. Hutch-
ful observes “the PNDC meetings were not held to carefully deliberate 
over policies, but rather to ratify Rawlings’ decisions. His perspectives 
influenced the weight attached to specific issues by the economic team” 
(Hutchful, 2002:146). Aware of his influence, “the dominant view among 
the IMF and World Bank staffs was that all that was needed was Rawl-
ings’ personal commitment to ensure that a policy would be carried” 
(ibid.). He relied on his charisma, popularity among the citizens and also 
the fear that he created in people. In the absence of a functioning state 
bureaucracy, he virtually controlled the individuals in the management 
team. He made key policy decisions after privately consulting some of 
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his closest advisers. Rawlings used a combination of intimidation and 
cunning to get all groups (for and against) the reforms to accept to his 
position.  
In addition, Rawlings was able to convince the populace that the 
structural reforms were short-term to medium-term measures to pro-
mote efficiency in the public sector. His public speeches increasingly 
emphasised Ghana’s need to promote efficiency and productivity in or-
der to reduce dependency on foreign support. Another reason underly-
ing the regime’s ability to survive the ERP and labour unrest was simply 
fear of the government. Rawlings used support of the military to shape 
up any opponents, even on policy matters that he had little intellectual 
insights into (Aryeetey and Cox, 1995).  
While foreign aid was changing economic policies, the PNDC leader-
ship also implemented its own programmes aimed at sanitising moral 
behaviour. This involved an anti-corruption drive that included vetting 
of people’s socio-economic lifestyles that might be at variance from such 
people’s income levels, indicating that those people might have questions 
to answer. The regime also established extra-judicial bodies, such as Pub-
lic Tribunals, Citizens Vetting Committees and the National Investiga-
tions Committee to investigate and try people perceived to have lived 
beyond their means. Direct state involvement in economic activities that 
provided opportunities for government officers and their associates to 
indulge in corruption was banned during the reform. The Rawlings re-
gime made state patronage and other forms of kalabule3 its target. Clearly, 
all the rent-seekers and others who had benefited from the system were a 
ready-made anti-PNDC group. According to Gyimah-Boadi and Jeffries, 
there was a general consensus among Ghanaians afterwards that corrup-
tion among policymakers and senior government officials had been re-
duced considerably. There was also a perception among Ghanaians that 
the government under the leadership of Jerry Rawlings was not corrupt. 
Gyimah-Boadi and Jeffries found that during that period one could hard-
ly point to any allegations that government officials either demanded or 
took bribes for awarding government contracts (Gyimah-Boadi and Jef-
fries, 2000). 
Generally, during the period of reforms, the leadership and Ghanaian 
institutions were predisposed to change. They were ready to accept that 
reform was a consequence of domestic mismanagement of the Ghanaian 
economy. That explains why, despite some hardships resulting from the 
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policies, Ghana did not descend into chaos. There were only isolated 
cases of minor demonstrations. According to Tsikata, “the reasons for 
the success of the early adjustment credits seem to be the high commit-
ment on all sides and the administratively simple steps required in the 
reforms” (1999:5).  
5.6 Foreign aid, Economic Recovery and a New Policy 
Direction 
5.6.1 Effect of foreign aid on macro-economic stability and 
recovery (Y3) 
From 1983 to 1986, an annual average of US$ 218m of foreign aid was 
injected into Ghana’s economy annually. This increased to an annual av-
erage of US$ 625m from 1987 to 1990. This foreign capital propped up 
the Ghanaian economy. The contribution of aid as a percentage of GDP 
rose from 4% in 1983-86 to 9% by the end of 1992. Aid was also a mas-
sive contributor to Ghana’s imports and current account (see Table 5.3).  
Table 5.3 
Aid Disbursement in Ghana since the beginning of ERP 
Annual Contribution 1983–86 1987–90 
Total disbursed aid in US$ millions 218 625 
Aid as % of GDP 4 9 
Aid as % of imports 30 39 
Aid as % of current account 113 184 
World Bank Database, 2014 
 
With massive injection of foreign aid, Ghana’s economy recovered 
from its negative growth rate of about 5% in 1983 to a hefty positive rate 
of 8.6% in 1984. This positive growth continued throughout the period, 
though it dipped in 1990 and 1992. The positive macro-economic 
growth throughout the period compared well with the abysmal GDP 
performance in SSA (see Table 5.4). Ghana’s GDP per capita rose from 
US$ 341 at the beginning of the reforms to US$ 415 in 1992. 
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Table 5.4 
Ghana’s Macro-economic indicators compared with SSA, 1983-92 
Year GDP PC  (current US$) 
Annual GDP 
growth 
SSA GDP Growth 
(%) 
1983 341 -4.6 -1.46 
1984 358 8.6 2.13 
1985 354 5.1 2.19 
1986 437 5.2 -0.42 
1987 376 4.8 0.06 
1988 375 5.6 4.41 
1989 369 5.1 3.27 
1990 403 3.3 2.41 
1991 439 5.3 0.03 
1992 415 3.9 -1.41 
Source: World Bank, 2014.  
 
 The ERP improved Ghana’s balance of payments (BOP) position 
through increased export earnings, which had been among its key tar-
gets. From a US$ 30.6m deficit in 1980, the BoP attained a surplus of 
US$ 1.4bn in 1990. Contribution of export earnings to GDP went up by 
about 50-60%, accounting for nearly 20% of government revenue and 
7% of GNP (Jacobeit, 1991: 222). By 1985, inflation had fallen from 
122.8% in 1983 to 10.3%, and it dropped further to its lowest level of 
10% in 1992 (See Figure 5.4). 
Figure 5.4 
Inflation pattern, 1983-92 (%) 
Source: World Bank Database, 2014. 
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Ghana’s economic recovery and structural adjustment worked to a 
very large extent in terms of turning macro-economic indicators around. 
Annual GDP growth, inflation, balance of payments, per capita income, 
all began to see appreciable and continuous growth over a decade.  
In Ghana’s case, the ERP/SAP worked because we appreciated the 
need for reforms. We wanted to do the reforms ourselves. But in many 
African countries, the reforms didn’t work because donors forced gov-
ernments to pursue them against their will. So as soon as IMF and World 
Bank officials returned to Washington, government officials would back-
track. So, by the end of 1990s, donors and gradually the Bank and the 
Fund began to move away slowly from old-style conditionality and ap-
preciated that reforms don’t work if they are forced from outside (Inter-
view with the Former Minister of Finance, 11 July 2013).  
Some indicators of standard of living also improved slightly. Life ex-
pectancy increased from 52 years in 1980 to 57years by 1992, and pov-
erty fell from 56.1% in 1986 to 51% in 1990 (Ghana Statistical Service, 
1992) 
5.6.2 Effect of foreign aid on economic policy change (B1+B3+C2) 
In terms of economic policy, by the end of the phase Ghana had a new 
direction. By 1986, the country was classified in the Sachs-Warner Index 
of Openness as an “open” economy, in contrast to the previous years 
when it was classified as “closed”. Market liberalisation opened Ghana’s 
economy to the international market, but it was implemented under an 
authoritarian regime. The PNDC leadership’s agreement to implement 
conditionality attached to foreign aid facilitated the switch in economic 
policies. Foreign aid catalysed the regime’s resolve to be fiscally disci-
plined.  
Public sector reforms and implementation of new managerialism that 
was introduced by the neo-liberal policy regime compelled the govern-
ment to sever the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and Customs from the 
civil service. This approach enabled rationalisation of the incentives sys-
tem of IRS and Customs staff, who received higher salaries and bonuses 
that were not accorded to other civil service employees. They were also 
given the power to recruit professionals without having to go through 
the civil service structure. Government revenue as a percentage of GDP 
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increased from 5% in 1981 to 13.6% in 1986. With increased revenue, 
government expenditure increased to 13% of GDP in 1986.  
Neo-liberalisation became the mantra of economic policy. The im-
plementation of the neoliberal economic policies in the 1980s built a 
strong mindset among many policymakers and ordinary Ghanaians that 
everything public sector was “not good”. It was, therefore, not surprising 
that during the transition to multi-party democracy all the political par-
ties were preaching neo-liberalism and touting their private sector cre-
dentials. The neo-liberal economic manifestos of the PNDC/NDC be-
came very similar to that of the leading opposition party, the NPP, 
expressing pride over the open market-based economy. The three other 
presidential candidates did not have any disagreement with the fact that 
state-led development had failed. All the candidates touted their private 
sector credentials; for example, one was a wealthy entrepreneur, another 
an economic adviser and Central Bank governor during the second Re-
public. The third candidate openly acknowledged that Nkrumahism was 
bound to collapse (Nugent, 1996). The Structural Adjustment Pro-
gramme that the PNDC implemented was never an issue in the presiden-
tial election campaign, reflecting how Ghanaian political parties had con-
verged in policy direction.  
Internationally during the period, Reaganomics and Thatchernomics 
policy prescription became fashionable to the extent that the most un-
likely countries, such as the Soviet Union, began to adopt similar poli-
cies. By the end of the period, there was widespread belief in the gov-
ernment and the Ghanaian populace accepted neo-liberalism as the 
solution to economic problems, though many African academics derided 
it (Olokoshi Adebajo, 1993; 1998). As some experts pointed out during 
the interviews, at the time the neo-liberal economic policies were accept-
ed by Ghana, there was evidence from countries such as Taiwan, South 
Korea, Singapore, Brazil, and Mexico that international trade and neo-
liberal policies were not that bad after all. These countries’ meteoric rise 
in the global economy was achieved through open-market economies 
and not autarchy, so there was no point in being negative about neo-
liberalism. Even some donor countries, such as France and the Nordic 
states that had in the past supported developmental socialist state models 
reduced the role of the state in their economies. Foreign aid provided by 
bilateral donors reinforced this policy change. There was a concern that 
the return to multi-party democracy would reverse the economic policy 
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direction, but that did not happen as Ghanaians by that time had become 
accustomed to neo-liberalism.  
5.6.3 Effect of foreign aid on economic structural transformation 
(B1–B4 effect on Y9) 
By concentrating investment on traditional export sectors (cocoa beans 
and gold) and not on expansion or diversification, the reforms seem to 
have had less impact on promoting an “ideal” structural transformation 
in the mid 1980s. The share of industry in GDP maintained an annual 
average of 16% throughout the period, rising from 11% in 1983 to 17% 
in 1985. The service sector, which had maintained a constant contribu-
tion of an average of 23% to the GDP throughout the 1970s, started to 
rise, attaining a constant average of 36% in the reform period (see Figure 
5.5).  
Figure 5.5 
Contribution of agriculture, industry and services to GDP, 1983-92 (%) 
Source: World Bank Database, 2014. 
 
The ERP succeeded in reversing the downward trend in production 
and exports of cocoa beans, gold, and timber, but little support was pro-
vided to process the primary products. The multilateral agencies were 
concerned with increasing production of the existing primary products 
for export so as to obtain much-needed foreign exchange, to turn the 
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balance of payments deficit into a surplus, and to pay off accumulated 
debt. In other words, foreign aid was not geared towards fixing structural 
problems of the economy. No investment was made towards diversifying 
the Ghanaian economy, which was the concern expressed by some of 
the Left-wing members of the regime.  
In the early 1990s, the world market prices for cocoa dropped, which 
meant that increased cocoa production was not bringing in the much-
needed foreign exchange that Ghana needed to repay foreign debt and 
further expand infrastructure. The price drop once again showed Gha-
na’s vulnerability in relying substantially on cocoa for development. In 
1991, the government’s economic management and negotiating team 
wanted the IMF and World Bank to shift their attention from short-term 
economic stabilisation measures to long-term structural issues relating to 
production. The PNDC negotiated a project loan of US$ 16.5m from 
the World Bank to work on non-traditional agricultural exports, with the 
hope of diversifying the economy. The loan supported four agro-
industries; coffee, rubber, oil palm, and horticulture, but the support was 
extremely tiny in comparison with the scale that was needed to develop 
the sectors (Anyemedu, 1991; Whitfield, 2011b:15). Even compared with 
the project loan of US$ 128m that had been given to rehabilitate cocoa 
in 1988, the amount given for agro-industries was too inadequate to 
make any impact. To diversify the economy to non-traditional exports 
like flowers, tropical fruits and fresh vegetables required reliable infra-
structure and communication networks, but these were in short supply in 
Ghana. Thus, there was no short-run alternative to cocoa and, further-
more, no appetite among the multilateral donor agencies to invest in 
long-term economic development.  
According to the 1984 national census, Ghana’s population was about 
12m people, with a labour force of 5.58m. Of these, 240,000 people were 
employed in public enterprises and nearly 60,000 were employed in the 
Cocoa Board and its subsidiaries alone (Aryeetey and Baah-Boateng, 
2007; Adda n.d.: 2). When structural transformation is considered in 
terms of employment, during the early years of the reform, the labour 
market was greatly influenced by the IMF/WB-inspired government re-
trenchment and redeployment policy. The public sector was downsized 
and large numbers of government workers lost their jobs. For example, 
the size of the Cocoa Board’s payroll, which previous regimes had used 
to promote patronage jobs, was reduced by 50%. The civil service lost 
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36,000 jobs. In general, public sector employment began to fall, reaching, 
and 186,300 in 1991 under the liberal regime. So, while the ERP and 
SAP did not change the structure of the economy in terms of sectoral 
composition of GDP, it reduced employment in the public sector. Given 
that the manufacturing sector did not expand to absorb the labour force 
that had been made redundant in the public sector, the majority of the 
newly jobless ended up in the informal sector, mainly as petty traders 
(Leith, 1996; Leith and Soderling, 2000; Dzorgbo, 2001; Aryeetey and 
Baah-Boateng, 2007).  
In terms of production function (inputs of capital and labour) as a 
function of GDP, Leith and Soderling (2000) examined the aggregate 
growth during the period to explain why Ghana’s modest GDP recovery 
could not raise income levels to those in the 1970s despite increasing 
foreign aid. Their study concluded that SAP and ERP focused on easy 
candidates for reforms (mainly supply and demand for money) but the 
difficult ones like factor productivity and investment to sustain future 
growth were more difficult to achieve (Leith and Soderling, 2000:72-75). 
The regime although authoritarian and having the power to undertake 
reforms at will, failed to reform some of the key areas of the economy 
that needed reform. Those included the cocoa sector, state-owned enter-
prises, land ownership, and tax collection. The inability of the PNDC to 
complete these reforms before returning the country to multi-party de-
mocracy in 1992 left the Ghanaian economy vulnerable to electoral she-
nanigans. Fiscal discipline started to wane with the introduction of multi-
party competitive elections. The government budget declined from a 
surplus of 1.6% of GDP in 1991 to a deficit of over 5% of GDP in 
1992. This was a result of increased government expenditure during the 
election period by nearly 4% of GDP and a reduction of government 
revenue mobilisation.  
5.6.4 Foreign aid and increased debt burden (B1 Effect on Y8) 
Despite rescuing Ghana’s economy from death, the massive financial 
support provided by multilateral agencies exacerbated Ghana’s external 
debt and aid dependency. The external debt rose sharply after the intro-
duction of SAPs, jumping from US$ 1bn in 1977 to US$ 3.3bn in 1987 
and reaching US$ 4.5bn in 1992, while the debt service to export ratio of 
30.4% in 1983 jumped to 56.6% in 1988 before falling to 28% in 1992 
(see Table 5.5 and also Konadu-Agyemang and Takyi, 2001:29). In 1987, 
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Ghana’s debt to IMF alone was 31% of the total external debt. Also, be-
cause there was little structural change and Ghana continued to export 
primary commodities, the debt burden became one of the challenges of 
the aid-induced economic growth. 
Table 5.5 
Debt statistics, 1983-92 
Description 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Total debt stocks 
(US$ millions)  
1666 1963 2257 2767 3313 3128 3397 3873 4371 4499 
Arrears, total 
(US$ millions)  
18  30  44  54 76 78 112 133 113 122 
Concessional/ 
Total debt (%)  
49.5 41.8 41.1  44.5 49.0 52.0 53.8 54.5 54.8 57.2 
Multilateral/ 
Total debt (%)  
22.5 20.2 23.3 28.3 34.4 42.1 43.5 47.5 47.6 48.9 
Debt service/ 
Exports (%)  
30.4 21.6 23.6 28.3 45.8 56.6 50.4 37.0 27.1 28.4 
Total debt/ 
Exports (%)  
348.6 318.6 333.6 343.6 365.3 324.2 377.4 388.8 392.3 400.8 
Total debt/ 
GNP (%)  
41.4 45.0 51.0 49.4 67.1 61.8 66.2 67.1 67.5 71.3 
Source: Leith and Soderling, 2000:59. 
5.7 Influence of Foreign Aid on Political Stability  
(B1-B4 effect on Y7)  
During phase II, with the tacit approval of donors, an authoritarian re-
gime ruled Ghana with an iron fist from 1983 to 1988. There was a cul-
ture of silence in the country, as the regime regularly reminded Ghana-
ians about the execution of the three former heads of state and other 
senior public officers to evoke fear and awareness that it would not tol-
erate any opposition. Political parties were banned, as Rawlings did not 
want any political opposition to the regime’s quest to implement the 
most radical economic reforms.  
In July 1987, with his popularity falling, Flt Lt Rawlings established 
the National Commission on Democracy to develop the modalities for 
organising participatory governance. The Commission recommended 
decentralisation of government functions from the centre to the grass-
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roots. With pockets of opposition groups beginning to emerge from 
former political parties, the regime organised local-level elections in 
1988. No political parties were allowed to participate in the election. 
Traditional chiefs were also barred from participation. Individuals were 
to contest on the basis of personal merit and not on the basis of any po-
litical party. According to Awortwi (2011) although the regime wanted to 
insulate chiefs from the ‘dirty’ politics or chicanery associated with poli-
tics, the real reason for banning chiefs from standing in local govern-
ment elections was actually to prevent local coalitions from becoming 
strong enough to negotiate power sharing with the regime.  
In 1989-90 donors, including the US government and the World 
Bank began to emphasise good governance as a condition for receiving 
aid. As one of the cardinal features of good governance, democratic re-
form was to become a conditionality for economic aid, although the 
Bank did not explicitly state that in its operational policy guidelines. The 
Bank issued an adjustment report on Africa that signalled the onset of 
political conditionality (World Bank, 1989). The report provided a litany 
of governance challenges in Africa and what needed to be done. That 
was a shift in emphasis from strengthening purely economic institutions 
to also acting to remove political barriers to economic development. 
Subsequent World Bank reports emphasised “good governance” indica-
tors, but without specifically mentioning democracy. At the country lev-
el, programme managers began to think about operationalisation of the 
additional approach. In a subsequent country strategy report, the World 
Bank advocated broader political participation in Ghana. 
In December 1989, Rawlings instructed the National Commission on 
Democracy (NCD) to investigate what type of democracy would be ap-
propriate for the country. Donors facilitated the work of the NCD 
through financial support for organising nationwide consultations. In 
August 1990, a pro-democracy organisation the Movement for Freedom 
and Justice (MFJ), was formed to begin to challenge the PNDC’s unbri-
dled political domination. The MFJ included the National Union of 
Ghana Students NUGS, the TUC, the Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary 
Guard (KNRG), the Ghana Bar Association (GBA), the Christian Coun-
cil of Ghana and the Catholic Bishops’ Conference (CBC). These organi-
sations were outside the PNDC coalition. There was also a new wave of 
democracy blowing around the continent in the early 1990s that inspired 
opposition groups in Ghana to organise to agitate for political reforms. 
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The MFJ proposed that the PNDC establish a constituent assembly 
where all political parties would submit proposals on the type of Consti-
tution needed to guide the country’s return to democracy. However, the 
PNDC regime harassed the MFJ by arresting four of its leading members 
a day before the movement’s inauguration. The BBC, USIS, British High 
Commission and German embassy helped secure their release (Handley, 
2008). The transition to multi-party democracy saw pro-democracy activ-
ists and remnants of opposition political parties getting their voices back. 
According to Handley (2008:16), “the MFJ received very little interna-
tional funding, if any at all, although they did set up committees among 
their supporters in London and in the USA.”  
In terms of bilateral donors, the UK and US governments exerted po-
litical pressure on the regime to transition to democracy. It was reported 
that in 1991 Baroness Lynda Chalker, Director of the Overseas Devel-
opment Administration, visited Ghana a couple of times and on each 
visit talked to Rawlings about democracy (Maame Gyekye-Jandoh, 2006). 
The Netherlands and Japan also became important trading partners and 
overtly encouraged the regime to consider multi-party democracy. China, 
on the other hand, was not a fan of Western type of democracy and did 
not promote it. Denmark focused its bilateral assistance to Ghana on 
decentralisation and local democracy (Crawford, 2003). 
The debate on the type of democracy that Ghanaians wanted domi-
nated discussions in the country through 1991. In March, the NCD 
submitted its consultation report, ‘True Democracy”, to the PNDC. The 
regime made it clear that it did not favour multi-party democracy but 
accepted the NCD report and said it would initiate the process to return 
the country to multi-party politics. On New Year’s Day 1991, with polit-
ical pressure continuing to grow, Rawlings announced a timetable to re-
turn Ghana to multi-party democracy. He subsequently granted amnesty 
to all political exiles so that they could return home. He made the deci-
sion once he was confident of his popularity in the country.  
It must also be pointed out that Rawlings was fearful of being har-
assed in the post-military era, so he inserted immunity from prosecution 
for himself and those of his PNDC colleagues who had staged the coup, 
in the Constitution that reintroduced democracy. The Constitution was 
approved in April 1992 through a national referendum organised with 
logistical support from the donors, and was followed by presidential and 
parliamentary elections in November and December respectively. The 
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Constitution separated the powers of government among three branches: 
The Executive, headed by the President; the Judiciary, headed by the 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; and the Legislature, headed by the 
Speaker of the national parliament. The Constitution introduced a two-
term limit on presidential tenure, each of four years, and a 200-member 
unicameral legislature.  
Foreign aid supported democratic reforms, but compared with the 
cost of economic reforms, the overall donor support to the transition or 
political reform was very little by international standards. During the 
election itself, donors provided financial support to the Electoral Com-
mission. The EU, CIDA, DFID, DANIDA, USAID and IFES support-
ed the Inter-party Advisory Committee (IPAC), attended IPAC meet-
ings, and gave money to support voter education programmes as well as 
the work of Ghana’s National Commission for Civic Education.  
Much of the external financial support to Ghana’s democratisation 
began after Rawlings accepted transition to democracy and immediately 
after the 1992 elections. Nevertheless, it must be stated that the PNDC 
got the message tacitly that continued donor support to its economic 
recovery programme, and particularly support from IMF/WB, would 
depend on progress on political reforms. The PNDC was vulnerable 
without IMF/WB financial support. The promise of neo-liberalism lead-
ing to an upsurge of private sector capital had not been realised, so the 
PNDC was relying on aid to promote public sector expenditure on infra-
structure. So influential was aid that Rawlings could not afford any disa-
greement with the donors.  
The PNDC regime was transformed into a political party called Na-
tional Democratic Congress (NDC) to contest the election. Remnants of 
the Nkrumah and Busua regimes also formed separate political parties 
and ran in the election. Rawlings won the presidential election with 
58.4% of the votes, but the opposition disputed the results and boycott-
ed the subsequent parliamentary elections. Therefore, the first Legislative 
Assembly of 200 seats was virtually a single-party institution, with NDC 
having 189 seats and other members of the coalition 11 seats. Immedi-
ately after the elections, donors demonstrated their support for democra-
tisation by pledging US$ 2.1bn to Ghana’s development programmes 
(Boafo-Arthur, 1999). There was no doubt that the donors appreciated 
the regime’s transition to democracy. 
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Some members of the PNDC said during interviews that there was 
implicit indication that the World Bank made democratisation a condi-
tion for sustained financial support. However, the key evidence that the 
World Bank perhaps put pressure on the regime to democratise comes 
from Jerry Rawlings himself, during an interview with Handley in 2008.  
Rawlings directly attributed (or blamed, in his view) the move to multipar-
ty democracy on the need to secure the next tranche of funding from the 
Bank, and threats from donors (the US in particular) that this would not 
be forthcoming if suitable political progress was not made (Handley, 
2008:42).  
Since the US government indirectly influences the World Bank’s 
granting decisions, and without foreign aid Rawlings’ government could 
not survive, in effect Rawlings agreed to transition to multi-party democ-
racy even though he did not believe in it. As Handley alludes, ”if a coun-
try does not have good relations with the USA, it does not get financial 
support from the IMF and the World Bank” (Handley, 2008:43). Given 
that bilateral donors were following the Bretton Woods institutions’ pol-
icy directions, the Bank gained unusual policy leverage over the country’s 
economic and political programmes.  
Rawlings later confirmed the suspicion that he was not enthused 
about returning the country to multi-party democracy:  
I have to state here that during the period when the 1992 Constitution was 
being formulated, I voiced some misgivings about the party political sys-
tem. I was accused of not believing in democracy. I believe passionately in 
meaningful participatory democracy, but time has vindicated my misgiv-
ings as party politics has grown increasingly antagonistic, wasteful of mon-
ey and resources, and causes governments to plan towards the next elec-
tion rather than plan for the nation’s long-term development (Former 
President Rawlings’ response to questionnaire for this study, 2 October 
2015).  
According to Haynes (1999) the Bretton Woods institutions and the 
bilateral donors, mostly Britain and the USA, clearly indicated that aid 
and loan flows could be suspended unless there was a shift towards de-
mocracy. The general belief in Ghana was that both the World Bank and 
domestic pro-democracy groups compelled the PNDC to loosen its 
stranglehold on the political space.  
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In the run-up to elections, despite his dislike for the old political 
elites, Rawlings formed alliances with them so that he could win the elec-
tions. As a result, anti-democratic elements that were embedded in Gha-
na’s political structures and institutions, such as patronage, clientelism 
and corruption, resurfaced (Haynes, 1999). Foreign aid facilitated the 
Rawlings regime to extend infrastructure services such as roads and elec-
tricity to rural areas; it was a subtle form of state patronage to bolster 
support for his political party, -the NDC. The regime raised the salaries 
of civil servants by 80% (Reno, 1997:142; Tsikata, 1999; Aryeetey and 
Baah-Boateng, 2007:10). Thus, foreign aid further strengthened Rawl-
ings’ hold on power by enabling him to win the presidential election by a 
sizeable margin of 58.4%.  
5.8 Conclusion: Aid Was a Direct Catalyst to Economic 
Transformation and Indirect Catalyst to Political 
Transformation 
This chapter has discussed the interaction between foreign aid and Gha-
na’s endogenous political, economic and bureaucratic institutions; the 
political settlement that was needed to enable the regime to implement 
radical economic reforms; and the quantity and quality of aid provided. 
Using process tracing, it has tried to connect the catalysis of aid-
endogenous relationships and outcomes in terms of economic and polit-
ical transformation. This final section reflects on the attributes of cataly-
sis to answer the basic question: was foreign aid a catalyst to Ghana’s 
economic and political transformation during phase II?  
As a catalyst, aid facilitates what endogenous actors want to do to 
transform policies and structures that do not promote development. The 
discussions in this chapter clearly show that foreign aid was an important 
factor in the decision by the PNDC to undertake policy reform as the 
government anticipated that it would help solve its fiscal challenges. The 
Ghanaian authorities were ready to embark on reforms but needed fi-
nancial support. The leadership role that Rawlings and a few committed 
officials played showed that endogenous elements were ready to react 
positively to donor demands. Foreign aid was an important catalyst in 
sustaining the difficult reforms as it counterbalanced economic shocks, 
generated demonstration effects and reduced political pressure. The 
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massive inflows of foreign aid catalysed the growth of the Ghanaian 
economy and further enabled policy changes to be made.  
However, the instances of policy slippages in the early 1990s suggest 
that aid alone could not have sustained the reforms without the com-
mitment and support of endogenous actors, including leadership and the 
role that cocoa and gold played. The ERP and the SAP were implement-
ed in conditions marked by extremely weak state institutions inherited 
from previous regimes. Yet, the ERP was judged to have been success-
fully implemented, introducing a wide range of economic policies. The 
reason for this success was the high calibre group (though small in num-
bers) of policymakers who were committed to changing policies.  
A major endogenous factor that made aid a catalyst to resuscitating 
Ghana’s economy was the enthusiastic involvement of the general popu-
lace. From the outset, the PNDC encouraged the formation of local 
committees in neighbourhoods and workplaces to become involved in 
aid-induced development projects. By 1988, a law was passed and elec-
tions held to establish district assemblies, unleashing local initiative in 
planning and monitoring development relevant to their needs. The peo-
ple became participants in national development rather than passive re-
cipients of government largesse. As Rawlings indicated in his response to 
the study questionnaire, a key endogenous fact that enabled the country 
to use aid effectively was the absence of party politics, and therefore a 
sense of unity of purpose. 
There is no doubt that the World Bank provided a catalytic role to 
Ghana, not only in terms of directly providing financial resources to the 
cash-strapped economy but also through its prompting of bilateral do-
nors to return to Ghana as the country began to implement economic 
reforms that provided some guarantee to donors that their financial sup-
port would be put to good use. In the early years of the reforms, many 
bilateral donors had a wait-and-see attitude, but subsequently they fol-
lowed the lead of the IMF and World Bank. When the Bretton Woods 
institutions decided that Ghana had complied with its conditionality re-
quirements, bilateral donors followed and offered assistance. The finan-
cial aid to Ghana, therefore, not only had consequences for itself, but it 
was also directly linked to larger aid flows to Ghana. Nevertheless, the 
involvement of donors, especially the World Bank and IMF, delayed any 
discussion on Ghana’s transition to a developmental state. Though the 
state was seen as inefficient in many of the things it was doing, the policy 
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drive that the IMF and World Bank supported in Ghana was aimed at 
replacing the state with the market. The Bank always touted the suprem-
acy of the private sector instead of ensuring that the state became better 
at doing some of the things that were part of the role of the state. With 
the connivance of endogenous leadership, the role of the state and its 
capacity were dismantled. 
A catalyst requires minimum activation energy among participating 
substances to enable faster reaction, and that is how aid performed dur-
ing the second half of the reform period. During the first half, Ghana 
was ruled by the military. Donor support was hugely in favour of eco-
nomic recovery and far from directly supporting democracy. The mas-
sive injection of aid money sustained the military leadership’s capacity to 
implement the radical economic policies. At the initial stages of the re-
forms, neither the Bretton Woods institutions nor the bilateral donors 
considered it to be in their interest to put pressure on a government that 
was in the forefront of implementing harsh economic policies, so the 
issue of political reforms was not raised. It gave breathing space to Rawl-
ings, enabling him to suppress dissenting voices within his own political 
regime as well as outside it so that he could implement the radical poli-
cies.  
On the basis of the interviews with experts, review of relevant litera-
ture and data analysis, we can reasonably conclude that Ghana’s econo-
my would have headed for total collapse had the PNDC not opted for 
economic reforms. The party could not have resuscitated Ghana’s econ-
omy because at that time few endogenous financial resources were avail-
able. A number of analysts provided scenarios of what could have hap-
pened to Ghana had the government hesitated to go to the IMF and 
World Bank. They pointed to Ghana’s neighbouring West African coun-
tries, like Gambia, Sierra Leone, Senegal, and Niger, which procrastinat-
ed and adopted IMF and World Bank prescriptions a couple of years 
after Ghana did. Their economies deteriorated so badly that even when 
they adopted the IMF and World Bank prescriptions they eventually ex-
perienced political instability. In all likelihood, had Rawlings and the 
PNDC not agreed to implement the IMF and World Bank structural ad-
justment policies, Ghana would have been classified as a failed state by 
now. It would probably have been caught in a vicious circle of dismal 
economic performance and political instability, and possibly even inter-
nal conflicts.  
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However, were the IMF and World Bank roles good enough for ca-
talysis? To answer this, it is useful to look at South Korea’s experience, 
as described in the comparative analysis of Ghana and Korea by Kim 
(2013). The South Korean government was not burdened with debt aris-
ing from US and Japanese aid during the 1960s, because much of that aid 
was in the form of grants. In contrast, in Ghana a substantial part of the 
aid for economic and structural reform was not in the form of grants but 
had to be repaid with interest, resulting in an unsustainable debt trap for 
the government and Ghanaian taxpayers. The support provided by the 
multilaterals could have been more catalytic had grant elements been 
higher than loans.  
By the late 1960s, with the increasing availability of other external re-
sources, such as commercial loans, financial institution loans, bank loans, 
foreign and private bonds, and foreign direct investment, foreign aid was 
no longer central as an investment source in Korea (Kim, 2013). This 
was the surest indication that investors considered the country to be 
ready for business. In addition, the Korea’s export drive enabled the 
country to repay loans. In contrast, in Ghana, while the IMF and World 
Bank supported the introduction of neo-liberal policies, there was little 
conviction among international investors that the country was ready for 
business. This shows that the success of foreign aid in opening up a re-
cipient country’s economy depends on that economy’s potential for for-
eign direct investment. FDI did not emerge as a by-product of economic 
reforms and thus did not play a catalytic role in Ghana. Apparently, there 
was a lack of trust that Rawlings was serious about supporting private 
sector development.  
Ghana going to the IMF and World Bank was not enough. It enabled 
us to create the environment of confidence to attract private capital, 
technical know-how and market because you need all three to transform 
your economy and develop. Believe me, in terms of trust and confidence. 
The West didn’t have enough confidence in Rawlings and his administra-
tion. They were doing what I call maintenance support, but they didn’t 
really trust Rawlings. Even Ghanaians didn’t trust him. Rawlings gave 
the impression of being more towards socialism from the beginning, so 
when he gave the impression of having converted, people didn’t believe 
him when he had impoverished Apenteng, Appiah Menkah and B.A 
Mensah, the three most prominent private sector industrialists in our 
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history (Interview with the former Finance Minister of Ghana during the 
NPP administration, 15 August 2015). 
There was some hesitation in the privatisation programme, and many 
critics argue that even when Rawlings was talking about private sector 
participation, he remained suspicious of the private sector. Globally, as 
governments became less trusted to allocate and distribute resources, 
and market solutions were celebrated, private sector capital flows and 
foreign investment rose. Unfortunately, most of the private sector capital 
went to Asia and not Africa, so Ghana did not benefit from the global 
capital flow even as it reformed its economic policies. Hopkins (2000) 
argues that aspirations about aid launching rapid growth, as in South Ko-
rea, Indonesia and Taiwan, were not realised in Ghana. So, by the end of 
the phase, there was no alternative but to continue with the IMF and 
World Bank programme. 
The second attribute of a catalyst is that it provides a convenient sur-
face for endogenous elements to coalesce and react. This was also mani-
fested during the transition to democracy. When the IMF and World 
Bank began to pressure the PNDC regime to return the country to mul-
ti-party democracy, they found endogenous pro-democracy groups that 
were also pressuring the PNDC for political space. The endogenous 
pressure groups that pushed for plurality of the political landscape in-
cluded NUGS, TUC and remnants of former political parties. Pro-
democracy forces in Ghana and international donors catalysed the politi-
cal landscape, shaping the contours and pace of Ghana’s transition to 
democracy. Their actions reinforced each other in important ways. The 
multilateral financial institutions and bilateral donors were effective in 
using aid to pressure the Rawlings regime to consider liberalisation of the 
political space and a return to constitutionalism. It was rather the lever-
age associated with donor financial support than the aid itself that was 
decisive in swaying the PNDC to embark on political reform. Without 
the donors’ use of their financial leverage, the Ghanaian pro-democracy 
groups would perhaps have had to struggle much more to persuade 
Rawlings to consider a return to multi-party democracy.  
Notes 
 
1 He completed his studies and co-founded Third World Network-Africa 
(TWN-Africa). 
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2 “Bonuses” enable a customer who sells USD to get more Ghanaian cedis than 
at the current exchange rate, while “surcharges” mean a customer has to pay 
extra for buying foreign currency. 
3 A word that was frequently used to describe illegal trading in controlled goods 
at higher prices than those set by the government.  
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6 
Foreign Aid in the Consolidation of 
Democratic Governance and Economic 
Takeoff (1993-2013) 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter six has a similar structure to that of the previous two chapters. It 
discusses how foreign aid and endogenous drivers interacted to consoli-
date the democratic transition that Ghana had embarked on at the end of 
phase II, and the prospects for economic takeoff after nine years of 
structural adjustment. The analysis period is 1993-2013, but given that 
the study ended in 2016, the thesis occasionally uses data and material 
references from subsequent years (2014-16). The chapter is divided into 
seven sections. After this introduction, section 6.2 presents the process 
tracing analysis that links the three causal covariables to the economic 
and political transformation and development outcome. The subsequent 
sections provide in-depth analysis of the causal-effect analyses. Section 
6.3 identifies the critical junctures or historical events before 1993 that 
contributed in shaping the subsequent flow of aid and mode of interac-
tions between aid and endogenous drivers of development. Section 6.4 
analyses the interactions between aid and economic and social policies 
during the period. Section 6.5 examines both quantitative and qualitative 
flows of foreign aid and further assesses the reliability of aid by compar-
ing what donors committed to the country and how much was actually 
disbursed. Section 6.6 discusses the interaction between foreign aid and 
the types of political settlements that were developed and sustained in 
the country. The section also discusses the extent to which foreign aid 
and domestic funds were used to support productive sectors. Section 6.7 
recaps the economic and political transformation that took place during 
phase III and tries to answer the question of whether aid had anything to 
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do with the degree of the country’s transformation and development. 
Section 6.8 draws conclusions from the analysis in the chapter. 
6.2 Tracing a New Dawn of Political Transformation and 
Economic Takeoff with Foreign Aid 
Ghana began phase III as a newly democratic state after many years of 
authoritarian rule. The country’s development partners pledged substan-
tial aid to help consolidate the democratic regime. From 1993 to 2013, 
Ghana became one of the most touted democracies in Africa. The struc-
ture of Ghana’s economy experienced marginal change but was not 
transformed. By 2013, Ghana had become a lower middle-income coun-
try and no longer had the characteristics of low-income countries. Access 
to electricity had increased from 30.6% in 1990 to 64.1% in 2012 and 
water from 65% to 88% in the same period (World Bank, 2016). Poverty 
was reduced from 51.7% in 1991/92, to 24.2% in 2013 though there are 
spatial inequalities. Ghana thus became the first country in SSA to 
achieve the MDG1 indicator of halving poverty; it achieved this two 
years ahead of the MDG target year 2015. Despite these achievements, 
in 2014, 24.2% of the population (about 6.4 million people) lived on less 
than the international poverty level of US$ 2 a day, of whom about 8.4% 
lived on less than US$ 1.10 a day, the level of extreme poverty (Ghana 
Statistical Service, 2014). As shown in Table 6.1, poverty has consistently 
remained high in the three northern regions—Northern, Upper West 
and Upper East.  
After years of support with aid projects, the three northern regions 
are still the poorest in Ghana. This supports the argument of this study 
that aid can only be a facilitator and not a prime mover of development. 
The three regions are arid, isolated and not linked to the south of the 
country, where conditions are better. These are among the factors that 
have contributed to the impoverishment of the north.  
On the basis of in-depth interviews with experts and the literature re-
view, this study identified the 24 causal variables below, which interacted 
and led to the kind of political and economic transformation and devel-
opment that occurred in Ghana by 2013. The linkages between these 
variables are presented in Figure 6.1.  
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Table 6.1 
Regional disparities in depth and severity of poverty, 2006 and 2013 
Regions 
Depth Severity Difference (%points) 
2006 2013 2006 2013 Depth Severity 
Western 5.4 5.7 1.9 2.4 0.34 0.41 
Central 5.6 5.6 1.8 2.5 0.05 0.65 
Greater Accra 3.7 1.6 1.4 0.6 -2.07 -0.76 
Volta 9.2 9.8 3.2 4.0 0.66 0.75 
Eastern 4.2 5.8 1.6 2.4 1.59 0.82 
Ashanti 6.4 3.5 2.4 1.3 -2.86 -1.18 
Brong Ahafo 9.5 7.4 3.7 2.9 -2.13 -0.86 
Northern 23.0 19.3 12.0 9.8 -3.71 -2.22 
Upper East 35.3 17.2 20.4 9.0 -18.17 -11.42 
Upper West 50.7 33.2 32.8 18.8 -17.54 -14.01 
Source: Ghana Poverty and Inequality Report (6th GLSS), 2016. 
 
A:  Historical Antecedents 
A1:  End of  Cold War, fall of  the Berlin Wall, and collapse of  the 
Soviet Union. 
A2:  Donors’ appetite for multi-party democracy.  
A3:  Ghana’s transition to multi-party democracy after 11years. 
B:  Aid 
B1:  Increase in the number of  bilateral donors. 
B2:  Changes in quantity and quality of  aid flows as well as rate of  
disbursement. 
B3:  ODA focused on strengthening democratic institutions and 
addressing ecological policies. 
B4:  Availability of  alternative funding mechanisms (Chinese 
assistance and commercial loans). 
B5:  Debt relief. 
C: Endogenous Factors  
C1:  Pursuit of  unbridled neo-liberal economic policies.  
C2:  Home-grown economic takeoff  policies.  
C3:  Establishment of  National Development Planning Commission. 
C4:  Implementation of  international social development 
programmes (MDGs, GPRSPs). 
C5:  Weak support to productive sector (agriculture and industry). 
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C6:  Investment in infrastructure as state priority, as part of  the 
development of  enabling environment for private sector 
development. 
C7:  Fiscal indiscipline. 
C8:  Weak state bureaucracy unable to manage substantial donor 
inflows and provide clear policy direction. 
C9:  Competitive clientelistic political settlement as mode of  
governance.  
C10:  Poor coordination of  donor projects. 
C11:  Strengthening of  democratic institutions and civil society 
organisations. 
C12:  Commercial oil discovery and export. 
C13:  Pursuit of  short-term projects. 
C14  Duo-political parties. 
C15:  Lack of  selfless political leadership. 
C16:  Government of  Ghana and Development Partners Compact. 
Y: Degree of  Political and Economic Transformation 
Y1:  Failed industrial policy and golden age of  business. 
Y2:  High and unsustainable debt. 
Y3:  Macro-economic instability.  
Y4:  Reduction in poverty but increasing inequality. 
Y5:  Expansion of  the economy. 
Y6:  Weak and unconventional economic transformation. 
Y7:  Democratic consolidation and growth. 
Y8:  Unprecedented level of  corruption. 
Z:  Standard of  living: Lower middle income country. 
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Figure 6.1 
Tracing Ghana’s developmental trajectory from 1993 to 2013 (phase III) 
6.3 Historical Antecedents that Influenced Aid and 
Endogenous Institutions 
Three historical events that preceded the beginning of Phase III had ef-
fects on subsequent interactions between aid and endogenous factors. 
They were: (i) the end of the cold war, fall of the Berlin Wall, and col-
lapse of the Soviet Union; (ii) Donors’ appetite for multi-party democra-
cy as a condition for support, even though not explicitly stated; and (iii) 
Ghana’s transition to multi-party democracy after 12 years of military 
rule. 
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6.3.1 End of Cold War, fall of the Berlin Wall, and collapse of the 
Soviet Union (A1) 
As the 1980s came to an end, much of the Eastern bloc that constituted 
the Soviet Union and the ‘Iron Curtain’ between the West and East 
started to unravel. The Berlin Wall came down in November 1989, and 
by 1990, leaders of Eastern Europe had been dethroned by popular up-
risings. By 1993, many of the republics that constituted the Union of So-
viet Socialist Republics had declared independence from the USSR. The 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War had economic 
and political ramifications for Africa, eliminating one of the strategic de-
terminants of the provision of foreign aid, especially by the USA and its 
allied OECD countries. As Hopkins points out: 
Until 1990, cold war concerns provided a core motivation for aid. 
Development was a secondary concern; rentier elites were not obliged to 
account to donors for aid effectiveness in terms of economic or political 
improvements. Now that the cold war is over, foreign policy is more 
geared towards international public goods, including containing internal 
‘bads’ (2000:425).  
With this historical event, the international environment within which 
Ghana was operating changed. At the beginning of the period also came 
the recognition that aid for development was effective when channelled 
through multilateral agencies like the World Bank and UNDP. Accord-
ing to Lancaster, aid for development came to the fore and donors con-
sidered expansion of the proportion of aid money to multilateral agen-
cies such as the World Bank and United Nations development agencies; 
aid through those agencies was then seen widely as having greater impact 
on economic and social progress in poor countries than aid through bi-
lateral channels (Lancaster, 2008:42).  
With the end of the Cold War and collapse of the state-controlled 
economy espoused by the Soviet Union, the only financial source left for 
international development was Western donors, their ideology and policy 
preferences. African governments’ use of Cold War rivalries to negotiate 
aid was no longer viable. In addition, with the collapse of the Eastern 
bloc, Western Europe and bilateral donors were expected to turn their 
attention to the economic and political needs of Eastern Europe; hence, 
there was an expectation that aid to Africa would be reduced (Grant and 
Nijman, 1998). 
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6.3.2 Donors’ appetite for multi-party democracy (A2) 
In 1989, only five countries (Botswana, Senegal, Mauritius, The Gambia 
and Zimbabwe) had multi-party political systems in Africa. The rest were 
11 military governments and 29 one-party states (Carbone, 2007:4). By 
1991, the international context had changed and donors openly declared 
their preference for multi-party democracy in aid recipient countries. The 
US State Department announced that foreign aid to its partners in Africa 
would be dependent on progress towards democracy. That was a change 
from the previous decade, when donors had not explicitly voiced dislike 
for military regimes or made democracy a condition for financial sup-
port. There was an expectation that substantial foreign aid would follow 
with the transition to multi-party democracy, and that was strengthened 
when the Paris Club pledged US$ 2.1bn in financial support to Ghana 
immediately after the 1992 elections (Boafo-Arthur, 1999). 
6.3.3 Ghana’s transition to multi-party democracy (A3) 
Ghana began 1993 as a new democratic nation, having successfully tran-
sitioned from a military regime to an elected government. While the 
transition brought new hope to many citizens and political observers be-
cause Ghana’s political direction was in line with donors’ requirements, 
there was apprehension among some donors about Ghana’s ability to 
consolidate economic reforms in an era of multi-party democracy. Cen-
tralised decision-making had served the PNDC well during the early pe-
riod of economic reform, but now decisions had to be made on the basis 
of consensus among multiple stakeholders. However, since the major 
opposition party, the NPP, had boycotted the parliamentary elections, 
citing widespread irregularity in the earlier presidential election, the Na-
tional Assembly was virtually a one-party parliament dominated by the 
NDC and its coalition of political parties. The promise of more aid by 
the Paris Club was viewed as a demonstration of donors’ commitment to 
facilitating the country’s fragile transition to democratic governance 
(Boafo-Arthur, 1999).  
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6.4 Interaction of Foreign Aid and Endogenous Drivers  
(B1-5 + C1-16)  
The above three historical events coalesced in shaping interactions be-
tween foreign aid, the conditions and mode of its delivery, and endoge-
nous institutions, actors and political and economic structures. This sec-
tion analyses some of the interactions. 
6.4.1 Implementation of Economic and Social Development 
Policies (B3+C1+C2+C3+C5) 
During Phase III, Ghana implemented a number of economic and social 
policies that received mixed support from donors. The first was aggres-
sive implementation of privatisation policies.1 Ghana began 1993 with a 
fiscal deficit arising from government overspending in the run-up to the 
November 1992general elections. As a result, donors, mostly the IMF 
and World Bank, nudged the government to aggressively pursue the pri-
vatisation policy that the PNDC had implemented half-heartedly during 
the ERP/SAP era in Phase II. The reason for this was to enable the gov-
ernment to regain control of the fiscal deficit and to regain confidence 
among bilateral donors that had expressed concern about Ghana’s 
commitment to pursuing fiscal discipline during multi-party elections. 
The government earmarked 221 state enterprises to be sold in 1993. The 
first to be put on the market was the government’s share of the Ashanti 
Goldfields Corporation (AGC). By then, AGC had begun to make profit 
on the back of the substantial investment that the World Bank had made 
in it. Privatisation of AGC fetched about US$ 245m in 1995, while other 
sales added up to US$ 300m (Marr, 1997; Adda, n.d.:6). Other major 
state enterprises sold included the Golden Tulip Hotel, West African 
Mills Company, Tema Steel Company, Ghana Agro-Food Company, 
Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Ghana Limited, Suhuma Company 
Limited (formerly Glistken West Africa Company), a couple of mining 
companies and Ghana Oil Palm Development Company Limited (DIC, 
2003; Adda, n.d.: 7). Table 6.2 shows the privatisation transactions be-
fore and after the elections, and during the 10years of multi-party de-
mocracy. 
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Table 6.2 
Privatisation transactions, 1990-2002  
Year 
Mode of privatisation 
Total Sale of 
assets 
Sale of 
shares 
Joint 
ventures Leases 
Liquid-
ation 
1990 3 8 0 2 21 34 
1991 8 3 1 0 3 12 
1992 3 6 2 0 2 13 
1993 4 3 0 0 3 10 
1994 25 8 7 2 7 44 
1995 19 1 1 0 0 21 
1996 66 1 3 0 1 71 
1997 34 5 1 1 0 41 
1998 15 3 0 0 2 21 
1999 12 3 0 1 2 18 
2000 11 1 0 0 0 12 
2001 3 0 0 0 0 3 
2002 7 1 0 0 0 8 
Source: Divestiture Implementation Committee, 2003; Adda, n.d.:7. 
 
The second development policy direction can be termed “home-
grown” although the term was never used in official policy documents. 
The genesis of this policy direction lay in criticisms that the ERP and 
SAP lacked focus on long-term development and only concentrated on 
short-term fiscal stability. So, the NDC government designed a long-
term economic policy direction devoid of IMF/WB short-term solu-
tions. The national mantra at that time was “Ghana is ready to take off 
economically”, –which was very encouraging to the populace after years 
of structural reforms. The functions of the Ministry of Finance and Eco-
nomic Planning were split into two to strategize “home-grown” devel-
opment policies. The role of economic planning was given to the Na-
tional Development Planning Commission (NDPC) while the Ministry 
of Finance had responsibility for fiscal policy and monetary regulation. 
However, the work of the NDPC did not attract sufficient budget and 
human resources, either through deliberate manoeuvring by the Ministry 
of Finance to undermine the NDPC, or because of external pressure 
(some analysts interviewed during the study mentioned underhand arm-
twisting by the World Bank). The NDPC became a dumping ground for 
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senior public servants that the government regarded as leaning towards 
opposition political parties but could not dismiss because of legal ramifi-
cations. Despite the problems, in 1995 the NDPC developed a “home 
grown” long-term national development plan, Ghana Vision 2020.  
The vision was that by the year 2020 Ghana would have achieved a 
balanced economy and a middle-income country status and standard of 
living, with a level of development close to the present level in Singapore 
(Government of Ghana, 1995:1).  
This vision of Ghana attaining middle-income status was to be achieved 
by “creating an open and liberal market economy established on competi-
tion, initiative and creativity; application of science and technology in de-
riving maximum productivity from the use of human and natural re-
sources; and optimising the rate of economic and social development with 
due regard to the protection of the environment, and equity in the distri-
bution of the benefits of development” (1995:1).  
The NDPC was tasked with ensuring that sectoral and district five-
year development plans were coordinated, rationalised and harmonised 
so that all development programmes and projects were mutually sup-
portive and compatible with the long-term plans of the country. The na-
tional development plan was to become the reference document that 
informed the entire country as well as the international community, pri-
vate sector investors, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
about the social and economic priorities of the state. From the long-term 
plan, a medium-term five-year development plan, Vision 2020: The First 
Step and Action Plan, was developed and used for negotiating for support 
from donor agencies. However, within the government, each ministry 
pursued donor-funded projects without reference to the NDPC docu-
ment. In the end, the Ministry of Finance did not secure financing of the 
plan because, donors said, it lacked a clear strategy to deliver.  
For instance, in the implementation of the productive sector compo-
nent of the plan, the government relied on donor support, especially 
from the World Bank, to finance agricultural development (Whitfield, 
2011a; Buur and Whitfield, 2011). The Ministry of Food and Agriculture 
initiated a strategy called Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Devel-
opment Strategy, with the expectation that the World Bank and other 
donors would finance it through a sector-wide approach. The World 
Bank designed a new programme that was too rudimentary compared 
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with what the government wanted. Foster et al. found that “some donors 
were never comfortable with the government’s focus on the agricultural 
sector and wanted more direct poverty reduction” (Foster et al., 
2000:15). Eventually, the ministry’s effort to promote development of 
the agricultural sector turned into a fiasco. Instead, the World Bank, on 
its own initiative, began giving agricultural sector adjustment credit that 
supported many small agricultural projects.2 The NDC government re-
jected the new proposal by the Bank, finding its focus to be too much on 
capacity building and too little on direct investment in production. Other 
bilateral donors did not support the World Bank’s agricultural projects 
and pursued their own interest.  
From 1992 to 2000, little foreign aid was used to support productive 
sectors in the plan, and there was insignificant investment by the state 
itself to support industrialisation and other productive sectors. One can, 
therefore, characterise the period as devoid of aid to support the produc-
tive sectors. Without adequate state or donor support, local production 
in agriculture and industry slumped, and with unbridled implementation 
of trade liberalisation policies, foreign goods outcompeted local goods in 
the Ghanaian market. By the time the NDC was voted out in 2000, im-
plementation of Vision 2020 was already dead because neither donors 
nor the new government were ready to support its implementation. The 
NPP declared its intention to abandon Vision 2020, out of fear that when 
the new government’s economic programmes were successful, the NDC 
would take credit for them because it had developed the vision docu-
ment (Whitfield and Jones, 2009). 
The third major development policy was a focus on poverty reduc-
tion. The NPP came to power in 2001, intending to resuscitate Ghana’s 
industrial policy, to spearhead job creation and reduce poverty. The party 
envisioned strong state-domestic private sector partnership and macro-
economic stability and declared its period in power “the Golden Age of 
Business”. The NPP government created the Ministry of Private Sector 
Development, which was given direct access to the Office of the Presi-
dent to ensure political support. However, the NPP’s “golden age of 
business” stumbled from the beginning when the new government was 
confronted with an economy that was almost bankrupt. Ghana had de-
pended on World Bank and IMF assistance for two decades without any 
signs of self-sustaining growth, and the NPP administration inherited 
rising inflation, currency depreciation, a huge domestic debt, shortfalls in 
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aid flows and massive external debt servicing. It faced the challenge of 
either cutting public expenditure drastically or asking the international 
community for more aid and chose the latter. Ghana declared itself in-
solvent and signed up to the Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) ini-
tiative, which was a prerequisite for receiving debt relief. During that pe-
riod, donors’ attention had shifted to poverty alleviation as part of the 
MDGs, and, with the support of the IMF and World Bank, Ghana de-
veloped the ‘Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper’ (GPRSP). 
From 2001 to 2004, the NPP economic direction was heavily dictated to 
by the conditions of the HIPC programme—use of the HIPC funds to 
implement poverty alleviation programmes. The GPRSP I (2003-2005) 
became the only coherent set of policy objectives that guided economic 
policy-making with its core objective being to alleviate poverty (Gov-
ernment of Ghana, 2003).  
The government negotiated successfully with the IMF and World 
Bank to use 20% of the HIPC relief to pay off interest on domestic debt 
while the rest of the money was used to support small projects in the 
ministries and local governments (IMF, 2004:9). In 2006, the govern-
ment developed the GPRS-II, which emphasised growth as the basis for 
sustained poverty reduction with the aim of Ghana regaining middle-
income status. The GPRS II focused implementation on macro-
economic stability, promotion of private sector competitiveness, and 
good governance, among other things. One of the key priorities was to 
increase local agricultural production, including rice and poultry, which 
had declined significantly in the 1990s and 2000s, following a steep rise 
in imports facilitated by the country’s trade liberalisation policy. The 
NPP revisited the Agricultural Services Sub-Sector Investment Project 
that the World Bank had designed, renegotiated with the Bank and mod-
ified the project after a year’s delay (Voisard and Jaeger, 2003).  
Alongside implementation of the GPRSP II, the government also 
sought to put into operation the state-private sector development policy 
through creation of the Ministry of Private Sector Development 
(MoPSD) with direct access to the Office of the President. This was to 
ensure political support. The donors were happy with the direction of 
the new government and they began to anchor a donor thematic group 
on the private sector in the new ministry. The donors offered to finance 
the development of a more comprehensive strategy for the MoPSD. To 
secure donor funding for its activities, the ministry obliged and went on 
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to develop Ghana’s first private sector development strategy (PSD), 
which was launched in 2004 (Government of Ghana, 2004). However, 
the MoPSD had the smallest budget of all government ministries in 
2004. 
While providing money for the ministry, bilateral aid donors also 
dominated the direction of the strategy. The government and Ghanaian 
entrepreneurs wanted direct support of the state in production, but the 
donors did not. At that time, many of the donors’ ideas about promoting 
PSD in the south revolved around creating an “enabling environment” 
and a good “investment climate”, so the PSD strategy in Ghana became 
a “state enabling strategy”, to please the donors. The President and some 
top political leaders inserted the President’s Special Initiatives (PSI) into 
the strategy. These PSI included garments and textiles, salt mining, cot-
ton production, oil palm production, and cassava starch production, to 
create growth-oriented international competitive firms. According to the 
Ghana Investment Promotion Council, the combined export of PSI 
products was to bring in US$ 6-10bn a year and create 70,000 jobs 
(GIPC, n.d). However, the PSI did not receive donor funding; eventual-
ly, it became part of the public sector reforms that donors wanted, on 
the understanding that an efficient state bureaucracy would help to de-
velop the private sector (Whitfield and Jones, 2009; Whitfield and Frazer, 
2010; Whitfield and Therkildsen, 2011.) Programmes to improve com-
petitiveness at the firm level were left to the World Bank and other bilat-
eral donors. Thus, not much of what the government wanted was 
achieved.  
With no donor funding for the government’s preferred direct support 
to business, political backing for the PSD strategy began to erode and 
the NPP political elite turned to poverty alleviation programmes that 
donors were interested in supporting. In 2006, the MoPSD was sub-
sumed into the Ministry of Trade and Industry. The notable result from 
the World Bank’s PSD strategy was Ghana’s rise in the World Bank’s 
Doing Business Index as a top reformer. Despite this, there was no ap-
preciable change in the country’s foreign direct investment (Whitfield, 
2011a).  
In 2006, the NPP decided to fund the government’s own initiatives to 
support industrial development and that responsibility was given to a 
senior NPP politician, Allan Kyeremateng, who also had presidential 
ambitions. He was appointed Minister of Trade and Industry and subse-
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quently developed the Industrial Reform and Accelerated Growth Pro-
gramme, which focused on agro-processing and other manufacturing 
industries. The strategy also involved mass mobilisation of rural commu-
nities, stimulation of competitive import substitutes, especially in pro-
cessed foods and agricultural products, and a district industrialisation 
programme. The industrialisation approach was conceived to be state led 
initially, and then, over time, to be developed into public-private partner-
ships with domestic entrepreneurs as the main partners. A number of 
industrial projects were implemented during this phase, including con-
struction of an export-processing zone in Tema, which was later trans-
formed into a multipurpose industrial park (see Whitfield, 2011a and c). 
Kyeremateng resigned from the position of Minister of Trade and Indus-
try in order to contest the presidency. As there was little support from 
the party and the state bureaucracy to implement the Industrial Reform 
and Accelerated Growth Programme, The projects began to crumble. 
For instance, one of Kyeremateng’s flagship projects, the Ayensu starch 
factory, which started production in 2002, closed down in 2006. In short, 
the PSIs had few results to show before the NPP left office. 
Thus, despite the many pronouncements by the NPP and President 
Kufuor to give direct aid to productive sectors, there was little support 
for industrial initiatives from the political elite, with the exception of 
Alan Kyeremateng. According to Whitfield (2011a) and confirmed by 
some of the experts interviewed during the field research. Other people 
with presidential ambitions within the NPP seem to have undermined 
Kyeremateng’s industrial policy because it would have built a personal 
political base for the Minister in the run-up to the 2008 elections.  
The NPP government was bold to develop several productive sector 
initiatives outside the remit of donor funding. However, in contrast to 
the political leadership’s support to cocoa, it did not provide much sup-
port to other promising products. The case is cited of large-scale 
“smooth cavenn” pineapple production, which was started by a few 
businessmen. Export of pineapples increased from 650 tons in 1984 to 
over 70,000 tons in 2004. By the late 1980s, Ghanaian pineapples had 
captured 60% of the market in air-freighted pineapples to Europe (Whit-
field, 2011b). However, lack of political support for providing working 
capital to the private sector led to the collapse of the business as a new 
variety of higher-yielding and pest-resistant pineapple from Costa Rica 
entered the market. The government of Costa Rica launched an aggres-
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sive marketing campaign for producers of the MD2 pineapple and it dis-
placed Ghana’s smooth cayenne (Whitfield, 2011b; Kelsell, 2013). Whit-
field (2011b) attributes Ghana’s loss of the pineapple market to lack of 
government support for the horticulture sector. 
Having achieved macro-economic stability on the back of HIPC from 
2004 to 2008, the NPP regime explored new sources of external money 
for public investment. These included the private capital market3 (which 
is not part of this study) and Chinese official concessionary credit. Chi-
nese concessionary loans and grants began to increase, but, again, much 
of the money was invested in areas that were not directly linked to pro-
ductive sectors. Loans and grants from the governments of China and 
India financed the construction of the new presidential palace, the Minis-
try of Defence, and rehabilitation of the Peduase Presidential Lodge 
(Whitfield, 2011d).  
The fourth major development policy was the ‘Ghana Shared Growth 
and Development Agenda’ (GSGDA) of 2011-2015. The GSGDA was 
developed by the NDPC within the context of a political manifesto, ‘Bet-
ter Ghana Agenda’, of the NDC government that won the elections in 
2009. The GSGDA encompassed, among other social and economic 
goals:  
 providing citizens with secure and sustainable jobs  
 rehabilitating and expanding infrastructural facilities  
 accelerating the economic growth rate to at least 8% per annum  
 pursuing an employment-led economic growth strategy that would ap-
propriately link agriculture to industry, particularly manufacturing. 
(Government of Ghana, 2010:1)  
Two important policy documents on development aid were produced 
in addition to the GSGDA (2011-2015): (i) ‘Ghana’s Aid Policy and 
Strategy’ (2011-2015) and (ii) ‘GoG and Development Partners Compact 
(2012-2022)’. These three documents were considered to be the basis for 
development cooperation between Ghana and development partners, 
and to affirm Ghana’s commitment to the Paris Declaration (2005), Ac-
cra Agenda for Action (2008) and Busan Partnership for Effective De-
velopment Cooperation. Although the compact is not legally binding, it 
synthesised some of the key government policies and strategies that de-
velopment partners were committed to, and aligned their support to 
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Ghana’s growth and poverty reduction objectives. In the compact, the 
Government of Ghana estimated that about US$ 23.9bn of services and 
investments expenditure would be needed to implement the GSGDA 
from 2010 to 2013. Of this, 39% would be needed for infrastructure, 
25% for human resources, 15.1% for oil and gas development and 4.1% 
for agriculture (Government of Ghana, 2012:6). The government ex-
pressed doubt that it would be able to raise all the funds, estimating a 
gap of US$ 12.5bn (52.3%) to be financed through other means includ-
ing ODA.  
The aid compact that the government and donors signed was against 
the background of dwindling ODA to Ghana and the country’s transi-
tion to lower-middle income status. Both the GSGDA and the compact 
acknowledged that modernisation of the agriculture sector was to under-
pin transformation of the economy through job creation, increased ex-
port earnings, food security and supply of raw materials for industry. De-
spite this commitment to make agriculture the leading sector in 
transforming the economy, only 4% investment was allocated to the sec-
tor. The period from 1992 to 2013 witnessed four major development 
policies that could be described as home-grown perhaps with the excep-
tion of the GPRSP, but their implementation was inconsistent as far as 
support to productive sectors was concerned. 
6.4.2  Effect of international development agenda on home-
grown policies (B3+C2+C4) 
Needless to say, throughout the period, neo-liberalism became the over-
arching ideology underlying the economic policies of the two political 
parties that took turns to rule Ghana. This seemed to have come from 
the overdose of economic prescriptions by the IMF and World Bank. 
The policy was a major constraint to productive sector development as 
trade liberalisation and elimination of import quotas led to a surge in im-
ports of agricultural and poultry products against which the local pro-
ducers were unable to compete. The government’s attempts to revive 
local industries did not fit in with the IMF policy prescriptions. This 
manifested in 2002, when the government wanted to regenerate local 
tomato industries and stop the importation of tomato paste (Robinson 
and Kolavalli, 2010a).  
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Rice and poultry were other products that the government wanted to 
be increasingly produced locally. In 2003, Ghana imported 58% of the 
rice consumed in the country, so to reduce the use of foreign exchange 
for rice importation, the NPP government announced a 5% increase in 
tariffs on rice and a 20% tariff increase on poultry imports in the 2003 
budget. However, just as the announcement was made the IMF opposed 
it and the government had to suspend the tariff increases (Whitfield, 
2011d: 33). The Ghana National Association of Poultry Farmers sought 
the intervention of the High Court of Ghana to compel the government 
to implement the new tariff that was approved by Parliament. The court 
ruled that suspension of the implementation of the poultry tariff was un-
constitutional, but within a week, the NPP-dominated parliament had 
repealed the tariff.  
The increase in tariffs was within the WTO tariff rates that Ghana 
was permitted to impose (about 99%) but in 2003 the government had 
signed a loan agreement with the IMF, which committed it to not impos-
ing tariffs and import duties on poultry and agricultural products to pro-
tect local industries. Given that, at that time, the NPP had accepted 
HIPC conditions from the IMF, it was not in a position to defy the IMF. 
This shows the influence that the IMF had over sovereign governments 
in policy-making. In 2006, the government repaid the IMF loan, pulled 
Ghana out of HIPC and decided not to sign any more loan agreements 
with the IMF during the rest of the NPP’s tenure in office.  
If IMF policy support were a catalyst, one would expect that institu-
tion to encourage and provide financial support for rice and poultry pro-
duction. As one of the people interviewed for this study put it: 
Why do we continue to grow cocoa if less than 10% of the population 
consume it and we export 90%, only to import rice? Why don’t our so-
called catalysts help us with the technology to cultivate the rice that we 
import? (Interview with a social commentator, 19 August 2016) 
In 2010, the new NDC government reinstated the rice tariff, and 
raised it to 35% in 2011 despite a massive outcry in the media from rice 
importers. The NDC was able to do that because by that time, the previ-
ous NPP government had repaid the IMF loan carrying a conditionality 
that Ghana would not impose tariffs on agricultural imports, not signed 
any more loan agreements with the IMF, and pulled Ghana out of HIPC, 
which left the IMF with no leverage on the country. In addition, unlike 
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the NPP, the NDC was not dependent on urban votes and so did not 
have to worry about the electoral effects of raising the tariff on a product 
that was mostly consumed in urban areas. Unfortunately, mismanage-
ment of Ghana’s economy arising from fiscal indiscipline during the 
2012 elections resulted in serious macro-economic instability, and, in 
2014, Ghana had no option but to negotiate another loan with the IMF.  
In 2011, the NDC government launched a US$ 346m industrial policy 
and support programme, including a US$ 296m Industrial Development 
Fund to be accessed by the private sector (Government of Ghana, 2011). 
The objective of this policy was to capture rents from oil and gas to de-
velop the industrial sector. However, by 2013 not a single project was in 
the process of being developed into a productive export sector. The 
problem was that Ghanaian politicians were focused on short-term pro-
jects that would enable them to win elections, while productive sector 
projects have a long-term horizon. Thus, the resources allocated by the 
government were insufficient for those projects (Oduro et al., 2014). 
6.4.3 Quantitative and qualitative flow of aid (B1-B5) 
Total aid to Ghana fell following the general elections in 1992, but it re-
mained higher than the pre-election levels. The reduction in aid flows 
was a result of government over-expenditure, compelling the IMF and 
World Bank to suspend disbursement. Total ODA decreased by 12.7%, 
from US$ 625m in 1993 to US$ 546m in 1994. However, that reduction 
was due to a temporary sanction, and by the end of 1993 the World 
Bank and IMF were disbursing funds once again and programmes were 
back on track. ODA increased to US$ 649m in 1996 but fell by 24% in 
1997, again for the same reasons—electoral-overspending and post-
election sanctions (IMF, 1999).4  
The degree to which a recipient country depends on foreign aid is a 
function of the availability of alternative sources of funding, such as do-
mestic tax revenue, foreign direct investment and private lending. Avail-
ability of alternative funding sources enables recipient to negotiate for 
terms and conditions that are favourable. In the early years of Phase III, 
the IMF and World Bank had incentives to apply sanctions, involving 
refusal to disburse aid, because increasingly there were no alternative 
funding sources that the government could use. There was no FDI de-
spite economic reforms. The Cold War had ended and funding possibili-
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ties from bilateral donors no longer depended on Cold War ideology. 
Western donors also began to coordinate their aid programmes and poli-
cies (Lancaster, 1999: 2008).  
By 1994, the government budget deficit had surpassed Nkrumah’s 
lavish years (25.8% of GDP in 1965). It was financed through borrowing 
from the Central Bank, which involved money supply, and borrowing 
from the public through treasury bills. During the period of multi-party 
elections, donors, like a catalyst that has lost its potency to act, began to 
lose control over instilling of fiscal discipline in Ghana’s economic man-
agement (Tsikata, 1998, 1999). Ghana survived temporary IMF/WB 
sanctions because bilateral donors had convinced the Bank and the IMF 
of their support for Ghana’s developmental path.. The country had been 
touted as a success story of structural adjustment and then had become 
the ultimate test of the efficacy of structural adjustment, so donors were 
unwilling to see it fail (Dzorgbo, 2001; Fosu, 2009). Canada, Japan and 
the U.K in particular, exerted pressure on the IMF and World Bank to 
resume support (Geddes et al., 2009). ODA flows increased by 65%, 
from US$ 1.015bn in 2001 to US$ 1.676bn in 2004, during the first term 
of the NPP government (see Figure 6.2). The increase in aid was as a 
result of global commitment to “make poverty history” and support for 
implementing the MDGs and PRSP.  
Figure 6.2 
ODA to Ghana, 1993-2013 (US$ millions) 
Source: OECD QWIDS Database, 2014. 
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Foreign aid maintained an appreciable level, averaging about US$ 
1.33bn annually from 2005 to 2008, during the second term of the NPP 
government. From 2000 to 2008, total external aid disbursements to 
Ghana (excluding HIPC and other debt relief) amounted to approxi-
mately US$ 9.6bn (Government of Ghana, 2010:10). In 2008, the NPP 
lost power to the NDC and, for the first time in the history of the 
Fourth Republic, foreign aid to Ghana did not fall the following year but 
rather increased remarkably to US$ 1.65bn in 2009, from US$ 1.31bn in 
2008, and to an all-time high of US$ 1.8bnon in 2011. There could be 
many reasons for the increase in aid, but from interviews with bilateral 
donors, it appears that aid poured in because there was a clear sense that 
Ghana would maintain political stability after elections, which the NDC 
won by the slimmest of margins (50. 23%). 
Figure 6.3 
Net ODA received as % of GNI and gross capital formation, 1993-2013 
Extracted from World Bank Database, 2014. 
 
Declining significance of ODA contribution to Ghana’s economy (C12) 
In 2010, Ghana became an oil-producing country and its economy ex-
panded. The contribution of aid to GDP declined significantly, from 
12% in 2000 to 4.6% in 2012 (World Bank, 2014). In terms of contribu-
tion to Ghana’s economy, from 1993 to 1999, net ODA share of GNI 
ranged between 13.6% and 8% but fell to an all-time low of 2.9% in 
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2013 (see Figure 6.3). The ODA contribution to gross capital formation, 
averaging about 40% in the 1990s and 50% in early 2000s, also decreased 
to an average of 22% in the late 2000s. 
As Ghana’s economy began to expand, Net ODA received as per-
centage of government expenditure also reduced remarkably, from 
64.4% in 2001 to 21.6% in 2011 (see Figure 6.4).  
Figure 6.4 
Net ODA received as % of central government expenditure, 2001-2011 
Source: Extracted from World Bank Database, 2014. 
 
It was against this background of the declining significance of ODA 
to Ghana’s economy that the government and donors signed the ‘Devel-
opment Aid Compact’ to guide strategic choices from 2012 to 2022.  
Increase of bilateral aid (B1) 
In terms of quantity of aid, multilateral aid from the IMF and World 
Bank was significantly higher than bilateral aid. As shown in Chapter 5, 
when Ghana embarked on ERP and SAP in the 1980s, multilateral aid 
soared above 70% of total ODA. However, when Ghana transitioned to 
democratic rule, ODA from the Bretton Woods institutions fell to an 
average of 47.3% from 1993 to 2015. Bilateral aid, on the other hand, 
increased substantially to above 50%, except in 2015 (see Fig. 6.5).  
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Figure 6.5 
Composition of multilateral and bilateral ODA, 1993-2015 
Source: OECD QWIDS Database, 2017. 
 
The exception in 2015 was a result of Ghana’s IMF financial bailout 
of US$ 918m over three years. In comparison with multilateral aid, bilat-
eral aid provided more favourable terms to Ghana because of its high 
percentage of grants. It is also argued that bilateral donors are slow to 
evoke sanctions, and when they are imposed, governments are able to 
negotiate an end to them through diplomacy.  
Compared with Phase II, during which multilateral aid was above bi-
lateral, the fluctuation in multilateral aid was not because there was a de-
crease in actual aid from the World Bank, but because of the rise in bilat-
eral aid as foreign governments wanted to be part of Ghana’s “economic 
and political success”. The transition to multi-party democracy brought 
in a considerable amount of bilateral assistance from traditional donors 
as well as new ones. Ghanaian authorities seem to like bilateral aid: 
No doubt, bilateral aid is preferred to multilateral aid because it is easier to 
negotiate with bilaterals than with Bretton Woods institutions (Interview 
with a senior civil servant in the Ministry of Finance, 13 August 2015).  
512566-L-sub01-bw-Awortwi
Processed on: 10-8-2017 PDF page: 233
 Democratic Governance and Economic Takeoff (1993-2013) 207 
Rise of Chinese bilateral assistance (B4) 
China was one of Ghana’s additional bilateral donors. Beginning in 2001, 
the NPP government rekindled Ghana’s bilateral relationship with Chi-
na, resulting in a US$ 2.2m grant to renovate the National Theatre. The 
Chinese government had built the theatre in 1990 as a reward for the 
country’s support during the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989. Since 
2001, China has been a major bilateral donor to Ghana, but the quality 
of Chinese aid leaves much to be desired. It is purely commercial or 
business-like with much of the aid being in the form of loans (ACET, 
2009) (see Table 6.3). 
Table 6.3 
Chinese economic and technical cooperation aid to Ghana, 2001-11  
Year Type of aid Amount  (US$ millions) Purpose 
2001 Grant 2.2 Renovation of National Theatre 
2005 Loan 5625 Construction of Bui Hydro-electricity Dam 
2007 Loan 66 Upgrade of telecom networks 
2012 Concessional loan 30 Construction of Ghana Ministry of Defence 
offices and provision of security communi-
cation gadgets 
2009 Interest-free loan 28 Construction of Ofankor-Nsawam Road 
2009 Interest-free loan 99 Construction of landing sites for fishing 
communities and Afife rice irrigation sys-
tem 
2011 Concessional loan 3,000 Infrastructure projects 
Sources: Chinese embassy in Ghana, 2013; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic 
of China; Wikipedia.org; China.aiddata.org; ACET, 2009. 
 
Composition and quality of ODA (B2) 
The quality of ODA flows in terms of grant/loans composition also 
changed during the second half of this phase. From 1993 to 1998, loans 
took a higher proportion of aid flows, averaging more than 60%, but 
from 2000, grants took a higher proportion, rising to 83.3% in 2004, and 
have since maintained a very high level throughout the period (see Figure 
6.6). The increase in the proportion of grants was a result of increased 
bilateral assistance as compared with multilateral assistance.  
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Figure 6.6 
Proportion of grants and gross loans to total ODA, 1993-2004 
Source: Extracted from OECD-DAC database (QWIDS). 
 
The two extremes in 2004 and 2006 are the result of debt relief 
(HIPC), which enabled the country to spend money on poverty-related 
projects that otherwise would have been used to service debt. Balance of 
payments (BoP) support continued to be important during the 1990s, 
but aid increasingly went to community and social services. In the 1993-
96 period, BoP support took an average of 37.1% of total ODA. Much 
of the money was spent on commodity aid, technical assistance and pro-
ject and programme aid. Project aid was concentrated on the three 
northern regions, where poverty is extremely high. It included basic in-
frastructure in education, health, water, sanitation, and energy. In the 
case of project aid, donors selected their preferred projects and the sec-
tor or geographical area. During Phase III, the increase in the number of 
projects aid and the transaction costs involved in managing different aid 
portfolios made it difficult for the country to strategise to achieve opti-
mum benefits.  
In 2000, the government and the leading donors in the country—the 
African Development Bank, Canada, Denmark, Germany, European 
Commission, Netherlands, Switzerland, United Kingdom and World 
Bank—developed the multi-donor budget support (MDBS) mechanism 
(ODI, 2007). Budget support gave the government flexibility to decide 
how to use the money, but it had to account for it in terms of specific 
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policy implementation outcomes before it could trigger release of subse-
quent tranches. The donors knew the potential minefield in putting aid 
money into the government budget but given the gradual improvement 
of Ghana’s political and financial management institutions, they were 
ready to work with the government. In 2003, the group agreed with the 
government to use the MDBS mechanism to support the newly adopted 
Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS).  
The MDBS objective was “to harmonise donors’ policies and proce-
dures in order to reduce the transaction costs for the Government and 
further create a structure for biannual dialogue between donors and 
Government” (ODI, 2007). At the macro-economic level, MDBS re-
sources facilitated reduction of the country’s fiscal deficit and debt stock. 
It also expanded public spending. Domestic interest payments and debt 
decreased as a consequence. The World Bank provided a maximum of 
US$ 250m support to the MDBS, which was tied to certain triggers, gov-
ernment actions and economic conditions. In 2013, the development 
partners withheld their contribution to the MDBS because of an exces-
sive government deficit arising from off-budget expenditure. 
We were seriously concerned about the poor fiscal management, the poor 
macro-economic management for the past two to three years and the ex-
cessive spending in the 2012 election. There were also allegations of sys-
temic frauds in payroll management, resulting in the wage bill going up to 
70% of tax reviews (Interview with an EU official, 19 August 2015). 
A World Bank official interviewed during the fieldwork said they had 
suspended their contribution to the budget because the government was 
not ready to act in a fiscally disciplined manner. 
The World Bank pulled out because the government was not prepared to 
do anything to comply with the agreements we had reached and discus-
sions we had held. There was little commitment on the part of the gov-
ernment to be disciplined. They promised but never delivered. Too many 
leakages in the economy, and the government was not prepared to plug 
those leakages, and we were not ready to put our money in that. It got to a 
point where the economy was going to crash until they went to the IMF 
(Interview with a World Bank official, 20 August 2015).  
The government organised a national forum with participants drawn 
from organised labour, the private sector, political parties, think-tanks, 
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financial institutions, and so on, in a town called Senchi. The forum drew 
up 22 resolutions for the government to implement but did not ask do-
nors to release the budgetary support money. Consequently, the gov-
ernment approached the IMF. Ghana signed a loan agreement with the 
IMF, which persuaded donors that the government would be fiscally dis-
ciplined. If the government had not gone to the IMF, the donors would 
not have released their support. Although most of the conditions in the 
IMF programme were part of the Senchi Declaration, the donors did not 
trust the government to stick to its commitments until the IMF gave its 
seal of approval. That is the catalytic role played by the IMF in the gov-
ernment’s negotiations with donors.  
The EU, the largest contributor to the budget support, released about 
EUR 160 million after the government signed the IMF programme to 
undertake reforms, including proper control and management of the 
government payroll.  
We also released the money for other reasons […] Basically, OECD coun-
tries have given special commitments to the UN […] to pay around 0.7% 
of our GDP as development aid, and so we have to spend. This is some-
thing, which this government knows pretty well, and it is playing that 
game. That is why we can’t continue to withhold our support for a long 
period. Sometimes the pressure on us to spend the money is quite huge. 
After this round of budget support, I don’t think EU will continue the 
programme [….] The experience of the past two to three years of mis-
management has been troubling. We may go back to project support or a 
sector-wide approach (Interview with two EU officials, 19 August 2015).  
Corruption is not only in the government but also within the donor com-
munity.6 [….] Some donors don’t want to dig too deep into this scandal, 
maybe because they are actively benefitting from the mismanagement of 
the funds. For example, the GIFMIS programme is deeply mismanaged,7 
and we have information that a major donor is involved. The effectiveness 
of that project is low. We suspect [… collusion] with programme officers 
at the Ministry of Finance to mismanage our contribution (Interview with 
two EU officials, 19 August 2015).  
Views expressed by donor agencies show that they are extremely con-
cerned about the level of corruption in Ghana but are hesitant to talk 
openly about it because they want to continue showcasing the country as 
an example of successful democratic development.  
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The need for donors to make democracy thrive seems to be crowding out 
their courage to speak openly. When democracy is defined purely as the 
election of a government or change of a government, then perhaps it ap-
pears that donors are comfortable with the cycle of elections that take 
place in Ghana. And so it is a better trade-off… to continue to support 
Ghana as long as the country is able to maintain a democratic system that 
is seen as credible. I don’t think they really care too much about the coun-
try’s success on economic transformation. It’s a kind of trade-off that they 
are ready to make (Interview with Action Aid official, 22 July 2015).  
The addition of Chinese external assistance to Ghana’s aid mix has al-
so influenced the quality of aid to Ghana in terms of conditionality and 
mode of delivery. China refused to be part of MDBS and used project 
approach to aid delivery. The conditionality attached to Chinese loans 
includes the use of Chinese contractors and goods, thereby reducing the 
potential for promoting local capacity and other multipliers. For in-
stance, the US$ 3bn Chinese loan agreement that the government signed 
in 2011 requires Ghana to provide 750m barrels of crude oil for 15years 
(13,000 barrels per day) or end up paying US$ 6.4bn, more than twice 
the initial amount (Aiddata, 2010; Adam, 2014:9). The loan agreement 
also requires that 60% of all contracts for loan-related projects go to 
Chinese companies.  
Much of Chinese assistance finances social and capital investment and 
there is less focus on production for export. Since 1972, only US$ 20.2m 
of Chinese economic and technical assistance has gone to support for 
Ghana’s industrial sector. This includes US$ 1.5m to the Juapong cotton 
and textile factory in 1972, US$ 11.1m to a cocoa processing project, and 
US$ 9.1m to fishing lines and net-processing projects, both in 1998 
(ACET, 2009). Furthermore, disbursement of Chinese assistance is ir-
regular and often shrouded in secrecy.  
Chinese loans are often shielded from public scrutiny [….] the loans are 
often written in their language, […] demanding translation in the first 
place. It also involves a lot of back and forth negotiations because it in-
volves the use of all sort of Chinese labour [….] if you’re not careful, 
they’ll bring prisoners to work for you as part of the technical assistance 
(Interview with a social commentator and policy analyst, 13 August, 2013). 
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Quality of ODA disbursement  
During the period, there was high disbursement of ODA. From 1993 to 
2012, average disbursement of committed ODA was higher than in the 
1980s. However, a consistent pattern that has emerged is that aid dis-
bursement reduces substantially during election years (or the year before 
an election) for fear of misapplication of funds for electoral patronage 
(see Figures 6.7a and 6.7b).  
Figure 6.7a 
Foreign aid committed and disbursement in current US$,  
1992-2015 (millions) 
Source: Extracted from OECD-DAC-QWIDS Database. 
 
 
In the election years 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008 and 2012, a lower 
percentage of committed ODA was disbursed in comparison with other 
years (see Figure 6.7b).  
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Figure 6.7b 
Percentage of committed ODA disbursed, 1992-2015 
Source: Extracted from OECD-DAC-QWIDS Database. 
 
There were two low points; 2004, which was a result of high com-
mitment to debt relief arising from HIPC funds; and 2008, when donors 
refused to release budget support money because of misapplication of 
state resources during the last year of the Kufuor government.  
ODA debt burden and relief (B1+B2+B3) 
At the beginning of 1993, Ghana’s external debt was US$ 4.5bn but it 
rose to US$ 6.5bn by the end of the decade. By 2000, total external debt 
was US$ 6.2bn. Ghana’s external debt was equivalent to 254.9% of ex-
ports of goods and services and 129.6% of GNI. The enormous flow of 
loans and excessive borrowing by the PNDC/NDC government led to 
the country being in an unsustainable debt repayment situation. In 2001, 
an opposition political party, the NPP, won the general elections, de-
clared Ghana insolvent and applied for HIPC debt relief. 
From 2002 to 2004, Ghana’s debt was substantially reduced by more 
than 50% as a result of HIPC. About US$ 3.5bn of Ghana’s debt was 
written off. However, Ghana replaced the cancelled debts with new 
loans, which was not the way to sustainably manage its foreign debt. 
Within six years after the debt cancellation, the country was back to the 
same debt level as in 2002 when a considerable amount of money was 
spent on celebrating the 50th anniversary of the country’s independence 
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and other unproductive activities. By 2011, Ghana’s external debt stock8 
was equivalent to the total GDP of the country (see Figure 6.8).  
Figure 6.8 
Total External Debt Stock and GDP compared, 1993-2013  
(US$ billions at constant prices, 2015) 
Source: Extracted from World Bank Database, 2015. 
 
By 2013, Ghana’s debt had gone up to US$ 15.8b. The increasing 
debt stock was a result of over-borrowing and much of the external in-
flows not spent on direct productive sectors (see Table 6.4). For exam-
ple, in January 2014 the Bank of Ghana injected US$ 20m into the econ-
omy to shore up Ghana’s currency and prevent depreciation (Daily 
Graphic, 2014) and in July 2015, the Finance Minister announced that 
US$ 20m would be pumped into the economy every day to prevent de-
preciation of the currency (Bank of Ghana, 2015) a few months after 
Ghana received budget support credit of over US$ 800m from the IMF. 
Another assessment of the quality of aid provided during the period 
was how much of it went into direct productive sectors compared with 
social sectors. Table 6.4 and Figure 6.9 show allocation of ODA between 
the broad sectors in Ghana (2002-13). 
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Table 6.4 
Sectoral Allocation of ODA in Ghana, 2002-13 (US$ millions)  
ODA 
Social 
Infra-
struc-
ture 
Eco. 
infra-
struc-
ture 
Produc-
tive 
sectors 
Budget 
support 
Debt 
Relief Others 
All  
sectors 
2002 175 93,9 35,8 134,4 161,7 79,8 680,6 
2003 365,5 123,8 76 200,4 137 95 997,4 
2004 479,9 164,2 62,3 177,8 1364 98 2346 
2005 475,3 207,4 100,4 145,3 456,7 194 1579 
2006 473,5 183,8 101,8 289 4809,6 46 1110 
2007 521,4 205,5 108,5 181,5 192 74,6 1292 
2008 569,2 202,2 178,6 249,3 9,1 84 1650 
2009 615,6 231,2 170,4 391 99,9 172 1712 
2010 659,4 313,7 238,9 367,7 3,38 86 1860 
2011 635,5 413,6 290,9 411,1 0,6 93 1860 
2012 692,5 417,9 224,4 432,4 0 500 1900 
2013 679,6 339,4 192,6 71,5 9,28 150 1401 
Source: Extracted from OECD-DAC QWIDS.  
 
While a 12-year average allocation of ODA to social infrastructure 
services (education, health, water, sanitation, and so on) was 35% of total 
aid, allocation to productive sectors was a paltry 9.5%. In 2002, social 
infrastructure allocation was 25.7% (US$ 175m) but increased to 42.7% 
(US$ 473.5m) in 2006. In 2013 it took almost 50% (US$ 679,6m) of 
ODA allocation while productive sectors received 5.3% (US$ 35.8m), 
8.4% (US$ 101.8m) and 13.7% (US$ 192.6m) in 2002, 2006 and 2013 
respectively. Productive sector support includes GIZ facilitation with the 
Ministry of Trade and with technical advisors on creating a business-
enabling environment. DANIDA is also implementing a programme 
called Business to Business through which Danish companies partner 
Ghanaian businesses, while the Italian embassy has a business support 
unit. However, the budget for all these private sector activities is minus-
cule. Productive sectors include agriculture, agro-industry, fishing, min-
ing, construction, and so on; the economic infrastructure sector includes 
energy, transport, banking, communication, and so on. 
512566-L-sub01-bw-Awortwi
Processed on: 10-8-2017 PDF page: 242
216 CHAPTER 6 
 
Figure 6.9 
Allocation of ODA to productive and social infrastructure projects,  
2002-13 (US$ millions) 
Source: Extracted from OECD-DAC QWIDS, 2016. 
 
Whitfield and Jones (2009) and Whitfield and Therkildsen (2011) 
seem to suggest that productive sector policies by various government 
ministries are “written largely with an eye to appeasing donor interests” 
and to entice them to invest aid money in the sector. Analyses of eco-
nomic policies over the years show that Ghanaian governments have 
committed very little of state resources to investment in agriculture, ex-
cept in cocoa. For instance, despite the government’s policy of support 
to diversify the economy from cocoa to horticulture, the largest amount 
of aid to horticulture came from the US government funding of the Mil-
lennium Challenge Account. In 2004, over 90% of the Ministry of Agri-
culture’s budget was financed by donors (Sarpong, 2007). Analyses of the 
productive sector in Ghana from the early 1990s to the late 2000s show 
that there is very little government support to the export industry outside 
the donor-negotiated projects (Whitfield and Jones, 2009; Whitfield and 
Therkildsen, 2011).  
The EU claims that it has allocated almost 50% of its aid budget be-
tween 2014 and 2020 to productive investment in the agriculture sector. 
To the EU, investment in productive sectors means supporting an ena-
bling environment for the private sector to go into, for example in agri-
culture.  
512566-L-sub01-bw-Awortwi
Processed on: 10-8-2017 PDF page: 243
 Democratic Governance and Economic Takeoff (1993-2013) 217 
We want to support especially the Northern Region of Ghana by building 
roads, irrigation, and solar systems so that small farmers in those poor are-
as can increase their crop yields (Interview with an EU official, 19 August 
2015).  
The EU claims that this is not a change in direction because it has al-
ways supported productive sectors in the tune of about EUR 15 million 
a year.  
Yes, it could be true that in the past 15 years we have supported the 
MDGs and that perhaps has shifted our focus a bit from productive sec-
tors to social sectors, but we have always had a component of aid support-
ing business environment [….] Without a clear regulatory environment, 
the productive sectors will not thrive. But you cannot blame donors too 
much for not supporting the productive sectors because we are partnering 
with a government that also wants the money for its own programmes and 
it appears supporting productive sectors has not been really pushed by the 
government. We are also not convinced that the government is the best 
actor to manage productive sector money (Interview with an EU official, 
19 August, 2015).  
Many experts in Ghana also shared their experiences with regard to 
aid to productive sectors.  
If you look at the budget that goes into the Ministry of Agriculture, it is 
quite substantial, but the problem is that the money goes into areas that do 
not increase productivity. Look, the years that agriculture recorded a nega-
tive growth rate are also the years with the largest agriculture budget sup-
port. You sent fertiliser to Northern Ghana but they smuggled it to Burki-
na Faso. We give tractors to MPs who have no farms. Sometimes you 
wonder about the sense behind these […] and there are several of them 
(Interview with an economics professor at the University of Ghana, 16 
August 2015). 
The reason why donors do not support agriculture and other productive 
sectors is that if a farmer has a farm in a remote village donors cannot 
come and put their signboards there. Nobody sees and acknowledges the 
donor’s contribution. It is roads and electricity where you see the big signs, 
and those are the things that donors put their money into, but not into ag-
riculture (Interview with an industrialist and commercial farmer, 14 June 
2016). 
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Many experts interviewed for this study shared the above view of the 
industrialist. They pointed out that investment in the manufacturing sec-
tor would generate jobs and sustain economic growth, but donors do not 
support that sector. Not only do the donors avoid that sector, they also 
discourage the government from providing direct support to it.  
How can aid be a catalyst to development when it does not invest in the 
sectors that promote economic growth? And why is the government not 
vigorously pursuing promotion of agriculture productivity and agro-
processing industries through deliberate industrial policy like it happened 
in Southeast Asia? The issue is that our history of import substitution in-
dustrialisation has not been anything to write home about. If a govern-
ment tries, […] donors say, given your history of industrialisation and the 
kind of political patronage system the country has, the solution is not state 
involvement but rather providing the enabling environment and let the 
private sector take the lead (Interview with an economics professor at the 
University of Ghana, 16 August 2015). 
The findings of this study resonate with the earlier analysis by Page 
and Shimeles (2013) on how donors have supported aid with their mon-
ey the last 20 years. Their research shows that “there has been a clear 
shift away from “productive” sectors to financing “social or non-
productive sectors”. According to Page and Shimeles, about 25% of all 
ODA in Africa (some US$ 21 billion per year) is used to finance creation 
of an investment-climate. This has done more harm than good (2014:11). 
While creation of an investment-climate may be useful, it hardly removes 
constraints to structural transformation and, importantly, constraints to 
industrial development. Numerous studies in Africa shows that it is lack 
of infrastructure and skills that makes the difference in raising Africa’s 
competitiveness compared with other regions (Dinh et al., 2013) but very 
little aid money goes to support infrastructure development in Africa.  
6.4.4 Negotiation, implementation and management of foreign 
aid (B1+C8+C10) 
In Phase II, the IMF and World Bank took turns to convene donor-
coordinating meetings on behalf of the Ghana government. However, by 
the mid 1990s the government, through the International Economic Re-
lations Division (IERD) of the Ministry of Finance, had taken over that 
leadership role in setting the agenda for aid and donor coordination 
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meetings (Tsikata, 1998). The Bank of Ghana and the Controller and 
Accountant-General’s office also played important roles in monitoring 
aid flows. Given the country’s successful transition to democracy, many 
bilateral donors jumped on the bandwagon and there was a proliferation 
of aid and donors. This created serious aid-management problems as 
state bureaucracies could not manage and coordinate aid programmes 
(Brautigam and Botchwey, 1998).  
In Phase II, Ghana’s economic performance was strongly associated 
with the long-serving Finance Minister, Dr. Kwesi Botchwey, and a small 
team; with his resignation from the government in 1995, the reform lost 
some of its clout and attention. Donors needed time to build new rela-
tionships of trust with new personalities. This resulted in more donor-
driven agendas, and with that, less ownership (Tsikata, 1999). In the late 
1990s, instead of giving aid to individual projects, donors started adopt-
ing a sector-wide approach (SWAp) to aid delivery. The basic idea was 
that donors would work together with the government, agreeing on sec-
tors to support and seeking ways to pool their assistance.  
As indicated earlier, in Phase III the state developed several policies 
and strategies through which foreign aid was supposed to play a catalytic 
role. This study has sought to understand how civil servants interacted 
with programmes that foreign aid was supposed to assist and the percep-
tion that aid agencies have about the professionalism of Ghanaian civil 
servants. During interviews with donors, almost all of them admitted 
having implemented discrete projects with ministries and district assem-
blies (LGs). They said that institutional capacity and corruption were two 
of the reasons why they had established project offices within the minis-
tries and embassies.  
Bureaucracy, or let me say civil service, in Ghana after years of donor sup-
port does not function as an instrument for achieving social and economic 
goals; nor does it complement the private sector to achieve set targets of 
the state. Some senior government officers don’t even read aid documents 
before they come to the negotiation table. They only think about per diem 
and the opportunity to travel abroad (Interview with an EU official, 19 
August 2015).  
A Ghanaian senior World Bank official working in the Accra office 
voiced similar concern about the attitude of many public officers who 
came to discuss aid-funded projects.  
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The problem with our people (now I am talking as a Ghanaian) is that we 
don’t read, we don’t analyse, we don’t think through the projects. We just 
assume this is money coming, who will be the project coordinator, whom 
can we fix, who gets the project vehicle(s), who will drive what, and so on. 
I am in charge of the projects portfolio and sometimes you sit in negotia-
tions and you just bite your lips and fingers, you just wish they would not 
say certain things […] but they are there and all that they are thinking 
about is “when is the money coming and who is going to get what” (Inter-
view, 20 August 2015). 
The above statements summarise the perception that many donors 
have about the Ghanaian public or civil servants with whom they inter-
act during aid negotiations. Many donors believe that the challenges fac-
ing Ghanaian civil servants are less of capacity or competence, but rather 
attitudinal and of prioritising personal interest. From the top of the gov-
ernment to the lowest government officers, they have little passion for 
delivering public interest goods.  
The World Bank has a portfolio of US$ 2bn to support discrete infra-
structure projects such as roads, water, and energy in Ghana, but because 
project funds are strictly controlled to ensure that they are used only for 
earmarked activities, the money is not fully utilised. A World Bank pro-
ject officer noted, “where a project is identified, procurement and con-
tractual processes get mired in administrative delays”. Implementation of 
aid-funded projects is frequently delayed because civil servants often 
want kickbacks from contractors or simply do not like the tender winner 
and look for an opportunity to change the contractual process. In other 
circumstances, if a project involves consultants from abroad, civil serv-
ants are reluctant to support it. In other instances, after a local counter-
part’s capacity to support implementation of aid-funded projects has 
been strengthened, that person is transferred from the project because a 
superior does not like that individual for other reasons. 
I have worked in the World Bank’s offices in many countries. In Mongo-
lia, by the time the project is completed institutional aspects would have 
been embedded in the sector ministry and they move on to other projects. 
In Ghana, one policy document or a law can take the life of the project 
and sometimes outlive it. There is no seriousness or commitment on the 
part of civil servants and this is connected to leadership (Interview with a 
World Bank official, 20 August 2015).  
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Many of the donors compared the Ghanaian civil servants with simi-
lar civil servants from the EU and Southeast Asia and said that the Gha-
naians are less oriented to public interest. They focus very much on the 
small dot instead of the bigger picture. Their engagement with substan-
tive issues is weak, but when it comes to securing a trip to Brussels or 
allowances to be paid, they are strong. . When such issues come to the 
negotiation table, as one donor described it “suddenly they wake up and 
that becomes a tough negotiation”. Many of the donors also opined that 
the motivation to obtain additional funding opportunities often distracts 
the civil servants from focusing on implementation of priority projects.  
We have supported projects in the health sector and I can say that the 
moment there are additional donor funds in another sector, the civil serv-
ants stop everything they are doing, and submit new proposals [….] Whilst 
they are looking at the horizon for the next funding opportunity, they for-
get to implement. That is an obstacle I have found here in Ghana. Imple-
mentation in the country is so slow, and that is sad. There is so much po-
tential in the country, but the leadership both at the political and 
bureaucratic levels have little sense of urgency to change and make things 
happen. Over the years, it is getting worse. I think the appetite for addi-
tional funds is getting bigger and bigger and it has to do with the fact that 
once you have seen what additional funds can do and the ‘freedom’ you 
get with spending donor money against the government’s own funds, 
there is motivation to go for more (Interview with an EU official, 20 Au-
gust 2015).  
The challenge with Ghana is that civil servants are not motivated to work 
on a national agenda for development. They are reluctant to sit in the driv-
er’s seat. They have a very passive attitude (Interview with a DANIDA 
senior programme officer, 16 August 2015). 
A senior government officer in charge of the civil service confirmed 
that many aid projects have not been implemented or money disbursed 
because donors make the chief directors or the sectoral ministers the 
chairmen of project implementation. Nothing gets done because those 
people are busy.  
Yes, we have issues in terms of the quality of our leadership and their 
commitment to getting things done. Ghana’s problem is not aid per se. It 
is the people who we choose to manage aid projects. It is a joke—donors 
think they can bring one consultant here and manage the project. It 
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doesn’t work. We had […] for almost 10 years. I can say his impact was 
very minimal. The only reason why we kept him here for that long was 
that when you wrote a proposal and he presented it to DFID, it would get 
funded because they trusted him. I have seen this happen all over the 
place. Donor technical assistance is useful initially, but once it is overex-
tended it makes no sense (A senior civil servant working at the Office of 
the Head of the civil service, 13 August 2015).  
I have been to Rwanda twice and have met with senior civil servants and 
the leadership. Public servants in Rwanda are much more empowered; 
much stronger because the President is a strong leader. So, when aid is 
provided and the President says this is the way it should be utilised, that is 
it. Work will get done, and much quicker (Interview with a Senior Pro-
gramme Officer, Action Aid in Accra on 13 August 2015). 
Taking into account the perception that donor agencies have of Gha-
naian civil servants, this study sought in interviews to link that with the 
concept of aid as a catalyst to development.  
I agree with your concept that aid is a facilitator of development. It is sup-
posed to help the country do what it wants to achieve. If you say it is a 
prime mover, then you somehow put too much emphasis on what we do-
nors provide. But currently in Ghana, it is development partners who are 
putting pressure on the government to take the right decisions on fiscal is-
sues, and sometimes we feel it is not sustainable. We don’t have to be in 
the driver’s seat (Interview with an EU official, 20 August 2015). 
Aid is a catalyst. Much of its work depends on the commitment from local 
players. In my view, it can only finance, provide some impetus, some ide-
as, some technical support and knowledge. I think the government, the 
sector ministers and the civil servants should be in the driver’s seat. In 
Ghana’s case, for the past 15 years aid has made some achievements, but if 
you compare that to what some of the Asian countries have done within 
the same time then you wonder why Ghana is at this stage. That is why aid 
can only facilitate, but sometimes it can become an obstacle to develop-
ment. Mind you, donors don’t understand everything, so if local people do 
not direct aid then it may fail to serve the purpose. If they refuse to work 
on the project because there is an international consultant involved, then 
aid will fail to achieve its purpose in the country (Interview with an EU of-
ficial, 20 August 2015). 
Aid is effective if government officials want it to work. In Ghana, our key 
challenge is functional leadership and not positional leadership. You need 
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strong leaders to build strong institutions in this country. It is not academ-
ic qualifications but quality in terms of people to deliver. We have many 
civil servants with Masters and PhD degrees. What we lack is attitude to 
work, attitude to make things happen (Interview with a senior government 
official at the Office of the Head of the Civil Service, 13 August 2015).  
I am not sure aid works in Ghana, to be honest. The leadership in Ghana 
is very much characterised by promises; lots of talking, that these things 
would be done, we want this and we will do that, but they lack commit-
ment to implementation and follow up [….] I think leadership and civil 
servants are very important. If institutions work, then a change of gov-
ernment should not make a big difference in terms of macro-economic 
management (Interview with a DFID official, 23 August 2015).  
Many Ghanaian experts interviewed for this study admitted that lead-
ership and civil servants are key if aid is to catalyse development. As a 
former Minister of Finance said about negotiations with donors, ‘You 
must know what you want and why that is needed and be ready to tell 
donors to keep their aid if your demand is not what they would offer.’ 
This suggests that the aid provided to the recipient country should be 
demand-driven and not supply-led. It should respond to the recipient’s 
need.  
During my time, I could walk out of an IMF meeting, saying this I won’t 
do. I “fought” with the World Bank over support to the education sector. 
The Bank didn’t want aid money to go to tertiary education. All their em-
phases were on primary education, so I asked the World Bank a simple 
question: at which level is the know-how relevant in education? Certainly 
not primary education? [….] It is your MITs and universities that have 
done all the research and discovered innovations, so if we are going to 
convert our raw material into anything, the basic fundamental should be at 
the university. So, I told the Bank, as a Minister of Finance I want aid 
money to support science and technology so Ghana can develop the oil 
sector. I told them I was interested in basic education, but giving aid for it 
and excluding technical and tertiary levels that would not help Ghana, so 
we should thoroughly discuss the matter. It took me six months to con-
vince them why we needed money to develop oil technology and develop 
our competitiveness in that sector. They were still talking about primary 
education. I wanted a split 50% for basic education and the other half for 
tertiary, but at the end we negotiated for one-third. That is what I mean by 
aid should be internally induced. Ideas on what we need aid money for 
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should come from us, not donors (Interview with a former Minister of Fi-
nance and later Minister of Education, 15 August 2015).  
Donors do not always give what the recipient wants because they also 
have specific interests for providing aid. This suggests that preparations 
by the recipient country prior to meeting the donor and ability to negoti-
ate favourable terms are qualities that public officers or civil servants are 
expected to have.  
6.5 Political Settlement: Competitive Clientelism as Mode 
of Governance (C7+C9+C15) 
During Phase III, political parties became the medium through which 
elites served their interests. This led to an expansion of the key actors 
and institutions that constituted Ghana’s political settlement. This did 
not happen in Phase II (1983-92), when the ruling coalition was small.9 
In Phase III, with the advent of multi-party democracy, the coalition ex-
panded to include former elites: “professional politicians, traditional 
leaders, leaders of trade unions, senior journalists, and businessmen and 
women” that the previous regime had chastised, discredited and prose-
cuted for being corrupt and elitist (Oduro et al., 2014). With the political 
process being competitively contested, a ruling government needs a large 
coalition to to continue being in power. This involves formal and infor-
mal alliances with political parties and non-political institutions, using a 
patronage system. Rawlings needed to build a large coalition to enable 
him hold on to power (Akonor, 2006). However, by embracing the for-
mer elites, Rawlings compromised his revolutionary principles of ‘power 
to the people’, probity and accountability, hence the fight against corrup-
tion and rent seeking got lost during the return to competitive party poli-
tics.  
Table 6.5 depicts key actors and institutions that were key to Ghana’s 
political settlement and their level of influence on policies and the devel-
opment trajectory.  
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Table 6.5 
Actors that comprised the political settlement during Phase III 
 High Power  
Strong Incentives 
Ruling political parties and coalition 
members  
Professional associations  
Business associations (contractors 
linked to politicians) 
Military and police 
Bureaucracy 
Party foot soldiers 
Media 
Ghana Bar Association 
Faith-based organisations 
Donors 
Transnational actors 
Religious leaders  
Traditional authorities 
W
eak Incentives 
Local political elites 
Small traders  
Academia 
Think-tanks 
Small farmers 
NGOs 
Small traders 
 Low Power  
Adapted from Oduro et al (2014:12) 
 
The ruling coalition occupies the top left cell with high power and 
strong incentives either to keep the political and economic status quo or 
to change them if they do not serve their interest. Institutions and actors 
affiliated to the ruling coalition capitalise on their position for private 
benefit. For instance, pro-ruling government businesses are able to get 
easy concessions, donor projects and corrupt business deals. Even when 
they have not delivered their obligations in contracts, they can still be 
paid.  
Leaders of religious organisations, traditional authorities, donors and 
transnational organisations also had considerable power to change the 
economic and political setup of the competitive patronage system of 
governance, but had little incentive to do so. The traditional chiefs were 
barred by the Constitution from engaging in active politics, but indirectly 
received favours in the form of pork-barrel projects, so it was not in 
their interest to support a change. Religious leaders were seen as being 
above the chicanery of politics and had no incentive to dabble in politics 
to change the status quo.  
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The media became very vocal during this phase. They kept govern-
ments on their toes, but some were also established to toe the line set by 
political parties. Donors continued to wield strong power in Ghana’s 
political settlement, given the financial support they provided, but as 
Ghana’s economy expands and dependency on aid gradually reduces, 
donors have had less leverage to change the nature of Ghana’s competi-
tive clientelistic political settlement. Occasionally, they threatened to 
withdraw pledged aid but that was not enough to change the status quo. 
In 2013, donors withheld support to Ghana, apparently for over-
expenditure during the 2012 elections, but eventually released the money 
after the government entered into a new conditionality agreement with 
the IMF. 
Ghana accepted the IMF programme to build up some level of donor 
confidence about financial management. In other words, the IMF pro-
gramme was to provide supervision of Ghana’s fiscal policy, government 
spending, payroll budget and public finance management. Although 
many senior government officers in the Ministry of Finance claim that 
the IMF package signed by the government was a ‘home-grown’ pro-
gramme (the Senchi consensus), other development partners dispute that 
and argue that what IMF package brought was higher commitment and 
enforcement than what was arrived at in Senchi.  
The advantage of the IMF programme is that the Ghanaian government is 
compelled to give accurate information, more accurate than what they 
would give under normal circumstances. The IMF has competence in 
economic analysis and unfettered access to data, and since Ghana is a 
member, the Central Bank is mandated to provide access to information. 
Without the IMF, the Central Bank has no legal mandate to give us infor-
mation (Interview with a senior EU official, 19 August 2015). 
With the dawn of pluralistic politics, bilateral and multilateral donors 
began to emphasise aid that would facilitate strengthening of democratic 
institutions. The World Bank shifted its lending instruments towards 
non-lending services such as support for building CSOs, the media and 
parliament. Given that opposition political parties boycotted the parlia-
mentary elections in 1992, citing electoral fraud in the presidential elec-
tion, bilateral donors begun to provide financial and technical assistance 
to support organisation of elections. With the 1996 elections drawing 
near, an Inter Party Advisory Committee (IPAC) was established to 
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promote consensus building in the electoral system. The donor commu-
nity gave US$ 12.3 million to the National Electoral Commission (NEC) 
to “facilitate free and fair elections” (Tsikata, 1999:38). A wide range of 
bilateral donors—the USA, Canada, Germany, the EU, and the Nether-
lands—contributed towards organising Ghana’s elections. Also during 
Phase III, the policy formulation process in Ghana shifted from a small, 
centralised team within the ruling government to broad-based consulta-
tion. This involved civil society groups, many of whom are funded by 
donors. Through various ‘consultative meetings’, donors became in-
volved in the policy-making process. This did not mean that there was 
broad consensus over the policy direction of the country.  
The results of general elections from 1992 to date show that the 
country has settled on a duopoly political party system where the NPP 
and NDC together command more than 95% of the electorate (Daddieh 
and Bob-Milliar, 2012). The competitive nature of politics also deter-
mines policy preferences of the ruling government. The 1993-2013 peri-
od witnessed four different ruling governments: (i) the National Demo-
cratic Congress (NDC) government under the presidency of J.J. 
Rawlings (1993-2000); (ii) the New Patriotic Party (NPP) government 
under the presidency of J.A. Kufuor (2001-2008); (iii) the NDC govern-
ment under J.A. Mills (2009-2012) and John Mahama (2012-2016). After 
six electoral cycles, there has been little stability for the ruling elite in 
power. The intense competition for power between the two political par-
ties and the Constitutional two terms limit, each term being four years, 
have contributed to vulnerability of ruling parties to electoral defeat to 
the extent that they pursue only short-term patronage programmes that 
enable them to win votes. This has resulted in economic instability—-
high inflation, currency depreciation and high cost of living (Leith and 
Solderling, 2000; Whitfield, 2009, 2010; Oduro et al., 2014). With the 
exception of 2004, the election years were marked by huge off-budget 
payments that seriously affected the economy. 
Ghana’s institutional weakness is not limited to fiscal indiscipline but 
runs through a number of programmes. Many experts, both public and 
private, attribute that to the type of politics in the country.  
Take Ghana’s decentralisation programme, for example. We got a lot 
more done under Rawlings’ military regime than after 1992 when we tran-
sitioned into the multi-party era […] because people trusted the political 
leadership. The leaders, both at the national and local levels were not con-
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cerned about losing power. They were just concerned about getting the 
job done. In Ghana, politics and leadership are the bane of our develop-
ment. Look at post-genocide Rwanda; the changes that have taken place 
can never take place in Ghana. Not that they are smarter than us, but the 
kind of leadership that Paul Kagami and the party provide is what is lack-
ing in Ghana. A benevolent dictator is perhaps what Ghana needs, and not 
the type of leaders we have now who can’t make decisive decisions be-
cause they think about the implications for winning votes (Interview with 
a senior officer at the Office of the Head of the Civil Service, 13 August 
2015). 
The two-party political process and highly polarised support base of 
the two parties have worked against building a broad coalition of con-
sensus for national development. It is also manifests in how policy for 
productive sectors, including aid money, is perceived by the followers of 
the two political parties (Gyimah-Boadi and Prempeh, 2012). Policy-
making in support of productive sectors is discussed purely as a partisan 
issue informed by short-term gain, like votes, more than national devel-
opment.  
Political parties, especially the two leading ones, have not only become 
election-winning machines, but have also strived to become sources of 
economic empowerment machines for their followers (Oduro et al., 
2014:8).  
Competition for rent through corruption has become more pervasive. 
Divestiture of state enterprises is a means for rewarding the party faithful 
and other cronies. According to Appiah Kubi (2001), in many cases, 
beneficiaries of state divestiture did not have money to pay for the assets 
and relied on their membership of the ruling government to acquire 
them. For instance, by the time the NDC-Rawlings government left 
power, about one-third of the value of divestiture proceeds was out-
standing. The cycle of macro-economic instability arising from patronage 
electioneering repeated itself in 2000. By the time the Rawlings regime 
was defeated, Ghana’s economy had dropped sharply, with foreign re-
serves only sufficient to import essential goods for one-month, and with 
substantial local and foreign debt to pay. In business terms, the country 
could have been described as bankrupt. The NPP government that took 
over had no choice but to opt for the HIPC initiative.  
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Whenever there is a fiscal deficit, a short-term solution is found in the 
form of divestiture of state assets. After the 1992 fiscal deficit, the gov-
ernment had to sell profitable enterprises amounting to US$ 569m, with 
a substantial part of that revenue coming from the sale of the govern-
ment’s shares in Ashanti Goldfields (about US$ 454 million). The reve-
nue from the sale was used to support the budget because the IMF sus-
pended concessional assistance to Ghana for fiscal indiscipline 
(Whitfield, 2011d). The NPP government, which succeeded the NDC, 
achieved macro-economic stability as its economic policies yielded mas-
sive external inflows, but political patronage during the government’s 
second term led to massive deficits by the time the government lost 
power in 2009. There was uncontrollable overspending in 2007 and 2008 
on unproductive things like the 50th anniversary of Ghana’s independ-
ence (US$ 100m); construction of three new football stadia for the Afri-
can Cup of Nations (US$ 77 million); building a new presidential palace 
(about US$ 80million) (Government of Ghana, 2010).  
According to The Commission of Enquiry established by the new 
government in 2009 and the White Paper on that report (GoG, 2010) 
the NPP government used the proceeds from the sale of Ghana Tele-
com as well as proceeds from the Eurobond to finance the budget defi-
cit. By the end of 2008, the budget deficit arising from off-budget pay-
ments was 14.5% of GDP. The report noted that the NPP 
administration spent five times more money to celebrate Ghana’s 50th 
independence anniversary than had been approved. The commission 
concluded that negligence and corruption led to the budget deficit. The 
discovery of oil appears to have worsened corruption because there was 
a false hope that even when the government mismanaged the economy 
with existing revenue, oil rent would defray it. Four years after Ghana 
began to sell oil in commercial quantities, there was no major investment 
in infrastructure that one could point at as resulting from the oil mon-
ey10. The high expectations from the oil discovery seem to have quickly 
evaporated when Ghana’s economy went into a serious crisis in 2014, 
forcing the government to negotiate with the IMF for a bailout. In 2014, 
the Ghanaian cedi was judged to be the worst currency in Africa by 
Bloomberg after its value depreciated by 23% in six months (Dzawu and 
Brand, 2014).  
Two important institutions, the Ministry of Finance and the Central 
Bank, have the responsibility to ensure fiscal and monetary discipline in 
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the country. The Finance Ministry ensures that the budget is implement-
ed in accordance with the Appropriation Act, and the Bank of Ghana 
(BoG) honours government cheques and controls the money supply in 
the economy. The role of the IMF in Ghana is like that of an overseer, 
supervising fiscal and monetary policies and practices of the BoG and 
the Ministry of Finance. According to a former Minister of Finance, 
since 1992 Ghana’s fiscal deficit after each election year has gone above 
the IMF-recommended rate of 5% of GDP, with the exception of 2004 
when Ghana’s fiscal deficit was only 3.5%. Various governments have 
been unable to sustain fiscal discipline because of politics. Frequent defi-
cits do not provide the safeguards and protection that institutions need 
to work. The Bank of Ghana Act 2002 (Act 612) regulates government 
deficit spending. It specifies that under no terms should the Central 
Bank lend to the government more than 10% of the previous year’s rev-
enue. According to the former Minister, this law also exists in Brazil, 
Taiwan, and South Korea, where it is successful because the central bank 
governors there are empowered to ensure compliance.  
I managed to maintain a lower budget deficit in 2004 because I bounced a 
few government cheques, to the embarrassment of some sector ministers, 
and they did not dare to do it again. I did it to one minister and he has re-
fused to date to talk to me. That is the discipline that we need. We have a 
budget that is supported by the Appropriation Act, which is a law but is 
not respected. That is part of the lawlessness in our fiscal and monetary 
practices (Interview with a former minister of Finance and later Educa-
tion, 15 August 2015).  
In 2012, the government had a budget deficit of 45% (Government 
of Ghana, 2013). If Bank of Ghana Act were enforced, any Finance Min-
ister who overspent would be referred to the Attorney General for pros-
ecution. However, Ghana’s fiscal discipline depends on the personal dis-
cretion of the Finance Minister rather than institutional regulation. 
Moreover, the Governor of the Central Bank is appointed by the Presi-
dent and does not have independence. That explains why the govern-
ment resorted to IMF supervision to maintain fiscal discipline. Without 
The BoG is required to submit data every month to the IMF, and given 
that financial support is provided in tranches and each tranche is linked 
to certain outputs, if the rules are not followed, the IMF does not release 
the next tranche. A World Bank official interviewed for this study la-
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belled political patronage a major challenge to Ghana’s fiscal manage-
ment (Interview on 20 August 2015). 
In a competitive multi-party political system like Ghana’s, many dif-
ferent types of institutions—for example, the Peace Council, Commis-
sion for Human Rights and Administrative Justice, and the Electoral 
Commission—are created to promote democracy. This entails additional 
costs that may not necessarily lead to economic production but may be 
required because of a provision in the Constitution. However, this also 
has negative aspects:  
So many democratic institutions have been established and all of them 
want offices at the districts. If there are five people working in each of 216 
districts in Ghana, just imagine the cost; and this has little to do with pro-
duction of tangible goods, people’s bread and butter. These institutions 
have nothing to do with manufacturing goods. But we have entered into 
democratic governance and that requires those institutions. And my ques-
tion is, do we really need them? (Interview with a senior civil servant in the 
Ministry of Agriculture, 16 August 2015). 
During the military regime, so many things got done, but we rushed into 
multi-party democracy without figuring out what sort of political institu-
tions Ghana really needs. The elites at that time were fixated on Western 
liberal democracy and managed to convince the populace that it was the 
only way of governing people when, at that time, benevolent dictators and 
dominant party systems were transforming economies in Southeast Asia. 
Why didn’t Ghanaian elites think about other models? (Interview with the 
head of a think-tank, 13 August 2015)  
I am a believer in human rights, but I still don’t understand why we are es-
tablishing institutions and organisations all the time. There is too much 
discussion on politics in Ghana but nothing gets done on production and 
diversification of the economy. The government is unable to take firm de-
cisions on crucial policy issues because somebody will go to court to stop 
execution. Plastic wastes are making the cities untidy, private companies 
are unwilling to pay the appropriate tax to get them collected, but the gov-
ernment is afraid to ban its use. Look at the number of development pro-
jects for which we have contracted loans and grants from development 
partners but which have been derailed because of politics: “Sodom and 
Gomorrah”11 Kejetia redevelopment12, etc. There is need for a national 
agenda that will let Ghanaians see the bigger picture. I always say that I 
wish we could have a President who would say “I don’t care even if it 
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means I will be a one-term President.” We need a President that will make 
decisive decisions and damn the consequences. How can we develop 
when you have multi-party elections where all that politicians care about is 
winning elections? What kind of foreign aid will help solve this problem? 
No, it has to be ours. (Interview with the head of a think-tank, 13 August 
2015).  
With an emphasis on poverty alleviation driven very much by the 
MDGs, the two main political parties increasingly focused on day-to-day 
bread and butter issues of the electorate and gradually moved away from 
implementation of the “home-grown” Vision 2020 development agenda 
and economic takeoff policies. During the era of competitive multi-party 
democracy, Ghana has experienced what many describe as unprecedent-
ed levels of corruption and mistrust of public institutions. In 1993, wide-
spread allegations of corruption against government ministers compelled 
the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) 
to investigate. While CHRAJ found some public officials culpable, others 
were exonerated. The NDC government did not bring charges against 
those cited for corruption (CDD, 2000). Table 6.6 outlines some cases of 
corruption involving politicians.  
Afro-barometer studies over a decade show increasing public mistrust 
of government institutions that are responsible for promoting probity 
and accountability. The credibility of the presidency has declined the 
most (see Table 6.7). According to the 2015 Afro-barometer studies, the 
proportion of Ghanaians expressing little or no trust in public institu-
tions increased significantly between 2002 and 2014. In terms of percep-
tion of corruption, the presidency is judged by a majority of Ghanaians 
to be the most corrupt, followed by members of parliament and the judi-
ciary (see Table 6.8).  
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Table 6.6 
Some cases of corruption involving politicians 
Period Amount  Cases/Narratives  
1993-8 US$ 
232,000 
The former chief executive officer of the Ghana National Petroleum 
Corporation was found guilty of “wilfully causing financial loss”. He 
was imprisoned for 5years on June 18th 2008 (GNA, 2008) 
1999-
2000 
US$20 
million 
 Two former ministers and two senior civil servants were sentenced 
on 29th April 2003 to various terms of imprisonment for misappro-
priation of public funds (GNA, 2003).  
2006-
2011 
EUR47 
million  
Judgment: Debt was paid to Waterville Construction company with-
out a contract. The Supreme Court ruled that money should be 
returned to the state but it had not been returned (myjoyonline, 
2013) 
2010  US$$38 
million 
Subah Info Solutions Ltd., was a subsidiary of Zoomlion Ghana Ltd., 
was contracted in 2010 by Ghana Revenue Authority to provide 
telecommunication traffic monitoring services. It was reported to 
have received a total sum of GH¢144 million, with no job done 
(Myjoyonline, 2014). 
2012 US$8 
million  
Asongtaba Cottage Industries (ACI) and Savannah Accelerated De-
velopment Authority (SADA) were accused to have misappropriated 
and misapplied various state funds associated with Afforestation 
Projects in Northern Ghana (Cityfmonline, 2014) 
2012  US$50 
million  
The Auditor-General’s Report of 2011 uncovered enormous financial 
irregularities, which included “lack of documentation on loan 
agreements, misappropriation of funds, overestimation of funds 
needed, and failure to notify bankers to stop payment of unearned 
salaries, among others” (Auditor General Report, 2011). 
2014 US$ 
260,000 
A total of GH¢7.9 million was paid to 22,612 non-existent national 
service persons; 163 staff members involved were dismissed (City-
fmonline, 2015). 
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Table 6.7 
Ghanaians’ lack of trust in public institutions or officials (%) 
Public institutions 2002 2005 2008 2012 2014 2012-14 
2002-
14 
The President  30  21  24  43  57  +14  +27  
Parliament  43  25  34  50  61  +11  +18  
Courts of law  49  30  38  42  54  +12  +5  
Electoral Commission  41  21  29  40  59  +19  +18  
Ruling party  42  28  31  52  61  +9  +19  
Opposition parties  62  41  46  43  50  +7  -12  
Tax department  --  --  --  58  62  +4  --  
Local government 49  41  42  55  62  +7  +13  
Police  46  32  51  58  62  +4  +16  
Army  41  23  --  27  40  +13  -1  
Traditional leaders  41  --  30  --  47  --  +6  
Religious leaders  --  --  --  --  34  --  -- 
Source: Afro-barometer Studies, 2015. 
Notes: The percentages represent people who said they had “no trust” or “little trust” while 
blanks represent no information.  
Table 6.8 
Changes in Ghanaians’ perception of corruption over time (%) 
Public Institutions 2002 2005 2008 2012 2014 2012-14 
2002
-14 
President and officials in his 
Office  47  56  70  87  83  -4  +36  
Members of parliament  --  59  74  90  85  -5  +26  
Judges and magistrates  70  72  79  90  85  -5  +15  
Officials of Electoral  
Commission  --  --  --  --  81  --  --  
Tax officials of Ghana  
Revenue Authority  --  70  79  90  85  -5  +15  
Police  79  81  86  94  89  -5  +10  
National government officials  --  66  77  91  86  -5  +20  
District chief executives  --  --  --  89  84  -5  --  
Local government  --  60  71  86  83  -3  +23  
Business executives  63  --  --  --  82  --  +19  
Religious leaders  41  --  --  --  69  --  +28  
Traditional leaders  --  --  68  --  78  --  +10  
Source: Afro-barometer Studies, 2015. 
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Ghanaians consider corruption to be the major factor holding back 
the country’s development (Gyimah Boadi, 2009). Several financial irreg-
ularities and embezzlements by public officials, as disclosed in the Audi-
tor-General’s reports, are estimated to have involved about 8% percent 
of GDP (Agyeman, 2015:13). This is more than twice the ODA received 
by Ghana in 2013. The actual amount that could not be accounted for by 
various ministries, departments and agencies was 476 million Ghana 
cedis, about US$ 206,521,739 (Auditor-General’s Report, 2013; Brobbey, 
2015). Although no systematic and rigorous estimate of the total cost of 
public corruption has been made, opinion articles in newspapers put it at 
about US$ 3bn a year (Kwarteng, 2016). 
Political patronage remains endemic and perceptions of public cor-
ruption remain high. A survey of 1500 households in August 2000 found 
that 75% of Ghanaians perceive corruption as a major problem in the 
country. And 82% believed that corruption was more prevalent than 
three years earlier (CDD, 2000). The 2015 Afro-barometer report also 
showed that 75% of Ghanaians believed that corruption had increased 
during the previous year. 
The competitive political party system is being used by business ac-
tors in concert with ruling parties to siphon state resources into unpro-
ductive sectors in return for votes. “Ghana’s multi-party political system 
has become an important source of patronage, where it is expected to 
provide jobs, opportunities, and in some cases cash to its workers” 
(Oduro et al., 2014:8). Ghana’s experience with multi-party politics and 
increasing trends in corruption are quite similar to what Hope and 
Chikulo (2000) identify in many emerging African democracies. Politi-
cians “buy votes” from groups within the population with “development 
projects”, which dramatically expands public expenditures and increases 
the fiscal deficit; the additional expenditure on unproductive sectors re-
sults in inflation and rapid depreciation of the country’s currency. To 
narrow the deficit, loans are contracted from multilateral donors while 
bilateral donors provide grants. The government also contracts commer-
cial loans if they are available. All these inflows are consolidated in the 
general budget, but very little is invested in the productive sectors seen as 
the key to sustainable long-term economic growth. Whitfield (2010) 
shows that Ghana’s economic crisis at the end of 2008 was not caused 
by global financial markets, but was largely the government’s own crea-
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tion. The competitive clientelism mode of governance has been the main 
factor enabling the massive corruption in the country.  
6.6 Catalytic Role of Foreign Aid in Political and Economic 
Transformation (Y1-Y8) 
6.6.1 Endogenous drive towards democratic consolidation  
(1993-2013) Y7 + Y8 
From 1993 to 2013, political leadership in Ghana was conducted through 
a democratic process and not through the barrel of a gun. Ghana has 
since conducted six democratic presidential and parliamentary elections, 
with power changing hands every two terms (see Tables 6.9 and 6.10 for 
presidential and parliamentary election results respectively).  
Table 6.9 
Presidential election results in Ghana, 1992-2012 
Election Year 
Votes won by 
Voter turnout 
(%) NDC (%) NPP (%) other political parties (%) 
1992 58.4 30.4 11.2 50.2 
1996 57.4 39.6 3 78.2 
2000* 43.1 56.9  60.4 
2004 44.64 52.45 2.92 81.5 
2008* 50.23 49.77  69.52 
2012 50.70 47.74 1.56 80.15 
Source: National Electoral Commission.  
* Presidential runoff elections.  
 
In 2000, for the first time in the nation’s history, an opposition politi-
cal party defeated an incumbent government. In 2008, there was a sec-
ond democratic change of government when the NDC party defeated 
the ruling NPP. The margin of victory was very slim, with the NDC re-
ceiving 50.23% of the vote and the NPP 49.77%, a difference of fewer 
than 30,000 votes. In policy terms, there is little ideological difference 
between the two parties, although the NDC tries to distinguish itself by 
referring to its policies as social democratic. Both lean towards the mar-
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ket or a greater role for the private sector, with the government acting as 
facilitator.  
Table 6.10 
Parliamentary election results in Ghana, 1992-2012 
Election 
Year 
No. of seats won by 
Voter  
turnout % NDC NPP other political parties 
1992 189 Boycotted 11 28.1 
1996 133 60 7 78 
2000 92 103 9 62 
2004 94 128 8 85.1 
2008 114 107 7 69 
2012 148 122 5 80 
Source: National Electoral Commission. 
 
Since 1992, Ghana has become one of the most competitive democ-
racies in Africa. A country that was under military dictatorship for most 
of its post-independence history, where there was no transfer of power 
from one democratic government to the other, all of a sudden under-
stood the meaning of democratic governance and stayed stable after eve-
ry competitive election. This is a high mark of political transformation in 
an African context. Indeed, for an incumbent African government to 
peacefully accept defeat by a margin of 0.1%, as happened in the 2008 
presidential election, is a clear testimony of democratic maturity. As the 
country successfully organised one election after another and was able to 
elect an opposition political party to replace an incumbent government, 
the country endeared itself to the donor community. Donors began to 
have confidence that any new government would be committed to the 
rule of law and democratic governance.  
In 2010, Ghana was rated 5th in Africa by the Economic Intelligence 
Unit’s Democracy Index, with a score of 6.02 out of a possible 10. In the 
same year, the Freedom House Index classified Ghana as “free”, a label 
granted to only four other African countries: South Africa, Botswana, 
Mali, Namibia and Benin. The coups that characterised Ghana’s post-
independence era have given way to stable multi-party democracy. Since 
1992, there has been no report of political uprising or rumour of an im-
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minent military takeover. Once characterised by McGowan (2003) as 
among the most “elite-politically unstable countries” in Africa, the coun-
try has emerged as one of the mature liberal democratic countries in the 
world. As Table 1.3 showed, not only the political transformation, but 
also the economic transformation is drawing praise. In 2012, Ghana’s 
political credibility and democratic resolve were put to test when the 
NPP challenged the legitimacy of the President-elect in court. By a 5-4 
majority decision, the Supreme Court dismissed the NPP’s petition and 
confirmed the NDC’s election victory. The opposition accepted defeat, 
congratulated the President-elect and moved on to organise for the 2016 
elections. 
 Ghana’s political transformation also manifests in its performance on 
governance ranking in Africa. Since 2006 Ghana has consistently ranked 
7th out of 52 countries in Mo Ibrahim index of African governance. The 
highest ranked country is Mauritius and the lowest, Somalia (refer to ta-
ble 1.1 presented earlier in chapter one). In terms of specific governance 
indicators, Ghana does far better in safety of residence, rule of law, ac-
countability and national security. Ghana scores higher than SSA average 
score (see table 1.2 presented earlier in chapter one). According to Gyi-
mah-Boadi (2009) these exceptional events have confirmed Ghana’s role 
as a beacon of hope for democracy in Africa.  
Ghana ranks among the first eight countries in Africa in any govern-
ance index. This includes the Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance, 
Worldwide Governance Indicators, African Governance Indicators, Af-
rican Peer Review Mechanism Indicators, and Freedom House Index. 
The role that foreign aid played in cajoling or persuading the PNDC and 
Rawlings to return to multi-party democracy was that of a catalyst. 
Though multilateral financial institutions like the World Bank and IMF 
did not provide financial resources to support capacity building of dem-
ocratic institutions, the financial and technical assistance that the USA, 
UK, Germany, Canada and UNDP gave to the Electoral Commission, 
and further support to civil society organisations for democratic moni-
toring, were an important catalyst. The UNDP supports governance-
related programmes such as capacity building for parliamentarians, the 
Electoral Commission and political parties.  
A former member of parliament told the author how DANIDA 
helped to reduce tension in the run-up to the 2000 elections:  
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At an Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC) meeting, my party argued 
for transparent ballot boxes, but the chairman of the Electoral Commis-
sion looked right into our faces and said “No money”. There were a num-
ber of donors at that meeting. One donor asked the Commissioner how 
much it would cost and he knew the answer by heart. He said, “We have 
19,000 polling stations, so we need about 25,000 transparent boxes. It 
would cost so much and that was not budgeted for, so we can’t afford 
them.” There was total silence in the room. One donor representative 
raised a hand and said, “You need 35,000 boxes, we will give you the 
money. We will not bring in 25,000 boxes, we will bring in 40,000 boxes. 
Consider it paid.” This was Denmark. It reduced the tension during that 
year’s election. The government could afford the boxes, but it was unwill-
ing so a donor helped and stopped any deception from the Electoral 
Commissioner. That was a catalyst. 
While acknowledging the role of donors in catalysing Ghana’s politi-
cal transformation, many of the experts interviewed were quick to indi-
cate that donor assistance in the political transformation was nowhere 
near what Ghanaians had contributed. It was not about money, but 
commitment and resolve to make multi-party democracy work. 
Ghana needed just a little aid and donor influence on Rawlings to have 
such rapid political transformation, because the citizens and local institu-
tions committed themselves to a political discourse that they feel they 
own, and they were determined to make it work. Ghanaians committed to 
multi-party democracy because they were weary of authoritarian regimes. 
With a little financial support from donors, Ghana was ready to go (Inter-
view with the head of a think-tank, 13 August 2015. 
Afro-barometer studies consistently show that Ghanaians’ appetite 
for multi-party democracy is high, but resentment is gradually building 
up over the failure of democratic governments to tackle the widespread 
corruption. While a few corrupt politicians have been imprisoned, others 
get away with siphoning money into their pockets. This is making Gha-
naians disillusioned with multi-party democracy. The strong executive 
presidential system is reducing the benefit of democracy to just organisa-
tion of regular elections and less to accountability and inclusive devel-
opment. The moment a regime comes to power, eyes and minds are fix-
ated on winning the next election more than on making efforts to 
improve the living conditions of the people. With so much corruption in 
the country, Ghana’s democracy is becoming irrelevant to the people 
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because it is not able to provide effective accountability. The former 
President and founder of the NDC, Jerry Rawlings, castigated his party 
political leadership over corruption:  
It is time for President Mahama to deal with the opulence in his govern-
ment. Our leaders must be able to play by the book […] the unprecedent-
ed levels of corruption, offensive show of power and opulence by some at 
a time when our country requires prudence and frugality […]we cannot 
fight corruption if we do not take on leaders and so-called untouchables 
who have sought to institutionalise corruption (Rawlings’ speech when re-
ceiving an honorary doctorate at University of Education, Winneba, Gha-
na, on 14 August 2014 ). 
In 2013, Africawatch Magazine branded Ghana the “Republic of Cor-
ruption” after a series of corrupt government contracts and payments 
had been made public. The Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) Ghana, 
remarked in a report: 
It is a tragic paradox that a number of agencies set up to fight poverty and 
under development have themselves become channels of corruption by 
which state funds meant for development are siphoned. The case of the 
Ghana Youth Employment and Entrepreneurial Development Agency 
(GYEEDA), the Savannah Accelerated Development Authority (SADA) 
and the National Service Scheme (NSS) are ready examples (IEA, 2015). 
When Ghana discovered oil in commercial quantities, many Ghana-
ians were hopeful that it heralded a new economic beginning. However, 
those hopes were dashed as the hardships suffered by Ghanaians in-
creased. Critical analysts compared Ghana’s history of gold exploitation 
with the oil discovery and cautioned that the future would not be differ-
ent. An influential Ghanaian, Rev. Dr Mensah Otabil, once told a con-
gregation that it was his fervent prayer that Ghana would never found oil 
because it would deprive the country the work ethics required to develop 
a productive society. This resonates very well with the experience of Ni-
geria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, and the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo. Recent cases of corruption in Ghana show that the country’s 
democratic institutions are not strong enough to insulate it from mis-
management of oil money, from what has come to be known as “the oil 
curse” (Hickey et al., 2015). Ghana’s judiciary, which once prided itself as 
“”, has recently become embroiled in corruption scandals. In 2015, seven 
High Court judges and 23 junior judges were suspended after they were 
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caught on video collecting bribes to influence the outcome of court cases 
(BBC, 2015).  
Ghana was able to wean itself from the IMF in 2006 without oil 
money, so how was it that six years later, and with export of oil, the 
economy was in such dire straits that it had to return to the IMF for a 
bailout? Many of the experts interviewed by the author attributed Gha-
na’s economic challenges to lack of exemplary political leadership. They 
also argued that the type of political practises that are predominant in 
Ghana do not produce the kind of leadership that can enable the country 
to achieve economic transformation.  
6.6.2 Influence of foreign aid on economic transformation 
(Y1+Y2+Y3+Y4+Y5) 
Before multi-party elections, GDP growth averaged 5% a year for a dec-
ade, but it fell to 3.9% during the 1992 general elections and did not re-
cover to its pre-1992 level for seven years. From 1993, the growth rate 
averaged 4% until 2000. Inflation maintained double digits throughout 
the 1990s, rising to about 60% in 1995 before falling to 11% at the end 
of the decade. A pattern of rising inflation during and after election peri-
ods has been the hallmark of the competitive clientelistic party system of 
government, as money is distributed in exchange for votes (see Figure 
6.10).  
Figure 6.10 
GDP and inflation growth, 1991-2014 (%) 
Source: Extracted from World Bank Database, 2016 
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Ghana began the new millennium with poor macro-economic indica-
tors. However, the economy regained some growth impetus beginning in 
2001. This was largely on account of improved export earnings from 
high gold and cocoa prices, a focus on growth and poverty alleviation, 
noticeable improvement in fiscal discipline and monetary management, 
and availability of extensive development aid as a result of a change of 
government. In 2011, Ghana exported its first oil, pushing GDP growth 
to an unprecedented 15% before it fell to 7.1% in 2013. Inflation also 
fell throughout the period and became single digit. Consistent average 
annual growth of more than 4% during the 1990s and above 5% in the 
2000s increased GDP per capita from US$ 2024 in 1993 to US$ 3894 in 
2014 (see Figure 6.11).  
Figure 6.11 
Growth of GDP per capita (PPP), 1993-2014 
Source: Extracted from World Bank Database, 2016. 
 
Ghana clearly improved its macro-economic performance with con-
tinuation of the economic reforms, but an important issue was whether 
continuous economic growth could be sustained and whether the struc-
ture of the economy, with its dependence on cocoa and gold, could be 
transformed. There are several possible barometers for assessing this. 
Traditionally, rapid economic growth is accompanied by expansion of 
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industrial activities, measured by growth and structural change in the in-
dustrial sector (Rodrik, 2006) but this has not happened in Ghana alt-
hough there was a slight change in the structure of the economy. Agri-
culture’s contribution to GDP reduced, from 45% at the beginning of 
the 1990s to less than 40% at the end of the decade, while that of indus-
try rose in the same period from 17% to just a little below 28%. The rea-
son for the growth of industry was exploitation of oil, but mainly it was a 
statistical effect resulting from the reduction of agriculture’s contribution 
to GDP. Also, services rose remarkably as more people found jobs in 
the informal sector, mainly in trading. This accounts for the changes in 
structural composition (see Figure 6.12). 
Figure 6.12 
Sectoral contribution to GDP, 1992-2012 (%) 
 
Source: Extracted from World Bank Database 
 
Ghana’s structural transformation does not conform to the presumed 
sequence of changes in the structural composition of agriculture, manu-
facturing and services as an economy develops. Usually, there is a shift in 
GDP composition from agriculture to industry to services as an econo-
my grows. Productivity in Ghana’s agricultural sector has not changed. 
Agriculture is still characterised by high dependence on rainfall, low in-
puts and production by smallholder farmers (Asmah, 2011). Only 19% 
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of farmers use inorganic fertiliser and 7% rent equipment (Quinones and 
Diao, 2011). Production, except that of cocoa, is at subsistence level and 
families and traditional chiefs manage the landholding system. The cum-
bersome institutional channels prohibit large-scale land acquisition and 
investment. Transformation would require institutional changes in the 
land tenure system. Currently, obtaining land for commercial farming is 
cumbersome, to say the least, requiring different institutional channels 
and settlement of ownership disputes (Larbi, 2006).  
Agriculture does not provide the needed inputs to the manufacturing 
sector (Delgado et al., 1998; Ramatu and Egyir, 2002). Currently, less 
than 10% of cocoa beans are being processed for domestic consumption 
and the Ghana Cocoa Board does not consider capital-intensive pro-
cessing of cocoa for export a priority. Instead, it wants to be associated 
with the export of high-quality cocoa beans to the global market. The 
low linkage between agriculture and agro-processing is further under-
mined by foreign imports of cheap processed goods. Efforts to develop 
food industries in the country have not been successful. For example, 
promotion of tomato processing has been frustrated by importation of 
canned tomatoes (Ablorh-Odjidia, 2003; Robinson and Kolavalli 2010); 
yet various governments have been hesitant to ban importation of 
canned tomatoes because of demand for them in the urban market, 
where a ban could have electoral consequences, and fear of violating 
World Trade Organisation rules.  
Ghana’s industry is the least-transformed sector of the economy 
(Robinson and Kolavalli, 2010). The contribution of industry to Ghana’s 
overall GDP has remained virtually 20-25% for over 15 years. The man-
ufacturing sector, which has been a major source of structural transfor-
mation at the beginning of the development process of many transition 
and advanced countries, has been abysmally poor in terms of its contri-
bution to GDP, employment and competitiveness in Ghana. Ghana’s 
manufacturing sector is small even when compared with other African 
countries like Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire (Breisinger, Diao, Kolavalli et al., 
2011). From 1994 to 2010, the average annual growth rate of manufac-
turing has been only 3.2%, the lowest among Ghana’s industrial subsec-
tors. High costs of electricity and imported raw materials, and obsolete 
machinery, have been the major cause of the manufacturing sector’s 
poor growth (Yusof, 2010).  
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Trade and domestic consumption, instead of production, have driven 
Ghana’s service-led transformation. The rebasing13 of the economy 
shows that the share of the service sector in GDP reached 50% in 2006. 
From 1994 to 2010, the service sector grew at an annual growth rate of 
5.9%, compared with 5% in industry and 4.4% in agriculture (GSS, 
2011a). While India’s experience of service-led transformation has been 
driven by export-oriented services, in the case of Ghana it is basically 
domestic consumption. It is worth noting that most FDI in Ghana is in 
natural-resource-based industries such as mining and oil, which have few 
linkages with other sectors of the economy. Also, they provide few jobs, 
because mining and oil are relatively capital-intensive activities.  
In addition, Ghana’s manufacturing sector has failed to tap interna-
tional markets. Countries that have achieved middle-income status out-
side Africa have done so with changes in the export sector, with a de-
cline in the share of agricultural exports and an increase in the share of 
manufacturing (Breisinger et al., 2007). Those fortunate enough to have 
a seacoast have developed clusters of export-oriented manufacturing 
companies. This has not happened in Ghana. With the exception of oil 
and a few non-traditional exports like pineapples, no new investments in 
product discovery have been made for many years. Some of the coun-
tries that have been successful in economic transformation, for example 
China and Malaysia, have benefited from policy changes that enable 
them to export more products to the international market (Haussman, 
Hwang and Rodrik, 2006). In contrast, Ghana’s share of new products in 
global total products is said to have remained almost the same between 
1962 and 2000 (Kolavalli, et al., 2012:10).  
Many countries that have experienced rapid economic growth with 
structural transformation have also undergone changes in employment 
patterns, with labour being released from agriculture as productivity in-
creases, and being pushed into non-agricultural economic activities 
(Headey et al., 2010). There has been movement of people and resources 
from agriculture and rural areas into services, which, on the surface, ap-
pears to show an element of economic transformation (Ellis and Free-
man 2004; Lay and Schuler 2007).  
As many African countries, employment data in Ghana is unreliable, 
but there appears to be a gradual but steady decline in agricultural em-
ployment and rise of employment in services. Employment in services 
rose from 22% in the 1960s to just over 30% percent between 2000 and 
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2006, while industry hovered around 10% between 1994 and 2000, less 
than the high of 17% in 1973. Employment in industries is currently 
around 14%. There are few wage employment opportunities in the for-
mal sector, except in Accra and Kumasi, the two largest cities in Ghana.. 
In general, about 80% of Ghanaians work in the informal sector, with 
high job insecurity. Ghana’s rapid race to informalisation occurred dur-
ing the early years of ERP/SAP. In 1999, only 14% of the population 
were wage earners (Global Policy Net- work, 2004). 
One other indicator for assessing the strength of Ghana’s economic 
transformation is balance of payments. Ghana has continuously regis-
tered a deficit because of excess imports. The 2005 balance of payment 
deficit was US$ 1.11bn and by 2012 it had risen to US$ 4.71bn, which 
was about 11.2% of total GDP. The deficit is attributed to lack of eco-
nomic diversification and high imports levels of goods and services from 
abroad. Because of its trade liberalisation policies, Ghana lost competi-
tiveness in the productive sectors, even in the domestic market for many 
agricultural products like meat and rice. By early 2000, Ghana had be-
come a net agricultural importer. Food importation amounted to about 
US$ 1bn in 2008 (Kolavalli, 2012:12). This constituted about 30% of 
Ghana’s foreign exchange from export of cocoa. Urbanisation and the 
growing middle class in cities had led to increasing demand for imported 
agricultural products. Ghana currently imports around 60-90% of poul-
try meat consumed domestically because there is little competitive indus-
try for production of poultry products and processed food products 
(Robinson and Kolavalli, 2010). Trade liberalisation policies pushed by 
IMF and the government’s ideology of ceding direct involvement in 
productive sectors to the private sector appear not to have helped the 
industry to develop.  
The structure of Ghana’s economy has experienced only marginal 
change, it has not been transformed. Agriculture contributions to GDP 
and employment are steadily being reduced, while the service sector is 
gaining ground. Ghana’s leading export, cocoa, is not being given added 
value through processing and has very few linkages with the local econ-
omy. The share of cocoa processed in Ghana is below the African aver-
age of 8-12% and particularly compares unfavourably with Côte 
D’Ivoire, which processes about 48% of its cocoa beans. After many 
years of being a leader in implementing neo-liberal policies of private-
sector-led development, Ghanaian firms remain less competitive than 
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those in other African countries such as Côte d’Ivoire, Cameroun, Ethi-
opia, Kenya, Senegal and Uganda (Global Competitive Index, 2016). 
Lack of support to the manufacturing sector appears to have led to 
inadequate conversion of raw materials to secondary products. Between 
1992 and 2013, Ghana has had four different governments but with the 
exception of the one led by Kufuor, none has implemented concerted 
programmes to support productive sectors, especially manufacturing. In 
the agricultural sector, the state has been hesitant to push for develop-
ment of non-traditional exports. It has only supported productive sectors 
when donors have shown some interest in them, but donors have fo-
cused most of their aid on social sectors, so very little can be seen in 
terms of transformation of the productive sectors. However, some do-
nors have realised that and intend to aid productive activities. In 2015, 
the author was told by and EU official: 
Actually we are moving into that direction. From 2014 to 2020 we are al-
locating about half of the aid envelope to productive investment in agricul-
ture. We want to support especially Northern Ghana by building roads, ir-
rigation systems, solar systems, etc., so that small farmers can increase 
their yields (Interview, 20 August 2015).  
A DANIDA official said in 2016: 
Because of the MDGs, for the past 15 years we have focused a substantial 
part of our funds on social sectors, but we always have a component 
where we want to support creating an enabling environment, clear regula-
tory environment, etc. In the 90s, the extreme poverty and inequality was 
huge, so supporting the MDGs was the right thing. But now we have seen 
some improvement, so switching more to productive sectors makes sense 
(interview, 20 August 2016).  
Ghana is currently flooded with manufactured goods from abroad. In 
2005 alone, the country imported US$ 433.74m worth of cheap manu-
factured products from China, while it exported only US$ 31.26m to 
China. Cheap Chinese products undermine Ghana’s local industries; for 
example, the textile factories are gradually closing down because of im-
ported Chinese textiles. Like many African countries, Ghana has experi-
enced consistently high economic growth for the past two decades, but 
the economy remains untransformed. It still has many of the features 
that the country inherited at independence. Improvement in smallholder 
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agricultural productivity is notably absent. Agriculture still employs the 
greater majority of the working population, though service sector em-
ployment is rising and may overtake agriculture soon. While mining, 
construction and the service sector are booming, technological im-
provements and manufacturing are not part of the growth pattern. There 
are few state policies that support agricultural transformation or technol-
ogy-based industries (see Amoako, 2011; ECA and AU, 2011; Lin, 2012; 
Norman and Stiglitz, 2012).  
6.7 Conclusion: Aid Was a Catalyst to Endogenous Drivers 
of Political Transformation but Increasingly Lost Its 
Potency for Economic Transformation 
To determine if aid catalysed Ghana’s economic and political transfor-
mation in Phase III, let us return to the five attributes of a catalyst and 
assess how they worked out in promoting political and economic trans-
formation from 1993 to 2013. 
The first attribute is facilitation or speeding up of economic trans-
formation and democratic consolidation. The analysis shows that during 
Phase III, foreign aid was used to support balance of payments as well as 
civil society organisations and other democratic institutions. The conclu-
sion is that foreign aid facilitated endogenous drivers of democratic con-
solidation in a way that is enduring and sustainable. Ghana’s political 
transformation will keep improving and it will take extraordinary and 
unimaginable catastrophes for that process to be derailed.  
The reason for this is that the process has developed from below, 
with substantial inputs by endogenous actors and institutions that were 
determined to make it work. Foreign aid sped up that process through 
capacity development of democratic institutions. With endogenous ac-
tors being predisposed to let that political system work, foreign aid pro-
vided the space around which institutions and actors coalesced to pro-
mote liberal democracy. While Ghanaians acknowledge the failures of 
the current democratic structures and institutions to curb corruption and 
promote accountability, they are not ready to return to the past at any 
cost. Even with the rise of Chinese “aid” and other alternative means of 
funding, Ghanaians still believe in democracy as a better way to organise 
politics than autocracy (Afro-barometer, 2008).  
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In terms of the economic transformation, there has been little in 
terms of the stylised sequential approach, but foreign aid has facilitated a 
switch to liberal economic policies that would not have occurred without 
it. The policy switch from socialism to neo-liberalism has been accepted 
by Ghanaian elites and ruling governments. In fact, there appears to be a 
consensus between the two major political parties that neo-liberalism is 
to be used to pursue economic growth. The initial apprehension that a 
return to multi-party democracy would reverse that policy switch has not 
materialised, because by the time the country went into a multi-party sys-
tem of government, Ghanaians had become used to viewing the market 
as the only source of production and distribution of goods and services. 
Throughout Ghana’s two decades of multi-party democracy, there has 
been no attempt at policy reversal and Ghanaians have never asked for a 
return to state control of the economy. Nkrumah’s political, which con-
tinues to campaign on socialist policies, has received no more than 1% 
of the electoral votes since Ghana returned to democratic rule in 1992 
and has failed to win more than one seat in the National Assembly.  
With regard to the key objective of economic transformation, foreign 
aid has not substantially been a catalyst, but how much of this weakness 
can be attributed to the catalytic role of aid? The third attribute provides 
a clue here. Is the Ghanaian political settlement predisposed to promot-
ing economic transformation? As discussed in this chapter, , a number of 
“home-grown” policies and programmes were developed by different 
regimes during phase III, but they did not attract donor support. Where 
a government tried to promote industrial policies for economic trans-
formation, foreign aid was not been provided to catalyse that endoge-
nous driver. In fact, a wrong catalyst was added, explaining the failure to 
transform. This occurred during Kufuor’s presidency (2001-08) when 
both bilateral and multilateral donors failed to provide direct financial 
support to the industrialisation programme and instead promoted public 
sector reform and “doing business environment”. On the basis of this 
finding, one can conclude that the flow of aid has not provided the catal-
ysis that endogenous actors needed to promote economic transfor-
mation. Unlike in political transformation, where just a little catalytic aid 
was needed to support endogenous efforts and commitment, in econom-
ic transformation catalytic aid was absent.  
Generally, Ghana has not used much of its aid money to invest in 
productive sectors that would sustain growth. Ghana’s political settle-
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ment among ruling elites is to pursue a democratic process on the basis 
that it will help maintain political stability and subsequently enable them 
maintain their private interests. With political stability, aid would also 
continue to flow to supplement, if not substitute for, mismanagement of 
local resources. Responses by EU and USAID officials seem to support 
this: 
There are some fundamental values that govern EU societies that are rec-
ognised by the UN. And that is human rights, rule of law and democracy. 
Through foreign aid we promote these values. These values are core or 
overarching in our development policy. So, countries or governments that 
do not observe these values receive less aid from us. Ghana, being a dem-
ocratic state and respecting the rule of law, is attractive to our foreign poli-
cy and likely to receive extra foreign aid. Though, given that Ghana has 
developed economically and is now a lower middle-income country, aid 
will decline a bit in the future, but the motivations for giving aid is not on-
ly economic (Interview with an EU official, 19 August 2015).  
While many donors acknowledged corruption and mismanagement as 
some of the challenges in the country, they also argued that democracy is 
not the cause of these challenges. They still believe that there is work to 
be done on building strong institutions in the country. This is also the 
rationale for giving aid, because many of the donors do not believe that 
Ghana needs a different type of politics than what pertains in their own 
countries.  
Yes, implicitly we support democratic regimes even if economic perfor-
mance is poor. Democracy is also about rights of the people. With democ-
racy, the voices of the people are represented and this is basically what you 
want to achieve at the end. Development is about what the people actually 
want (Interview with a USAID official, 17 August 2015). 
Ghana needs both institutions and leadership to work. What I have ob-
served is that the Constitution does not facilitate proper balance of power 
and proper accountability of the President. I think there is too much pow-
er vested in the President. That is why you end up with the winner-takes-
all government. That is why you invest so much in elections because once 
you are there you can take it all, which is poor institutionally. In addition, 
you also need a lot of qualified lawyers to fill the judiciary posts and prose-
cute corrupt cases. Those are the actors that let institutions work and re-
duce the culture of impunity. You need to have attorneys who are actually 
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lawyers and not police officers, many of whom have little training in law 
(Interview with an EU official, 19 August 2015).  
The experiences of African countries that have transitioned from aid 
dependency show that the central plank of their strategies involved tak-
ing control of domestic policy, ideology on pursuit of development, and 
ensuring that donors worked within a national development plan or vi-
sion. For instance, in Botswana in the 1960s and 1970s, the ruling Bot-
swana Democratic Party negotiated with donors to invest in projects that 
were within the national development plans and scrutinised and accepted 
only projects that were consistent with government priorities. It also re-
sisted donor-led and managed project enclaves (Whitfield and Frazer, 
2010:351).  
Notes 
 
1 Although privatisation of state-owned enterprises (SoE) began in 1988 as a 
conditionality for aid, most of the actual sales took place after 1993. By 1992, 
only 73 of the 317 SoE earmarked for divestiture had been sold (Adda, n.d.: 5).  
2 This included agricultural diversification, national agricultural research, na-
tional agricultural extension services, national feeder roads, national livestock 
services, coastal wetlands management, environmental resource management, 
and agricultural sector investment projects. 
3 In September 2007, the government issued a 10-year Eurobond with 8.5% 
interest to raise US$ 750m from the international capital markets. 
4 In a press release, the IMF listed a number of challenges that Ghana’s political 
economy was facing. These included fiscal discipline and limits on government 
borrowing. 
5 This loan was divided into two: a concessional loan of US$ 270m with a 2% 
interest rate and a US$ 292m commercial loan to be repaid over 20years.  
6 Corruption is discussed extensively in section 6.5. 
7 GIFMIS is an acronym for Ghana Integrated Financial Management Infor-
mation Systems, which involves the use of various integrated electronic finan-
cial modules in the management of public funds. It was created in 2009 with 
the aim of promoting efficiency, transparency and accountability in public fi-
nancial management through rationalisation and modernisation of budgeting 
and public expenditure management of the Government of Ghana (GoG). 
GIFMIS is jointly funded by GoG, DFID, EU and DANIDA.  
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8 “Total external debt is defined by the World Bank as “the sum of public, pub-
licly guaranteed, and private non-guaranteed long-term debt, use of IMF credit, 
and short-term debt. Short-term debt includes all debt having an original ma-
turity of one year or less and interest in arrears on long-term debt. Data are in 
current US$” (World Bank Data Base, 2014). 
9 The coalition comprised ordinary workers, army officers, Left-wing intellectu-
als who later became capitalists, and donors (mainly IMF and World Bank). 
And given the authoritarian nature of the government, Ghanaian elites and pre-
vious power and resource holders accepted a “culture of silence” as the order 
of the day until the country transitioned to multi-party democracy in 1992. 
10 Many of the interviewees including officials from the Ministry of Finance 
indicated that the revenue from oil had been added to the general government 
budget hence difficult to pin-point one infrastructure project that was an in-
vestment solely from the oil revenue. 
11 A slum settlement in Accra that was earmarked for demolition by a Ghanaian 
Court but various governments have failed to enforce the court ruling because 
of potential lost of votes.  
12 A US$298 infrastructure project in Ghana’s second largest city (Kumasi) to 
redevelop the central market and bus terminals.  
13 In July 2007, the Bank redenominated the Ghanaian cedi by eliminating four 
zeros from all nominal prices, putting the cedi a little higher than the US dollar 
at the rate of 1 cedi = $1.05. With over 60% of the economy being informal, 
the redenomination significantly reduced both transaction costs and the risk of 
carrying big amounts of cash around.  
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7 Conclusion and Reflections 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Ghana’s economic and political progress is the subject of much debate 
among development analysts in and outside Africa. Whilst many tout the 
country’s progress as a success story, critics are quick to point out that 
Ghana is not different from any other aid-dependent African country. A 
comparison of Ghana’s level of development with that of some of its 
peers from the early 1960s to date gives weight to the critics’ arguments. 
As indicated in Chapter 1, in the early 1960s Ghana was considered a 
middle-income country, with per capita income of US$ 490. That was 
comparable with Mexico and South Korea, and far higher than all the 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa. However, these non-African countries 
that were considered peers have since multiplied their GDP per capita 
several-fold while Ghana continues to wallow in the shadow of its 1960s 
status. For instance, South Korea has transformed from being aid-
dependent and poor in the 1960s to a developed country that also pro-
vides development assistance to low-income countries. The South Kore-
an economy is the thirteenth largest in the world (Kim, 2013). Kim’s 
comparative analysis of why and how foreign assistance catalysed South 
Korea’s economic transformation, but less so in Ghana, attributes the 
difference to a number of factors, among them policy choices, political 
leadership, types of foreign aid provided to the country, and the role of 
colonial powers.  
The current in-depth study has followed up on some of these deter-
mining factors, using the concept of aid as a catalyst to development. 
The general objective was to push further the frontiers of that concept. 
To accomplish that overarching objective, the thesis used Ghana as a 
case study to explore the extent to which aid has been a catalyst to the 
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country’s political and economic transformation in three time periods 
(1957-82, 1983-92, and 1993-2013). The study asked four specific ques-
tions: (i) What relevant challenges characterised Ghana’s three periods of 
economic and political transformation, and to what extent have these 
challenges been addressed? (ii) How did endogenous drivers (political 
and economic structures, institutions, agents, and ideas) respond to the 
country’s economic and political challenges? (iii) How did foreign aid 
interact with endogenous drivers, and to what extent did it possibly play 
a catalytic role towards the country’s economic and political transfor-
mation? (iv) On the basis of Ghana’s experiences with aid, generally un-
der what conditions can aid be a catalyst?  
The thesis systematically followed the analytical framework developed 
in chapters 2 and 3 to answer the research questions. Using primary and 
secondary sources of information, and constructing a chain of causal 
mechanisms and effects (process tracing), the three analytical chapters 
provided answers to how foreign aid and endogenous factors interacted 
in each of the three phases to achieve the level of economic and political 
transformation and development that Ghana has today. This final chap-
ter summarises the study’s findings and conclusions, and further reflects 
on the concept of aid as a catalyst to draw some general policy implica-
tions for Africa. 
7.2 Summary of Findings 
7.2.1 Ghana’s economic and political challenges from 1957 to 
2013 
The analysis found a number of intractable challenges bedevilling Gha-
na’s economy and politics since 1957 to date, and hence holding back the 
country’s development and transformation. The challenges are structural, 
institutional and policy related. If aid were, indeed, a catalyst to devel-
opment, then it would attempt to facilitate the efforts of endogenous 
actors to address those challenges. The following is a summary of some 
of the challenges. 
Weak economic structure, inadequate investment in transformation 
and consequent excessive demand for foreign exchange  
Ghana’s economy since independence has been led by agricultural and 
primary commodities. The mode of production has been a traditional 
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smallholder or peasant farming system with little use of technology. 
Agrarian transformation has been weak. There are also weak forward 
and backward linkages between agriculture and agro-industry. The reli-
ance of the economy on a few primary commodities like cocoa beans, 
gold, timber, and recently crude oil, means that the terms of trade have 
never favoured the country. An initial attempt to diversify the economy 
through import-substitution industries was a complete failure because of 
political patronage and inefficient management. Endogenous drives to-
wards structural transformation have been weak and inconsistent for two 
reasons: First, various political regimes have failed to push for transfor-
mation from above. Neither the military regime nor the liberal democrat-
ic regimes have invested in agricultural transformation. Governments 
have looked at short-term gains and have not invested many resources in 
productive sectors like agriculture, which is the first step to economic 
transformation. They have invested in infrastructure, which is “eye-
pleasing” to the electorate, in order to win votes. The second reason is 
the poor organisation of producer associations to push for transfor-
mation from below. With the exception of cocoa farmers, none of the 
associations of producers has a cohesive bargaining influence to compel 
ruling elites to support productive sectors. Many of the strong associa-
tions represent import and trading businesses and there are few in pro-
duction. Business associations comprise contractors that have strong 
linkages with political parties, especially the ones in power, and have 
strong incentives to maintain the status quo that emphasises trading in 
imported goods (Oduro et al., 2014). 
One of the consequences of Ghana’s weak economic structure is in-
adequate inflow of foreign currency. This challenge is compounded by 
high demand for foreign exchange to import goods from abroad, thereby 
putting pressure on the local currency. In January 2014 alone, the Gha-
naian cedi lost about 7% of its value against international currencies, es-
pecially the US dollar. The country’s inability to earn sufficient foreign 
exchange through international trade was the main reason why Nkru-
mah’s industrialisation programme failed. In 1983 and 2014, inadequate 
foreign exchange to maintain the value of the local currency from depre-
ciation was also why Ghana had to go to the IMF for a financial bailout. 
If a country does not produce much of what it consumes then there is 
always demand for foreign currency to import goods from abroad. 
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Ghana currently spends US$ 1bn to import food. In 2014, rice impor-
tation alone amounted to about US$ 600m and sugar, tomatoes, vegeta-
ble cooking oil, frozen fish, poultry and wheat an additional US$ 400m 
(Government of Ghana, 2014). Thus, there is always pressure on availa-
ble foreign exchange. This problem has been worsened by unbridled 
trade liberalisation that allows importation of everything into the coun-
try. Foreign aid, therefore, comes in handy to supplement the country’s 
foreign exchange shortages; but, because much of the aid is not invested 
in productive economic sectors that can increase exports to earn more 
foreign exchange, or invested in areas that will produce much of what 
the country imports, foreign aid has not helped to meet Ghana’s eco-
nomic challenge.  
While foreign aid has not provided the needed catalysis to productive 
sectors, the country’s history of political patronage and inefficient man-
agement of import-substitution industries has also not helped to rekindle 
state support to productive sectors. With the exception of Phase I, and 
specifically during Nkrumah’s regime, politicians and many senior eco-
nomic advisors to various governments have become fixated on the ide-
ology of state retreat and creation of an enabling environment for private 
sector development. Since 1986, Ghana has imbibed an overdose of neo-
liberal ideas that the state is not good at production; the state is only 
good at leading from behind. However, the so-called enabling environ-
ment over the years has not attracted private sector investment to the 
manufacturing sector that can create jobs for the growing urban popula-
tion. Ghana’s economy is suffering from the missing middle -
manufacturing; in fact, broadly speaking, from a weak industrial sector. 
The state has retreated from production while the private sector, both 
foreign and domestic, has been hesitant to invest in manufacturing. 
Former President Rawlings recounted his experience in 1988 when his 
government requested support from a major donor to build modern 
grain storage facilities in a major cereal production area: 
I recall that once, in the mid-eighties, the PNDC approached a donor with 
a proposal to build modern grain storage facilities in areas of major cereal 
production so that we could buy from the farmers at harvest time, prevent 
post-harvest losses and release grain for sale during the lean season. To 
our utter surprise, the donor refused, saying that it would “interfere with 
market forces”. Where are the market forces? Meanwhile, excess grain 
production was leading to falling prices and total waste. But the donor was 
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not interested (Interview with former President Rawlings, on 2 October 
2015). 
The Ghana government, apparently having realised the need to invest 
in the productive sector, in 2014 proposed to establish the EXIM Bank 
to provide direct funding to productive sectors that would focus on ex-
ports so that the country could earn more foreign exchange. In view of 
the government past failures with import-substitution industries, the 
state is hesitant to be a partner and hence the EXIM Bank will only offer 
loans to the private sector.  
Finding the best-fit economic policy  
Ghana has muddled through different economic policies, looking for the 
best fit for its socio-political context. As Chapter 4 showed, from 1957 
to 1982, Ghana for the most part pursued socialistic policies making 
state institutions the engine of economic growth. Nkrumah argued 
against developing a capitalist society because that would be inconsistent 
with the country’s context.1 Little foreign aid was invested in the socialis-
tic economic policies because the major aid providers of that time did 
not subscribe to them. Some of the experts interviewed for this argued 
that, had foreign aid supported Ghana’s preferred economic policy (so-
cialism or state-led development), the country would have probably built 
a strong developmental state such as Singapore or South Korea, which 
also began their transformation with a high level of state patronage.2 The 
state enterprises could have built up their capacity. This was because the 
two countries They pointed out that South Korea had received substan-
tial aid, mainly grants, from the United States and Japan, which it was 
able to build on and develop without being saddled with very high for-
eign.  
However, others labelled this argument as being counterfactual, that 
is, based on suppositions of what might have happened under different 
circumstances.3 They contended that even if foreign aid had been sub-
stantially invested in socialist economic policy, there was no guarantee 
that Ghana’s would have been transformed. For example, Tanzania had 
unsuccessfully experimented own version of African socialism, called 
Ujaama, even though it had received a considerable amount of donor 
aid, especially from the Scandinavian countries. It is estimated that about 
US$ 10bn of aid poured into Tanzania over 20 years (Ayadole et al., 
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2005:1). However, the economy contracted at an average rate of 0.5% a 
year from 1973 to 1988. In fact, there is no evidence of successful social-
ism from any African country. As shown in Chapter 4, Ghana almost 
became a failed state by 1983 due to many factors among them was so-
cialist policies. One of the key outcomes of the socialist policies was dis-
incentive to production and promotion of rent seeking, leading to en-
demic corruption in the country. 
 Many African leaders and analysts believe that had Ghana and many 
African countries not overextended the role of the state in development, 
the private sector could have triggered structural transformation as hap-
pened in Southeast Asia. Countries in SE Asia switched to capitalist poli-
cies and promoted exports and private sector growth instead of instead 
of import-substitution industries, which enabled them to develop faster 
than socialist African countries. President Aboulaye Wade of Senegal 
once said, “Countries that have developed—in Europe, America, Japan, 
Asian countries like Taiwan, Korea and Singapore—have all believed in 
free markets. There is no mystery there. Africa took the wrong road after 
independence.” (Ayedole, et al., 2005:1). Although the literature shows 
that the transformation of countries in Southeast Asia -South Korea, 
Singapore, and Malaysia involved significant statist policies with state 
patronage, the difference was that they managed state enterprises better 
than Ghana and the rest of Africa did. Given Ghana’s socio-cultural and 
political context of patronage, the adoption of control regimes hurt 
growth and also contributed to elite capture. 
By 1983, many Ghanaians were convinced that the economic policies 
had failed, and the drive to an alternative economic policy like capitalism 
was welcomed even if they did not know the consequences. From 1983 
to 1992, Ghana implemented economic neo-liberal policy reforms that 
received IMF and World Bank financial support. Foreign aid from the 
Bretton Woods institutions helped to shore up Ghana’s fiscal needs (bal-
ance of payments and budget financing) while contributing to macro-
economic management and stability. The general assessment was that aid 
was successful in reversing the economic decline. GDP growth moved 
from negative to positive. Since then Ghana has seen economic growth 
averaging 5% over three decades (1983-2013). Throughout the 1980s, 
Ghana earned high marks for its policy reform.  
However, in the Ghanaian political and economic history this period 
remains a contested one. While many analysts praise the new policy re-
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gime, others term the era as a lost decade and accuse the neo-liberal gov-
ernments of squandering opportunities for achieving sustainable eco-
nomic transformation and economic takeoff. Describing the neo-liberal 
policies as “Reaganomics gone berserk”, the critics say that the policies 
damaged the economy in many ways, to such an extent that Ghana may 
not be able to recover from their effects for many years to come (Lewis, 
2005). The analysis in this thesis showed that Ghana could not have dealt 
with the economic crisis amidst the three endogenous factors and four 
exogenous shocks that paralysed the economy in 1982/83. The IMF and 
World Bank grants and loans boosted government spending on basic 
necessities. If that flow of donor money had not come, the country 
would have been unstable, since coup leaders had always tried to justify 
their action by pointing to widespread economic hardship in the country. 
Thus, in the absence of development assistance by the IMF/WB, and 
later by bilateral donors, the economic hardships would have worsened, 
leading to violence. Ghana might have been counted as yet another failed 
state.  
In the late 1990s, the World Bank issued a series of reports showing 
that countries like Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire and Mauritius, 
which had adopted strong structural adjustment policies, had performed 
better than weak and non-SAP countries like Angola, Cameroun, 
Mozambique, Chad, Rwanda and Uganda. However, UNECA (n.d) dis-
putes the World Bank’s assessment.  
Towards the beginning of the new millennium, Ghana’s economic 
policies, inspired by the international community, focused on poverty 
alleviation. Currently, the policies lean towards unbridled neo-liberalism 
and there is lukewarm government support for productive sectors. The 
role of the state in economic development has changed substantially 
since 1983. The post-independence state was inefficient, but no donor 
proposed help to improve the management capacity of the government. 
Instead, when a later government approached the IMF and World Bank 
for aid, the conditionality was replacement of the economic role of the 
state with the market-driven private sector. With the support of the en-
dogenous leadership, the economic role of the state was dismantled.  
Recent experiences in Southeast Asia, China, and Brazil show that it is 
rather involvement, not withdrawal of the state that promotes economic 
transformation. In Ghana, the rigid implementation of neo-liberalism has 
crowded out policy-making by Ghanaian governments to the extent 
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where it is almost taboo for the state to contemplate direct support to 
productive sectors. The cocoa sector is the only one that almost all polit-
ical regimes coalesce around to ensure continuous production. Politicians 
and civil servants in Ghana would like to pursue a policy that provides 
incentives to productive sectors of the economy in the context of donor 
projects, but as long as donors do not invest in productive sectors, very 
few of the state’s resources are committed to those sectors.  
Of course, politicians have their own reason for wanting to support 
productive sectors: job creation, which would strengthen them electoral-
ly. And if there were donor interest in and financial support to produc-
tive sectors, there would be project perks that would come to politicians 
and civil servants directly. These are an important factor in determining 
the level of their commitment after signing on the dotted line. The 
World Bank’s support projects for non-traditional exports in the mid 
1990s are an example of how lack of interest and unsuitable policies can 
combine to undermine projects. The government did not have its own 
strategy for supporting the industry, so it merely followed the World 
Bank’s lead. The World Bank focused largely on providing short-term 
credit to cover shipments and neglected long-term credit for expanding 
the working capital of the small-scale private sector entrepreneurs (Whit-
field, 2011d). In the end, the overall effect of the projects did not meet 
the World Bank’s expectations.  
Ghana’s industrial sector as a whole has been affected by lack of sup-
port. Governments have not implemented any plans to support industry 
and donors have not been interested in putting money into the sector. 
Unsurprisingly, the size of the industrial sector shrank in the 1990s. The 
only time when there seems to have been direct support to manufactur-
ing industries was in 2006 when the NPP government decided to fund 
industrial development. However, when the NDC came to power, not 
much of this state support was provided. The bottom line is that Ghana 
has not managed to chart out the best-fit economic policies that would 
suit the economic challenges facing the country. Inadequate foreign ex-
change, poor terms of trade and consequent BoP deficits, and economic 
fragility, exist today as they did many decades ago, and the country con-
tinues to receive donor assistance and IMF/World Bank policy prescrip-
tions that so far have not led to economic transformation. 
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Finding a good-fit political system to complement economic policy  
Ghana’s pursuit of economic transformation also means that the country 
needs to find an appropriate political system that would not only com-
plement economic policy but also be in sync with Ghanaian society. It 
requires a political system that would enable the design of development 
policies and allocation of resources, including aid money, to the right 
investment that would expand economic rent. Ghana began its devel-
opmental trajectory with a political system that was akin to that of its 
colonial government. The founding political party and government, CPP, 
soon found that the political system—the Westminster model—was dif-
ficult to work with and changed it to a one-party model. As the analytical 
chapters showed, from 1957 to 2013, Ghana shifted from one political 
system to another, searching for the best fit. Since 1992, Ghana appears 
to have settled on multi-party democracy characterised by a competitive 
clientelistic political party system. That political system has generated 
perverse incentives for governments to look for short-term projects that 
enable them to win elections, rather than long-term planning towards 
economic transformation and development.  
Incumbent governments, whether NPP or NDC, engage in a wide-
spread state patronage to remain in power. They hardly consider the 
long-term economic repercussions of their short-term political gains. 
The large fiscal deficits following every election year increase the public 
debt, and because these expenditures are not for productive activities but 
purely for consumption, there is no corresponding revenue generation. 
In 2012, the NDC government overspent the budget to the tune of 
11.8% of GDP, while the approved target was 6.7% (MoF, 2013). Gha-
naian governments have little inclination to exercise fiscal discipline 
while talking much about immediate “bread and butter” issues. Hence, 
there are doubts as to whether the use of ODA in budgetary support is 
the appropriate catalyst that the country needs. Research in Thailand and 
Bangladesh (Webster et al., 2009) shows that the negative effect of com-
petitive clientelism politics can be neutralised if the country’s economy 
has seen some degree of transformation. In Ghana’s case, there has been 
little desired economic transformation, so a little wastage of resources 
translates into macro-economic instability because the absorptive capaci-
ty of the economy is small.  
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An efficient, committed and disciplined state bureaucracy  
According to Leftwich (1995: 401) developmental states are those 
“whose politics have concentrated sufficient power, autonomy and ca-
pacity at the centre to shape, pursue and encourage the achievement of 
explicit developmental objectives.” An efficient, committed and disci-
plined state bureaucracy is one of the major challenges to aid catalysis in 
Ghana (Andrews, 2010). After years of donor-supported reforms, bu-
reaucracy in Ghana does not function as an instrument for achieving so-
cial and economic goals, nor does it effectively complement the private 
sector to achieve a set target of the state. State bureaucracy functions 
more as a patronage institution for the government, or for individual 
benefit. State bureaucrats and public officers consider the perks that 
come with donor projects more than how much they are contributing to 
any identifiable national development goals, policy or programme. The 
relationship between politicians and bureaucrats is a key determinant of 
the success of a developmental state model.  
Democratic developmental leadership with the right attitude and 
vision 
One of the key developmental blockages facing Ghana is the lack of 
leadership with the right attitude and vision. Since Kwame Nkrumah’s 
overthrow, for more than four decades many Ghanaian leaders have had 
a similar orientation towards the development process, have been im-
plementing similar neo-liberal policies, and have been engaging in pat-
ronage politics. An expert interviewee who has witnessed all the leader-
ships and regimes in Ghana observed: 
Ghanaians and our development partners are fixated with democracy that 
leads to a change of presidency, but not inspired by any positive change in 
ideology and policies. Our leaders do not have their own ideology. Since 
the overthrow of Nkrumah, those who believe that Ghana is capable of 
solving its problems have not led Ghana or have never come to power. 
The overthrow of Nkrumah brought an end to endogenous ideology and 
drive towards development. Under certificate of urgency, Parliament 
passed a law that prohibited the holding and circulation of photographs of 
Nkrumah in 1969. That is how far we went in destroying endogenous or 
alternative ideology to the Western narrative about development. So, if to-
day we are not getting alternatives ideas and all our leaders behave in the 
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same way, it cannot be divorced from colonisation (Interview with a social 
commentator and journalist 07 August 2015).  
Many of the experts interviewed find a resonance with the above 
viewpoint. As shown in the analysis, apart from Nkrumah and Rawlings 
when he was heading a military regime, no leader has emerged with a 
radical vision that offers a possible solution to the developmental chal-
lenges facing Ghana, and who has managed to carry the people along 
that visionary path. Countries that have successfully transformed their 
economies (Singapore, Taiwan, Malaysia, South Korea) had presidents 
who were transformational. They charted a developmental path and en-
sured that the processes were cascaded down to influence the work eth-
ics of the public servants.  
7.2.2 Transformed politics: from military dictatorship to fully-
fledged democratic rule 
Ghana has become one of the most politically transformed countries on 
the African continent. A country that in a period of 35 years (1957-1992) 
has had only 13 years of democratic rule and 22 years of military dicta-
torship; and in the 1980s was described as one of the most elite unstable 
countries in Africa, is now a model of democratic governance for the 
continent. Since 1992, Ghana has organised seven competitive democrat-
ic elections judged by local and international observers to be free and 
fair. Opposition political parties have defeated ruling parties in competi-
tive elections that would have degenerated into chaos in many sub-
Saharan countries. There are clear separations of powers between the 
Executive, Judiciary and Legislature. While there are weaknesses in the 
current structure—for example, too much power is bestowed on the Ex-
ecutive—; it is not comparable to the periods of military rule when all 
powers resided in the head of state. There is also a vibrant media that 
provides a lot of political discourse, helping to inform the public. The 
political instability associated with frequent military takeovers is a thing 
of the past and is highly unlikely to happen again in the near future.  
Ghanaians have resolved to organise their politics through multi-party 
democracy and they believe that even imperfect democratic rule is better 
than military dictatorship. Afro-barometer studies (surveys 1-5) over the 
past years consistently show that 80% of Ghanaians prefer democracy to 
military rule (Afro-barometer, 2008). Since 1993 there has been no at-
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tempt by political groups or the military to overthrow the government. 
The country is highly stable; the occasional tensions during elections 
have not escalated to threaten state stability.  
Nevertheless, one has to be careful not to be carried away by the sub-
stantial progress that Ghana has made in political transformation. There 
remain questions regarding the quality of democratic institutions that 
have been developed. For instance, the democratic system dominated by 
two parties has led to a competitive clientelism political settlement that is 
not promoting productive economic transformation in the country. To a 
large extent, Ghana’s democratic institutions have generated more per-
verse actors who look out for their personal interests and use formal in-
stitutions and processes to protect their interests. A litany of corruption 
cases, instead of accountability, is what Ghanaians have become accus-
tomed to as the by-product of the current political settlement. Though 
they detest its prevalence in the country, their strong resolve to continue 
having democracy has given ruling elites perverse incentives to pursue 
more short-term and club goods instead of long-term public goods. The 
current political settlement has had strongly negative influence on inclu-
sive growth and development.  
7.2.3 Ghana’s economic growth without structural 
transformation 
Ghana’s economy has seen growth averaging about 5% over the last two 
decades. This has translated into 2.8% per capita growth per annum 
(Government of Ghana, 2010:4). However, there has been little econom-
ic structural transformation in the country. The stylised fact about eco-
nomic transformation is that agriculture’s contribution to GDP, agricul-
tural employment and agricultural exports decrease, while those of 
industry increase, and later this transformation cascades to the value 
added service sector. According to the literature, this conventional path 
to economic transformation starts with productivity gain in the agricul-
tural sector through science and technological innovation. From 1960 to 
2013, Ghana’s economy experienced unconventional structural changes 
(as shown in Figure 1.4). Agriculture’s contribution to GDP has fallen 
from 50% in 1965 to 22.7% in 2012. Instead of this reduction benefiting 
industry in a stylised structural transformation sense, industrial growth 
has been abysmal. From 1957, when industry was virtually non-existent 
until Nkrumah’s policy of import-substitution industrialisation, the con-
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tribution of industry to GDP growth rose to 23% in 1967. It has fluctu-
ated since then, reaching its lowest level at 10% from 1982 to 1985. It 
rose in late 1990s to mid 2000s, but growth has never gone beyond 30% 
of GDP throughout the five decades of the country’s quest to achieve 
economic transformation. It is the service sector that has seen massive 
growth; contributing more than 50% to GDP. As noted earlier, Ghana’s 
industrial sector performance is far lower than that of many of its coun-
terparts in the region. 
Since 1985, Ghana’s economy has seen consistent growth, though not 
comparable to the achievements of the Asian countries during their peri-
od of transition to economic development. The remarkable difference is 
that the Asians achieved their growth with economic structural trans-
formation, not without it. There was productivity increase in smallholder 
agriculture, and industrial growth. Their economic transformation fol-
lows a similar pattern in the industrial world. Throughout history, no 
country has achieved sustained growth without transformation of the 
structures of the economy (Kuznets, 1966). Ghana’s, and much of Afri-
ca’s, structural transformation does not follow the normal pattern. In-
dustrialisation, and particularly the manufacturing sector, was the key in 
the industrial revolutions of Western Countries as well as Southeast Asia. 
The service sector that is now leading in terms of employment and con-
tribution to GDP has not propelled Ghana and many SSA countries to 
an economic breakthrough. Without proper structural transformation 
that links agricultural productivity with industrial policy, as happened in 
Southeast Asia, a country like Ghana can at best achieve economic stabil-
ity if growth is fuelled by aid and natural resource expansion, but it may 
stumble several times on the path to sustainable economic growth. This 
is what has begun to happen to Ghana’s economy.  
Five decades of Ghana’s association with foreign aid has done very 
little to improve industrial performance. The economic challenges of in-
adequate foreign exchange, poor terms of trade and consequent BoP 
deficits, and economic fragility, exist today as they did many decades ago, 
and the country continues to receive donor assistance and IMF/World 
Bank policy prescriptions. Ghana’s exports composition has changed 
very little over decades in comparison with other high-growth nations. 
Exports still consist mainly of unprocessed agricultural commodities and 
extractive natural resources, and recently crude oil. Primary commodities 
account for about 50% of Ghana’s GDP and 90% of exports. Though 
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economic growth has continued over a long period, Ghana is unable to 
break into the ranks of sustainable high growth countries through ex-
ports of raw commodities. This does not mean that Ghana will have to 
cease exporting the products in which it has a comparative advantage; 
but unless there is value addition to the primary products, improved 
terms of trade and balance of payments will continue to elude the coun-
try. By adding value to primary products through processing, a link is 
established with structural transformation as labour can move from agri-
culture. The agricultural sector still absorbs about 42 % of the labour 
force, yet it contributes only 32% to GDP. There is no use of improved 
technology. Hence, the sector is devoid of the needed transformation. 
Manufacturing has been the weakest sector in terms of contribution to 
GDP, employment, and exports; the sector needs to grow to ensure sus-
tainable and inclusive development.  
Urban areas in Ghana have created a market for consumption of for-
eign goods and services in both formal and informal sectors. While cities 
generally present opportunities for manufacturing industries, in Ghana 
they are an opportunity for trading in cheap foreign-manufactured prod-
ucts rather than production of tradeable goods—the result of three dec-
ades of trade liberalisation policy supported by the IMF and World Bank. 
Ghana’s service-sector-led economy is devoid of export-oriented high 
technology and information production that characterises, for example, 
India’s. Ghana’s is dominated by informal small and micro businesses 
that trade in imported goods and services. All countries that remain poor 
have failed to achieve structural transformation. The abnormality of 
Ghana’s transformation is that the slight decline in the share of agricul-
ture has not been replaced by manufacturing, but by growing informality 
in the service sector. Manufacturing has stagnated for a very long time 
because of the state’s failure to transform agriculture and promote indus-
trialisation. Application of technology and science to increase productivi-
ty in the agricultural sector, which could drive transformation and com-
petitive agro-processing industries, is extremely slow. According to 
Kolavalli et al. (2012) high consumption of foreign goods by Ghanaian 
urban dwellers puts enormous pressure on the foreign exchange rate.  
The economic policy orientation of foreign aid in the past two dec-
ades has been the neo-liberal approach of getting fundamentals right in-
stead of promoting economic structural change, which is key to driving 
sustained economic growth. As pointed out by Rodrik (2006) there is a 
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need to focus on both, getting the fundamentals right “improved gov-
ernance, macro-economic management, openness, rule of law, property 
rights, better investment climate” right, and also promoting structural 
change “industrial policy, subsidies for specific sectors, infrastructure 
and technology investment, and transformation of the rural economy”. 
Rodrik argues that a heavy focus on one and less on the other will lead 
to unsustainable growth and development. Promotion of economic 
transformation is one area where aid has failed to catalyse development 
in Ghana. The country’s development partners have focused assistance 
on getting policy fundamentals right and less on supporting the structur-
al transformation of productive sectors.  
Going forward, there are a number of critical factors. There is a need 
for massive injection of science, technology and finance into the agricul-
tural sector to promote economic transformation. It is impossible for 
Ghana to reduce poverty substantially if there is no agriculture transfor-
mation to propel competitive agro-processing industries for job creation 
and economic growth.  
7.2.4 Catalysis of foreign aid and endogenous drivers of economic 
and political transformation and development (1957-2013) 
Foreign aid as a catalyst to development was found to be key in four 
channels: providing needed foreign exchange; prodding other reluctant 
donors to provide additional and complementary support; directly influ-
encing policy direction and political transition; and further nurturing 
democratic development. This study found that during Phase I, foreign 
aid was too little to have a significant impact on economic growth and 
policy direction. In-depth analysis shows that during the early part of 
Phase I, Ghana had endogenous drivers that could have substantially 
transformed the economy but very little aid was provided to support 
their efforts. Then, deterioration of the endogenous drivers led to the 
worst development outcomes in the history of the country.  
If there was one period in Ghana’s history when foreign aid was des-
perately needed (and was given) to catalyze endogenous efforts to 
change economic policy direction, it was 1983 to 1992. Total ODA in-
jected into the economy jumped from US$ 1,281bn (1970-82) to US$ 
4,626bn (1983-92), all in current US$ prices. Annual per capita ODA 
rose from US$ 9 in 1983 to US$ 50 in 1989. During that period, the IFI’s 
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catalytic role in Ghana did not end with directly providing financial re-
sources to the cash-strapped economy, but it also prompted the return 
of many bilateral donors that had left the country during the turbulent 
political and economic period. In the early years of the intervention, 
many bilateral donors had a “wait and see” attitude, but subsequently 
followed the financial lead and granting decisions of the IMF and World 
Bank. If the Bretton Woods institutions decided that Ghana had com-
plied with its conditionality, bilateral donors would follow and offer as-
sistance as well. The IFI’s aid to Ghana, therefore, not only became a 
consequence for itself but also was directly linked to larger aid flows to 
the country.  
Foreign aid further provided the catalyst for endogenous efforts to 
pursue economic policy reforms that previous governments had avoided 
because of serious political ramifications associated with economic re-
forms. As foreign aid offset economic shocks and reduced political pres-
sure, Ghanaian authorities became more confident about further pursu-
ing changes. Over time, aid flows to Ghana multiplied seven-fold from 
1983 to 1989, as many donors supported a country that was making dif-
ficult decisions in a precarious political context. Aid provided the foreign 
exchange to enable the government to import essential commodities 
needed by the populace. The inflows enabled the Ghanaian economy to 
“resurrect” in the crucial period when growth was needed most. In that 
sense, foreign aid enabled the government to buy support from the pop-
ulation as imports helped filled the empty shelves of supermarkets. It 
provided a breather for the government because the citizens immediately 
saw light shining at the end of the tunnel. Aid, in essence, allowed Ghana 
to escape the catastrophic possibility of being a tagged a failed state.  
The country’s macro-economic indicators, which had registered nega-
tive growth, all began to show positives. GDP growth rose from -4.6% 
in 1983 to 8.6% the following year and maintained a consistent rate of 
more than 5% throughout the decade. During the period of reforms 
(Phase II), endogenous elements were predisposed to making aid work. 
Whenever the World Bank and IMF considered endogenous resources 
around which to build growth of the economy, cocoa and gold provided 
the needed revenue to complement aid. Without the two resources, it 
would have been difficult for aid alone to resurrect the economy. Ghana-
ian technocrats also worked hard to make aid work during that period. 
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Aid conditionality compelled the Ghanaian government to be fiscally 
disciplined. 
In 1992, foreign aid was used to cajole the PNDC regime to return to 
multi-party democracy. Rawlings was hesitant to turn a new leaf until 
foreign aid was used in a carrot and stick approach. He was made to un-
derstand the consequences of foreign aid being withheld for not pursu-
ing democratic governance. The financial and technical assistance that 
donors provided for the transitional process and to the Electoral Com-
mission was an important catalyst. Aid supported election monitoring 
and institution building. Much of the budget of civil society organisa-
tions that supported democratic governance in Ghana came from do-
nors. While foreign aid has been a major catalyst to the transformation 
process, much of the credit must be given to Ghanaians for resolving to 
be ruled democratically. Compared with countries in the sub-region that 
also received substantial donor support to promote democratic reform, 
Ghana did not need much aid to bring about a rapid political transfor-
mation, because endogenous institutions and actors committed them-
selves to political discourse. They felt that they owned the process and 
were determined to make it work. With a little financial and technical 
support, in addition to moral pressure on the military regime, Ghana was 
ready to pursue political transformation that had failed to thrive in pre-
vious attempts. 
After the 1992 democratic elections, foreign aid increased substantial-
ly, reaching an annual average of US$ 600,000m in current prices 
throughout the decade. By 2004, the contribution of ODA to GDP had 
reached US$ 1.4bn a year, more than the total sum received from 1970 
to 1982, and by 2012 an all-time high of US$ 1.8bn. Though increased in 
absolute terms, the catalytic role of foreign aid to the economy began to 
experience diminishing returns by the late 1990s, as its continuous flow 
did not trigger much positive response from endogenous actors. The 
catalytic role of aid became less effective because the context within 
which it was provided changed substantially. During Phase III, Ghana 
became less desperately in need of the catalyst, as compared with Phase 
II. To quote Tsikata (2011), foreign aid had left Ghana in an “economic 
vegetative state” in which the economy did not respond to aid or be-
come worse off with additional doses of it. Many endogenous elements 
began to react negatively, thereby deactivating the potency of aid as a 
catalyst to development. The subsequent decline of aid as a percentage 
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of GDP and government expenditure gives the impression that aid could 
have been done without. 
During the era of competitive politics, fiscal discipline, which was one 
of the major catalytic roles that IMF introduced in its relationship with 
Ghana, was largely ignored during election years. Whenever there was a 
general election, the government incurred large budget deficits. This 
happened during the 1992, 1996, 2000, 2008 and 2012 elections. The 
immediate outcomes of fiscal indiscipline have been macro-economic 
instability (high inflation and interest rates, and unstable foreign ex-
change rates). Also, as a result of competitive clientelistic policies, Ghana 
has witnessed unprecedented levels of corruption during multi-party de-
mocracy. With so much money not linked to productive sectors but rent 
seeking through political side payments, the challenges of fiscal indisci-
pline and macro-economic instability occur regularly in the management 
of Ghana’s economy. Loans are contracted from bilateral and multilat-
eral donors, and also from commercial private capital, but very little of 
the money is invested in productive sectors. This means that fiscal disci-
pline is sustainable when endogenously generated, but it cannot be in-
duced by foreign aid and enforced by conditionality. The instances of 
policy slippage every four years suggest that sustained commitment to 
fiscal discipline is needed to enable the economic policy that aid catalyses 
to work, but the Ghanaian politicians cannot be pinned down on that 
attribute because that would mean losing elections to their competitors. 
In the absence of that endogenous discipline, foreign aid just replaces 
wasted endogenous resources. 
The findings of the study imply that foreign aid should have ended 
10years ago in Ghana, when it lost its positive catalytic effect. By 2007, 
foreign aid’s contribution to GDP had fallen substantially, and it contin-
ues to decline further. The continuous flow of aid into the country be-
came distractive because it got the leadership used to not thinking about 
economic management without the presence of aid. At the backs of their 
minds, ruling elites believed that when the economy worsened after 
mismanagement of endogenous revenue, donor money would come to 
the rescue. So, they cared less about the amount of debt stock they incur. 
In 2005, Ghana’s debt was substantially reduced by more than 50% as a 
result of HIPC. Cancelling debt and replacing it with new aid did not 
help the country; less than a decade later, after spending a considerable 
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amount of endogenous revenue on unproductive activities, the country 
was back to the 2005 debt level.  
Another area in which foreign aid became a negative catalyst to Gha-
na’s development was its role in making the public sector less proactive 
in promotion of development. Under the guise of structural adjustment 
policies, and specifically civil service reforms, the World Bank and IMF 
instigated dismantling of development planning in Ghana. It prevented 
the establishment of planning departments (Whitfield and Frazer, 
2010:356). However, studies of many successful developmental states 
show that state bureaucracy and planning were key to their success (Pi-
card, 1987; Kim, 2013; Thovoethin, 2014). 
In summary, during the past 56 years that Ghana has been associated 
with foreign aid, different forms of catalysis have taken place. Tables 7.1 
and 7.2 summarise the study findings and conclusions for each of the 
three phases. 
 
 
Table 7.1 
Summary of Economic Catalysis in the Three Phases  
Attribututes 
Of Catalytic 
Foreign Aid 
(ODA) 
Period 
Phase I (1957-82) Phase II (1983-92) Phase III (1993-2013) 
ODA as ac-
celerator of 
endogenous 
resources 
and invest-
ment drive 
Very little of a cata-
lyst was added to 
endogenous substanc-
es. Given the high 
activation energy of 
endogenous leader-
ship, developmental 
state ideology, re-
source endowment 
and political institu-
tions, if aid had been 
meant for economic 
transformation it 
would have been the 
best catalyst, but Cold 
War ideology and 
mode of aid at that 
time made its facilita-
tion role less catalytic. 
There was substantial 
provision of ODA that 
facilitated endogenous 
drive to economic 
policy change and 
growth. 
ODA was substantial 
but gradually lost 
potency to influence 
change. Endogenous 
institutions and actors 
produced negative 
reactions to deacti-
vate the potency of 
the catalyst to influ-
ence changes. Contin-
uous flow of aid was 
unable to induce 
change; in fact, aid 
itself has become a 
negative catalyst. 
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Attribututes 
Of Catalytic 
Foreign Aid 
(ODA) 
Period 
Phase I (1957-82) Phase II (1983-92) Phase III (1993-2013) 
ODA provid-
ing a conven-
ient surface 
for endoge-
nous drivers 
to react 
Cold War ideology that 
dominated ODA at that 
time did not provide a 
convenient space for 
its effective use for 
development. 
The Cold War ideology 
deactivated the po-
tency of ODA to cata-
lyse endogenous re-
sources. Subsequently, 
visionary leadership 
was replaced with 
poor leadership. 
In addition to provid-
ing money, it also 
provided a convenient 
platform to rally other 
donors and fostered 
economic policy re-
forms. Aid was able to 
deactivate endogenous 
energy coming from 
institutions and ac-
tors, thereby enabling 
positive catalysis to 
take place. 
Growing endogenous 
resources and institu-
tions made ODA super-
fluous at some stage. 
Disposition 
of a recipi-
ent country’s 
drivers to 
react to 
catalytic aid 
Endogenous drivers 
(leaderships in par-
ticular) were not pre-
disposed to working 
with aid. 
Endogenous drivers 
were highly disposed 
to working with aid. 
Depleted resources 
but committed leader-
ship catalysed effec-
tively with adequate 
amount of a catalyst. 
The overall condition 
was good for aid to 
work. 
  
Endogenous actors 
were disposed to 
working with aid, but 
for perverse reasons 
(to replace wasted 
endogenous resources) 
Selecting 
appropriate 
catalyst to 
yield prefer-
ential trans-
formation 
Aid was less as grants 
and more as loans. 
Also, a substantial 
part of the aid 
throughout the period 
was trade commodity 
and tied aid. With the 
exception of Akosom-
bo Dam, not much of 
the aid was invested in 
productive sectors to 
promote economic 
transformation. 
The quality of aid was 
good. The ratio of 
grants to loan was 
good. In addition, 
there was high dis-
bursement; supported 
rehabilitation of de-
funct industries and 
further targeted eco-
nomic institutions and 
policies. ODA helped 
knock Ghana off its 
deleterious economic 
path and enabled the 
country to achieve 
economic recovery. 
Ghana needed aid that 
would focus on pro-
ductive sectors, but 
aid was invested in-
stead in social sectors. 
Aid as a catalyst was 
therefore not the ideal 
type for economic 
transformation. 
Ideal catalyst 
would not 
change 
Ideology of aid was 
heavily influenced by 
the Cold War. Aid was 
less developmental 
compared with its 
original aim. 
The rationale of ODA 
changed from multi- 
development to a 
single ideology of neo-
liberalism. Poverty 
reduction was not a 
major target of aid 
Economic rationale 
appears not to be the 
driving force of aid. 
Ghana’s democratic 
credentials make it 
attractive to foreign 
aid. 
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Table 7.2 
Summary of political catalysis during the three phases  
Attributute Of 
Catalytic Foreign 
Aid 
Period 
Phase I  
(1957-82) 
Phase II  
(1983-92) 
Phase III  
(1993-2013) 
ODA as accelerator 
of endogenous 
resources and in-
vestment drive 
Though quantita-
tively very little, it 
was a negative 
catalyst to politi-
cal growth. 
Very little ODA was 
devoted to political 
change. In fact, ODA 
throughout the period 
was not targeted at 
political transfor-
mation, but for a 
good reason. 
Aid was a positive 
catalyst, substantial-
ly supporting demo-
cratic institutions. 
Providing a conven-
ient surface for 
endogenous drivers 
to react. 
Because of Cold 
War ideology, aid 
fostered tension 
and divided politi-
cal institutions in 
the country. ODA 
later became neg-
ative catalyst to 
state-building. 
During the later peri-
od of Phase II, ODA 
was used to cajole 
endogenous leaders to 
transition to multi-
party elections. ODA 
also supported local 
institutions to pro-
mote political plural-
ism. 
ODA provided space 
for endogenous insti-
tutions to build up 
the confidence and 
capacity to organise 
credible elections. 
Disposition of a 
recipient country’s 
drivers to react to 
catalytic aid 
Endogenous insti-
tutions and actors 
not predisposed to 
working with aid 
to change politics. 
Endogenous institu-
tions were predis-
posed to working with 
aid so catalysis took 
place at the appropri-
ate time. 
Civil society organi-
sations, political 
parties and endoge-
nous institutions 
agreed to organise 
politics through mul-
ti-party system. 
Selecting appropri-
ate catalyst to 
yield preferential 
transformation 
Cold War ideology 
was the driver of 
ODA. The type of 
politics being 
practised in the 
country did not 
matter. ODA pro-
vided on the basis 
of Cold War was a 
negative catalyst. 
Aid focused on eco-
nomic policy and less 
on political reforms 
until 1991 when it 
influenced transition 
to democracy. 
 Ghana’s current 
adversarial competi-
tive clientelistic 
party system re-
quires ODA that 
would support pro-
motion of accounta-
bility, not budget 
support.  
Ideal catalyst 
would not change 
 Compared with 
the Marshall Plan, 
the rationale for 
aid was very much 
changed by Cold 
War ideology. ODA 
to Ghana did not 
have much of a 
developmental 
objective. 
Foreign aid focused 
more on catalysing 
economic reforms 
than on political re-
forms. 
Multi-party elections 
and good governance 
became the key 
rationale for provid-
ing aid. 
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7.3 Hypothesising Foreign Aid as a Catalyst to 
Development: A New Model 
Comparing what happened during the three phases of Ghana’s devel-
opment trajectory with what could have been possible if other choices 
had been made and other types of policies had been adopted, the argu-
ment is that such an alternative path was blocked by the current political 
settlement that is characterised by competitive clientelism. On the basis 
of lessons learned from the Ghana case study, we can postulate that aid 
is a catalyst to economic and political transformation and development 
in a recipient country under the following four conditions:  
 A substantial part of the aid money is invested in the economically 
productive sectors with the objective of promoting structural 
transformation; 
 prevalence of a political settlement based on a dominant political 
party led by visionary and disciplined leadership;  
 availability of exportable value added products; 
 availability of a professional technocratic bureaucracy. 
7.3.1 Substantial part of ODA invested in the recipient’s 
economically productive sectors  
Aid is a catalyst to economic transformation when a substantial part of 
the money is invested in the productive sectors of the economy. This 
includes agriculture, industry, economic infrastructure and technology. 
On the basis of Ghana’s experience, this could be about 60% of the total 
aid money for it to have any catalytic impact. In Ghana and many devel-
oping countries, ODA should aim at promoting productivity and struc-
tural transformation. Given that a catalyst loses its potency after a period 
of time, both the recipient country and donors would need to consider a 
period during which an alternative catalyst would propel growth. In this 
case, the recipient country would wean itself from ODA and switch to 
commercial private capital to finance development. If this is not done 
and aid continues, it becomes just another input that is added to econo-
my without results. This has been the tragedy of Ghana and many other 
developing countries. 
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7.3.2 A political settlement based on dominant political party 
with strong and visionary leadership  
Ghana needs a democratic developmental regime that can centralise and 
manage rent in productive sectors. For this to occur, the current compet-
itive clientelism and adversarial politics has to change. Ghana needs a 
dominant developmental political settlement where the ruling govern-
ment does not feel threatened with electoral defeat every four years. A 
political settlement that is consensus-based, inclusive and developmental 
in orientation, even if it is patrimonial, would have higher potential to 
catalyse development than competitive adversarial multi-party politics. 
This political path may not conform to the Western liberal democracy 
that Ghana has swallowed hook, line and sinker. The current political 
setup makes it difficult for ruling governments to plan long-term devel-
opment. Experience from Southeast Asia and successful African models 
like Botswana, and recently Rwanda, shows that a dominant party sys-
tem, a disciplined and technocratic bureaucracy, and a deliberately in-
duced structural transformation policy that has backing from the highest 
political level, were instrumental in changing the economies of the coun-
tries (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, 2012; Booth, 2014).  
In addition, a political settlement based on a dominant party would 
need to be complemented by a well-disciplined state bureaucracy and a 
visionary, disciplined and benevolent leadership that would support pro-
ductive investment over the long term; leadership that would empower 
institutions but would also be prepared to change institutions if they did 
not work to promote structural transformation and development. In re-
cent times, the term “benevolent dictator” has been used to describe 
such a leadership (Hillman, 1992; Russell, 2012; Booth and Golooba-
Mutebi, 2012; Matfess, 2015).4 The unresolved question is: what needs to 
be done to ensure that such benevolent dictators do not become outright 
autocrats? Answers to this question are beyond the scope of this thesis.  
7.3.3 Availability of exportable and value added products 
If aid were to be invested in productive sectors, the recipient country 
would have exportable products with forward and backward linkages 
with the local economy. The exportable products would become the cen-
tres around which short-term catalysts work to promote productivity and 
structural transformation. Given a self-disciplined and visionary leader-
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ship supported by a dominant political party that is unlikely to lose pow-
er, the involvement of the state in productive sectors would not be inap-
propriate. In fact, most countries that have successfully transitioned into 
high-income countries have had state patronage towards industry in their 
developmental trajectory. 
7.3.4 Professional technocratic bureaucracy 
Development requires effective planning and implementation; a change 
of attitude from bureaucracy. Given their role in policy formulation and 
implementation, bureaucrats are in a position to design and implement 
economic policies and programmes, but as individuals they also have in-
centives to maintain the status quo if a dysfunctional set-up benefits 
them. A technocratic bureaucracy that is empowered, motivated and self-
disciplined would be needed. Recent studies show that successful devel-
opmental states such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Bot-
swana developed close political ties between politicians and bureaucrats 
on the basis of shared values and agreed policy goals (see Johnson, 1982; 
Evans, 1995; Amsden, 1989; Wade 1990; Charlton, 1991; Leftwich, 
1995). Another important characteristic of such developmental states is 
the power and autonomy of their bureaucracies in the design and imple-
mentation of policies (Leftwich, 1995). Johnson sums up how that works 
in Taiwan: “the politicians reign and the state bureaucrats rule” (John-
son, 1981:12) 
Dasandi’s review of successful developmental states identifies the key 
features of the relationship between bureaucrats and politicians that were 
commonly associated with Botswana and Korea but are missing in Gha-
na:  
A core group of ‘developmental’ senior politicians and bureaucrats who 
work closely together; shared developmental values and vision; shared so-
cial class or educational background; senior bureaucrats who were allowed 
to have significant influence in policy design; bureaucracies that were both 
meritocratic and ‘coherent’—having corporate objectives, values and 
norms that are widely observed; significant movement between senior po-
litical and bureaucratic positions; and bureaucracies that were often sub-
sumed within the dominant political party (Dasandi, 2014:4).  
These features, when they exist in a country, have a high probability 
of promoting the long-term structural transformation that is needed to 
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sustain economic growth and development. For aid to be a catalyst in 
development, this study’s model suggests a number of changes in the 
current aid design—it must aim at promoting structural transformation, 
a sure way to achieve sustained economic growth and development. This 
implies meaningful investments in agricultural productivity and an indus-
trial policy supported by a high degree of political will.  
7.4 Optimism of the Drive to a Future Without Aid in 
Ghana? 
The finances of a typical developing country are generated through two 
streams of financial flows: (i) internally generated revenue through local 
taxes, foreign exchange derived from export of goods and services, re-
mittances from citizens living abroad, and borrowing from citizens and 
commercial banks. (ii) External flows through foreign aid from bilateral 
and multilateral agencies, foreign direct investment and borrowing from 
the international private capital market. As a country develops economi-
cally, internally generated revenue increases to finance the country’s 
budget, and dependence on external support reduces. Over time, a de-
veloping country makes a decision to wean itself from ODA though it 
may borrow or raise funds from the private market. Donors may also 
automatically cut off aid to a developing country because of the recipient 
country’s new economic status, for instance attaining higher middle-
income status, or for other, non-economic reasons. After all, the philos-
ophy of aid is not to keep its role and influence rolling forever. 
Policy actions and inactions pursued by recipient countries on both 
external and internal revenue streams are key contributing factors for 
ending the need for ODA. Two of Africa’s touted countries to have suc-
ceeded in weaning themselves from aid, Botswana and Mauritius, re-
ceived a very high ratio of ODA to GDP at independence. In the case of 
Botswana, ODA continued to rise through the 1980s, peaking at US$ 
120 per capita in 1987, but dropped sharply to US$ 37 in 2012 as a result 
of a sustained period of economic growth. Through fiscal discipline, 
good leadership and sound economic management, Botswana has 
achieved per capita GDP of US$ 15,675 (PPP) in 2013 (World Bank, 
2014). During an interview, a senior economic policy advisor in the Min-
istry of Finance indicated that the Ghana government intends to wean 
itself from aid.  
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Ghana’s economic growth is sustainable without aid. Absolutely. The 
economy is run largely on our national resources. Aid currently represents 
less than 3% of Ghana’s GDP, so it is not the determining factor of the 
economy. Ghana is not the kind of country that depends on aid for its 
budget. So, weaning is not only possible but also that is the way to go. It 
must be our national quest to ensure that we are not dependent on aid. We 
have got a bit of money from oil, it is not huge; we are producing more 
than a million ounce of gold a year; our cocoa production is expanding. 
Therefore, it must be our national policy to wean ourselves off aid. Al-
ready we are at the stage where we will not collapse if we don’t get aid, but 
we must wean off totally (Interview, 29 July 2015).  
However, what basis do we have to suggest that Ghana can wean it-
self from ODA? From the analysis of the three phases, how optimistic 
can one be that Ghana is on a trajectory where it may soon not need 
much foreign aid?  
7.4.1 Expansion and growth of local tax revenue 
Tax revenue in the form of compulsory transfers to the central govern-
ment for public purposes is an indicator for assessing a country’s level of 
liquidity to finance its budget. The majority of the labour force in Ghana 
is in the informal sector, where tax payments are irregular. Expansion of 
tax revenue would demand more collection effort. In 1990, tax revenue 
was 11.4% of GDP, but that reduced to 10.8% in 1992 because of the 
transition to multi-party democracy. Politicians contesting for elections 
do not like to collect taxes from citizens for fear of losing their support. 
Nevertheless, after consolidation of multi-party democracy, revenue col-
lection increased from 2000 to 2005 (during President Kufuor’s first year 
in office). Kufuor’s government plugged tax loopholes, resulting in tax 
revenue being 21.8% of GDP in 2004, making it the fourth-highest in 
Africa, after South Africa, Namibia and Angola. However, it dipped by 
2006 to 12.6%, its lowest in a decade, before it rose again to about 15% 
(see Figure 7.1).  
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Figure 7.1 
Tax revenue as percentage of GDP, 2001-11  
Source: World Bank (Data Base), 2014 
 
For a very long time, Ghana’s tax revenue has covered only 50-60% 
of the total budget. “Tax revenue since the mid 1990s hardly exceeded 
80% of total budgetary revenue, 70% of total domestic expenditures, and 
57% of total expenditures” (CEPA, 2005:2). Foreign aid and domestic 
loans account for the shortfall in tax revenue in order to fully accomplish 
government expenditure.  
The study has shown that foreign aid works directly in shoring up 
Ghana’s foreign exchange needs and indirectly influencing economic 
policy choices. Foreign aid was not significant in terms of volume and 
policy influence during Phase I. However, in Phase II the quantity of aid 
helped to fix Ghana’s foreign exchange needs, stabilised the economy, 
and set macro-economic policy reforms rolling. The impact of the policy 
influence transited into phase III. From 1992 to 2012 ODA though has 
been increasing in absolute amount, as a percentage to GDP has been 
falling. If there is a fall in ODA receipt in a particular year it was because 
of reduction in disbursement arising from sanctions by the IMF/World 
Bank for fiscal indiscipline and not because the government preferred 
less of it. An analysis of Net ODA as a percentage of central government 
expenditure, tax revenue as percentage of GDP, and net ODA as per-
centage of GDP between 2006 and 2011 all indicate a country that is on 
a gradual path on weaning itself from aid. One can easily jump to that 
conclusion and optimism, as there is insignificant amount of reliance on 
aid. At the time of concluding the thesis in 2016, ODA to GNI had 
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dropped to less than 3%. The optimism that Ghana may be able to wean 
from aid is gleaned from the country’s falling ratio of net ODA received 
to central government expenditure (see figure 7.2). This has dropped 
from 68% in 2004 to 21.6% in 2011. 
Figure 7.2 
Net ODA as % of central government expenditure (2001-2011) 
 
Source: World Bank (Data Base), 2014 
 
In 2007 President Kufuor boldly declared Ghana’s withdrawal from 
credit conditionality of the IMF. Looking at the trend of aid flows over 
five decades (1960-2012) there was no reason not to sound optimistic 
about the potentials of Ghana to wean from aid. Ghana has the re-
sources to wean from aid but ruling elites don’t have the commitment to 
do so. The ruling elite believes in aid even if there is no need for it. They 
want aid so they can expand their patronage to the people in order to 
win votes. The competitive clientelistic political settlement as described 
in Chapter six seems to have worsened the effect of patronage politics 
on Ghana’s development.  
Countries that have managed to wean themselves from aid used local 
resources effectively. One of the conditions for effective use of endoge-
nous resources is the integrity of public officers and the prevalence of 
strong institutions. Unfortunately strong institutions are not in abun-
dance in Ghana. Article 103(6) of Ghana’s Constitution gives the Public 
Accounts Committee (PAC) of Parliament the responsibilities to scruti-
nise public accounts but less power to enforce its recommendations. It 
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rather relies on the Attorney-General and Minister of Justice for prose-
cution of cases—the very arm of government that PAC had found cul-
pable to sanctions itself. Several reports of the Parliamentary Committee 
on Public Finance that have found corruption and misuse of public 
funds have not gone up for prosecution. Ruling elites will run to the IMF 
and the World Bank for financial bailout while similar amount from in-
ternal revenue is ‘stolen’, misappropriated and/or mismanaged. Corrup-
tion and mismanagement of local resources combined with patronage-
based competitive clientelistic political settlement are two key impedi-
ments to Ghana’s quest to wean itself from aid. Both provides the need 
to always get extra money wherever it comes from to shore up potential 
shortfall arising from misuse of local resources. There is appetite for 
Ghanaian ruling elite to develop new institutions to check corruption at 
least gleaning from the number of such new organisations5 that have 
been established since 1992 but the political will to provide such institu-
tions the autonomy and power to effectively check corruption is weak. It 
appears that the current political settlement that enables the citizens to 
vote out a ruling political party and bring in an opposition appears inad-
equate to check corruption or promote accountability. 
Apart from institutions, there are other key factors that inhibit Gha-
na’s development — the lack of exemplary leadership. While the ‘West-
ern narrative’ eulogises institutions as key ingredients to development 
(North, 1990), in Ghana and much of Africa, there appears to be over-
exaggerations in the potential transformative power of institutions. This 
is because institutions do not function as ‘invisible hand’ as described in 
the free market economy. In Ghana and much of Africa, leadership 
makes institutions work. The potency of Parliament, the Police, Om-
budsman, Human Rights Commission, Serious Fraud Office (SFO), 
Economic and Organised Crime Office (EOCO), etc. to check corrup-
tion relies on the leadership that is committed to letting these institutions 
work. Leadership has the capacity to suspend institutions including the 
Constitution. Perhaps Ghanaian institutions will need longer time to be-
come independent of the leadership but for sometime to come, exempla-
ry or developmental leadership6 is what is needed to let institutions work. 
And as long as Ghanaian leaders have not been exemplary, there is al-
ways the lingering thought to request for foreign aid. According to many 
of the experts we interviewed a rude awakening that ‘aid is dead’ to bor-
row Moyo’s terminology, is perhaps the surest way Ghana would wean 
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itself from aid but not through voluntary action by governments or poli-
cy makers. This is not because the Ghanaian economy cannot survive 
without aid but because it is not in the interest of governments to volun-
tarily end aid as long as donors continue to provide.  
Ghana can easily wean from aid without encountering economic problems 
if manage own resources efficiently and effectively. Second, Ghana is now 
a middle-income country and as soon as we got to that level, the rules of 
the game changed. Access to certain types of grants begins to dry off. 
…… The idea now is to develop market-oriented tools that will make us 
go to the international market and raise external funds to support our de-
velopment. That is the path Ghana is currently on. The second approach 
is expansion of domestic resource mobilisation through tax collection (In-
terviewed with Senior Policy Advisor at the Ministry of Finance, Accra on 
29/7/15).  
In an interview with President Rawlings to solicit his views about cat-
alytic role of aid in Ghana development and at what point the country 
would find no need to ask for it, this was his response: 
Foreign aid must not be allowed to become a permanent answer to Gha-
na’s economic or social shortfalls. Each loan should be regarded as a step-
ping-stone towards self-generated development. Sadly, many governments 
have failed to seize the opportunity to build upon loan-financed projects 
and have settled for the easier option of asking for more loans indefinitely 
(Response to a questionnaire by President Rawlings in Ghana on 2 Oct 
2015). 
While many policy analysts are optimistic about Ghana weaning itself 
from aid, the Government of Ghana and many development partners do 
not share that optimism anytime soon. As indicated in the Ghana-donors 
compact (2012-2022) document:  
Given the structural imbalances of the economy, an abrupt withdrawal of 
development assistance is likely to undercut the country’s capacity for sus-
tained economic growth and its ability to reduce extreme forms of poverty 
(GoG, 2012: 7).  
With the help of our Development Partners, we have come a long way. 
We will try to reduce our aid dependence over the next 10 years (President 
Mahama, Policy Statement Sept.4, 2012) 
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The President did not sound optimistic about weaning from ODA, 
rather reducing it. In May 2014, amid citizen protests of high cost of liv-
ing and massive corruption in government the President indicated his 
willingness to implement a ‘home-grown’ stabilisation policy than going 
to the IMF for financial bail out. However, in a typical behaviour of an 
African politician, that pledge was not fulfilled and less than three 
months, the President announced going to the IMF. Ghana’s fiscal defi-
cit arose primarily because of expansion of the wage bill in the run up to 
2012 election and rising public debt (IMF, 2015a-b; Institute of Fiscal 
Studies, 2015). In an opinion article ‘Ghana’s fiscal challenges and the 
IMF bailout’, the Executive Director of the Institute of Fiscal Studies 
described Ghana’s bailout with IMF as problematic and stressed that it is 
unrealistic for one to expect that donor funds will flow just because of 
the IMF programme. According to him, “donor partners think there is 
too much corruption and fiscal irresponsibility and until that is changed, 
very little donor funds will come in” (Institute of Fiscal Studies, 2015:2).  
There was an expectation that about US$1.5billion financial bailout 
would flow into the country as a result of the IMF bailout (Quartey, 
2014). But how was it that a country grows at 8% without oil and two 
years after exporting oil goes to the IMF for a bailout? The answer lies in 
corruption and mismanagement of local resources as both donors and 
Ghanaian experts interviewed mentioned several times as key challenges 
the country faces. As long as these two ‘cancerous cells’ are not rooted 
out in the country, there is always the desire of the politicians to need aid 
to replace misused local revenue. Although many of the bilateral and 
multi-lateral donors interviewed expressed concern about corruption in 
the country they seemed unperturbed as a sufficient reason to reduce aid. 
This is because foreign aid is provided for several reasons. Britain gives 
aid to maintain cultural links with Ghana as its former colony. Perhaps 
one of the flaws of the whole aid business is the failure of donors to ex-
plain other rationale for giving and sustaining aid beyond development 
objectives. This argument resonates with some of the experts that com-
mented on the study hypothesis:  
The assumption that aid is only about development in poor countries is 
fundamentally flawed. Aid essentially is an instrument of foreign policy 
that seeks to control and dominate the recipient. (Interview with a social 
commentator and a journalist in Accra on 7/8/15).  
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Based on falling ODA share to Ghana’s GDP and government ex-
penditure, there is compelling reason that technically Ghana’s economy 
can survive without ODA. Ghana has all the resources to wean itself 
from foreign aid. By 2013 ODA had fallen to 2.9% but given that it is 
not in the interest of ruling elite to decouple from it, perhaps donors 
should have taken that initiative unilaterally. As this was not done, for-
eign aid in Ghana has become an end in itself. When the author of this 
current study provided an analogy that ‘A child will not wean itself from 
the mother’s breast milk unless the mother takes the initiative to do so, 
hence it’s time donors pull the plug of providing further aid to Ghana, 
the responses from some of the donors were a bit surprising and indif-
ferent: 
Once Ghana reached the status of a lower-middle income country access 
to specific grants and credit is restricted and interest rate goes up from 
0.75% to 1.25%. That should tell Ghana that it has reached adulthood. But 
am not sure Ghana can wean itself now. Even China still takes money 
from the Bank. Brazil, South Africa, Nigeria all takes money from the 
Bank (Response from a World Bank official during an in-depth interview 
in Accra on 20-08-15).  
Not only EU but also many donors are thinking about exit strategies and 
that is why we are encouraging the government to expand domestic reve-
nue mobilisation. The idea is to empower middle-income countries to 
stand on their own feet and stop sucking the ODA ‘breast milk’. EU has a 
programme to end aid to Ghana by 2020. We are doing this gradually and 
you can see that our support has reduced (Response from EU official dur-
ing an in-depth interview in Accra on 19-08-15).  
 The presence of ODA has created the conditions where the politi-
cian always thinks about its necessity even if there is an indication that 
aid may not be needed. Ghanaian ruling elites are proud to tout how the 
IMF or the World Bank is in partnership with the government as a sign 
of approval instead of thinking about working without aid and using its 
endogenous resources effectively. Studies on South Korea, China, India, 
South Africa, Botswana, Taiwan and Singapore show that they began 
experiencing sustainable growth upon weaning themselves of aid (East-
erly, 2002; Easterly, 2006; Moyo, 2009).  
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7.5 Conclusions on Ghana’s Case Study and Policy 
Implication for Africa 
Ghana represents an ideal country in the developing world and specifi-
cally in Africa to discover the signpost of economic and political trans-
formation if indeed aid is a ‘catalyst to development’. It is an ideal coun-
try because of the country’s head start and vast endogenous resources 
that aid had to work with at the time of independence. As pointed out at 
the beginning of the study, Ghana’s economy was in better shape than 
those of most of its peers. The country had huge foreign reserves, eco-
nomic infrastructure and human resources, which were thought to be the 
best in Africa. Politically, the country had a vibrant multi-party democra-
cy and a cadre of civil service thought to be the best in Africa. According 
to Harbison and Myers’ (1964:45-6) calculation of a composite index of 
human resource development, Ghana was the only country in Africa to 
have attained partially, the status of a developed country.  
The thesis has argued that for a long-term growth and development 
to take place in a country, there must first be political and economic 
structural transformation, of which the process can be facilitated by for-
eign aid. With Ghana’s endogenous resources, a little catalyst or foreign 
support is what was needed to make the country a signpost of develop-
ment. However, the analyses of interactions between foreign aid and en-
dogenous elements of resources, institutions and actors over five dec-
ades in Ghana have revealed intriguing findings to draw the following 
conclusions about the question ‘aid as a catalyst to development?’ 
Foreign aid was a positive catalyst to Ghana’s economic growth and 
policy reforms from 1983 to 1992. Without aid Ghana might have been a 
failed state. Aid enabled the country’s economy to resurrect again after it 
had been ran down by poor economic policies. From 2000 to 2004 when 
Ghana received debt relief (HIPC), aid was also a catalyst as it enabled 
substantial part of debt repayment to be used for supporting poverty al-
leviation programme and enabled the government to start bold econom-
ic programmes involving support to productive sectors. Politically, aid 
was also a catalyst as it influenced reforms in 1992 and sustained the 
transition to full-fledged and tested democracy in 2000s. Then after the 
positive catalysis of foreign aid began to diminish gradually. By 2006 for-
eign aid to economic transformation had lost its catalytic role both in 
relative economic impact and policy influence. This confirms the asser-
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tion that foreign aid can be a catalyst only as a short run measure. Given 
that a catalyst loses its potency if applied on endogenous resources over 
a long period of time unless it is regenerated or totally removed, in the 
case of Ghana; the continuous presence of the catalyst became ineffectu-
al. In other words, there was no need to keep aid flowing into Ghana’s 
economy when its contribution to GNI was less than 5%. Currently 
ODA is less than 3% but ruling elites do not have the courage to end its 
continuous flow because they use it to replace wasted internal revenue 
banking on the fact that aid monies are fungible.  
Given Ghana’s level of economic and political transformation, if for-
eign aid is needed at all, it has to be a different type of aid and not budg-
etary support as currently pertains. The preference for budget support 
among major donors (on the assumption that the modality strengthens 
the recipient country’s ownership of aid) and the rise of competitive cli-
entelism in Ghana combines to provide a potentially toxic cocktail for 
aid effectiveness. Ghana rather needs a technical assistance that will cata-
lyse productivity of the agriculture sector. Nevertheless, solutions to 
Ghana’s long-term structural challenges are internal. Foreign aid can help 
as long as endogenous elements react positively, a condition that can on-
ly be prompted by a change in the current political settlement in the 
country. Without a change in disposition of endogenous drivers, contin-
uous flow of foreign aid becomes just another addition of exogenous 
inputs without substantive impact. In fact its continuous long-term flow 
in Ghana is distractive, as it does not compel ruling elites to think about 
how it can approach productive sectors in ways that would promote 
structural transformation. The findings arising from the analyses show 
that aid has not been a catalyst to investment in productive sectors of the 
country hence the kind of economic transformation led by services, con-
trary to the stylised sequence of agriculture transformation, industrial 
growth and later value added services. In Ghana just as in many African 
countries, the reverse transformation has had negative bearing on devel-
opment.  
The nature of Ghana’s political settlement involving competitive cli-
entelistic politics is a key constraint to the country’s ability to further 
make economic leap expected beyond mere progress. Politics gets in the 
way of economic policy making so much that political expediency be-
tween the two major political parties is the overwhelming consideration 
instead of what may be considered the national interest. The highly 
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competitive nature of the de-facto two party systems has generated an 
institutional culture where ruling elite pursue short-term policies and 
projects that keep them in power at the expense of pursuing long-term 
economic transformation. The current process has promoted an unprec-
edented level of corruption in the history of the nation. Substantial state 
resources are used to maintain the support of members of the ruling 
elite. The competitive nature of politics is further worsened by the win-
ner takes all national Constitution. There is no incentive among the rul-
ing elite to change the current political settlement to promote inclusive-
ness, and given that aid has lost it catalytic influence there is currently no 
exogenous actor with the capacity to promote an ideal framework for 
long-term development of the country.  
Through various neo-liberal policies there is a false perception among 
ruling elites and policy actors in the country that the business of the state 
is not to engage in direct production of tradable goods but to leave that 
to the private sector. In the absence of the state in production and the 
private sector’s inability to commandeer the necessary capacity to lead 
economic transformation, the Ghanaian economy has become more of 
consumptive than productive. This suggests that building a modern and 
effective developmental state devoid of adversarial competitive clientelis-
tic politics as currently pertain in the country will be essential. To achieve 
that goal, a change in political settlement would be needed along the 
models presented earlier in section 7.3. That includes dominant political 
party and visionary and developmental leadership.  
Aid has enabled Ghana to achieve short-term degree of economic re-
covery and stability even if there are occasional macro-economic instabil-
ities. It has also supported political transformation. But one can conclude 
that both economic and political stability are taking place in a dysfunc-
tional institutional and structural set-up (a political settlement) that 
would continue to constrain further progress. The findings of the study 
gravitate towards a conclusion that foreign aid works as a bandage that 
enables a short-term treatment of wounds but does not cure it. For a 
cure to occur it needs applications of medications that do not treat 
symptoms but tackles the bacterial in the wound. When a bandage is ap-
plied on a wound for a long time, it exacerbates the conditions that ena-
ble microorganisms to thrive and unlikely to heal. This is the situation 
with aid in Ghana. Its continuous flow has led to no positive reaction 
from endogenous institutions and actors. And there is limited extent to 
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which foreign aid can induce development of new endogenous institu-
tions. It is absolutely essential for donors to recognise that the develop-
ment of a developmental political settlement like the one that is currently 
taking place in Rwanda can be achieved only through dynamic internal 
processes. The middle-income status that Ghana has achieved is a trigger 
for donors to begin to withdraw ODA. The Ghana-donors compact 
(2012-2022) does not suggest a specific year that ODA will cease but on-
ly indicated ‘less aid’. With current decline of ODA, donors may follow 
through their promise of gradual withdrawal but that remains to be seen. 
If the motive of aid is more than just facilitating development, then there 
is always a factor that would compel donors to regenerate a catalyst even 
when it may not be needed. 
Reflecting on the role that aid played in the economy of Ghana, one 
cannot ignore including economic transformation as an important goal 
that it must strive to catalyse if its developmental objectives in Africa is 
to make sense. Using aid to provide infrastructure is least complicated. 
But for aid to catalyse long-term structural transformation in Africa, do-
nors must support both productivity increase in the agriculture sector 
and industrial policies. With majority of the population in the agriculture 
sector, this can trigger structural transformation. This is what Africa 
needs to propel it to inclusive growth beyond the current narrative of 
‘African Rising’. Ironically multi-lateral and bilateral donors are interest-
ed in making short-term interventions so they can claim credit for im-
mediate success. As a former Minister of Finance rightly put it in an in-
terview “donors can’t put their signpost in a remote agriculture farm 
because nobody will see it. Investment in long-term productive sector is 
not their interest”. But if productive sector investment proposition is not 
in the interest of donors or not the core objectives of development aid, 
then it is unlikely that it can be called a catalyst to development in Africa. 
The focus of ODA in the promotion of ‘investment climate’ (changes in 
trade, regulatory, and labour market policies) in the area of productive 
sector is perhaps not what Africa needs compared to direct investment 
in increasing productivity and job created sectors.  
There is no doubt that Africa needs structural transformation to be 
able to make the developmental leap. But that will happen when endog-
enous actors especially ruling elites make vital decisions to invest national 
resources into productive sectors. Continuous prevalence of poverty, 
underemployment, and informalisation are symptoms of poor structural 
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transformation that have taken place in Africa. Shimeles 2014 shows that 
in Africa close to 54% of poverty is in the agriculture sector. What has 
happened to Africa contrasts sharply with development in Asia and the 
developed world where rapid poverty reduction and job creation was 
preceded by economic structural transformation involving increased in 
the productivity of the agriculture sector and movement of labour to 
manufacturing industries and services (Henley, 2010; Breisinger and Di-
ao, 2008; Dorosh and Mellor, 2013; Losch et al., 2012).  
7.6 Future Research  
The findings of this study call for a follow up research on two issues: 
First, the need to test the model presented earlier on the four conditions 
under which aid can be a catalyst. This study analysed interactions be-
tween foreign aid and a number of endogenous drivers to economic and 
political transformation in Ghana. Based on the findings of the Ghana-
ian study, we hypothesise that aid is a catalyst to development when (i) 
substantial part of it is invested in the respondent’s economic productive 
sectors with the objective of promoting structural transformation; (ii) the 
recipient country has a visionary and disciplinary leadership that is sup-
ported by a dominant political party (c) the recipient country has export-
able value added products and finally (d) there is a professional and 
technocratic bureaucracy in the recipient country. A future study to ex-
pand our understanding on the conditions under which aid is a catalyst 
will benefit from testing these variables in other countries in Africa. 
Second, the catalytic effect of aid appears to be positive if considered 
as a short-run exogenous input. The study indicated that aid to Ghana 
should have been cut off when its contribution to GDP reached less 
than 5% and the catalytic effect began to wane. Based on Ghana’s find-
ings the study concludes that positive catalytic effect of aid is a short run 
phenomenon. Hence aid needs not be kept flowing into a recipient 
country for a long time. But how is short-run defined, ten, twenty or 
thirty years? Over what time period might catalysis occur, when does 
foreign aid reach optimum catalytic level in a country’s economy beyond 
which further flows is detrimental? Can a large N study models the op-
timum level? Future research could undertake this study so it can provide 
countries and donors some time frame to consider weaning off.  
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Notes 
 
1 Ghana needed to build a cohesive nation-state at independence, with a strong 
central government, so socialism was necessary to some extent. This might 
have actually helped to avert civil war. 
2 State patronage refers to a government providing substantial financial support 
to private and pseudo-public corporations involved in economic activities. 
3 A number of experts interviewed opined that the counterfactual is always dif-
ficult to prove and that other factors had also been in play in successful econ-
omies. For instance, the physical proximity of Mexico to the USA had helped 
that country, and the location of Malaysia and South Korea had helped those 
two countries through the “flying geese” phenomenon. 
4 A benevolent dictator is a leader who uses his/her power for the benefit of a 
nation, and not self-aggrandisement or for the benefit of the few. He or she 
could allow for some democratic decisions, but ultimately the benevolent dicta-
tor prevails in determining the direction and governance of the country. 
5 Anti corruption institutions include the Serious Fraud Office (SFO), Econom-
ic and Organised Crime Office (EOCO), Commission for Human Right and 
Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) 
6 Note the thsis does not go into analysis of how developmental leadership may 
come about. For more discussion on leadership see Developmental Leadership 
Programme http://www.dlprog.org. 
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Annex 1  
Sample of Semi-Structured Questionnaire 
My name is Joana Vondee, a Ghanaian PhD student at the international In-
stitute of Social Studies of Erasmus University in the Netherlands. I’m cur-
rently collecting data & information on my research, which is about catalytic 
role of foreign aid to Ghana’s economic and political transformation in 
three epochs (1957-82; 83-92; 93 to date). My research hypothesises that 
‘foreign aid’ as financial and technical assistance to Ghana is a catalyst that 
works effectively through endogenous drivers (institutions, actors, struc-
tures). Without the needed endogenous drivers aid will be ineffective in its 
objectives of promoting development. While reviewing literature and also 
talking to people your name has been cited/mentioned as someone I need 
to talk to. I would appreciate very much if you could allow me to solicit 
your views on some of the aspects of my study. 
Questionnaire for Researchers/Academics 
1. What are your views on foreign aid as a catalyst to a country’s devel-
opment and not a prime mover of development? 
2. Apart from the quantitative nature of foreign aid (external financial 
support) and policy influence, what other ways is foreign aid seen (or 
can be seen) as a catalyst in a country’s economic and political trans-
formation and development and how is that a catalyst?  
3. In what ways do foreign aid systems (mode of delivery, actors involved, 
their power, negotiation and influence, conditionalities, etc.) become a 
negative/positive catalyst in a recipient country like Ghana?  
4. A catalyst needs endogenous substances to work with (in this case the 
recipient country’s institutions, available resources, political regimes, 
the people, leadership, etc.). With your experience in Ghana which en-
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dogenous factors are key to making aid a positive catalyst in the coun-
try, how is that factor crucial? 
5. How has the government and aid interacted to facilitate policies that 
aim at transforming Ghana’s economy? 
6. Can you share your experience generally on different time periods 
where you think aid was a positive and or negative catalyst to Ghana’s 
political and economic transformation?  
a. Phase 1: 1957-1981 
b. Phase 2: 1982-1991 
c. Phase 3: 1992-2013 
7. A catalyst does not change but aid has changed over the years. With 
reference to changes that have taken place in the world (end of coloni-
sation; end of cold war; the campaign to make poverty history and 
MDGs; economic recession in OECD-DAC; the rise of China, etc. 
which of these factors made foreign aid more or less a catalyst to de-
velopment in Ghana, and why? 
Questionnaire for Civil Society (NGOs, Think tanks, opinion leaders and 
activists) 
1. What are your views on foreign aid as a catalyst (positive/negative) to 
Ghana’s development in these three time periods? (Choose the periods 
that you’re familiar with) 
a. Phase 1: 1957-1981 
b. Phase 2: 1982-1991 
c. Phase 3: 1992-2013 
2. A catalyst needs endogenous substances to work with (in this case the 
recipient country’s institutions, political regimes, culture, leadership, 
private sector, civil society organisations, etc.). With your experience in 
Ghana which endogenous factors are key to making aid a posi-
tive/negative catalyst, how is that factor crucial? 
3. Can you share your experience generally the roles that civil society has 
played on different time periods to make foreign aid a positive or nega-
tive catalyst to Ghana’s political and economic transformation?  
a. Phase 1: 1957-1981 
b. Phase 2: 1982-1991 
c. Phase 3: 1992-2013 
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4. With reference to changes that have taken place in the world (end of 
colonisation; end of cold war; the campaign to make poverty history 
and MDGs; economic recession in OECD-DAC; the rise of China, etc. 
which of these factors made foreign aid more or less a catalyst to de-
velopment in Ghana, and why? 
5. Can Ghana continue its economic and political transformation without 
aid? 
6. What is your view that aid money must support productive sectors (ag-
riculture and industry) more than social sector if aid is to promote eco-
nomic transformation in Ghana? 
7. Can you please share experience regarding civil society interactions 
with Ghanaian political regimes, state bureaucracy, and donors on spe-
cific foreign aid? How was the aid negotiation, what were the outcomes 
and how do you characterise the nature of that aid as a catalyst (posi-
tive/negative)?  
8. With reference to changes that have taken place in the world (end of 
colonisation; end of cold war; the campaign to make poverty history 
and MDGs; economic recession in OECD-DAC; the rise of China, etc. 
which of these factors made foreign aid more or less a catalyst to de-
velopment in Ghana, and why? 
Questionnaire for Donors (multilateral and bilateral) 
1. What are your views on foreign aid as a catalyst to a country’s devel-
opment and not a prime mover of development? 
2. What role did foreign aid from your country/agency play in Ghana’s 
three phases of economic development? (Choose the time period that 
you’re familiar with) 
a. Phase 1: 1957-1981 
b. Phase 2: 1982-1991 
c. Phase 3: 1992-2013  
3. What role did foreign aid from your country/agency play in Ghana’s 
political transformation in these three phases? 
a. Phase 1: 1957-1981 
b. Phase 2: 1982-1991 
c. Phase 3: 1992-2013 
4. A catalyst needs endogenous substances to work with (in this case 
Ghana’s  
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a. Actors: state/government bureaucrats, leadership, media, entre-
preneurs, civil societies and the private sector  
b. Institutions: Politics and party system, Culture, rule of law  
c. Structures: production system, geographical location, natural and 
human resources, economic and social structure  
5. With your experience in Ghana which endogenous factors are key to 
making aid a positive catalyst (facilitator) in the country, how are those 
factors crucial, how have they reacted (positively or negatively)? 
6. How has your aid delivery changed over the three phases/periods of 
Ghana’s devt? 
7. Comparing Ghana to other countries in Africa what factors have made 
aid effective/ineffective? 
8. To what extent can Ghana continue its economic and political trans-
formation without aid? 
9. What is your view that aid money must support productive sectors (ag-
riculture and industry) more than social sector if aid is to promote eco-
nomic transformation in the recipient country like Ghana? 
10. Apart from financial support and policy influence, what other way is 
foreign aid seen (or can be seen) as a catalyst in Ghana and how is that 
a catalyst?  
11. Can you please share experience regarding aid processes interactions 
with Ghanaian political regimes, the private sector, civil society organi-
sations, and state administration?  
12. With reference to changes that have taken place in the world (end of 
colonisation; end of cold war; the campaign to make poverty history 
and MDGs; economic recession in OECD-DAC; the rise of China, etc. 
which of these factors made foreign aid more or less a catalyst to de-
velopment in Ghana, and why? 
 
Questionnaire for Government Officials  
1. What are your views on foreign aid as a catalyst to Ghana’s develop-
ment and not a prime mover of development? 
2. Can you share your experience generally on different time periods 
where you think aid was a positive and or negative catalyst to Ghana’s 
political and economic transformation? (Choose the period that you’re 
familiar with)  
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a. Phase 1: 1957-1981 
b. Phase 2: 1982-1991 
c. Phase 3: 1992-2013 
3. A catalyst needs endogenous substances to work with (in this case the 
country’s institutions, available resources, political regimes, leadership, 
etc.). In Ghana which endogenous factors are key to making aid a posi-
tive catalyst, how is that factor crucial? 
4. Which area of Ghana’s economy has foreign aid played a catalytic role? 
(for example diversification, agriculture, manufacturing, etc.) 
5. How has aid played a catalytic role to improve the opportunities for 
private investment in the country? 
6. What are some of major projects in agriculture and industry has foreign 
aid supported? (funded by which financial institutions or agencies)?  
7. How has aid influenced policies and governance of the present gov-
ernment? 
8. To what extent can Ghana continue pursue her development path 
without foreign aid?  
9. Can you share experiences where the government disagrees with do-
nors and what were the final compromises? 
10. With reference to changes that have taken place in the world (end of 
colonisation; end of cold war; the campaign to make poverty history 
and MDGs; economic recession in OECD-DAC; the rise of China, etc. 
which of these factors made foreign aid more or less a catalyst to de-
velopment in Ghana, and why? 
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Annex 2 
List of Institutions and Position of Interviewees 
Actor/ 
Institutions 
Name of  organisation Position
Government Office of  the Head of  
Civil Service 
Head of  Civil Service 
Ministry of  Finance and 
Economic Planning 
Director Economic 
Research and Forecasting 
Division  
Ministry of  Finance and 
Economic Planning 
Foreign Aid/loans officer  
Ministry Finance and 
Economic Planning 
Head of  Mobilisation Unit 
NDPC Chairman
Donors
 
World Bank Snr Country Operation 
officer 
World Bank Communications Officer 
IMF Technical Advisor and 
Consultant	
European Union 
(Ghana) 
Head, Macro Econ and 
Trade Section 
Secretary Finance 
Danida 
 
Aid and Development Snr 
Officer. 
 
DFID Governance and Project 
Support Unit 
Norwegian Senior Programme Manager	
USAID Senior Programme Officer	
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Civil Society/ 
Academics/ 
Thinks Tanks 
Institute of  Economic 
Affairs (IEA) 
Institute of  Democratic 
Governance (IDEG)  
1
Africa Center for 
Economic Transition 
(ACET) 
1
Third World Network 
Africa (TWN) 
1
ActionAid 1
ODI 1
UN-WIDER 1
Academics Univ. of  Gh, ISSER Head of  Department 	
Individuals  Former Finance Minister 
(Phase III) 
Former Finance Minister 
(Phase II) 
Former 
Regimes 
 President of  Ghana from 
1979- 2000 1st and 2nd Phase 
(Dual transition)	
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